Michael Moore
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199599493
- eISBN:
- 9780191594649
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599493.003.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
This chapter develops a theory of what a theory of and area of law, criminal law included, should look like. It describes what kind of thing an area of law might be, and previews the book's ...
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This chapter develops a theory of what a theory of and area of law, criminal law included, should look like. It describes what kind of thing an area of law might be, and previews the book's conclusions as to the correct views on these matters. Three different kinds of kinds are distinguished as possible for areas of law such as criminal law: nominal kinds, natural kinds, and functional kinds. Three different kinds of theories of areas of law are also distinguished, distinguishing evaluative, explanatory, and descriptive theories. The aim of the book is then described as the attempt to give a descriptive theory of the general part of the criminal law, and a normative theory of the special part of the criminal law. The content of each of these theories is then previewed.Less
This chapter develops a theory of what a theory of and area of law, criminal law included, should look like. It describes what kind of thing an area of law might be, and previews the book's conclusions as to the correct views on these matters. Three different kinds of kinds are distinguished as possible for areas of law such as criminal law: nominal kinds, natural kinds, and functional kinds. Three different kinds of theories of areas of law are also distinguished, distinguishing evaluative, explanatory, and descriptive theories. The aim of the book is then described as the attempt to give a descriptive theory of the general part of the criminal law, and a normative theory of the special part of the criminal law. The content of each of these theories is then previewed.
Michael Morris
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198239444
- eISBN:
- 9780191679919
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239444.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy
This chapter makes a programmatic showing how an evaluative theory of content can meet two constraints: the right substitution conditions for belief contexts, and what it is for words to be ...
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This chapter makes a programmatic showing how an evaluative theory of content can meet two constraints: the right substitution conditions for belief contexts, and what it is for words to be meaningful in the way they are. The chapter attempts to show in outline how to get fine-grained intensionality and a complete philosophy of language. Some constraints are imposed implicitly on how language must be thought of if the evaluative theory of content is correct. The chapter addresses the question of what words have to be doing in belief contexts if they are to be subject to the kind of rich intensionality which plausibility and conceptualism both require, and how it is that words can be subject to such constraints upon intersubstitution. It also defines concept-possession without explicitly relying on the idea of level-one opacity, and shows how little help a semantic theory can be in explaining opacity.Less
This chapter makes a programmatic showing how an evaluative theory of content can meet two constraints: the right substitution conditions for belief contexts, and what it is for words to be meaningful in the way they are. The chapter attempts to show in outline how to get fine-grained intensionality and a complete philosophy of language. Some constraints are imposed implicitly on how language must be thought of if the evaluative theory of content is correct. The chapter addresses the question of what words have to be doing in belief contexts if they are to be subject to the kind of rich intensionality which plausibility and conceptualism both require, and how it is that words can be subject to such constraints upon intersubstitution. It also defines concept-possession without explicitly relying on the idea of level-one opacity, and shows how little help a semantic theory can be in explaining opacity.
Sophie Ratcliffe
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199239870
- eISBN:
- 9780191716799
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239870.003.0002
- Subject:
- Literature, Poetry
This chapter presents an overview of ideas of sympathy and empathy, and their relations with theology, from the late 19th century to the present day. Using The Tempest as a central example, it ...
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This chapter presents an overview of ideas of sympathy and empathy, and their relations with theology, from the late 19th century to the present day. Using The Tempest as a central example, it considers the limits of the cognitive-evaluative object-based view of sympathy that is common in liberal humanist readings of texts, particularly those by Martha Nussbaum. Drawing on the ideas of Stanley Cavell and Noël Carroll, the chapter puts forward alternative models for reading, setting the idea of fictional ‘character’ against that of a fictional ‘creature’.Less
This chapter presents an overview of ideas of sympathy and empathy, and their relations with theology, from the late 19th century to the present day. Using The Tempest as a central example, it considers the limits of the cognitive-evaluative object-based view of sympathy that is common in liberal humanist readings of texts, particularly those by Martha Nussbaum. Drawing on the ideas of Stanley Cavell and Noël Carroll, the chapter puts forward alternative models for reading, setting the idea of fictional ‘character’ against that of a fictional ‘creature’.
Julien A. Deonna and Fabrice Teroni
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- December 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199686094
- eISBN:
- 9780191766039
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686094.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
In this chapter, the idea that emotions are evaluations is introduced. It explores two approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are alleged to become emotional when ...
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In this chapter, the idea that emotions are evaluations is introduced. It explores two approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are alleged to become emotional when taking evaluative contents. According to the first approach, emotions are evaluative judgements. According to the second, emotions are perceptual experiences of evaluative properties. This chapter explains why this theory remains unsatisfactory insofar as it shares with the evaluative judgement theory the idea that emotions are evaluations in virtue of their contents. An alternative is then outlined—the attitudinal theory of emotions. It parts with current theorizing about the emotions in elucidating the idea that emotions are evaluations not in terms of what they represent, but in terms of the attitude subjects take towards what they represent. Finally, the issue of what sorts of attitudes emotions are is examined, and the conclusion reached that they are felt bodily attitudes.Less
In this chapter, the idea that emotions are evaluations is introduced. It explores two approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are alleged to become emotional when taking evaluative contents. According to the first approach, emotions are evaluative judgements. According to the second, emotions are perceptual experiences of evaluative properties. This chapter explains why this theory remains unsatisfactory insofar as it shares with the evaluative judgement theory the idea that emotions are evaluations in virtue of their contents. An alternative is then outlined—the attitudinal theory of emotions. It parts with current theorizing about the emotions in elucidating the idea that emotions are evaluations not in terms of what they represent, but in terms of the attitude subjects take towards what they represent. Finally, the issue of what sorts of attitudes emotions are is examined, and the conclusion reached that they are felt bodily attitudes.
Fabrice Teroni
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- June 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198766858
- eISBN:
- 9780191840494
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198766858.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter focuses on fundamental trends in the philosophy of emotion since the publication of William James’ seminal and contentious view. James is famous for his claim that undergoing an emotion ...
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This chapter focuses on fundamental trends in the philosophy of emotion since the publication of William James’ seminal and contentious view. James is famous for his claim that undergoing an emotion comes down to feeling (psychological mode) specific changes within the body (content). Philosophers writing after him have also attempted to analyse emotional modes in terms of other psychological modes (believing, desiring, and perceiving) and to adjust their contents accordingly. The discussion is organized around a series of contrasts that have played fundamental roles in shaping these approaches to the emotions. These contrasts are those between emotions and feelings, between specific and unspecific phenomenology, and between dependent and independent modes. Focus on these contrasts enables a review of some dramatic turning points in the recent history of theorizing about the emotions; it also serves to bring to light fundamental constraints bearing on emotion theory.Less
This chapter focuses on fundamental trends in the philosophy of emotion since the publication of William James’ seminal and contentious view. James is famous for his claim that undergoing an emotion comes down to feeling (psychological mode) specific changes within the body (content). Philosophers writing after him have also attempted to analyse emotional modes in terms of other psychological modes (believing, desiring, and perceiving) and to adjust their contents accordingly. The discussion is organized around a series of contrasts that have played fundamental roles in shaping these approaches to the emotions. These contrasts are those between emotions and feelings, between specific and unspecific phenomenology, and between dependent and independent modes. Focus on these contrasts enables a review of some dramatic turning points in the recent history of theorizing about the emotions; it also serves to bring to light fundamental constraints bearing on emotion theory.
Daniel M. Hausman
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- April 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780190233181
- eISBN:
- 9780190233204
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190233181.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter is concerned with views of health. They maintain that that physical or mental states constitute diseases only if they make people worse off, diminish their opportunities, call for ...
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This chapter is concerned with views of health. They maintain that that physical or mental states constitute diseases only if they make people worse off, diminish their opportunities, call for medical treatment, excuse behavior that would ordinarily be condemned, or call for sympathy and care from others. Through a discussion of Tristram Engelhardt’s example of the now discredited view that masturbation is a disease, this chapter argues that evaluative theories of health should not deny that functional efficiency of parts and processes is a crucial element in health. Furthermore, although generic health measures are concerned with the value of health, they rely on the distinction between health and its value, which evaluative views elide.Less
This chapter is concerned with views of health. They maintain that that physical or mental states constitute diseases only if they make people worse off, diminish their opportunities, call for medical treatment, excuse behavior that would ordinarily be condemned, or call for sympathy and care from others. Through a discussion of Tristram Engelhardt’s example of the now discredited view that masturbation is a disease, this chapter argues that evaluative theories of health should not deny that functional efficiency of parts and processes is a crucial element in health. Furthermore, although generic health measures are concerned with the value of health, they rely on the distinction between health and its value, which evaluative views elide.
Julien A. Deonna and Federico Lauria (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- June 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780199370962
- eISBN:
- 9780199370986
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199370962.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General
Desire plays a pivotal role in our lives. Yet in recent times, it has not been a central topic in the philosophy of mind. The aim of this book is to redress this imbalance. What are desires? ...
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Desire plays a pivotal role in our lives. Yet in recent times, it has not been a central topic in the philosophy of mind. The aim of this book is to redress this imbalance. What are desires? According to a dogma, desire is a motivational state: desiring is being disposed to act. This conception aligns with the functionalist approach to desire and the standard account of desire’s direction of fit and of its role in explaining action. According to a second influential approach, however, desire is first and foremost an evaluation: desiring is representing something as good. This is in line with the thesis that we cannot desire something without “seeing” any good in it (the “guise of the good”). Are desires motivational states? How are we to understand desire’s direction of fit? How do desires explain action? Are desires evaluative states? Is the guise of the good true? Should we adopt an alternative picture that emphasizes desire’s deontic nature? Which view of desire does the neuroscientific evidence favor? The first section of the volume is devoted to the puzzle of desire’s essence and addresses these questions, among others. The second part investigates some implications that the various conceptions of desire have on a number of fundamental issues: Why are inconsistent desires problematic? What is desire’s role in practical deliberation? How do we know what we want? This volume is bound to contribute to the emergence of a fruitful debate on a neglected, albeit crucial, dimension of the mind.Less
Desire plays a pivotal role in our lives. Yet in recent times, it has not been a central topic in the philosophy of mind. The aim of this book is to redress this imbalance. What are desires? According to a dogma, desire is a motivational state: desiring is being disposed to act. This conception aligns with the functionalist approach to desire and the standard account of desire’s direction of fit and of its role in explaining action. According to a second influential approach, however, desire is first and foremost an evaluation: desiring is representing something as good. This is in line with the thesis that we cannot desire something without “seeing” any good in it (the “guise of the good”). Are desires motivational states? How are we to understand desire’s direction of fit? How do desires explain action? Are desires evaluative states? Is the guise of the good true? Should we adopt an alternative picture that emphasizes desire’s deontic nature? Which view of desire does the neuroscientific evidence favor? The first section of the volume is devoted to the puzzle of desire’s essence and addresses these questions, among others. The second part investigates some implications that the various conceptions of desire have on a number of fundamental issues: Why are inconsistent desires problematic? What is desire’s role in practical deliberation? How do we know what we want? This volume is bound to contribute to the emergence of a fruitful debate on a neglected, albeit crucial, dimension of the mind.
