Fred Feldman
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199571178
- eISBN:
- 9780191722547
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571178.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book is a philosophical study of the nature and value of happiness. Part I is devoted to critical discussion of the most important theories about the nature of happiness, understood as some sort ...
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This book is a philosophical study of the nature and value of happiness. Part I is devoted to critical discussion of the most important theories about the nature of happiness, understood as some sort of psychological state. Views discussed include sensory hedonism, local preferentism, Kahneman's theory, and Whole Life Satisfactionism. Part II of the book contains the exposition and defense of a novel theory about the nature and value of happiness. It is a form of attitudinal hedonism. The idea that a person's welfare, or well‐being, depends essentially on happiness is explained and (with reservations) defended, provided that happiness is understood according to the theory presented here. Part III of the book extends the discussion into some areas that bear on interactions between empirical research concerning happiness and philosophical inquiry into the same phenomenon. Current methods of measuring happiness are criticized and a new method is proposed. Philosophical implications of empirical research concerning happiness are evaluated.Less
This book is a philosophical study of the nature and value of happiness. Part I is devoted to critical discussion of the most important theories about the nature of happiness, understood as some sort of psychological state. Views discussed include sensory hedonism, local preferentism, Kahneman's theory, and Whole Life Satisfactionism. Part II of the book contains the exposition and defense of a novel theory about the nature and value of happiness. It is a form of attitudinal hedonism. The idea that a person's welfare, or well‐being, depends essentially on happiness is explained and (with reservations) defended, provided that happiness is understood according to the theory presented here. Part III of the book extends the discussion into some areas that bear on interactions between empirical research concerning happiness and philosophical inquiry into the same phenomenon. Current methods of measuring happiness are criticized and a new method is proposed. Philosophical implications of empirical research concerning happiness are evaluated.
Fred Feldman
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199571178
- eISBN:
- 9780191722547
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571178.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Chapter 14 summarizes the main points of the book. The reader is reminded that Part I focused on the descriptive concept of happiness. This is not itself an evaluative concept; it is probably a ...
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Chapter 14 summarizes the main points of the book. The reader is reminded that Part I focused on the descriptive concept of happiness. This is not itself an evaluative concept; it is probably a matter of psychology. The main philosophical theories about the nature of happiness so construed were critically examined. Attitudinal Hedonism about Happiness was then offered as a more plausible alternative. Part II started with a discussion of the relevant concept of welfare, or well‐being. It was suggested that welfare tracks happiness—the happier you are, the better your life is going for you. Part III contained discussion of some questions concerning interactions between the philosophical theory of happiness and empirical research. An approach to the measurement of happiness was sketched. This approach emerges from the theory of happiness defended in Part I. Questions were raised about the philosophical relevance of empirical research on happiness.Less
Chapter 14 summarizes the main points of the book. The reader is reminded that Part I focused on the descriptive concept of happiness. This is not itself an evaluative concept; it is probably a matter of psychology. The main philosophical theories about the nature of happiness so construed were critically examined. Attitudinal Hedonism about Happiness was then offered as a more plausible alternative. Part II started with a discussion of the relevant concept of welfare, or well‐being. It was suggested that welfare tracks happiness—the happier you are, the better your life is going for you. Part III contained discussion of some questions concerning interactions between the philosophical theory of happiness and empirical research. An approach to the measurement of happiness was sketched. This approach emerges from the theory of happiness defended in Part I. Questions were raised about the philosophical relevance of empirical research on happiness.
Lisa Tessman
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195179149
- eISBN:
- 9780199835782
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195179145.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
Lisa Tessman’s Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles engages questions central to feminist theory and practice, from the perspective of Aristotelian ethics. Focused primarily on ...
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Lisa Tessman’s Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles engages questions central to feminist theory and practice, from the perspective of Aristotelian ethics. Focused primarily on selves who endure and resist oppression, the book addresses the ways in which the devastating conditions confronted by these selves both limit and burden their moral goodness, and affect their possibilities for flourishing. The book describes two different forms of “moral trouble” prevalent under oppression. The first is that the oppressed self may be morally damaged, prevented from developing or exercising some of the virtues; the second is that the very conditions of oppression require the oppressed to develop a set of virtues that carry a moral cost to those who practice them, and that are referred to as “burdened virtues.” These virtues have the unusual feature of being disjoined from their bearer’s own well being. It is suggested that eudaimonistic theories should be able to account for virtues of this sort.Less
Lisa Tessman’s Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles engages questions central to feminist theory and practice, from the perspective of Aristotelian ethics. Focused primarily on selves who endure and resist oppression, the book addresses the ways in which the devastating conditions confronted by these selves both limit and burden their moral goodness, and affect their possibilities for flourishing. The book describes two different forms of “moral trouble” prevalent under oppression. The first is that the oppressed self may be morally damaged, prevented from developing or exercising some of the virtues; the second is that the very conditions of oppression require the oppressed to develop a set of virtues that carry a moral cost to those who practice them, and that are referred to as “burdened virtues.” These virtues have the unusual feature of being disjoined from their bearer’s own well being. It is suggested that eudaimonistic theories should be able to account for virtues of this sort.
Julia Annas
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195096521
- eISBN:
- 9780199833061
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195096525.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Because of their eudaimonistic structure, ancient theories have been criticized as egoistic, but this is a mistake, overlooking the place in them of philia or ‘friendship’, covering particular ...
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Because of their eudaimonistic structure, ancient theories have been criticized as egoistic, but this is a mistake, overlooking the place in them of philia or ‘friendship’, covering particular relationships, and of justice; both require other‐concern, the question for ancient ethics being how far this should extend.Less
Because of their eudaimonistic structure, ancient theories have been criticized as egoistic, but this is a mistake, overlooking the place in them of philia or ‘friendship’, covering particular relationships, and of justice; both require other‐concern, the question for ancient ethics being how far this should extend.
James Doyle
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199644384
- eISBN:
- 9780191743344
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644384.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
It is generally supposed that what Socrates in Plato's Apology describes himself as having spent his life doing in obedience to a divine command (activity A), what Socrates has urged others to do ...
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It is generally supposed that what Socrates in Plato's Apology describes himself as having spent his life doing in obedience to a divine command (activity A), what Socrates has urged others to do (activity B), and what Plato depicts Socrates as doing in other ‘Socratic’ dialogues (activity C), are all one and the same activity. This chapter argues that the identification is ambiguous and either false or misleading and, either way, cannot be presupposed, as it standardly is presupposed, in the interpretation of the dialogues. Socrates implicitly distinguishes two modes of philosophical activity in the Apology, which is called missionary and lay philosophy; conflating these makes nonsense of Socrates' defence. Activity A is missionary philosophy. Activity B and (insofar as the Gorgias is representative of ‘Socratic’ dialogues) activity C, are both lay philosophy.Less
It is generally supposed that what Socrates in Plato's Apology describes himself as having spent his life doing in obedience to a divine command (activity A), what Socrates has urged others to do (activity B), and what Plato depicts Socrates as doing in other ‘Socratic’ dialogues (activity C), are all one and the same activity. This chapter argues that the identification is ambiguous and either false or misleading and, either way, cannot be presupposed, as it standardly is presupposed, in the interpretation of the dialogues. Socrates implicitly distinguishes two modes of philosophical activity in the Apology, which is called missionary and lay philosophy; conflating these makes nonsense of Socrates' defence. Activity A is missionary philosophy. Activity B and (insofar as the Gorgias is representative of ‘Socratic’ dialogues) activity C, are both lay philosophy.
Fred Feldman
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199571178
- eISBN:
- 9780191722547
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571178.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Amartya Sen mentioned the case of a “demeaned and demoralized housewife” who has been brainwashed into thinking that a constricted life such as hers is appropriate for a woman. Thus, she is satisfied ...
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Amartya Sen mentioned the case of a “demeaned and demoralized housewife” who has been brainwashed into thinking that a constricted life such as hers is appropriate for a woman. Thus, she is satisfied with that life. A simple form of Whole Life Satisfactionism implies that this housewife (‘Bertha’) is happy. A typical form of eudaimonism then implies that Bertha is enjoying positive welfare. This may seem implausible. Wayne Sumner responded by claiming that for a person's happiness to contribute to her welfare, that happiness must be “authentic”. Chapter 9 contains discussion of a series of cases intended to show that the restriction to authentic satisfaction yields problematic evaluations in certain types of cases. The relevance of these cases for Attitudinal Hedonic Eudaimonism is then assessed. It is claimed that theory yields defensible (though possibly surprising) accounts of the welfare of people such as Bertha. Perhaps it's better to be non‐autonomously happy than not to be happy at all.Less
Amartya Sen mentioned the case of a “demeaned and demoralized housewife” who has been brainwashed into thinking that a constricted life such as hers is appropriate for a woman. Thus, she is satisfied with that life. A simple form of Whole Life Satisfactionism implies that this housewife (‘Bertha’) is happy. A typical form of eudaimonism then implies that Bertha is enjoying positive welfare. This may seem implausible. Wayne Sumner responded by claiming that for a person's happiness to contribute to her welfare, that happiness must be “authentic”. Chapter 9 contains discussion of a series of cases intended to show that the restriction to authentic satisfaction yields problematic evaluations in certain types of cases. The relevance of these cases for Attitudinal Hedonic Eudaimonism is then assessed. It is claimed that theory yields defensible (though possibly surprising) accounts of the welfare of people such as Bertha. Perhaps it's better to be non‐autonomously happy than not to be happy at all.
Fred Feldman
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199571178
- eISBN:
- 9780191722547
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571178.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
An ancient objection to eudaimonism is based on the idea of “disgusting happiness”. Steven Cahn developed an interesting version of this objection based on a fictional character—Judah Rosenthal, from ...
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An ancient objection to eudaimonism is based on the idea of “disgusting happiness”. Steven Cahn developed an interesting version of this objection based on a fictional character—Judah Rosenthal, from the Woody Allen film Crimes and Misdemeanors. Judah passes all popular tests for happiness but is utterly morally corrupt. His case casts doubt on the naive identification of happiness with welfare. It's not clear that the case is decisive. Nevertheless, a form of eudaimonism that is intended to circumvent this problem can be developed. According to this novel form of the theory, the welfare value of each episode of happiness must be adjusted so as to reflect the extent to which the object of that happiness deserves to be enjoyed. It is left to the interested reader to determine whether the modification is really needed.Less
An ancient objection to eudaimonism is based on the idea of “disgusting happiness”. Steven Cahn developed an interesting version of this objection based on a fictional character—Judah Rosenthal, from the Woody Allen film Crimes and Misdemeanors. Judah passes all popular tests for happiness but is utterly morally corrupt. His case casts doubt on the naive identification of happiness with welfare. It's not clear that the case is decisive. Nevertheless, a form of eudaimonism that is intended to circumvent this problem can be developed. According to this novel form of the theory, the welfare value of each episode of happiness must be adjusted so as to reflect the extent to which the object of that happiness deserves to be enjoyed. It is left to the interested reader to determine whether the modification is really needed.
Julia Annas
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199228782
- eISBN:
- 9780191725524
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228782.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
The book develops an account of virtue which, in a contemporary version, foregrounds the idea that virtue is an exercise of practical intelligence (ideally, a form of practical wisdom) similar to the ...
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The book develops an account of virtue which, in a contemporary version, foregrounds the idea that virtue is an exercise of practical intelligence (ideally, a form of practical wisdom) similar to the practical exercise of a skill. A practical skill is acquired through experience and habituation, but the result is not routine but an educated and intelligent application of thinking in action. This way of thinking of virtue shows how virtue does not conform to modern expectations of ‘moral reasoning’ and enables us to see how many contemporary objections to virtue as it figures in ethical theories misfire. The book does not present an ethics of virtue, but shows how the account can illuminatingly distinguish among different varieties of virtue ethics, depending on the conception of the good to which they are committed. The book also shows how an account of virtue which emphasizes its structural likeness to a practical skill fits a theory of eudaimonism, which takes us to have the aim, over our lives as wholes, of achieving happiness or flourishing.Less
The book develops an account of virtue which, in a contemporary version, foregrounds the idea that virtue is an exercise of practical intelligence (ideally, a form of practical wisdom) similar to the practical exercise of a skill. A practical skill is acquired through experience and habituation, but the result is not routine but an educated and intelligent application of thinking in action. This way of thinking of virtue shows how virtue does not conform to modern expectations of ‘moral reasoning’ and enables us to see how many contemporary objections to virtue as it figures in ethical theories misfire. The book does not present an ethics of virtue, but shows how the account can illuminatingly distinguish among different varieties of virtue ethics, depending on the conception of the good to which they are committed. The book also shows how an account of virtue which emphasizes its structural likeness to a practical skill fits a theory of eudaimonism, which takes us to have the aim, over our lives as wholes, of achieving happiness or flourishing.
Charles Goodman
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195375190
- eISBN:
- 9780199871377
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195375190.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Buddhism
This chapter presents basic features of the three main families of Western ethical theories: consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. The main task is to clarify how to distinguish ...
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This chapter presents basic features of the three main families of Western ethical theories: consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. The main task is to clarify how to distinguish consequentialism in general from virtue ethics in general. Virtue ethicists typically assert eudaimonism is a close connection between virtue and the agent’s own flourishing, whereas consequentialists deny this. Moreover, consequentialist theories endorse agent-neutrality, whereas virtue ethics is agent-relative. Consequentialism is appealing, but faces damaging objections; some of these can be blocked by switching from direct consequentialism to indirect consequentialism. The three families of theories offer different responses to intrinsic value: consequentialism seeks to promote it, deontology to respect it, and virtue ethics to embody it. The chapter discusses the definition of hedonism and presents alternative accounts of well-being.Less
This chapter presents basic features of the three main families of Western ethical theories: consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. The main task is to clarify how to distinguish consequentialism in general from virtue ethics in general. Virtue ethicists typically assert eudaimonism is a close connection between virtue and the agent’s own flourishing, whereas consequentialists deny this. Moreover, consequentialist theories endorse agent-neutrality, whereas virtue ethics is agent-relative. Consequentialism is appealing, but faces damaging objections; some of these can be blocked by switching from direct consequentialism to indirect consequentialism. The three families of theories offer different responses to intrinsic value: consequentialism seeks to promote it, deontology to respect it, and virtue ethics to embody it. The chapter discusses the definition of hedonism and presents alternative accounts of well-being.
Fred Feldman
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199571178
- eISBN:
- 9780191722547
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571178.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Popular reports indicate that some empirical researchers have discovered that the curve of lifetime happiness is U‐shaped; others have discovered that it is inverted U‐shaped; and others have found ...
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Popular reports indicate that some empirical researchers have discovered that the curve of lifetime happiness is U‐shaped; others have discovered that it is inverted U‐shaped; and others have found that it is a straight line. Perhaps the researchers were focusing on distinct phenomena. But then which of them was actually studying happiness? We need to determine the nature of happiness before we set out to plot its curve. The attempt to determine the nature of happiness is a philosophical project, not to be confused with the empirical project of trying to determine the typical causes of happiness. There is a further philosophical question: does individual human welfare track happiness? If we can determine what happiness is, and if we come to think that welfare tracks happiness, then we will want to determine whether philosophical reflection can help to shed light on the conceptual foundations of empirical research into happiness.Less
Popular reports indicate that some empirical researchers have discovered that the curve of lifetime happiness is U‐shaped; others have discovered that it is inverted U‐shaped; and others have found that it is a straight line. Perhaps the researchers were focusing on distinct phenomena. But then which of them was actually studying happiness? We need to determine the nature of happiness before we set out to plot its curve. The attempt to determine the nature of happiness is a philosophical project, not to be confused with the empirical project of trying to determine the typical causes of happiness. There is a further philosophical question: does individual human welfare track happiness? If we can determine what happiness is, and if we come to think that welfare tracks happiness, then we will want to determine whether philosophical reflection can help to shed light on the conceptual foundations of empirical research into happiness.
Fred Feldman
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199571178
- eISBN:
- 9780191722547
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571178.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Eudaimonism is the doctrine that welfare tracks happiness. Section 8.2 contains critical discussion of several proposed tests designed to help us to focus on the concept of welfare. The Crib Test and ...
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Eudaimonism is the doctrine that welfare tracks happiness. Section 8.2 contains critical discussion of several proposed tests designed to help us to focus on the concept of welfare. The Crib Test and the Sympathy Test are not entirely decisive. Alternatively, we may be able to identify welfare by noting how it fits into a web including such concepts as benefit, harm, self‐interest, prudence, selflessness, altruism, and quality of life. Amartya Sen suggested that when a person's happiness depends upon “desperate survival strategies”, his welfare may be lower than his happiness level. In section 8.3 the objection is critically examined. Another problem for eudaimonism arises in the case of a person whose happiness is “fragmented”. The extent to which the fragmented happiness of such a person constitutes a difficulty for eudaimonism is discussed in section 8.4. Appendix D distinguishes among several different theories that may go by the name ‘eudaimonism’.Less
Eudaimonism is the doctrine that welfare tracks happiness. Section 8.2 contains critical discussion of several proposed tests designed to help us to focus on the concept of welfare. The Crib Test and the Sympathy Test are not entirely decisive. Alternatively, we may be able to identify welfare by noting how it fits into a web including such concepts as benefit, harm, self‐interest, prudence, selflessness, altruism, and quality of life. Amartya Sen suggested that when a person's happiness depends upon “desperate survival strategies”, his welfare may be lower than his happiness level. In section 8.3 the objection is critically examined. Another problem for eudaimonism arises in the case of a person whose happiness is “fragmented”. The extent to which the fragmented happiness of such a person constitutes a difficulty for eudaimonism is discussed in section 8.4. Appendix D distinguishes among several different theories that may go by the name ‘eudaimonism’.
MARK LEBAR and NATHANIEL GOLDBERG
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199646043
- eISBN:
- 9780191743368
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646043.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics can each be understood as claiming that all human beings desire to live well, and that this desire, when accompanied by correct beliefs about the role of virtue in ...
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Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics can each be understood as claiming that all human beings desire to live well, and that this desire, when accompanied by correct beliefs about the role of virtue in living well, moves people to be virtuous. Call this claim ‘psychological eudaimonism’ (‘PE’). Neither Plato, Aristotle, nor the Stoics, however, investigate PE's warrant. After identifying the claim in these ancients' writings, this paper argues in their stead that PE is warranted by what is involved in understanding others as rational generally, and what is involved in understanding ourselves as practically rational specifically. The former is interestingly and unexpectedly informed by Donald Davidson’s account of linguistic interpretation. The latter is the ancients’ account of practical rationality itself.Less
Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics can each be understood as claiming that all human beings desire to live well, and that this desire, when accompanied by correct beliefs about the role of virtue in living well, moves people to be virtuous. Call this claim ‘psychological eudaimonism’ (‘PE’). Neither Plato, Aristotle, nor the Stoics, however, investigate PE's warrant. After identifying the claim in these ancients' writings, this paper argues in their stead that PE is warranted by what is involved in understanding others as rational generally, and what is involved in understanding ourselves as practically rational specifically. The former is interestingly and unexpectedly informed by Donald Davidson’s account of linguistic interpretation. The latter is the ancients’ account of practical rationality itself.
Jessica N. Berry
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195368420
- eISBN:
- 9780199867479
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195368420.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter takes up the question whether Nietzsche's philosophy ought to be characterized as “therapeutic,” as it so often has been, and investigates both his and the Greek skeptics' relationship ...
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This chapter takes up the question whether Nietzsche's philosophy ought to be characterized as “therapeutic,” as it so often has been, and investigates both his and the Greek skeptics' relationship with “health” as a goal of the philosophic enterprise. It might be objected that the Pyrrhonists' adoption of ataraxia (tranquility) as the ultimate aim of their practice, an aim which has often been linked with indifference, impassivity, and the avoidance of suffering, could not be consistent with any notion of health advanced by Nietzsche. Yet an exploration of the history and etymology of ataraxia—indeed, a genealogy of ataraxia—conducted in light of Nietzsche's longtime interest in the pre-Platonic philosopher Democritus of Abdera illuminates a model of psychological health and well-being that again brings him in line with the Skeptical tradition.Less
This chapter takes up the question whether Nietzsche's philosophy ought to be characterized as “therapeutic,” as it so often has been, and investigates both his and the Greek skeptics' relationship with “health” as a goal of the philosophic enterprise. It might be objected that the Pyrrhonists' adoption of ataraxia (tranquility) as the ultimate aim of their practice, an aim which has often been linked with indifference, impassivity, and the avoidance of suffering, could not be consistent with any notion of health advanced by Nietzsche. Yet an exploration of the history and etymology of ataraxia—indeed, a genealogy of ataraxia—conducted in light of Nietzsche's longtime interest in the pre-Platonic philosopher Democritus of Abdera illuminates a model of psychological health and well-being that again brings him in line with the Skeptical tradition.
Valerie Tiberius and Alexandra Plakias
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199582143
- eISBN:
- 9780191594496
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Whether it is to be maximized or promoted as the object of a duty of beneficence, well-being is a vitally important notion in ethical theory. Well-being is a value, but to play the role it has often ...
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Whether it is to be maximized or promoted as the object of a duty of beneficence, well-being is a vitally important notion in ethical theory. Well-being is a value, but to play the role it has often been assigned by ethical theory it must also be something we can measure and compare. It is a normative concept, then, but it also seems to have empirical content. Historically, philosophical conceptions of well-being have been responsive to the paired demands for normative and empirical adequacy. However, recent work has yet to pay serious attention to the burgeoning field of well-being research in empirical psychology. This might be because the research is new and unknown, or it might be due to uncertainty about how a philosophical investigation would take such research into account. This chapter offers solutions to both of these problems. It provides an overview of well-being research in empirical psychology. It then uses this overview as part of an argument for an empirical informed account of well-being that we call the Value-Based Life Satisfaction Account.Less
Whether it is to be maximized or promoted as the object of a duty of beneficence, well-being is a vitally important notion in ethical theory. Well-being is a value, but to play the role it has often been assigned by ethical theory it must also be something we can measure and compare. It is a normative concept, then, but it also seems to have empirical content. Historically, philosophical conceptions of well-being have been responsive to the paired demands for normative and empirical adequacy. However, recent work has yet to pay serious attention to the burgeoning field of well-being research in empirical psychology. This might be because the research is new and unknown, or it might be due to uncertainty about how a philosophical investigation would take such research into account. This chapter offers solutions to both of these problems. It provides an overview of well-being research in empirical psychology. It then uses this overview as part of an argument for an empirical informed account of well-being that we call the Value-Based Life Satisfaction Account.
Lisa Tessman
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195179149
- eISBN:
- 9780199835782
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195179145.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
Virtue ethics seems to present a puzzle about the privileged: If moral virtue is necessary for flourishing (which is a core assumption of virtue ethics), then members of privileged groups can only ...
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Virtue ethics seems to present a puzzle about the privileged: If moral virtue is necessary for flourishing (which is a core assumption of virtue ethics), then members of privileged groups can only flourish if they are morally good, but it is more plausible to conceive of the privileged as morally deficient than as morally good, since their privileges result from unjust social positions. Thus it appears that they are barred from flourishing, which is odd since one would expect conditions of oppression to prevent the victims rather than the beneficiaries of these conditions from living the good life. The puzzle begins to dissolve when one distinguishes between the contemporary understanding of happiness and the ancient Greek conception of flourishing, for it turns out that privileged people can be said to be happy without granting that they flourish. The distinction helps uncover a key assumption of interdependence behind the belief that even the so-called other-regarding virtues (and not just self-regarding virtues) are necessary for one’s own flourishing; if people are interdependent in such a way that the flourishing of one is tied to the flourishing of all, then for the privileged to flourish they would have to worry a lot more about the well-being of the disadvantaged. This suggests a critical revision to Aristotle’s eudaimonistic theory, by the addition of the claim that a trait that contributes to one’s own well-being cannot count as morally praiseworthy if it detracts from the flourishing of an inclusive social collectivity.Less
Virtue ethics seems to present a puzzle about the privileged: If moral virtue is necessary for flourishing (which is a core assumption of virtue ethics), then members of privileged groups can only flourish if they are morally good, but it is more plausible to conceive of the privileged as morally deficient than as morally good, since their privileges result from unjust social positions. Thus it appears that they are barred from flourishing, which is odd since one would expect conditions of oppression to prevent the victims rather than the beneficiaries of these conditions from living the good life. The puzzle begins to dissolve when one distinguishes between the contemporary understanding of happiness and the ancient Greek conception of flourishing, for it turns out that privileged people can be said to be happy without granting that they flourish. The distinction helps uncover a key assumption of interdependence behind the belief that even the so-called other-regarding virtues (and not just self-regarding virtues) are necessary for one’s own flourishing; if people are interdependent in such a way that the flourishing of one is tied to the flourishing of all, then for the privileged to flourish they would have to worry a lot more about the well-being of the disadvantaged. This suggests a critical revision to Aristotle’s eudaimonistic theory, by the addition of the claim that a trait that contributes to one’s own well-being cannot count as morally praiseworthy if it detracts from the flourishing of an inclusive social collectivity.
Lisa Tessman
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195179149
- eISBN:
- 9780199835782
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195179145.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
This chapter examines the way that liberatory movements—including both feminist movements and Black liberation movements—offer praise for their best members, holding them up to model the character ...
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This chapter examines the way that liberatory movements—including both feminist movements and Black liberation movements—offer praise for their best members, holding them up to model the character traits that enable political resistance. This praise appears strange given a eudaimonistic ethics in which character traits that are morally praiseworthy are usually conducive to or constitutive of flourishing, for the character traits recommended for resistance often disable resisters themselves from flourishing. Based on Aristotle’s discussion of “mixed actions,” a description is given of the political resister as displaying “mixed traits” that are routinely unlinked from flourishing and thereby burdened. The problematic traits of the politically resistant self include those such as anger that contribute to maintaining a hard resolve against the oppressors, those such as courage that help resisters take risks and accept loss and sacrifice, and those that resisters must display in their relationships with one another, such as loyalty coupled with an openness to criticism and self-criticism. The chapter includes an extended analysis of one of these questionable virtues, namely anger.Less
This chapter examines the way that liberatory movements—including both feminist movements and Black liberation movements—offer praise for their best members, holding them up to model the character traits that enable political resistance. This praise appears strange given a eudaimonistic ethics in which character traits that are morally praiseworthy are usually conducive to or constitutive of flourishing, for the character traits recommended for resistance often disable resisters themselves from flourishing. Based on Aristotle’s discussion of “mixed actions,” a description is given of the political resister as displaying “mixed traits” that are routinely unlinked from flourishing and thereby burdened. The problematic traits of the politically resistant self include those such as anger that contribute to maintaining a hard resolve against the oppressors, those such as courage that help resisters take risks and accept loss and sacrifice, and those that resisters must display in their relationships with one another, such as loyalty coupled with an openness to criticism and self-criticism. The chapter includes an extended analysis of one of these questionable virtues, namely anger.
Lisa Tessman
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195179149
- eISBN:
- 9780199835782
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195179145.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
The conclusion addresses a question that emerges given all of the critical revisions to a eudaimonistic virtue ethics that are suggested in the course of the book, and especially given the proposed ...
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The conclusion addresses a question that emerges given all of the critical revisions to a eudaimonistic virtue ethics that are suggested in the course of the book, and especially given the proposed addition of an odd category of virtues—burdened virtues—that lack the usual feature of virtues because they are exercised in contexts in which flourishing tends to be diminished or unattainable. The conclusion considers how one could identify the virtues under conditions in which the link between virtue and flourishing is so unreliable. Given that the burdened virtues tend to fail to enable their bearers to flourish, one cannot find these virtues simply by beginning with a conception of flourishing and then working backwards from there to see which traits are conducive to or constitutive of such flourishing. What is proposed instead is a variety of ways in which a trait, despite being costly or detrimental, could be otherwise identifiably praiseworthy.Less
The conclusion addresses a question that emerges given all of the critical revisions to a eudaimonistic virtue ethics that are suggested in the course of the book, and especially given the proposed addition of an odd category of virtues—burdened virtues—that lack the usual feature of virtues because they are exercised in contexts in which flourishing tends to be diminished or unattainable. The conclusion considers how one could identify the virtues under conditions in which the link between virtue and flourishing is so unreliable. Given that the burdened virtues tend to fail to enable their bearers to flourish, one cannot find these virtues simply by beginning with a conception of flourishing and then working backwards from there to see which traits are conducive to or constitutive of such flourishing. What is proposed instead is a variety of ways in which a trait, despite being costly or detrimental, could be otherwise identifiably praiseworthy.
Mark LeBar
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199931118
- eISBN:
- 9780199345717
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199931118.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Since the middle of the twentieth century, virtue ethics has enriched the range of philosophical approaches to normative ethics, often drawing on the work of the ancient Greeks, who offered accounts ...
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Since the middle of the twentieth century, virtue ethics has enriched the range of philosophical approaches to normative ethics, often drawing on the work of the ancient Greeks, who offered accounts of the virtues that have become part of contemporary philosophical ethics. But these virtue ethical theories were situated within a more general picture of human practical rationality, one which maintained that to understand virtue we must appeal to what would make our lives go well. They were built on a framework established by the thought that we have most reason to live well—to have eudaimonia. This feature of ethical theorizing has not become part of philosophical ethics as the virtue theories dependent upon it have. This book is an attempt to bring eudaimonism into dialog with contemporary philosophical work in ethical theory. It does not attempt to replicate the many contributions to normative ethics, in particular to thinking about the virtues. Instead, it attempts to contribute to metatethics—to thinking about what we are doing when we think about normative ethics. In particular, it attempts to contribute to contemporary philosophical debate on the nature of what is good for us, on what we have most reason to do, on what facts about both those ideas consist in, on the nature of values and value facts, and on the nature of the reasons for respect for others we might have. Its aim is to mark off space in these debates where a way of thinking about ourselves and our agential, practical natures as the ancients did can enrich our thinking about those deep and important questions. In this way the book makes a case for what we might call Virtue Eudaimonism. Less
Since the middle of the twentieth century, virtue ethics has enriched the range of philosophical approaches to normative ethics, often drawing on the work of the ancient Greeks, who offered accounts of the virtues that have become part of contemporary philosophical ethics. But these virtue ethical theories were situated within a more general picture of human practical rationality, one which maintained that to understand virtue we must appeal to what would make our lives go well. They were built on a framework established by the thought that we have most reason to live well—to have eudaimonia. This feature of ethical theorizing has not become part of philosophical ethics as the virtue theories dependent upon it have. This book is an attempt to bring eudaimonism into dialog with contemporary philosophical work in ethical theory. It does not attempt to replicate the many contributions to normative ethics, in particular to thinking about the virtues. Instead, it attempts to contribute to metatethics—to thinking about what we are doing when we think about normative ethics. In particular, it attempts to contribute to contemporary philosophical debate on the nature of what is good for us, on what we have most reason to do, on what facts about both those ideas consist in, on the nature of values and value facts, and on the nature of the reasons for respect for others we might have. Its aim is to mark off space in these debates where a way of thinking about ourselves and our agential, practical natures as the ancients did can enrich our thinking about those deep and important questions. In this way the book makes a case for what we might call Virtue Eudaimonism.
Julia Annas
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195096521
- eISBN:
- 9780199833061
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195096525.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
The book examines the major traditions of ancient ethical theory, showing that they share a common theoretical structure. They are examples of eudaimonism, a type of ethical theory in which the basic ...
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The book examines the major traditions of ancient ethical theory, showing that they share a common theoretical structure. They are examples of eudaimonism, a type of ethical theory in which the basic concepts are those of happiness and virtue. The book looks at the way this type of theory is articulated in Aristotle, and then at the differing versions of it to be found in Epicurus, the Stoics, and Academic and Pyrrhonian Sceptics. We find a common structure: we all implicitly seek a final end in all our actions, but different theories offer rival accounts of what this consists in. To gain a proper understanding of the ancient debates, we have to examine the basic concepts of happiness and virtue, which in modern ethical theories are often subject to misunderstanding. The book first aims to recover the ancient understanding of these basic notions, then examines the role of nature in ancient ethical justification, the role in eudaimonism of other‐concern, and finally the extent to which the ancient theories demand revision and transformation of everyday ethical thought.Less
The book examines the major traditions of ancient ethical theory, showing that they share a common theoretical structure. They are examples of eudaimonism, a type of ethical theory in which the basic concepts are those of happiness and virtue. The book looks at the way this type of theory is articulated in Aristotle, and then at the differing versions of it to be found in Epicurus, the Stoics, and Academic and Pyrrhonian Sceptics. We find a common structure: we all implicitly seek a final end in all our actions, but different theories offer rival accounts of what this consists in. To gain a proper understanding of the ancient debates, we have to examine the basic concepts of happiness and virtue, which in modern ethical theories are often subject to misunderstanding. The book first aims to recover the ancient understanding of these basic notions, then examines the role of nature in ancient ethical justification, the role in eudaimonism of other‐concern, and finally the extent to which the ancient theories demand revision and transformation of everyday ethical thought.
Jonathan A. Jacobs (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199767175
- eISBN:
- 9780199979592
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199767175.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This book combines historical scholarship with conceptual analysis focusing on the ways in which theological considerations have figured in natural law theorizing from Plato to Spinoza. Theological ...
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This book combines historical scholarship with conceptual analysis focusing on the ways in which theological considerations have figured in natural law theorizing from Plato to Spinoza. Theological considerations have had a pronounced role in Thomistic natural law theorizing but much remains to explore concerning both Aquinas and other key figures in the long and complex history of natural law theorizing overall. The chapters in this book examine the relation between conceptions of natural law and theistic claims and principles, explicating the variety of those conceptions and relations in crucial periods prior to modern era. They articulate diverse ways in which natural law has been understood and the diverse ways in which theistic claims have been related to claims about the objectivity and rationality of principles of natural law. In addition to exploring Plato and the Stoics, the volume also looks at medieval Jewish thought, Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham, and the ways in which Spinoza's thought includes resonances of earlier views and intimations of later developments. These chapters enlarge the scope of the discussion of natural law through study of how the naturalness of natural law has often been related to theses of philosophical theology. The latter are often crucial elements of natural law theorizing, having an integral role in accounting for the metaethical status and ethical bindingness of natural law. Questions of the relation between natural law and God, and the relation between natural law and divine command have been answered in a multiplicity of ways by key figures in the history of natural law theorizing. These chapters draw attention to important elements of natural law theorizing, according them the explanatory significance they deserve.Less
This book combines historical scholarship with conceptual analysis focusing on the ways in which theological considerations have figured in natural law theorizing from Plato to Spinoza. Theological considerations have had a pronounced role in Thomistic natural law theorizing but much remains to explore concerning both Aquinas and other key figures in the long and complex history of natural law theorizing overall. The chapters in this book examine the relation between conceptions of natural law and theistic claims and principles, explicating the variety of those conceptions and relations in crucial periods prior to modern era. They articulate diverse ways in which natural law has been understood and the diverse ways in which theistic claims have been related to claims about the objectivity and rationality of principles of natural law. In addition to exploring Plato and the Stoics, the volume also looks at medieval Jewish thought, Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham, and the ways in which Spinoza's thought includes resonances of earlier views and intimations of later developments. These chapters enlarge the scope of the discussion of natural law through study of how the naturalness of natural law has often been related to theses of philosophical theology. The latter are often crucial elements of natural law theorizing, having an integral role in accounting for the metaethical status and ethical bindingness of natural law. Questions of the relation between natural law and God, and the relation between natural law and divine command have been answered in a multiplicity of ways by key figures in the history of natural law theorizing. These chapters draw attention to important elements of natural law theorizing, according them the explanatory significance they deserve.
