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Answering the Evolutionary Debunkers

Erik J. Wielenberg

in Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
November 2014
ISBN:
9780198714323
eISBN:
9780191782725
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714323.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter expands the account of moral knowledge presented in Chapter 3 to respond to evolutionary debunking arguments presented by Michael Ruse, Sharon Street, and Richard Joyce. It ends with a ... More


Against Minimalist Responses to Moral Debunking Arguments

Daniel Z. Korman and Dustin Locke

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
August 2020
ISBN:
9780198859512
eISBN:
9780191891861
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198859512.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

Moral debunking arguments are meant to show that, by realist lights, moral beliefs are not explained by moral facts, which in turn is meant to show that they lack some significant counterfactual ... More


Why There is No Darwinian Dilemma for Ethical Realism

William J. FitzPatrick

in Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
August 2014
ISBN:
9780199669776
eISBN:
9780191778650
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669776.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion

This chapter provides a realist response to Street’s ‘Darwinian Dilemma’ and to evolutionary debunking arguments more generally, showing that there is in fact no such dilemma for ethical realism and ... More


No Coincidence?*

Matthew Bedke

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 9

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
June 2014
ISBN:
9780198709299
eISBN:
9780191781056
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198709299.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

The literature is now full of etiological debunking arguments for normative beliefs. This chapter focuses on those arguments that target varieties of normative realism and charge that alignment ... More


Street’s Meta-Ethical Constructivism

Derek Parfit

in On What Matters: Volume Three

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
December 2017
ISBN:
9780198778608
eISBN:
9780191853487
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198778608.003.0015
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter considers an evolutionary debunking argument, which states that, because our normative beliefs were greatly influenced by natural selection, these beliefs were caused in ways that were ... More


Epistemological Advantages

Amie L. Thomasson

in Norms and Necessity

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
July 2020
ISBN:
9780190098193
eISBN:
9780190098223
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190098193.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter argues that accepting modal normativism brings significant epistemological advantages. Those who aim to account for modal knowledge face the integration challenge of reconciling an ... More


Parfit on Objectivity and “The Profoundest Problem of Ethics”

Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer

in Does Anything Really Matter?: Essays on Parfit on Objectivity

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
March 2017
ISBN:
9780199653836
eISBN:
9780191823916
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653836.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Parfit, like Sidgwick, believes that there are objective normative reasons. Yet Sidgwick found himself unable, in The Methods of Ethics, to put ethics on a rational basis. Reason points, he thought, ... More


The General Argument from Intuition

Robert C. Koons

in Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God: The Plantinga Project

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
September 2018
ISBN:
9780190842215
eISBN:
9780190874445
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190842215.003.0015
Subject:
Religion, Theology

Argument Q, the seventeenth argument in Plantinga’s battery, concerns the problem of explaining how we can take seriously our capacity for intuition in such areas as logic, arithmetic, morality, and ... More


Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Rethink It

Sharon Street

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics: 11

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
September 2016
ISBN:
9780198784647
eISBN:
9780191828775
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198784647.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter accepts for the sake of argument Ronald Dworkin’s point that the only viable form of normative skepticism is internal, and develops an internal skeptical argument directed specifically ... More


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