Search Results

This chapter develops the basic metaphysics of agent causation. The author analyzes causal notions generally in terms of the notion of ’causal power’ or ’causal capacity.’ The difference between event (or broadly mechanistic) causation and agent (or personal) causation concerns the way in which causal capacities are exercised. With event causation, the capacity to generate a particular effect (in some cases, from a range of possible effects) is exercised ’as a matter of course’: having the capacity in the right circumstances directly gives rise to what is either its unique characteristic effect or one of the effects within its characteristic range. By contrast, having the properties that subserve an agent‐causal capacity doesn’t produce an effect; rather, it enables the agent to freely determine an effect (within a circumscribed range).

This chapter addresses the metaphysics of free and responsible agency. Most theorists today presuppose a theory of causation according to which causes and effects are events of one kind or other (“event causation”), and human action is no different. A smaller group, almost exclusively composed of incompatibilists — those who deny that freedom and determinism are compatible — adopt a theory according to which the causes of human action are agents (“agent causation”), and not simply events involving them. This chapter presents a theory of responsibility that is compatible with either sort of theory of causation, and argues that there are distinct advantages to the latter, especially when we adopt a version that does not single out a kind of causation for human action that differs from the kind of causation found elsewhere in the world. The view set out provides a new way of looking at the long-running debate about agent causation and the metaphysics of freedom more generally.

Our belief that we have free will is based on our many and varied experiences of reliably moving our minds and bodies in the ways we try to move them, and on our belief that we are always, or almost always, able to try. It is argued that these experiences and beliefs are neutral with respect to determinism and the details of the truth about the causal relation and causal relata. Some philosophers argue that we are free and morally responsible agents only if determinism is false and we cause our choices in some way that does not consist in event causation; this is called ‘agent-causation’. The metaphysics of agent-causation is investigated. It is argued that insofar as we have reason to think that agent-causation is possible, we have reason to believe it is compatible with strict deterministic laws.

Examining the relation that has to obtain between an agent and an event for the latter to be an action attributed to the agent, Davidson shows there are no grammatical tests of agency: action verbs sometimes leave it open whether the action was done intentionally or not, as in ‘he fell’. He offers an alternative definition by which someone is the agent of an act if what he does can be described under an aspect that makes it intentional; this leaves the relation between the act and its agent intact regardless of how these are described. As this still requires illumination of what makes an action intentional, Davidson invokes causal terms familiar from Essay 1: an action counts as intentional if the agent (his beliefs and desires) caused it. However, this had better not straightforwardly reduce to ordinary event causation lest all causal effects of my actions are invariably attributed to my agency; this is called the ‘accord on effect’ by which causal transitivity makes for transfer of agency.

Davidson therefore sharply distinguishes ‘primitive actions’ (those mostly having to do with bodily action) from their ‘unintended begettings’ and concludes that the former, for which I can solely be attributed agency, are ‘the only actions there are’: while primitive actions allow re‐descriptions that may include their causal consequences it is mistaken to infer that the consequences themselves are included in the described action.

The psychological literature on causation includes a variety of proposed analyses of causal relations: simple correlation, mental models, causal powers, etc. Each of these proposals is subject to everyday counterexamples. Correlation accounts confuse intervention with conditioning and yield statistical jokes; mental models fail to capture conditional information; races and voting present difficulties for causal power theories, as do existing philosophical accounts of causal relations among events.

Libertarian accounts of free will face the objection that they are liable to leave our decisions and actions with no explanation whatever for their existence. To counter this objection some libertarians invoke a concept of agent causation, whereby agents are held to confer existence on their own decisions and actions. This chapter argues that, construed as operations of existence conferral, neither agent nor event causation can be given a coherent account. Rather, God’s action as primary cause is alone responsible for the existence of all that has being. The chapter argues further that God’s action as primary cause does not interfere with any legitimate condition of responsible free will.

This essay develops the theory of action presupposed by Buddhist Reductionists. Their account uses the theory of two truths to reconcile the folk theory of human action with the Buddhist claim that there are no agents. The conventional truth has it that persons are substance-causes of actions, and the willings that trigger actions are exercises of a person’s powers in light of their reasons. According to the ultimate truth, there are no persons, only causal series of bundles of tropes. An action is a bodily or mental event in one such series that has the occurrence of a prior intention event as its cause. Facts about causally connected psychophysical elements explain the utility, and thus the conventional truth, of claims about persons as agents. This two-tier account of human agency makes possible a novel approach to making attributions of moral responsibility compatible with psychological determinism.

In order to allow for contrast with Anselm’s theory, this chapter begins by outlining the two main contemporary libertarian positions: event-causation as represented by Robert Kane and agent-causation as represented by Timothy O’Connor and Randolph Clark. Then the chapter describes Anselm’s motivation for constructing his parsimonious agent-causal theory, noting the similarity to Kane’s motivation. Explaining Anselm’s motivation provides an example of the suggested methodology of emphasizing the worldview in which his theory is rooted. Then the chapter begins to set out the elements which Anselm will use to develop his theory of free choice by examining the three meanings he gives for the term voluntas (will); there is will as instrument, will as affectio (motivation or desire depending on the context) and will as use. This sets the stage for presenting his theory in Chapter 3.

This paper starts by considering an interesting argument of H. A. Prichard’s against the view that to act is to cause a change; the argument is that causing is not an activity. The argument is important because of the recent emergence of an ‘agent-causation’ view according to which actions are the causing of changes by agents. The author suggests a way of responding to Prichard’s argument, and then, profiting from one of his own conclusions, turns to consider the relation between neurophysiological changes and the causation of bodily movement by the agent. The paper makes a suggestion about the proper way to understand the relation between the neurophysiological changes, the bodily movements and the action.

Libertarian accounts of free will face the objection that they are liable to leave our decisions and actions with no explanation for their existence given the presence of luck. To counter this objection, some libertarians invoke a concept of agent-causation, whereby agents are held to confer existence on their own decisions and actions. The author of this essay, Hugh J. McCann, argues that, construed as operations of existence conferral, neither agent- nor event-causation can be given a coherent account. Rather, God’s action as primary cause alone is responsible for the existence of all that has being. The writer argues further that God’s action as primary cause does not interfere with any legitimate condition of responsibility.