Search Results

This chapter argues that, if scientists are to avoid railroading their own values into individual and societal decision‐making processes, they need to follow an ethics of expertise (EOE) when disseminating information. The chapter suggests that an EOE based on the principle of informed consent would help decision makers to formulate choices based on their own values and priorities, and it would also help them to evaluate the trustworthiness of various experts. On the basis of this principle, it advises proponents of hormesis to be as explicit as possible in acknowledging the major and controversial value judgments present in their work. Two of these crucial judgments are that hormesis is the predominant toxicological dose‐response relationship and that it should be the default dose‐response model in risk assessment. Clarifying these judgments would help decision makers to recognize the key sources of uncertainty and controversy in the information supplied to them, and it would prevent interest groups from misusing the claims of hormesis proponents.

This chapter shows how the major lessons of the preceding chapters apply to cases of policy‐relevant research other than hormesis. It argues that those who investigate endocrine disruption and multiple chemical sensitivity also encounter at least four major categories of value judgments: (1) choices about what topics to investigate and how to design studies; (2) decisions about what scientific terminology and definitions to employ; (3) choices about how to interpret and evaluate studies; and (4) questions about how to incorporate scientific research into policy decisions. The chapter also shows, in accordance with Chapter 4, that current university conflict‐of‐interest policies are unlikely to prevent interest groups from exerting powerful influences on these judgments. Chapter 7 also supports the central contention of Chapter 5 (i.e., that diagnosing deliberative forums is important) by showing the problematic effects of poorly designed deliberation in the MCS case and the positive consequences of well‐designed deliberation in response to endocrine disruption. Finally, the chapter shows that experts who study MCS and endocrine disruption could also gain valuable guidance by reflecting on the ethics of expertise developed in Chapter 6.

This chapter provides an overview of the book and a summary of each subsequent chapter. It highlights the volume's two major goals: to examine the range of methodological decisions and interpretive judgments that permeate policy‐relevant scientific research and to explore ways of making these choices more responsive to a range of public values (in addition to those of deep pockets, which have abundant resources to spend on research). It also introduces readers to the book's central case study, hormesis, which involves seemingly beneficial effects produced by low doses of substances that are normally toxic. Chapters 2 and 3 perform two preliminary tasks: (1) They clarify the major categories of value judgments that contribute to differing evaluations of the generalizability and regulatory implications of hormesis; and (2) they argue that societal values should not be completely excluded from influencing any of these categories of judgments. Chapters 4 through 6 develop the book's three primary lessons, corresponding to the three “bodies” that Sheila Jasanoff emphasizes as central to obtaining trustworthy public‐policy guidance from scientific experts. These lessons concern how to safeguard the body of scientific knowledge from interest groups, how to ascertain the best advisory bodies for guiding policy makers and directing the course of future research, and how to provide the bodies of experts themselves with an ethics of expertise. Chapter 7 argues that the lessons drawn in chapters 2 through 6 are applicable not only to the hormesis case but also to other areas of policy‐relevant research, such as endocrine disruption and multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS).

This final chapter reviews the book's major claims and considers important directions for future scholarship. The analyses in the preceding chapters suggest at least three promising avenues for future work: (1) further philosophical studies of the roles that various sorts of values should play in scientific research; (2) new scientific investigations of the biological effects of toxicants at low doses; and (3) ongoing social‐scientific research on how to incorporate a representative range of societal values in science. Regarding the role of values in science, leading philosophers of science disagree both about the extent to which scientific theory choice is underdetermined by epistemic values and about the conditions under which nonepistemic values should be employed in resolving this underdetermination. Related questions include whether the conceptual distinction between epistemic and nonepistemic values holds up to critical scrutiny and whether it is possible to draw a convincing distinction between practical decisions about how to act and epistemic judgments about what to believe. Regarding new scientific investigations, it is probably more important in the near future for scientific research to focus on hazards like endocrine disruption and toxic‐chemical mixtures than on hormesis, especially because sensitive populations like children are probably already exposed to mixtures of toxicants at levels above the hormetic dose range. Nevertheless, hormesis research may still be valuable in some fields, such as pharmaceutical development. Finally, with respect to social‐science research, it would be helpful to develop new strategies for addressing conflicts of interest, new research on the sorts of deliberative mechanisms that are effective in particular contexts, and further studies on how to effectively disseminate scientific information to its recipients.