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This book traces a complex of issues surrounding moral agency from Kant through Schelling to Kierkegaard. There are two complementary projects. The first is to clarify the contours of German idealism as a philosophical movement by examining the motivations not only of its beginning, but also of its end. In tracing the motivations for the transition to mid-19th century post-idealism to Schelling’s middle and late periods and, ultimately, back to a problem originally presented in Kant, it shows the causes of the demise of that movement to be the same as the causes of its rise. In the process, it presents the most detailed discussion to date of the moral psychology and moral epistemology of Schelling’s work after 1809. The second project — which is simply the first viewed from a different angle — is to trace the sources of Kierkegaard’s theory of agency and his criticism of philosophical ethics to this same complex of issues in Kant and post-Kantian idealism. In the process, it is argued that Schelling’s influence on Kierkegaard was greater than has been thought, and builds a new understanding of Kierkegaard’s project in his pseudonymous works on the basis of this revised picture of their historical background.

This book aims at clarifying what Christians mean when they call Christ ‘our Redeemer’. That entails asking: How did the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus transform humanity's relationship with God? How can such past events of redemption work, both here and now and in the future, to save human beings and their world? The book also takes up the issue of the beneficiaries of this redeeming ‘work’. Why do human beings need redemption, both individually and collectively? A further central question bears on the appropriate image of God for a biblically based interpretation of redemption. The heart of the book is the discussion of three pervasive approaches to redemption: as liberation from evil, as cleansing from built, and as the transforming power of love. This work argues for the divine love as the primary interpretative key for a Christian doctrine of salvation—both for human beings and the universe.

This book assesses the worth of arguments for and against the existence of God. Evidence confirms (makes more probable) an explanatory hypothesis in so far as (1) given the hypothesis the evidence is to be expected, that is the hypothesis makes the evidence probable, (2) the evidence is not otherwise to be expected, (3) the hypothesis is simple, and (4) it fits with background knowledge (i.e., knowledge about how things behave in neighbouring fields of enquiry). When we are assessing hypotheses (such as theism, the hypothesis that there is a God) purporting to explain everything, there will be no background knowledge. Theism is a very simple hypothesis. If there is a God, there is some reason to expect that he will create a universe, with laws of nature, leading to the evolution of humans (bodies connected to souls), who often have experiences which seem to them experiences of God. It is most improbable that all this evidence would exist if there was no God. Taken together therefore all this evidence makes it probable that there is a God. The occurrence of evil, whether produced by humans or natural processes, does not significantly diminish that probability.

This book contains in eight chapters the revised text of eight Gifford lectures, which were delivered at the University of St Andrews in 2003. The problem of evil may be formulated as a question addressed to theists: why would an all-powerful and benevolent God permit the existence of vast amounts of truly horrible suffering? Many reflective people are convinced that this question has no answer. The reasons that underlie this conviction can be formulated as an argument for the non-existence of God, the so-called argument from evil: if there were a God, he would not permit the existence of vast amounts of truly horrible suffering; since such suffering exists, there is no God. The examination of the problem of evil in these chapters is largely an examination of the argument from evil, which the author of the book regards as a paradigmatically philosophical argument. The conclusion of the main argument of the chapters (which takes the form of a debate centred on the ‘free-will defence’) is that the argument from evil is, like most philosophical arguments, a failure. The following topics receive special attention: the concept of God; success and failure in philosophical argument; versions of the argument from evil that depend on the vast amount of evil in the world and versions of the argument that depend on a particular evil, such as the Holocaust; the free-will defence; animal suffering; and the problem of the hiddenness of God.

Recent sociological studies have confirmed the persistence of profound internal challenges to the continuity of Judaism as a religion and to the Jews as a people. These challenges are eroding the foundations of Jewish identity and are threatening the authenticity of Judaism as a historical living faith-tradition. This work “makes the case” for a return to Jewish theology as a means of restoring Jewish authenticity and for reversing self-destructive trends. After identifying and critiquing various “substitute faiths” embraced by many contemporary Jews in Chapters One and Two, the nature and goals of Jewish theology are examined (Chapter Three). Rather than depicting theology as “faith seeking understanding,” the chapters that follow present a comprehensive theology of Judaism, deeply rooted in classical Jewish texts, and an understanding of theology as “faith seeking meaning (Chapter Four). Rather than portraying theology, as often has been the case, as a systematic creed imposed from without, theology is presented here as an outcome of the dialogue between an individual's quest for meaning and the spiritual and intellectual resources of a historical faith-tradition—in this case, Judaism. Features of faith such as living in a covenantal relationship (Chapter Five), seeking a rendezvous with God in the self, the sacred word, the world, and the sacred and ethical deed, are offered as paths to individual meaning and to creating one's life as a work of art (Chapter Six), despite the challenges of evil and absurdity encountered in daily experience (Chapters Seven and Eight).

To create a possible world is to actualize it strongly or weakly. A world is prime if God can create it and he cannot create a world better than it. This book's conclusions include: (1) If there is at least one prime world, then if God does create some world he will create one of them. (2) If there are no prime worlds, then it does not follow that God does not exist. Instead, what follows is that if God creates a world he will create one that is good enough, despite the fact that he could create a world which is better. (3) These conclusions do not give rise to a good objection to theism, based on the apparent fact that the actual world is improvable, and is not good enough. (4) Even if there is a best world, or several equal‐best worlds, God cannot create any of them. (5) A good partial theodicy for evil can be provided, appealing to goods bound up with human free will, moral responsibility, and the roles of individuals' own personal traits in shaping their own and other people's lives. The partial theodicy is neutral between theological compatibilism and libertarianism. (6) The problem of evil does not provide a very strong objection to the existence of God.

The problem of evil remains a perennial challenge to theistic belief. However, one aspect of this challenge has been largely unexplored by theists — the problem of non-human animal pain and suffering. This problem has become even more vexing in the last century as theists have come to accept that non-human animals capable of pain and suffering have inhabited the earth for hundreds of millions of years, struggling to survive in the face of disease, deprivation, and predation. Evil of this sort might not be especially problematic if standard theodices offered by theists could be applied here as well. Unfortunately, those explanations seem impotent in this domain. This book explores the special challenge to theism raised by non-human animals pain and suffering and explores four broad-ranging explanations aimed at responding to the challenge.

In the twentieth century, many thinkers have put forward theories that purport to explain the motivations underlying the violent behavior of human beings. This book presents Kierkegaard's thought as offering a way of interpreting violent behavior that is superior to the alternatives. The basic elements of Kierkegaard's psychology are drawn out of his published and unpublished works, concentrating on The Concept of Anxiety, Works of Love, and The Sickness unto Death. Violence, most fundamentally, arises out of human resistance to the possibility of psychological change and growth into maturity. Violence toward others seeks to fend off that potential for otherness within oneself that is entailed by the incompleteness of creation. Kierkegaard's theory of violence is compared and contrasted with Rene Girard's theory, and both thinkers are brought into conversation with Karl Barth and Eric Voegelin. Anabaptism's approach to interpreting the history of Christian violence is taken into consideration. Hitler and Stalin, as key contemporary examples of demonic violence, are analyzed in connection with Kierkegaard's aesthetic and ethical spheres of existence. The book closes with reflections on the Christian doctrine of atonement in light of the preceding discussion of the roots of human evil.

The existence of evil has given rise to perplexed questioning of divine justice from the beginning of recorded history. The present volume examines early responses to the problem of theodicy in Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Syria-Palestine as a way of assessing modern approaches to existential and religious crises. Through close readings of many texts in the Hebrew Bible and comparison with treatments in extrabiblical literature, it explores the richly diverse legacy of those who have influenced the West in so many ways. That legacy ranges from denying that a problem exists—the atheistic answer—to positing a vulnerable deity who assumes full responsibility for evil and its eradication. Between those two poles are responses that attempt to spread the blame, assuming a multiplicity of deities, a single rival deity (the personification of all evil), or a solitary deity who is somehow constrained, either by limited power and knowledge or by a split personality that struggles to balance the conflicting demands of justice and mercy. Analogies from parenting, jurisprudence, and the cult offer responses of discipline, retribution, and substitutionary atonement, respectively. Two final responses acquiesce to injustice in the present life, anticipating rectification beyond the grave or acknowledging human ignorance in the face of divine mystery. The limitation articulated by the last response requires that even the effort to provide a theodicy be questioned, especially given the fact that mortals have already received from the deity the greatest gift of all: life. Still, the search for answers is bound to continue, for it is only in challenging belief that theological discourse retains its integrity.

This book is a response to the growing disenchantment in the Western world with contemporary life. It provides rationally justified answers to questions about the meaning of life, the basis of morality, the contingencies of human lives, the prevalence of evil, the nature and extent of human responsibility, and the sources of values we prize. It offers a realistic view of the human condition that rejects both facile optimism and gloomy pessimism; acknowledges that we are vulnerable to contingencies we cannot fully control; defends a humanistic understanding of our condition; recognizes that the values worth pursuing are plural, often conflicting, and that there are many reasonable conceptions of well‐being. It emphasizes the importance of facing the fact that man's inhumanity to man is widespread. It rejects as simple‐minded both the view that human nature is basically good and that it is basically bad, and argues that our well‐being depends on coping with the complex truth that human nature is basically complicated. It argues that the scheme of things is indifferent to our fortunes and that we can rely only on our own resources to make what we can of our lives.

On May 21‐23, 2010, philosophers, family and friends gathered at the University of Notre Dame to celebrate the career and retirement of Alvin Plantinga, widely recognized as one of the world’s leading figures in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Plantinga has earned particular respect within the community of Christian philosophers for the pivotal role that he played in the recent renewal and development of philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. Each of the essays in this volume engages with some particular aspect of Plantinga’s views on metaphysics, epistemology, or philosophy of religion. Contributors include Michael Bergman, Ernest Sosa, Trenton Merricks, Richard Otte, Peter VanInwagen, Thomas P. Flint, Eleonore Stump, Dean Zimmerman, and Nicholas Wolterstorff. We include responses to each essay by Bas van Fraassen, Stephen Wykstra, David VanderLaan, Robin Collins, Raymond VanArragon, E. J. Coffman, Thomas Crisp and Donald Smith.

Can those who appreciate the explanatory power of modern science still believe in traditional religious accounts of the nature and purpose of the universe? This book is intended for those who care about that question and are dissatisfied with the rigid dichotomies that dominate the contemporary debate. The extremists won’t be interested – those who assume that science answers all the questions that matter, and those so certain of their religious faith that dialogue with science, philosophy, or other faith traditions seems unnecessary. But far more people today recognize that matters of faith are complex, that doubt is endemic to belief, and that dialogue is indispensable in our day. In eight probing chapters, the authors of The Predicament of Belief consider the most urgent reasons for doubting that religious claims – in particular, those embedded in the Christian tradition – are likely to be true. They develop a version of Christian faith that preserves the tradition’s core insights but also gauges the varying degrees of certainty with which those insights can still be affirmed. Along the way, they address such questions as the ultimate origin of the universe, the existence of innocent suffering, the challenge of religious plurality, and how to understand the extraordinary claim that an ancient teacher rose from the dead. They end with a discussion of what their conclusions imply about the present state and future structure of churches and other communities in which Christian affirmations are made.

At a time in which probability theory is exerting an unprecedented influence on epistemology and philosophy of science, promising to deliver an exact and unified foundation for the philosophy of rational inference and decision-making, it is worth remembering that the philosophy of religion has long proven to be an extremely fertile ground for the application of probabilistic thinking to traditional epistemological debates. This book offers a representative sample of the work currently being carried out in this potentially rich field of inquiry. Grouped into five sections, the chapters span a broad range of traditional issues in religious epistemology. The first three sections discuss the evidential impact of various considerations that have been thought to have a bearing on the question of the existence of God. These include witness reports of the occurrence of miraculous events, the existence of complex biological adaptations, the apparent ‘fine-tuning’ for life of various physical constants and the existence of seemingly unnecessary evil. The fourth section addresses a number of issues raised by Pascal’s famous pragmatic argument for theistic belief. A final section offers probabilistic perspectives on the rationality of faith and the epistemic significance of religious disagreement.

This book offers an in-depth study of Saint Thomas Aquinas's thoughts on God and evil, revealing that Aquinas's thinking about God and evil can be traced through his metaphysical philosophy, his thoughts on God and creation, and his writings about Christian revelation and the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. The book first gives an introduction to Aquinas's philosophical theology, as well as a nuanced analysis of the ways in which Aquinas's writings have been considered over time. For hundreds of years scholars have argued that Aquinas's views on God and evil were original and different from those of his contemporaries. The book shows that Aquinas's views were by modern standards very original, but that in their historical context they were more traditional than many scholars since have realized. The book also provides insight into what we can learn from Aquinas's philosophy.

This book deconstructs and reconstructs the fortunate Fall (felix culpa) theme of Western thought, using Kierkegaard as a guide. Dating back to the fifth century Easter Eve Mass, the claim that Adam's Fall might be considered “fortunate” in light of a resultant good has become Christianity's most controversial and unwieldy idea. Whereas the phrase originally praised sin as a backhanded witness to the ineffability of redemption, modern speculative theodicy came to understand all evil as comprehensible, historically productive, and therefore fortunate, while the Romantic poets celebrated transgression for bolstering individual creativity and spiritedness. This book traces Kierkegaard's blunt critique of Idealism's justification of evil, as well as his playful deconstruction of Romantic celebrations of sin. The book argues, however, that Kierkegaard also resists the moralization of evil, preferring to consider temptation and sin as determinative dimensions of religious existence. At least in relation to the assumed “innocence” of Christendom's cultured Christians, the self-conscious sinner might be the better religious witness. Although the book shows how Kierkegaard finally replaces actual sin with human fragility, temptation, and the possibility of spiritual offense as that which “happily” shapes religious faith, it also argues that his understanding of “fortunate fallibility” is at least as rhetorically compelling and theologically operative as talk of a “fortunate Fall.” Together, Kierkegaard's playful maneuvers and this book's thematizations carve rhetorical space for Christian theologians to speak of sin in ways that are more particular and peculiar than the typical discourses of Church and culture.

Unless he has very strong reason for supposing that there is a God, a theist needs a theodicy (or at least needs to begin to develop one) in order justifiably to believe that there is a God. Part 2 of this book describes the good goals that God might be seeking to produce in his Universe—beauty; creatures having knowledge (in a largely internalist sense), having their good desires satisfied, with a free will to do actions that promote each others’ well‐being, being of use to others, and worshipping God. Part 3 shows how the possibility of moral evil, and the actual occurrence of natural evil (providing knowledge of possible good and bad actions, and the scope for good response) are necessary to secure these ends. God has the right to allow some creatures to suffer for the benefit of others, so long as he compensates them in this life or after death. The expected value of allowing the evils in order to achieve the good goals is positive.

This book explores the foundations of religious commitment in the domains of metaphysics/epistemology and the ethical. Throughout, the book takes a literary (rather than philosophical) approach to theology that nevertheless makes room for philosophical exploration of religion. The book rejects the usual picture of religious life sitting atop a metaphysical foundation, in need of epistemological justification.

Is it ever possible for people to act freely and intentionally against their better judgement? Is it ever possible to act in opposition to one's strongest desire? If either of these questions are answered in the negative, the common-sense distinctions between recklessness, weakness of will and compulsion collapse. This would threaten our ordinary notion of self-control and undermine our practice of holding each other responsible for moral failure. So a clear and plausible account of how weakness of will and self-control are possible is of great practical significance. Taking the problem of weakness of will as her starting point, Jeanette Kennett builds an admirably comprehensive and integrated account of moral agency which gives a central place to the capacity for self-control. Her account of the exercise and limits of self-control vindicates the common-sense distinction between weakness of will and compulsion and so underwrites our ordinary allocations of moral responsibility. She addresses with clarity and insight a range of important topics in moral psychology, such as the nature of valuing and desiring, conceptions of virtue, moral conflict, and the varieties of recklessness (here characterised as culpable bad judgement) — and does so in terms which make their relations to each other and to the challenges of real life obvious. Agency and Responsibility concludes by testing the accounts developed of self-control, moral failure, and moral responsibility against the hard cases provided by acts of extreme evil.