Catherine A. Salmon and Todd K. Shackelford (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195320510
- eISBN:
- 9780199786800
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195320510.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
Kinship ties — the close relationships found within the family — have been a central focus of evolutionary biological analyses of social behavior ever since biologist William Hamilton extended the ...
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Kinship ties — the close relationships found within the family — have been a central focus of evolutionary biological analyses of social behavior ever since biologist William Hamilton extended the concept of Darwinian fitness to include an individual's actions benefiting not only his own offspring, but also collateral kin. Evolutionary biologists consider organisms not only reproductive strategists, but also nepotistic strategists. If a person's genes are just as likely to be reproduced in her sister as in her daughter, then we should expect the evolution of sororal investment in the same way as one expects maternal investment. This concept has revolutionized biologists' understanding of social interaction and developmental psychologists' understanding of the family. However, kinship ties have largely been ignored in other areas of psychology, particularly social psychology. This book illustrates the ways in which an evolutionary perspective can inform our study and understanding of family relationships. It is argued that family psychology is relationship specific: the relationship between mother and daughter is different from that between father and daughter or that between brother and sister or sister and sister. In other words, humans have evolved specialized mechanisms for processing information and motivating behavior that deal with the distinct demands of being a mate, father, mother, sibling, child, or grandparent. Such an evolutionary perspective on family dynamics provides a unique insight into human behavior.Less
Kinship ties — the close relationships found within the family — have been a central focus of evolutionary biological analyses of social behavior ever since biologist William Hamilton extended the concept of Darwinian fitness to include an individual's actions benefiting not only his own offspring, but also collateral kin. Evolutionary biologists consider organisms not only reproductive strategists, but also nepotistic strategists. If a person's genes are just as likely to be reproduced in her sister as in her daughter, then we should expect the evolution of sororal investment in the same way as one expects maternal investment. This concept has revolutionized biologists' understanding of social interaction and developmental psychologists' understanding of the family. However, kinship ties have largely been ignored in other areas of psychology, particularly social psychology. This book illustrates the ways in which an evolutionary perspective can inform our study and understanding of family relationships. It is argued that family psychology is relationship specific: the relationship between mother and daughter is different from that between father and daughter or that between brother and sister or sister and sister. In other words, humans have evolved specialized mechanisms for processing information and motivating behavior that deal with the distinct demands of being a mate, father, mother, sibling, child, or grandparent. Such an evolutionary perspective on family dynamics provides a unique insight into human behavior.
Peter Carruthers
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199207077
- eISBN:
- 9780191708909
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207077.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter lays out the main arguments supporting massive modularity and explicates the notion of ‘module’ that those arguments support (which is significantly weaker than on Fodor’s influential ...
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This chapter lays out the main arguments supporting massive modularity and explicates the notion of ‘module’ that those arguments support (which is significantly weaker than on Fodor’s influential account). It argues that modularity is a property of biological systems quite generally, and of animal minds in particular. It also defends the viability of evolutionary psychology as a scientific research program. The chapter criticizes Fodor’s argument that encapsulated forms of modularity are a requirement of computational tractability, arguing that the latter can be assured through the use of various kinds of cognitive heuristic.Less
This chapter lays out the main arguments supporting massive modularity and explicates the notion of ‘module’ that those arguments support (which is significantly weaker than on Fodor’s influential account). It argues that modularity is a property of biological systems quite generally, and of animal minds in particular. It also defends the viability of evolutionary psychology as a scientific research program. The chapter criticizes Fodor’s argument that encapsulated forms of modularity are a requirement of computational tractability, arguing that the latter can be assured through the use of various kinds of cognitive heuristic.
Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence, and Stephen Stich (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195310139
- eISBN:
- 9780199871209
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195310139.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book is the second of a three-volume set on the subject of innateness. The book is highly interdisciplinary, and addresses such question as: to what extent are mature cognitive capacities a ...
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This book is the second of a three-volume set on the subject of innateness. The book is highly interdisciplinary, and addresses such question as: to what extent are mature cognitive capacities a reflection of particular cultures and to what extent are they a product of innate elements? How do innate elements interact with culture to achieve mature cognitive capacities? How do minds generate and shape cultures? How are cultures processed by minds?Less
This book is the second of a three-volume set on the subject of innateness. The book is highly interdisciplinary, and addresses such question as: to what extent are mature cognitive capacities a reflection of particular cultures and to what extent are they a product of innate elements? How do innate elements interact with culture to achieve mature cognitive capacities? How do minds generate and shape cultures? How are cultures processed by minds?
Rick Rylance
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198122838
- eISBN:
- 9780191671555
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198122838.003.0008
- Subject:
- Literature, 19th-century and Victorian Literature
Of all the shifts in psychological opinion in the period covered by this book, probably the most far-reaching was the remodeling of it in the light of evolutionary theories. The evolutionary paradigm ...
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Of all the shifts in psychological opinion in the period covered by this book, probably the most far-reaching was the remodeling of it in the light of evolutionary theories. The evolutionary paradigm placed the mind in the general analysis of nature and the biological functions. This chapter examines the development of ‘materialist’, evolutionary psychological theory in the work of one of its leading writers, Herbert Spencer, in detail and in context. Spencer's new psychology, launched in 1855, was portrayed by both radicals and conservatives as marking a fresh and strikingly original turn in the development of psychological theory. The first section describes the changes in models of the mind in the second half of the nineteenth century. The second section discusses Spencer's psychology from associationism to evolutionary theory. The third examines the varying responses to psychological theory. The last section discusses epistemology and evolutionary psychology.Less
Of all the shifts in psychological opinion in the period covered by this book, probably the most far-reaching was the remodeling of it in the light of evolutionary theories. The evolutionary paradigm placed the mind in the general analysis of nature and the biological functions. This chapter examines the development of ‘materialist’, evolutionary psychological theory in the work of one of its leading writers, Herbert Spencer, in detail and in context. Spencer's new psychology, launched in 1855, was portrayed by both radicals and conservatives as marking a fresh and strikingly original turn in the development of psychological theory. The first section describes the changes in models of the mind in the second half of the nineteenth century. The second section discusses Spencer's psychology from associationism to evolutionary theory. The third examines the varying responses to psychological theory. The last section discusses epistemology and evolutionary psychology.
Richard Samuels, Stephen Stich, and Michael Bishop
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199733477
- eISBN:
- 9780199949823
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199733477.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter argues that much of the dispute between evolutionary psychologists and those in the heuristics and biases tradition is itself an illusion. The fireworks generated by each side focusing ...
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This chapter argues that much of the dispute between evolutionary psychologists and those in the heuristics and biases tradition is itself an illusion. The fireworks generated by each side focusing on the rhetorical excesses of the other have distracted attention from what is, in fact, an emerging consensus about the scope and limits of human rationality and about the cognitive architecture that supports it. The central goal of this chapter is to refocus the discussion away from the rhetoric of the debate between evolutionary psychology and the heuristics and biases tradition and toward this emerging consensus on fundamental points. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the two research programs and explains the core claims and the rhetorical excesses on both sides. Section 3 argues that it is implausible to maintain that either research program rejects the core claims of the other. Once this is accomplished the illusion that evolutionary psychology and the heuristics and biases tradition have a deep disagreement about how rational human beings are should disappear. This is not to say, however, that there are no genuine disagreements between these two research programs. Section 4 briefly outlines and discusses some genuine disagreements between evolutionary psychology and the heuristics and biases tradition.Less
This chapter argues that much of the dispute between evolutionary psychologists and those in the heuristics and biases tradition is itself an illusion. The fireworks generated by each side focusing on the rhetorical excesses of the other have distracted attention from what is, in fact, an emerging consensus about the scope and limits of human rationality and about the cognitive architecture that supports it. The central goal of this chapter is to refocus the discussion away from the rhetoric of the debate between evolutionary psychology and the heuristics and biases tradition and toward this emerging consensus on fundamental points. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the two research programs and explains the core claims and the rhetorical excesses on both sides. Section 3 argues that it is implausible to maintain that either research program rejects the core claims of the other. Once this is accomplished the illusion that evolutionary psychology and the heuristics and biases tradition have a deep disagreement about how rational human beings are should disappear. This is not to say, however, that there are no genuine disagreements between these two research programs. Section 4 briefly outlines and discusses some genuine disagreements between evolutionary psychology and the heuristics and biases tradition.
Jerome H. Barkow (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- April 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195130027
- eISBN:
- 9780199893874
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195130027.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Evolutionary Psychology
Sociologists and social and cultural anthropologists have largely missed a major intellectual revolution of our time: the application to our own species of the Darwinian framework that has been ...
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Sociologists and social and cultural anthropologists have largely missed a major intellectual revolution of our time: the application to our own species of the Darwinian framework that has been spectacularly successful in explaining the behaviors and societies of every other species in the natural world. This volume demonstrates the utility of the evolutionary approach for the social sciences, while discussing the confusions and unfounded fears that have in the past made this scientific perspective seem so controversial. Our evolved psychology is foundational for fields ranging from feminism to criminology, an insight obscured by the endemic speciesism that has led the social sciences to nearly miss the revolution.Less
Sociologists and social and cultural anthropologists have largely missed a major intellectual revolution of our time: the application to our own species of the Darwinian framework that has been spectacularly successful in explaining the behaviors and societies of every other species in the natural world. This volume demonstrates the utility of the evolutionary approach for the social sciences, while discussing the confusions and unfounded fears that have in the past made this scientific perspective seem so controversial. Our evolved psychology is foundational for fields ranging from feminism to criminology, an insight obscured by the endemic speciesism that has led the social sciences to nearly miss the revolution.
Leif Edward Ottesen Kennair
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195372090
- eISBN:
- 9780199893485
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195372090.003.0016
- Subject:
- Psychology, Evolutionary Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter considers how an evolutionary psychology approach may assist in the development of a scientifically based, general definition of psychopathology, as well as help integrate the disparate ...
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This chapter considers how an evolutionary psychology approach may assist in the development of a scientifically based, general definition of psychopathology, as well as help integrate the disparate field of evolutionary psychopathology. The latter goal will require changes to mainstream evolutionary psychological theory so that it will encompass the major phenomena and symptoms of psychopathology. These changes are discussed. In so doing, the chapter focuses on psychopathology in general and how an evolutionary psychology approach may provide the theoretical foundation for defining the nature of mental disorders. Throughout the chapter gives examples from different mental disorders which are used to illustrate general principles.Less
This chapter considers how an evolutionary psychology approach may assist in the development of a scientifically based, general definition of psychopathology, as well as help integrate the disparate field of evolutionary psychopathology. The latter goal will require changes to mainstream evolutionary psychological theory so that it will encompass the major phenomena and symptoms of psychopathology. These changes are discussed. In so doing, the chapter focuses on psychopathology in general and how an evolutionary psychology approach may provide the theoretical foundation for defining the nature of mental disorders. Throughout the chapter gives examples from different mental disorders which are used to illustrate general principles.
Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195310139
- eISBN:
- 9780199871209
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195310139.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Culture has fundamentally changed the nature of human evolution because it creates a novel evolutionary tradeoff. Social learning allows human populations to rapidly evolve accumulate cultural ...
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Culture has fundamentally changed the nature of human evolution because it creates a novel evolutionary tradeoff. Social learning allows human populations to rapidly evolve accumulate cultural evolution of highly adaptive culturally transmitted behaviors. However, to get the benefits of social learning, humans have to be credulous, for the most part accepting the ways that they observe in their society as sensible and proper; such credulity opens up human minds to the spread of maladaptive beliefs. These costs can be reduced by tinkering with our evolved psychology, but they cannot be eliminated without losing the adaptive benefits of cumulative cultural evolution. The classic nature-nurture controversy neglects the processes of gene-culture coevolution. An evolutionary psychology lacking an account of this fundamental tradeoff cannot successfully explain human evolution.Less
Culture has fundamentally changed the nature of human evolution because it creates a novel evolutionary tradeoff. Social learning allows human populations to rapidly evolve accumulate cultural evolution of highly adaptive culturally transmitted behaviors. However, to get the benefits of social learning, humans have to be credulous, for the most part accepting the ways that they observe in their society as sensible and proper; such credulity opens up human minds to the spread of maladaptive beliefs. These costs can be reduced by tinkering with our evolved psychology, but they cannot be eliminated without losing the adaptive benefits of cumulative cultural evolution. The classic nature-nurture controversy neglects the processes of gene-culture coevolution. An evolutionary psychology lacking an account of this fundamental tradeoff cannot successfully explain human evolution.
John Dupré
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199284214
- eISBN:
- 9780191700286
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284214.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Charles Darwin transformed our understanding of the universe and our place in it with his development of the theory of evolution. One hundred and fifty years later, we are still puzzling over the ...
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Charles Darwin transformed our understanding of the universe and our place in it with his development of the theory of evolution. One hundred and fifty years later, we are still puzzling over the implications. This book presents an introduction to evolution and what it means for our view of humanity, the natural world, and religion. The author explains the right and the wrong ways to understand evolution: in the latter category fall most of the claims of evolutionary psychology, of which the author gives a withering critique. He shows why the theory of evolution is one of the most important scientific ideas of all time, but makes clear that it cannot explain everything — contrary to widespread popular belief, it has very little to tell us about the details of human nature and human behaviour, such as language, culture, and sexuality.Less
Charles Darwin transformed our understanding of the universe and our place in it with his development of the theory of evolution. One hundred and fifty years later, we are still puzzling over the implications. This book presents an introduction to evolution and what it means for our view of humanity, the natural world, and religion. The author explains the right and the wrong ways to understand evolution: in the latter category fall most of the claims of evolutionary psychology, of which the author gives a withering critique. He shows why the theory of evolution is one of the most important scientific ideas of all time, but makes clear that it cannot explain everything — contrary to widespread popular belief, it has very little to tell us about the details of human nature and human behaviour, such as language, culture, and sexuality.
Tom Simpson, Stephen Stich, Peter Carruthers, and Stephen Laurence
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195310139
- eISBN:
- 9780199871209
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195310139.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter provides a brief history of some of the theoretical strands that form the backdrop to contemporary debates among nativists about the evolutionary and cognitive underpinnings of culture, ...
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This chapter provides a brief history of some of the theoretical strands that form the backdrop to contemporary debates among nativists about the evolutionary and cognitive underpinnings of culture, and the ways that culture shapes the mind. Summaries of the contents of each of the chapters in the volume are also provided.Less
This chapter provides a brief history of some of the theoretical strands that form the backdrop to contemporary debates among nativists about the evolutionary and cognitive underpinnings of culture, and the ways that culture shapes the mind. Summaries of the contents of each of the chapters in the volume are also provided.
Edward O. Wilson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195310726
- eISBN:
- 9780199785179
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195310726.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
Edward O. Wilson is a public intellectual and the best-selling author of On Human Nature, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, Biophilia, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge, and many other books. Wilson ...
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Edward O. Wilson is a public intellectual and the best-selling author of On Human Nature, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, Biophilia, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge, and many other books. Wilson is also a world authority on ants. In 1990, in collaboration with the German biologist Bert Hölldobler, Wilson published the Pulitzer prize-winning The Ants, a massive work of 732 beautifully illustrated pages. Moving beyond ants, he has expanded into the study of social insects, social animals, and human beings. Wilson is also known as an environmentalist and for his work in evolutionary psychology.Less
Edward O. Wilson is a public intellectual and the best-selling author of On Human Nature, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, Biophilia, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge, and many other books. Wilson is also a world authority on ants. In 1990, in collaboration with the German biologist Bert Hölldobler, Wilson published the Pulitzer prize-winning The Ants, a massive work of 732 beautifully illustrated pages. Moving beyond ants, he has expanded into the study of social insects, social animals, and human beings. Wilson is also known as an environmentalist and for his work in evolutionary psychology.
John Dupré
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199248063
- eISBN:
- 9780191597367
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199248060.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This book applies to the study of human nature the generally pluralistic metaphysics and methodology developed in the author's earlier work. It begins with detailed criticism of two popular projects ...
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This book applies to the study of human nature the generally pluralistic metaphysics and methodology developed in the author's earlier work. It begins with detailed criticism of two popular projects for understanding human nature, evolutionary psychology, and rational‐choice theory. The argument shows how the flaws in these projects reflect deep misconceptions about the nature and the legitimate ambitions of science. Such scientific theories necessarily provide highly simplified accounts of a phenomenon as complex as human nature and can provide only a small part of the total picture of such a phenomenon. Only a pluralistic approach, an approach that combines insights from a variety of perspectives not limited to the scientific, can hope to provide anything close to an adequate account of human nature. In addition to a variety of partial perspectives from science, the humanities, and, not least, common human experience, it is argued that there is also room for a conception of human autonomy. The details of this conception, including a sketch of a novel voluntarist theory of freedom of the will, are provided in a concluding chapter.Less
This book applies to the study of human nature the generally pluralistic metaphysics and methodology developed in the author's earlier work. It begins with detailed criticism of two popular projects for understanding human nature, evolutionary psychology, and rational‐choice theory. The argument shows how the flaws in these projects reflect deep misconceptions about the nature and the legitimate ambitions of science. Such scientific theories necessarily provide highly simplified accounts of a phenomenon as complex as human nature and can provide only a small part of the total picture of such a phenomenon. Only a pluralistic approach, an approach that combines insights from a variety of perspectives not limited to the scientific, can hope to provide anything close to an adequate account of human nature. In addition to a variety of partial perspectives from science, the humanities, and, not least, common human experience, it is argued that there is also room for a conception of human autonomy. The details of this conception, including a sketch of a novel voluntarist theory of freedom of the will, are provided in a concluding chapter.
John Dupré
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199691982
- eISBN:
- 9780191738111
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691982.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter takes up a theme from earlier work, the critique of Evolutionary Psychology. The chapter focuses on one central claim of Evolutionary Psychology, that the crucial human cognitive ...
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This chapter takes up a theme from earlier work, the critique of Evolutionary Psychology. The chapter focuses on one central claim of Evolutionary Psychology, that the crucial human cognitive mechanisms evolved in the Pleistocene, two million years or so prior to the appearance of human civilization. Drawing on the critiques of neo-Darwinism described in Chapter 9, it is argued that the theory is based on an obsolete view of the evolutionary process. A wider view of evolutionary processes, including cultural evolution, suggests that significant evolutionary changes are likely to have taken place in the last few millennia.Less
This chapter takes up a theme from earlier work, the critique of Evolutionary Psychology. The chapter focuses on one central claim of Evolutionary Psychology, that the crucial human cognitive mechanisms evolved in the Pleistocene, two million years or so prior to the appearance of human civilization. Drawing on the critiques of neo-Darwinism described in Chapter 9, it is argued that the theory is based on an obsolete view of the evolutionary process. A wider view of evolutionary processes, including cultural evolution, suggests that significant evolutionary changes are likely to have taken place in the last few millennia.
Gillian Barker
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780231171885
- eISBN:
- 9780231540391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231171885.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Evolutionary psychologists have argued that evolved human nature sets strict limits on what kinds of human society are possible--in particular, that attempts to overcome racism, gender inequity, ...
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Evolutionary psychologists have argued that evolved human nature sets strict limits on what kinds of human society are possible--in particular, that attempts to overcome racism, gender inequity, social inequality, and violence are bound to fail and should be given up. This book will counter their claims, arguing that these thinkers are drawing on unstated and questionable assumptions about both facts and values in reaching their conclusions, and that recent results from evolutionary biology, developmental biology and social psychology support a revised view of human nature that permits much greater optimism about the prospects for social change.Less
Evolutionary psychologists have argued that evolved human nature sets strict limits on what kinds of human society are possible--in particular, that attempts to overcome racism, gender inequity, social inequality, and violence are bound to fail and should be given up. This book will counter their claims, arguing that these thinkers are drawing on unstated and questionable assumptions about both facts and values in reaching their conclusions, and that recent results from evolutionary biology, developmental biology and social psychology support a revised view of human nature that permits much greater optimism about the prospects for social change.
Anne Campbell
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- April 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195130027
- eISBN:
- 9780199893874
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195130027.003.0002
- Subject:
- Psychology, Evolutionary Psychology
For many feminists in the social sciences, evolutionary psychologists are still seen as the enemy. The disagreement is not about the desirability of social change, but about where the causes of ...
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For many feminists in the social sciences, evolutionary psychologists are still seen as the enemy. The disagreement is not about the desirability of social change, but about where the causes of gender differences can be found. Unlike social constructionists, evolutionary psychologists accept that beliefs reside in the mind and not just in discourse and language. Traditional empirical method may not be perfect but it has the advantage of being a self-correcting system. Liberal feminists identify causes that are proximate and external but ultimately incompatible with a mass of empirical research. To acknowledge the impact of culture is not the same as saying that gender has no biological basis and that the nature of men and women is wholly constructed by society. Many social science feminists reject the notion that evolution could have had an impact on the minds of the two sexes. Reductionism allows us to work toward the truth by first decomposing the explanation into its constituent elements, which span the range from the biological to cultural. But let us remove all constraints from women and see whether evolutionary psychologists are right in expecting a dearth of massive change in the choices women make.Less
For many feminists in the social sciences, evolutionary psychologists are still seen as the enemy. The disagreement is not about the desirability of social change, but about where the causes of gender differences can be found. Unlike social constructionists, evolutionary psychologists accept that beliefs reside in the mind and not just in discourse and language. Traditional empirical method may not be perfect but it has the advantage of being a self-correcting system. Liberal feminists identify causes that are proximate and external but ultimately incompatible with a mass of empirical research. To acknowledge the impact of culture is not the same as saying that gender has no biological basis and that the nature of men and women is wholly constructed by society. Many social science feminists reject the notion that evolution could have had an impact on the minds of the two sexes. Reductionism allows us to work toward the truth by first decomposing the explanation into its constituent elements, which span the range from the biological to cultural. But let us remove all constraints from women and see whether evolutionary psychologists are right in expecting a dearth of massive change in the choices women make.
Robert C. Fuller
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195369175
- eISBN:
- 9780199871186
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195369175.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This chapter explores the leverage that the body exerts on humanity's propensity toward religion. Recent research in the emotions, neurobiology, sexuality, pain, and the chemical components of ...
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This chapter explores the leverage that the body exerts on humanity's propensity toward religion. Recent research in the emotions, neurobiology, sexuality, pain, and the chemical components of thought or feeling all shed light on the varieties of human spirituality. Studying religion “in the flesh” furnishes a new set of critical terms that bring a fully interdisciplinary perspective to bear on understanding the most elusive forms of embodied experience.Less
This chapter explores the leverage that the body exerts on humanity's propensity toward religion. Recent research in the emotions, neurobiology, sexuality, pain, and the chemical components of thought or feeling all shed light on the varieties of human spirituality. Studying religion “in the flesh” furnishes a new set of critical terms that bring a fully interdisciplinary perspective to bear on understanding the most elusive forms of embodied experience.
Todd Tremlin
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195305340
- eISBN:
- 9780199784721
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195305345.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter presents an overview of the development and architecture of the human brain, and shows what evolutionary history has to do with the nature of cognition today. Drawing on the perspectives ...
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This chapter presents an overview of the development and architecture of the human brain, and shows what evolutionary history has to do with the nature of cognition today. Drawing on the perspectives and techniques of evolutionary psychology, it pursues the following questions: (1) Given our ancestral world, what kinds of mental structures and functions should we expect to find in the brain, and do we? and (2) What roles do mental structures and functions formed in the Pleistocene world continue to play in “modern” minds? In the course of the discussion, it also outlines contemporary models of the mind — from the “blank slate” view to the idea of massive modularity — and surveys the range of intuitive knowledge (e.g., intuitive biology, intuitive physics, and intuitive psychology) and innate cognitive processes that both shape and constrain human thought.Less
This chapter presents an overview of the development and architecture of the human brain, and shows what evolutionary history has to do with the nature of cognition today. Drawing on the perspectives and techniques of evolutionary psychology, it pursues the following questions: (1) Given our ancestral world, what kinds of mental structures and functions should we expect to find in the brain, and do we? and (2) What roles do mental structures and functions formed in the Pleistocene world continue to play in “modern” minds? In the course of the discussion, it also outlines contemporary models of the mind — from the “blank slate” view to the idea of massive modularity — and surveys the range of intuitive knowledge (e.g., intuitive biology, intuitive physics, and intuitive psychology) and innate cognitive processes that both shape and constrain human thought.
Peter Carruthers
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195310139
- eISBN:
- 9780199871209
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195310139.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter investigates the extent to which claims of massive modular organization of the mind (espoused by some members of the evolutionary psychology research program) are consistent with the ...
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This chapter investigates the extent to which claims of massive modular organization of the mind (espoused by some members of the evolutionary psychology research program) are consistent with the main elements of the simple heuristics research program. A number of potential sources of conflict between the two programs are investigated and defused. However, the simple heuristics program turns out to undermine one of the main arguments offered in support of massive modularity, at least as the latter is generally understood by philosophers. So one result of the argument will be to force us to re-examine the way in which the notion of modularity in cognitive science should best be characterized, if the thesis of massive modularity isn't to be abandoned altogether. What is at stake in this discussion is whether there is a well-motivated notion of “module”, such that we have good reason to think that the human mind must be massively modular in its organization. It is argued that there is.Less
This chapter investigates the extent to which claims of massive modular organization of the mind (espoused by some members of the evolutionary psychology research program) are consistent with the main elements of the simple heuristics research program. A number of potential sources of conflict between the two programs are investigated and defused. However, the simple heuristics program turns out to undermine one of the main arguments offered in support of massive modularity, at least as the latter is generally understood by philosophers. So one result of the argument will be to force us to re-examine the way in which the notion of modularity in cognitive science should best be characterized, if the thesis of massive modularity isn't to be abandoned altogether. What is at stake in this discussion is whether there is a well-motivated notion of “module”, such that we have good reason to think that the human mind must be massively modular in its organization. It is argued that there is.
Kim Sterelny
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195310139
- eISBN:
- 9780199871209
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195310139.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter argues that much human decision-making has a high cognitive load, that is, agents make satisfying decisions only by accessing and effectively using information that is hard to get, ...
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This chapter argues that much human decision-making has a high cognitive load, that is, agents make satisfying decisions only by accessing and effectively using information that is hard to get, interpret, or both. When the type of information needed for good decision-making is predictable over evolutionarily significant time frames, there is likely to be a modular explanation of its intelligent use. When the environment is stable in the right way, natural selection can pre-equip agents to register the relevant information and use it efficiently. But human environments are variable, and as a consequence there are many high-cognitive-load problems that we face whose informational requirements are not stable over evolutionary time. This chapter argues that our capacity to respond successfully to these novel problems depends on two other evolved strategies. The first is informational niche construction. Informational engineering is an ancient feature of human lifeways, and it is argued that human minds are adapted to this social transmission of information. The second strategy is less sensitive to the pace of change. Most obviously, we store information in the environment. This too is an ancient feature of human lifeways. Human minds are adapted not just to relatively invariant features of human environments, but also to changeable ones. Adaptive action in the face of novel challenges depends on some combination of informational niche construction and epistemic technology.Less
This chapter argues that much human decision-making has a high cognitive load, that is, agents make satisfying decisions only by accessing and effectively using information that is hard to get, interpret, or both. When the type of information needed for good decision-making is predictable over evolutionarily significant time frames, there is likely to be a modular explanation of its intelligent use. When the environment is stable in the right way, natural selection can pre-equip agents to register the relevant information and use it efficiently. But human environments are variable, and as a consequence there are many high-cognitive-load problems that we face whose informational requirements are not stable over evolutionary time. This chapter argues that our capacity to respond successfully to these novel problems depends on two other evolved strategies. The first is informational niche construction. Informational engineering is an ancient feature of human lifeways, and it is argued that human minds are adapted to this social transmission of information. The second strategy is less sensitive to the pace of change. Most obviously, we store information in the environment. This too is an ancient feature of human lifeways. Human minds are adapted not just to relatively invariant features of human environments, but also to changeable ones. Adaptive action in the face of novel challenges depends on some combination of informational niche construction and epistemic technology.
Robert Kurzban and Martie G. Haselton
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- April 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195130027
- eISBN:
- 9780199893874
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195130027.003.0005
- Subject:
- Psychology, Evolutionary Psychology
Debates should move past mischaracterizations and toward a discussion of genuine issues of contention. In order for fruitful debates to occur, all parties will need to agree that evolutionary ...
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Debates should move past mischaracterizations and toward a discussion of genuine issues of contention. In order for fruitful debates to occur, all parties will need to agree that evolutionary psychologists already argue the following: (i) the environment is extremely important to any organism's development; (ii) organisms have parts that are not adaptations, but by-products or noise; (iii) hypotheses that do not yield new insights are not useful; (iv) there are multiple levels of explanation for any given phenomenon; and that (v) claims for adaptation require support, usually in the form of evidence of special design.Less
Debates should move past mischaracterizations and toward a discussion of genuine issues of contention. In order for fruitful debates to occur, all parties will need to agree that evolutionary psychologists already argue the following: (i) the environment is extremely important to any organism's development; (ii) organisms have parts that are not adaptations, but by-products or noise; (iii) hypotheses that do not yield new insights are not useful; (iv) there are multiple levels of explanation for any given phenomenon; and that (v) claims for adaptation require support, usually in the form of evidence of special design.
