Peter Carruthers
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199207077
- eISBN:
- 9780191708909
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207077.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter provides a modularist account of the main elements of human practical reasoning. It appeals to a norms module that is structured in such a way as to attach intrinsic motivation to stored ...
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This chapter provides a modularist account of the main elements of human practical reasoning. It appeals to a norms module that is structured in such a way as to attach intrinsic motivation to stored normative beliefs, and it suggests that our tendency to express our desires in descriptive form (e.g., as statements of value) enables us to reap the benefits of our theoretical reasoning capacities for practical purposes. It distinguishes between two kinds of practical reasoning and intention (System 1 and System 2), and argues against the view that beliefs alone can motivate action. The chapter closes with discussion and endorsement of Wegner’s thesis that conscious will is an illusion.Less
This chapter provides a modularist account of the main elements of human practical reasoning. It appeals to a norms module that is structured in such a way as to attach intrinsic motivation to stored normative beliefs, and it suggests that our tendency to express our desires in descriptive form (e.g., as statements of value) enables us to reap the benefits of our theoretical reasoning capacities for practical purposes. It distinguishes between two kinds of practical reasoning and intention (System 1 and System 2), and argues against the view that beliefs alone can motivate action. The chapter closes with discussion and endorsement of Wegner’s thesis that conscious will is an illusion.
Ruth Barcan Marcus
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195096576
- eISBN:
- 9780199833412
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195096576.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
In this paper, a confusion between evaluative and prescriptive uses of “ought” is located, and the prescriptive use of deontic operators is then recommended.
In this paper, a confusion between evaluative and prescriptive uses of “ought” is located, and the prescriptive use of deontic operators is then recommended.
Paul Horwich
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199251247
- eISBN:
- 9780191603983
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925124X.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Truth and meaning each have evaluative import. However, contrary to Dummett, Gibbard, Brandom, and many others, these notions are not constitutively normative — they are not themselves evaluative ...
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Truth and meaning each have evaluative import. However, contrary to Dummett, Gibbard, Brandom, and many others, these notions are not constitutively normative — they are not themselves evaluative concepts. One element of this argument is a discussion of why true belief is desirable. Another element is a demonstration — in case meaning is a matter of implicitly following rules for the use of words — that such rule following can be analyzed in terms that are purely naturalistic (i.e., non-normative and non-semantic).Less
Truth and meaning each have evaluative import. However, contrary to Dummett, Gibbard, Brandom, and many others, these notions are not constitutively normative — they are not themselves evaluative concepts. One element of this argument is a discussion of why true belief is desirable. Another element is a demonstration — in case meaning is a matter of implicitly following rules for the use of words — that such rule following can be analyzed in terms that are purely naturalistic (i.e., non-normative and non-semantic).
Ian Clark
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199219193
- eISBN:
- 9780191717734
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219193.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the objectives of this book, which is to develop an understanding of legitimacy against the background of international relations. It is shown ...
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This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the objectives of this book, which is to develop an understanding of legitimacy against the background of international relations. It is shown that international society is a political framework: its commitment is to a consensually mediated application of these norms, and that makes a qualitative difference to our understanding of it. Legitimacy draws substance from such norms, but is distinct from them. These norms operate as evaluative denominators for international acts and performances, understood as objects. In contrast, legitimacy refers to international society as the subject: it denotes the condition of international society, not the condition of its individual actors and actions.Less
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the objectives of this book, which is to develop an understanding of legitimacy against the background of international relations. It is shown that international society is a political framework: its commitment is to a consensually mediated application of these norms, and that makes a qualitative difference to our understanding of it. Legitimacy draws substance from such norms, but is distinct from them. These norms operate as evaluative denominators for international acts and performances, understood as objects. In contrast, legitimacy refers to international society as the subject: it denotes the condition of international society, not the condition of its individual actors and actions.
John Bishop
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199205547
- eISBN:
- 9780191709432
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205547.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter considers three strategies: assimilation to cases of inter-personal trust; appeal to consequentialism (on which Pascal's Wager bears), and a ‘tu quoque’, which maintains that everyone ...
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This chapter considers three strategies: assimilation to cases of inter-personal trust; appeal to consequentialism (on which Pascal's Wager bears), and a ‘tu quoque’, which maintains that everyone unavoidably makes faith-ventures, including evidentialists. Yet evidentialism need not be self-undermining, since evidentialists may accept that just one faith-venture is required in order to exclude all others. The evidentialists' key factual claim is that passional doxastic inclinations cannot function as guides to truth even when the truth is essentially evidentially undecidable. This claim may be challenged by appeal to epistemological externalism, and by arguing that passionally motivated faith-ventures (compare this with in relation to evaluative beliefs) can have epistemically rational aspects. The evidentialists' key claim may perhaps be supported by the evolutionary psychology of religious beliefs — but only granted prior faith-commitment to naturalism. Since faith-venture seems to meet fideist requirements, the debate appears to end in impasse.Less
This chapter considers three strategies: assimilation to cases of inter-personal trust; appeal to consequentialism (on which Pascal's Wager bears), and a ‘tu quoque’, which maintains that everyone unavoidably makes faith-ventures, including evidentialists. Yet evidentialism need not be self-undermining, since evidentialists may accept that just one faith-venture is required in order to exclude all others. The evidentialists' key factual claim is that passional doxastic inclinations cannot function as guides to truth even when the truth is essentially evidentially undecidable. This claim may be challenged by appeal to epistemological externalism, and by arguing that passionally motivated faith-ventures (compare this with in relation to evaluative beliefs) can have epistemically rational aspects. The evidentialists' key claim may perhaps be supported by the evolutionary psychology of religious beliefs — but only granted prior faith-commitment to naturalism. Since faith-venture seems to meet fideist requirements, the debate appears to end in impasse.
Jie W Weiss and David J Weiss
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195322989
- eISBN:
- 9780199869206
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195322989.003.0028
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter discusses a multiattribute utility analysis of seven school desegregation plans submitted by external groups to the Los Angeles School Board, which were under court order to desegregate. ...
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This chapter discusses a multiattribute utility analysis of seven school desegregation plans submitted by external groups to the Los Angeles School Board, which were under court order to desegregate. District officials, board members, plaintiffs, and intervenors in the court case provided evaluative dimensions. Weights for these dimensions were elicited from the above, plus from several professional experts. District staff made judgments of the probable performance of each plan on each evaluative dimension. Aggregate measures of benefits and of benefit/cost ratios were computed. The only plan not so evaluated was the one which the Board ultimately adopted.Less
This chapter discusses a multiattribute utility analysis of seven school desegregation plans submitted by external groups to the Los Angeles School Board, which were under court order to desegregate. District officials, board members, plaintiffs, and intervenors in the court case provided evaluative dimensions. Weights for these dimensions were elicited from the above, plus from several professional experts. District staff made judgments of the probable performance of each plan on each evaluative dimension. Aggregate measures of benefits and of benefit/cost ratios were computed. The only plan not so evaluated was the one which the Board ultimately adopted.
Idan Landau
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199544325
- eISBN:
- 9780191720536
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199544325.003.0010
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Historical Linguistics
Evaluative adjectives (e.g. rude, clever) display a systematic alternation, which brings about a cluster of syntactic and semantic changes. The adjectival variants are related by the joint ...
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Evaluative adjectives (e.g. rude, clever) display a systematic alternation, which brings about a cluster of syntactic and semantic changes. The adjectival variants are related by the joint application of two operators: A lexical saturation operator (also seen in verbal passive) and a syntactic reification operator (also seen in nominalization).Less
Evaluative adjectives (e.g. rude, clever) display a systematic alternation, which brings about a cluster of syntactic and semantic changes. The adjectival variants are related by the joint application of two operators: A lexical saturation operator (also seen in verbal passive) and a syntactic reification operator (also seen in nominalization).
KEITH CULVER and MICHAEL GIUDICE
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195370751
- eISBN:
- 9780199775903
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195370751.003.003
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter returns to the method and purpose of analytical jurisprudence. It discusses the way analytical legal theorists have attempted to identify what they claim are necessary features of an ...
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This chapter returns to the method and purpose of analytical jurisprudence. It discusses the way analytical legal theorists have attempted to identify what they claim are necessary features of an admittedly contingent concept of law. It argues that the problems associated with lack of specification of the connection to actual social situations demonstrate how narrowly bootstrapped analytical legal theories are, supposing as they have that adequate data and experience of life under law are in hand such that a general jurisprudence can be advanced. It is not that bootstrapping itself is at fault, but only the way it has been carried out. The chapter offers a renewed view of the perspective of analytical legal theory, which emphasizes the conditions under which bootstrapping must be carried out in order to achieve a general jurisprudence that is balanced in its conceptual elaboration and descriptive-explanatory responsiveness to situations of life under law.Less
This chapter returns to the method and purpose of analytical jurisprudence. It discusses the way analytical legal theorists have attempted to identify what they claim are necessary features of an admittedly contingent concept of law. It argues that the problems associated with lack of specification of the connection to actual social situations demonstrate how narrowly bootstrapped analytical legal theories are, supposing as they have that adequate data and experience of life under law are in hand such that a general jurisprudence can be advanced. It is not that bootstrapping itself is at fault, but only the way it has been carried out. The chapter offers a renewed view of the perspective of analytical legal theory, which emphasizes the conditions under which bootstrapping must be carried out in order to achieve a general jurisprudence that is balanced in its conceptual elaboration and descriptive-explanatory responsiveness to situations of life under law.
Ronald K. S. Macaulay
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195173819
- eISBN:
- 9780199788361
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195173819.003.0010
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
As had been found in the previous study in Ayr, middle-class speakers used derived adverbs in -ly significantly more frequently than working-class speakers. This is true of both adults and ...
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As had been found in the previous study in Ayr, middle-class speakers used derived adverbs in -ly significantly more frequently than working-class speakers. This is true of both adults and adolescents. The middle-class speakers also use very and quite significantly more than the working-class speakers, but there are no differences in the use of just. The adolescents rarely use very, preferring pure and dead. The middle-class speakers also use evaluative adjectives twice as frequently as the working-class speakers.Less
As had been found in the previous study in Ayr, middle-class speakers used derived adverbs in -ly significantly more frequently than working-class speakers. This is true of both adults and adolescents. The middle-class speakers also use very and quite significantly more than the working-class speakers, but there are no differences in the use of just. The adolescents rarely use very, preferring pure and dead. The middle-class speakers also use evaluative adjectives twice as frequently as the working-class speakers.
Ronald K. S. Macaulay
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195173819
- eISBN:
- 9780199788361
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195173819.003.0014
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
This chapter presents a qualitative analysis of the different kinds of discourse styles employed by the speakers, relating this to the quantitative measures. The significant differences in adverb use ...
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This chapter presents a qualitative analysis of the different kinds of discourse styles employed by the speakers, relating this to the quantitative measures. The significant differences in adverb use between the middle-class speakers and the working-class speakers are shown to reflect a basic difference in discourse style. The middle-class speakers make frequent evaluative comments, whereas the working-class speakers avoid them. The results contradict the inference Bernstein drew about social class differences in speech.Less
This chapter presents a qualitative analysis of the different kinds of discourse styles employed by the speakers, relating this to the quantitative measures. The significant differences in adverb use between the middle-class speakers and the working-class speakers are shown to reflect a basic difference in discourse style. The middle-class speakers make frequent evaluative comments, whereas the working-class speakers avoid them. The results contradict the inference Bernstein drew about social class differences in speech.
Rachel Cohon
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199268443
- eISBN:
- 9780191708565
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199268443.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book interprets the moral philosophy of David Hume, focusing on two areas: his metaethics and the artificial virtues. The book first reinterprets Hume's claim that moral distinctions are not ...
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This book interprets the moral philosophy of David Hume, focusing on two areas: his metaethics and the artificial virtues. The book first reinterprets Hume's claim that moral distinctions are not derived from reason and explains why he makes it. It finds that Hume did not actually hold three ‘Humean’ claims: firstly that beliefs alone cannot move us to act, secondly that evaluative propositions cannot be validly inferred from purely factual propositions, or thirdly that moral judgments lack truth value. According to Hume, human beings discern moral virtues and vices by means of feeling or emotion in a way rather like sensing; but this also gives the moral judge a truth-apt idea of a virtue or vice as a felt property. The book then turns to looking at the artificial virtues. Hume says that although many virtues are refinements of natural human tendencies, others (such as honesty) are constructed by social convention to make cooperation possible; and some of these generate paradoxes. The book argues that Hume sees these traits as prosthetic virtues that compensate for deficiencies in human nature. However, their true status clashes with our common-sense conception of a virtue, and so has been concealed, giving rise to the paradoxes.Less
This book interprets the moral philosophy of David Hume, focusing on two areas: his metaethics and the artificial virtues. The book first reinterprets Hume's claim that moral distinctions are not derived from reason and explains why he makes it. It finds that Hume did not actually hold three ‘Humean’ claims: firstly that beliefs alone cannot move us to act, secondly that evaluative propositions cannot be validly inferred from purely factual propositions, or thirdly that moral judgments lack truth value. According to Hume, human beings discern moral virtues and vices by means of feeling or emotion in a way rather like sensing; but this also gives the moral judge a truth-apt idea of a virtue or vice as a felt property. The book then turns to looking at the artificial virtues. Hume says that although many virtues are refinements of natural human tendencies, others (such as honesty) are constructed by social convention to make cooperation possible; and some of these generate paradoxes. The book argues that Hume sees these traits as prosthetic virtues that compensate for deficiencies in human nature. However, their true status clashes with our common-sense conception of a virtue, and so has been concealed, giving rise to the paradoxes.
Robert DiYanni and Anton Borst
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- September 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780691183800
- eISBN:
- 9780691202006
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691183800.003.0012
- Subject:
- Education, Higher and Further Education
This chapter considers assessment and grading. It argues that assessment is not grading, and grading is not assessment—though the two are often conflated and sometimes confused. Instead of seeing ...
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This chapter considers assessment and grading. It argues that assessment is not grading, and grading is not assessment—though the two are often conflated and sometimes confused. Instead of seeing these two forms of evaluation as the same, this chapter argues for the need to distinguish between them, related though they may be. When students' work is being graded, teachers evaluate their performance against a standard that can be clarified and explained with a rubric, or evaluative tool. When a student's work is being assessed, teachers evaluate its level of proficiency as a work in progress. Grades are final in a way that assessments are not.Less
This chapter considers assessment and grading. It argues that assessment is not grading, and grading is not assessment—though the two are often conflated and sometimes confused. Instead of seeing these two forms of evaluation as the same, this chapter argues for the need to distinguish between them, related though they may be. When students' work is being graded, teachers evaluate their performance against a standard that can be clarified and explained with a rubric, or evaluative tool. When a student's work is being assessed, teachers evaluate its level of proficiency as a work in progress. Grades are final in a way that assessments are not.
Christine M. Korsgaard
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199552733
- eISBN:
- 9780191720321
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552733.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
According to Plato and Aristotle, a virtue is a quality that makes you good at performing your function. Aristotle thinks that the human function is rational activity. This chapter asks how the moral ...
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According to Plato and Aristotle, a virtue is a quality that makes you good at performing your function. Aristotle thinks that the human function is rational activity. This chapter asks how the moral virtues could contribute to rational activity. It distinguishes five different answers suggested by the text of the Nicomachean Ethics, and examines their merits and demerits. Combining the most promising of them, it argues that in Aristotle's theory, rationality is a potential that is actualized by the acquisition of the virtues. By providing correct evaluative perceptions, the moral virtues bring the soul into a transformed condition in which appetites and passions are caused by rational considerations.Less
According to Plato and Aristotle, a virtue is a quality that makes you good at performing your function. Aristotle thinks that the human function is rational activity. This chapter asks how the moral virtues could contribute to rational activity. It distinguishes five different answers suggested by the text of the Nicomachean Ethics, and examines their merits and demerits. Combining the most promising of them, it argues that in Aristotle's theory, rationality is a potential that is actualized by the acquisition of the virtues. By providing correct evaluative perceptions, the moral virtues bring the soul into a transformed condition in which appetites and passions are caused by rational considerations.
Terence Cuneo
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199218837
- eISBN:
- 9780191711749
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218837.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The argument for the core argument's first premise comes in two stages. This chapter presents the first stage of the argument. Its aim is threefold: first, to identify the character of epistemic ...
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The argument for the core argument's first premise comes in two stages. This chapter presents the first stage of the argument. Its aim is threefold: first, to identify the character of epistemic realism of a paradigmatic sort; second, to point out four relevant similarities between epistemic and moral facts; and, third, to reply to several objections to the effect that there are important and deep dissimilarities between epistemic and moral facts.Less
The argument for the core argument's first premise comes in two stages. This chapter presents the first stage of the argument. Its aim is threefold: first, to identify the character of epistemic realism of a paradigmatic sort; second, to point out four relevant similarities between epistemic and moral facts; and, third, to reply to several objections to the effect that there are important and deep dissimilarities between epistemic and moral facts.
Sophie Ratcliffe
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199239870
- eISBN:
- 9780191716799
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239870.003.0002
- Subject:
- Literature, Poetry
This chapter presents an overview of ideas of sympathy and empathy, and their relations with theology, from the late 19th century to the present day. Using The Tempest as a central example, it ...
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This chapter presents an overview of ideas of sympathy and empathy, and their relations with theology, from the late 19th century to the present day. Using The Tempest as a central example, it considers the limits of the cognitive-evaluative object-based view of sympathy that is common in liberal humanist readings of texts, particularly those by Martha Nussbaum. Drawing on the ideas of Stanley Cavell and Noël Carroll, the chapter puts forward alternative models for reading, setting the idea of fictional ‘character’ against that of a fictional ‘creature’.Less
This chapter presents an overview of ideas of sympathy and empathy, and their relations with theology, from the late 19th century to the present day. Using The Tempest as a central example, it considers the limits of the cognitive-evaluative object-based view of sympathy that is common in liberal humanist readings of texts, particularly those by Martha Nussbaum. Drawing on the ideas of Stanley Cavell and Noël Carroll, the chapter puts forward alternative models for reading, setting the idea of fictional ‘character’ against that of a fictional ‘creature’.
Katja Maria Vogt
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195320091
- eISBN:
- 9780199869657
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195320091.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
It is argued that the two dominant ways of reconstructing the Stoic conception of law—as a set of rules (rules‐interpretation) or as identified with the perfect decision‐making of the sage ...
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It is argued that the two dominant ways of reconstructing the Stoic conception of law—as a set of rules (rules‐interpretation) or as identified with the perfect decision‐making of the sage (prescriptive reason—interpretation)—miss important aspects of the theory. There is not enough textual evidence to show that the Stoics conceived of universal or general rules; even those texts which, by apparently mentioning exceptions, seem to imply the existence of rules are more plausibly interpreted without this assumption. The prescriptive reason—interpretation correctly captures key ideas of the Stoics' theory, but misses the substantive side of their conception of the law. A third interpretation is proposed that draws in crucial ways on the Stoics' substantive conception of reason. What the law commands is a life based on an understanding of what is valuable for human beings; the law thus is substantive without breaking down into rules—it is substantive in the same way in which perfect reason, which knows everything that is relevant to wisdom, is substantive.Less
It is argued that the two dominant ways of reconstructing the Stoic conception of law—as a set of rules (rules‐interpretation) or as identified with the perfect decision‐making of the sage (prescriptive reason—interpretation)—miss important aspects of the theory. There is not enough textual evidence to show that the Stoics conceived of universal or general rules; even those texts which, by apparently mentioning exceptions, seem to imply the existence of rules are more plausibly interpreted without this assumption. The prescriptive reason—interpretation correctly captures key ideas of the Stoics' theory, but misses the substantive side of their conception of the law. A third interpretation is proposed that draws in crucial ways on the Stoics' substantive conception of reason. What the law commands is a life based on an understanding of what is valuable for human beings; the law thus is substantive without breaking down into rules—it is substantive in the same way in which perfect reason, which knows everything that is relevant to wisdom, is substantive.
Bennett W. Helm
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199567898
- eISBN:
- 9780191722387
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567898.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter sketches a basic account of what it is for something to have import to an agent — of what it is for an agent to care about something — in terms of which is distinguished mere ...
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This chapter sketches a basic account of what it is for something to have import to an agent — of what it is for an agent to care about something — in terms of which is distinguished mere goal-directedness from genuine desire, and hence mere intentional systems from genuine agents. The resulting account rejects the cognitive-conative divide: emotions, desires, and evaluative judgments are not cognitions insofar as they serve to constitute their objects as having import, and yet they are not conations insofar as they are rationally evaluable in terms of that import. Rather, import and the rational patterns of felt evaluations and evaluative judgments emerge simultaneously, each presupposing the other in a way that is unintelligible were we to accept the cognitive-conative divide. This account paves the way for an account of love that understands love like caring to be neither simply an appraisal nor simply a bestowal of value; instead, love is simultaneously both.Less
This chapter sketches a basic account of what it is for something to have import to an agent — of what it is for an agent to care about something — in terms of which is distinguished mere goal-directedness from genuine desire, and hence mere intentional systems from genuine agents. The resulting account rejects the cognitive-conative divide: emotions, desires, and evaluative judgments are not cognitions insofar as they serve to constitute their objects as having import, and yet they are not conations insofar as they are rationally evaluable in terms of that import. Rather, import and the rational patterns of felt evaluations and evaluative judgments emerge simultaneously, each presupposing the other in a way that is unintelligible were we to accept the cognitive-conative divide. This account paves the way for an account of love that understands love like caring to be neither simply an appraisal nor simply a bestowal of value; instead, love is simultaneously both.
Bennett W. Helm
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199567898
- eISBN:
- 9780191722387
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567898.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter argues that an account of valuing should be modeled on the account of caring provided: valuing (the evaluative attitude) and values (the relevant kind of import) are constituted by a ...
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This chapter argues that an account of valuing should be modeled on the account of caring provided: valuing (the evaluative attitude) and values (the relevant kind of import) are constituted by a projectible, rational pattern of felt evaluations and evaluative judgments. The difference between values and cares lies in the distinctive kind of felt evaluations and evaluative judgments at issue in each. In particular, valuing is constituted by a pattern of emotions like pride and shame, for it is these emotions that serve to identify one with their objects, thereby making sense of the intuitive ‘depth’ of values. Establishing this thesis will require providing an account not merely of pride and shame but also of the more general kind of which these are instances, such that a projectible pattern of felt evaluations of this kind is intelligible as constitutive of values.Less
This chapter argues that an account of valuing should be modeled on the account of caring provided: valuing (the evaluative attitude) and values (the relevant kind of import) are constituted by a projectible, rational pattern of felt evaluations and evaluative judgments. The difference between values and cares lies in the distinctive kind of felt evaluations and evaluative judgments at issue in each. In particular, valuing is constituted by a pattern of emotions like pride and shame, for it is these emotions that serve to identify one with their objects, thereby making sense of the intuitive ‘depth’ of values. Establishing this thesis will require providing an account not merely of pride and shame but also of the more general kind of which these are instances, such that a projectible pattern of felt evaluations of this kind is intelligible as constitutive of values.
Adrienne Lehrer
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195307931
- eISBN:
- 9780199867493
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195307931.003.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Theoretical Linguistics
The large and growing wine vocabulary is analyzed into its major categories: acidity, sweetness, balance, age, astringency, body, nose, finish, effervescence, and evaluation. The vocabulary of most ...
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The large and growing wine vocabulary is analyzed into its major categories: acidity, sweetness, balance, age, astringency, body, nose, finish, effervescence, and evaluation. The vocabulary of most categories have an evaluative as well as descriptive components, where negative words either have too much or too little of the property described, whereas the positive words have the right amount. A thin has too little body while a coarse wine has too much. Both delicate and full-bodied are positive descriptors for describing body. Many words are only evaluative, and these can be divided into those of high praise, low praise, mild derogation, and strong derogation. There are also numerous metaphorical descriptors based on personality and character, such as vivacious, assertive, and aggressive.Less
The large and growing wine vocabulary is analyzed into its major categories: acidity, sweetness, balance, age, astringency, body, nose, finish, effervescence, and evaluation. The vocabulary of most categories have an evaluative as well as descriptive components, where negative words either have too much or too little of the property described, whereas the positive words have the right amount. A thin has too little body while a coarse wine has too much. Both delicate and full-bodied are positive descriptors for describing body. Many words are only evaluative, and these can be divided into those of high praise, low praise, mild derogation, and strong derogation. There are also numerous metaphorical descriptors based on personality and character, such as vivacious, assertive, and aggressive.
Paul M. Sniderman, Michael Bang Petersen, Rune Slothuus, and Rune Stubager
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691161105
- eISBN:
- 9781400852673
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691161105.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This chapter presents a theory of the covenant paradox, i.e., the moral covenant underpinning the welfare state that simultaneously promotes equal treatment for (some) immigrants and provides a ...
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This chapter presents a theory of the covenant paradox, i.e., the moral covenant underpinning the welfare state that simultaneously promotes equal treatment for (some) immigrants and provides a platform for discrimination against (other) immigrants. It first discusses under what conditions and why the moral premises of the welfare state favor the equal treatment of immigrants. It then considers under what conditions and why the very same moral premises open the door to discrimination against immigrants. It shows that the key to these contradictory outcomes is the temporal logic of evaluative judgments. Prospective judgments of benefits and obligations favor equal treatment. Retrospective judgments, again of benefits and obligations, pave the way for discriminatory treatment.Less
This chapter presents a theory of the covenant paradox, i.e., the moral covenant underpinning the welfare state that simultaneously promotes equal treatment for (some) immigrants and provides a platform for discrimination against (other) immigrants. It first discusses under what conditions and why the moral premises of the welfare state favor the equal treatment of immigrants. It then considers under what conditions and why the very same moral premises open the door to discrimination against immigrants. It shows that the key to these contradictory outcomes is the temporal logic of evaluative judgments. Prospective judgments of benefits and obligations favor equal treatment. Retrospective judgments, again of benefits and obligations, pave the way for discriminatory treatment.
