Nicholas L. Sturgeon
David Copp (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195147797
- eISBN:
- 9780199785841
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195147790.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Ethical naturalism holds that ethical facts about such matters as good and bad, right and wrong, are part of a purely natural world — the world studied by the sciences. It is supported by the ...
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Ethical naturalism holds that ethical facts about such matters as good and bad, right and wrong, are part of a purely natural world — the world studied by the sciences. It is supported by the apparent reasonableness of many moral explanations. It has been thought to face an epistemological challenge because of the existence of an “is-ought gap”; it also faces metaphysical objections from philosophers who hold that ethical facts would have to be supernatural or “nonnatural,” sometimes on the grounds that ethical thought has a practical role that no thought about purely natural facts could have. Its defenders have argued resourcefully against these challenges.Less
Ethical naturalism holds that ethical facts about such matters as good and bad, right and wrong, are part of a purely natural world — the world studied by the sciences. It is supported by the apparent reasonableness of many moral explanations. It has been thought to face an epistemological challenge because of the existence of an “is-ought gap”; it also faces metaphysical objections from philosophers who hold that ethical facts would have to be supernatural or “nonnatural,” sometimes on the grounds that ethical thought has a practical role that no thought about purely natural facts could have. Its defenders have argued resourcefully against these challenges.
Tristram McPherson
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199653492
- eISBN:
- 9780191741661
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
It is widely accepted that the ethical supervenes on the natural, where this is roughly the claim that it is impossible for two circumstances to be identical in all natural respects, but different in ...
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It is widely accepted that the ethical supervenes on the natural, where this is roughly the claim that it is impossible for two circumstances to be identical in all natural respects, but different in their ethical respects. This chapter refines and defends the traditional thought that this fact poses a significant challenge to ethical non-naturalism, a view on which ethical properties are fundamentally different in kind from natural properties. The challenge can be encapsulated in three core claims which the chapter defends: that a defensible non-naturalism is committed to the supervenience of the ethical, that this commits the non-naturalist to a brute necessary connection between properties of distinct kinds, and that commitment to such brute connections counts against the non-naturalist’s view. Each of these claims has recently been challenged. Against Nicholas Sturgeon’s recent doubts about the dialectical force of supervenience, this chapter defends a supervenience thesis as deserving to be common ground among ethical realists. It is then argued that attempts to explain supervenience on behalf of the non-naturalist either fail as explanations, generate near-identical explanatory burdens elsewhere, or appeal to commitments that are inconsistent with core motivations for non-naturalism. The chapter concludes that, suitably refined, the traditional argument against non-naturalism from supervenience is alive and well.Less
It is widely accepted that the ethical supervenes on the natural, where this is roughly the claim that it is impossible for two circumstances to be identical in all natural respects, but different in their ethical respects. This chapter refines and defends the traditional thought that this fact poses a significant challenge to ethical non-naturalism, a view on which ethical properties are fundamentally different in kind from natural properties. The challenge can be encapsulated in three core claims which the chapter defends: that a defensible non-naturalism is committed to the supervenience of the ethical, that this commits the non-naturalist to a brute necessary connection between properties of distinct kinds, and that commitment to such brute connections counts against the non-naturalist’s view. Each of these claims has recently been challenged. Against Nicholas Sturgeon’s recent doubts about the dialectical force of supervenience, this chapter defends a supervenience thesis as deserving to be common ground among ethical realists. It is then argued that attempts to explain supervenience on behalf of the non-naturalist either fail as explanations, generate near-identical explanatory burdens elsewhere, or appeal to commitments that are inconsistent with core motivations for non-naturalism. The chapter concludes that, suitably refined, the traditional argument against non-naturalism from supervenience is alive and well.
Russ Shafer-Landau
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199259755
- eISBN:
- 9780191601835
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199259755.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Defends ethical non‐naturalism. Presents G. E. Moore's open question argument as the basis for drawing a natural/non‐natural divide, and discusses various ways of marking the distinction between the ...
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Defends ethical non‐naturalism. Presents G. E. Moore's open question argument as the basis for drawing a natural/non‐natural divide, and discusses various ways of marking the distinction between the natural and the non‐natural. Includes criticisms of ethical naturalism.Less
Defends ethical non‐naturalism. Presents G. E. Moore's open question argument as the basis for drawing a natural/non‐natural divide, and discusses various ways of marking the distinction between the natural and the non‐natural. Includes criticisms of ethical naturalism.
Rosalind Hursthouse
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199247998
- eISBN:
- 9780191597756
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199247994.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
On Virtue Ethics is an exposition and defence of neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics. The first part discusses the ways in which it can provide action guidance and action assessment, which ...
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On Virtue Ethics is an exposition and defence of neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics. The first part discusses the ways in which it can provide action guidance and action assessment, which are usually given by the v‐rules—rules generated from the names of the virtues and vices such as ‘Do what is honest’, ‘Do not do what is dishonest’. That such rules may (apparently) conflict, leads to an exploration of the virtue ethics approach to resolvable, irresolvable, and tragic dilemmas. The second part is about the role of the emotions in virtue and vice, since it examines the inculcation of racism through the miseducation of the emotions. Kant and Aristotle are compared on the question of moral motivation, and a virtue ethics’ account of acting ‘from a sense of duty’ provided. The third part is on ‘the rationality of morality’ in relation to virtue ethics, the question of whether there is any ‘objective’ criterion for a certain character trait being a virtue. The standard neo‐Aristotelian premise that ‘A virtue is a character trait a human being needs for eudaimonia, to flourish or live well’ should be regarded as encapsulating two interrelated claims, namely, that the virtues benefit their possessor, and that the virtues make their possessor good qua human being (human beings need the virtues in order to live a characteristically good human life.) The second claim is defended in terms of a form of ethical naturalism—the enterprise of basing ethics in some way on considerations of human nature—but a form that explicitly disavows any pretensions to being purely scientific.Less
On Virtue Ethics is an exposition and defence of neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics. The first part discusses the ways in which it can provide action guidance and action assessment, which are usually given by the v‐rules—rules generated from the names of the virtues and vices such as ‘Do what is honest’, ‘Do not do what is dishonest’. That such rules may (apparently) conflict, leads to an exploration of the virtue ethics approach to resolvable, irresolvable, and tragic dilemmas. The second part is about the role of the emotions in virtue and vice, since it examines the inculcation of racism through the miseducation of the emotions. Kant and Aristotle are compared on the question of moral motivation, and a virtue ethics’ account of acting ‘from a sense of duty’ provided. The third part is on ‘the rationality of morality’ in relation to virtue ethics, the question of whether there is any ‘objective’ criterion for a certain character trait being a virtue. The standard neo‐Aristotelian premise that ‘A virtue is a character trait a human being needs for eudaimonia, to flourish or live well’ should be regarded as encapsulating two interrelated claims, namely, that the virtues benefit their possessor, and that the virtues make their possessor good qua human being (human beings need the virtues in order to live a characteristically good human life.) The second claim is defended in terms of a form of ethical naturalism—the enterprise of basing ethics in some way on considerations of human nature—but a form that explicitly disavows any pretensions to being purely scientific.
Rosalind Hursthouse
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199247998
- eISBN:
- 9780191597756
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199247994.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Ethical naturalism is not to be construed as the attempt to ground ethical evaluations in a scientific account of human nature; ethical evaluations are disanalogous to non‐ethical ones in various ...
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Ethical naturalism is not to be construed as the attempt to ground ethical evaluations in a scientific account of human nature; ethical evaluations are disanalogous to non‐ethical ones in various ways. Both depend upon our identifying what is characteristic of the species in question. But the other animals’ characteristic ways of going on are many, and ours is just one—a rational way—which introduces a normative aspect.Less
Ethical naturalism is not to be construed as the attempt to ground ethical evaluations in a scientific account of human nature; ethical evaluations are disanalogous to non‐ethical ones in various ways. Both depend upon our identifying what is characteristic of the species in question. But the other animals’ characteristic ways of going on are many, and ours is just one—a rational way—which introduces a normative aspect.
James Griffin
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198752318
- eISBN:
- 9780191597541
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198752318.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The book asks how, and how much, we can improve our ethical standards—not lift our behaviour closer to our standards but refine the standards themselves. To answer this question requires answering ...
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The book asks how, and how much, we can improve our ethical standards—not lift our behaviour closer to our standards but refine the standards themselves. To answer this question requires answering most of the major questions of ethics. So the book includes a discussion of what a good life is like, where the bounds of the natural world come, how values relate to that world (e.g. naturalism, realism), how great human capacities—the ones important to ethics—are, and where moral norms come from. Throughout the book, the question of what philosophy can contribute to ethics arises. Philosophical traditions, such as most forms of utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics, are, the book contends, too ambitious. Ethics cannot be what philosophers in those traditions expect it to be because agents cannot be what these philosophies require them to be. The book starts by questioning the adequacy of both appeals to intuition and the coherence method of justification in ethics (e.g. wide reflective equilibrium) and ends with a description of the sort of justification available to us.Less
The book asks how, and how much, we can improve our ethical standards—not lift our behaviour closer to our standards but refine the standards themselves. To answer this question requires answering most of the major questions of ethics. So the book includes a discussion of what a good life is like, where the bounds of the natural world come, how values relate to that world (e.g. naturalism, realism), how great human capacities—the ones important to ethics—are, and where moral norms come from. Throughout the book, the question of what philosophy can contribute to ethics arises. Philosophical traditions, such as most forms of utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics, are, the book contends, too ambitious. Ethics cannot be what philosophers in those traditions expect it to be because agents cannot be what these philosophies require them to be. The book starts by questioning the adequacy of both appeals to intuition and the coherence method of justification in ethics (e.g. wide reflective equilibrium) and ends with a description of the sort of justification available to us.
Rosalind Hursthouse
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199247998
- eISBN:
- 9780191597756
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199247994.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Virtues are those character traits that make a human being a good human being— those traits that human beings need to live well as human beings, to live a characteristically human life. Ethical ...
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Virtues are those character traits that make a human being a good human being— those traits that human beings need to live well as human beings, to live a characteristically human life. Ethical evaluations of human beings as good or bad are taken to be analogous to evaluations of other living things as good or bad specimens of their kind, as Foot has argued. This naturalism reveals that several features of ethical evaluation thought to be peculiar to it, and inimical to its objectivity, are present in the quasi‐scientific evaluation, even of plants.Less
Virtues are those character traits that make a human being a good human being— those traits that human beings need to live well as human beings, to live a characteristically human life. Ethical evaluations of human beings as good or bad are taken to be analogous to evaluations of other living things as good or bad specimens of their kind, as Foot has argued. This naturalism reveals that several features of ethical evaluation thought to be peculiar to it, and inimical to its objectivity, are present in the quasi‐scientific evaluation, even of plants.
Anthony J. Lisska
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198269670
- eISBN:
- 9780191683732
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269670.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This new critique of Aquinas' theory of natural law presents an incisive, new analysis of the central themes and relevant texts in the Summa Theologiae, which became the classical canon for natural ...
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This new critique of Aquinas' theory of natural law presents an incisive, new analysis of the central themes and relevant texts in the Summa Theologiae, which became the classical canon for natural law. The author discusses Aquinas' view of ethical naturalism within the context of the contemporary revival and recovery of Aristotelian ethics, arguing that Aquinas is fundamentally Aristotelian in the foundations of his moral theory. The book looks at the historical development of natural law themes in the twentieth century, and in particular demonstrates the important connections between Aquinas and contemporary legal philosophers. The book should be of considerable interest to scholars of jurisprudence as well as philosophers.Less
This new critique of Aquinas' theory of natural law presents an incisive, new analysis of the central themes and relevant texts in the Summa Theologiae, which became the classical canon for natural law. The author discusses Aquinas' view of ethical naturalism within the context of the contemporary revival and recovery of Aristotelian ethics, arguing that Aquinas is fundamentally Aristotelian in the foundations of his moral theory. The book looks at the historical development of natural law themes in the twentieth century, and in particular demonstrates the important connections between Aquinas and contemporary legal philosophers. The book should be of considerable interest to scholars of jurisprudence as well as philosophers.
Chad Hansen
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9789888028931
- eISBN:
- 9789882209800
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Hong Kong University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5790/hongkong/9789888028931.003.0015
- Subject:
- Society and Culture, Asian Studies
Modern ethical naturalism has the challenge of showing how normativity, broadly speaking, is a feature of the natural world—a description, roughly, acceptable in the language of modern natural ...
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Modern ethical naturalism has the challenge of showing how normativity, broadly speaking, is a feature of the natural world—a description, roughly, acceptable in the language of modern natural science. The concept of dào can be used in expressing a positivist traditionalism, social or rational constructivism, or emotivism, among other positions, as well as naturalism. This chapter refines claims about the overall role and value of a concept in normative language that functions as dào does. It discusses Mackie's queerness objection to ethical naturalism and briefly illustrates how it envisions dào-like concepts dispelling it. The chapter also argues that normative claims explicated in natural dào terms would not seem as strange, particularly given other salient features of Chinese normative vocabulary. Furthermore, it briefly sketches a picture of the larger gradations in plausible naturalistic stories illustrating continuity in the emergence of normative from natural dàos.Less
Modern ethical naturalism has the challenge of showing how normativity, broadly speaking, is a feature of the natural world—a description, roughly, acceptable in the language of modern natural science. The concept of dào can be used in expressing a positivist traditionalism, social or rational constructivism, or emotivism, among other positions, as well as naturalism. This chapter refines claims about the overall role and value of a concept in normative language that functions as dào does. It discusses Mackie's queerness objection to ethical naturalism and briefly illustrates how it envisions dào-like concepts dispelling it. The chapter also argues that normative claims explicated in natural dào terms would not seem as strange, particularly given other salient features of Chinese normative vocabulary. Furthermore, it briefly sketches a picture of the larger gradations in plausible naturalistic stories illustrating continuity in the emergence of normative from natural dàos.
Anthony J. Lisska
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198269670
- eISBN:
- 9780191683732
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269670.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter examines how Thomas Aquinas' natural law ethical theory might fit into the programme of contemporary moral and legal discussions. The analyses in this chapter indicate how Aristotle and ...
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This chapter examines how Thomas Aquinas' natural law ethical theory might fit into the programme of contemporary moral and legal discussions. The analyses in this chapter indicate how Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas might resolve the is/ought problem and transcend the naturalistic fallacy. This chapter identifies several principles that Aquinas needs to assume in order for his theory of natural law to be a consistent theory of ethical naturalism. These principles include a theory of natural kinds, a metaphysics of finality, and a consistent theory of practical reason.Less
This chapter examines how Thomas Aquinas' natural law ethical theory might fit into the programme of contemporary moral and legal discussions. The analyses in this chapter indicate how Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas might resolve the is/ought problem and transcend the naturalistic fallacy. This chapter identifies several principles that Aquinas needs to assume in order for his theory of natural law to be a consistent theory of ethical naturalism. These principles include a theory of natural kinds, a metaphysics of finality, and a consistent theory of practical reason.
Anthony J. Lisska
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198269670
- eISBN:
- 9780191683732
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269670.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter proposes a reconstruction of Thomas Aquinas' theory of natural law. It aims to elucidate the texts and the metaphysics underlying Aquinas' moral theory using an approach called ...
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This chapter proposes a reconstruction of Thomas Aquinas' theory of natural law. It aims to elucidate the texts and the metaphysics underlying Aquinas' moral theory using an approach called structural history of philosophy. The analyses of the texts considered several issues central to the moral theory in natural law. These include the presuppositions of the theory, the structure of the argument, the place of Aquinas' ethical naturalism in contemporary meta-ethics, and traditional objections to ethical naturalism.Less
This chapter proposes a reconstruction of Thomas Aquinas' theory of natural law. It aims to elucidate the texts and the metaphysics underlying Aquinas' moral theory using an approach called structural history of philosophy. The analyses of the texts considered several issues central to the moral theory in natural law. These include the presuppositions of the theory, the structure of the argument, the place of Aquinas' ethical naturalism in contemporary meta-ethics, and traditional objections to ethical naturalism.
James Griffin
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198752318
- eISBN:
- 9780191597541
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198752318.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Can values be reduced to facts about nature? There are different forms of ethical naturalism: conceptual naturalism (that value‐terms are definable in natural terms, a view that G.E. Moore famously ...
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Can values be reduced to facts about nature? There are different forms of ethical naturalism: conceptual naturalism (that value‐terms are definable in natural terms, a view that G.E. Moore famously denounced as ‘the naturalistic fallacy’) and substantive naturalism (that certain matters of value in effect come down to certain matters about the natural world). Both these forms of naturalism bring us up against the fuzziness of the notion of the ‘natural’. In this connection, the chapter considers whether values supervene on natural properties, and ends with doubts that they do. The chapter then proposes a third form of naturalism: expansive naturalism, in which the boundaries of the ‘natural’ are pushed outward a bit, in a duly motivated way, with the effect that they now encompass basic human interests and so prudential values.Less
Can values be reduced to facts about nature? There are different forms of ethical naturalism: conceptual naturalism (that value‐terms are definable in natural terms, a view that G.E. Moore famously denounced as ‘the naturalistic fallacy’) and substantive naturalism (that certain matters of value in effect come down to certain matters about the natural world). Both these forms of naturalism bring us up against the fuzziness of the notion of the ‘natural’. In this connection, the chapter considers whether values supervene on natural properties, and ends with doubts that they do. The chapter then proposes a third form of naturalism: expansive naturalism, in which the boundaries of the ‘natural’ are pushed outward a bit, in a duly motivated way, with the effect that they now encompass basic human interests and so prudential values.
Angus Ritchie
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199652518
- eISBN:
- 9780191745850
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652518.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter examines John McDowell's ‘re-enchanted’ naturalism; a position that builds on Foot's and seeks to answer the objection advanced in Chapter 5. After offering an exposition of McDowell's ...
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This chapter examines John McDowell's ‘re-enchanted’ naturalism; a position that builds on Foot's and seeks to answer the objection advanced in Chapter 5. After offering an exposition of McDowell's wider position, the chapter defends the legitimacy of a demand for an explanation of the reliability of human moral cognition against McDowell's quietism. It seeks to demonstrate both that an explanation is required, and that McDowell cannot provide one. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of David Wiggins' weaker conception of objectivity in ethics. It argues that Wiggins' position offers further confirmation of the central thesis of the book: that the explanatory gap is only evaded by positions which fail to do justice to our pre-philosophical commitments.Less
This chapter examines John McDowell's ‘re-enchanted’ naturalism; a position that builds on Foot's and seeks to answer the objection advanced in Chapter 5. After offering an exposition of McDowell's wider position, the chapter defends the legitimacy of a demand for an explanation of the reliability of human moral cognition against McDowell's quietism. It seeks to demonstrate both that an explanation is required, and that McDowell cannot provide one. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of David Wiggins' weaker conception of objectivity in ethics. It argues that Wiggins' position offers further confirmation of the central thesis of the book: that the explanatory gap is only evaded by positions which fail to do justice to our pre-philosophical commitments.
Arthur N. Prior
- Published in print:
- 1963
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198241577
- eISBN:
- 9780191680380
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198241577.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Moral Philosophy
This chapter discusses and explains what Professor G. E. Moore calls naturalistic fallacy, and what he considers to be involved in its fallaciousness. The chapter also gives reasons regarding Moore’s ...
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This chapter discusses and explains what Professor G. E. Moore calls naturalistic fallacy, and what he considers to be involved in its fallaciousness. The chapter also gives reasons regarding Moore’s argument, not as disproving ethical naturalism itself, but as exposing an inconsistency into which some naturalists have fallen. Naturalistic fallacy is defined by Moore as the assumption that because some quality or combination of qualities invariably and necessarily accompanies the quality of goodness, or is invariably and necessarily accompanied by it, or both, this quality or combination of qualities is identical with goodness.Less
This chapter discusses and explains what Professor G. E. Moore calls naturalistic fallacy, and what he considers to be involved in its fallaciousness. The chapter also gives reasons regarding Moore’s argument, not as disproving ethical naturalism itself, but as exposing an inconsistency into which some naturalists have fallen. Naturalistic fallacy is defined by Moore as the assumption that because some quality or combination of qualities invariably and necessarily accompanies the quality of goodness, or is invariably and necessarily accompanied by it, or both, this quality or combination of qualities is identical with goodness.
C. Stephen Evans
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199696680
- eISBN:
- 9780191744266
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696680.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion, Theology
This chapter considers a number of metaethical accounts which are often regarded as rivals to a divine command account. The chapter argues that some of them, such as ethical naturalism, ethical ...
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This chapter considers a number of metaethical accounts which are often regarded as rivals to a divine command account. The chapter argues that some of them, such as ethical naturalism, ethical non-naturalism, and sensibility theories, are actually not rivals to a divine command account when developed in a reasonable form. Error theory, while certainly a rival, also provides support for a divine command account at key points. The chapter argues that varieties of expressivism fail adequately to account for the objectivity and authority of moral obligations. Some constructivist accounts, such as social contract theories, also have these defects, and fail to explain the universality of moral obligations as well. Other constructivist accounts, such as that of Christine Korsgaard, turn out to be forms of moral realism on close inspection, and are compatible with a divine command view when developed in accordance with Kant's account.Less
This chapter considers a number of metaethical accounts which are often regarded as rivals to a divine command account. The chapter argues that some of them, such as ethical naturalism, ethical non-naturalism, and sensibility theories, are actually not rivals to a divine command account when developed in a reasonable form. Error theory, while certainly a rival, also provides support for a divine command account at key points. The chapter argues that varieties of expressivism fail adequately to account for the objectivity and authority of moral obligations. Some constructivist accounts, such as social contract theories, also have these defects, and fail to explain the universality of moral obligations as well. Other constructivist accounts, such as that of Christine Korsgaard, turn out to be forms of moral realism on close inspection, and are compatible with a divine command view when developed in accordance with Kant's account.
Angus Ritchie
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199652518
- eISBN:
- 9780191745850
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652518.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter evaluates Philippa Foot's moral philosophy, applying the three standards she sets for a satisfactory account — namely that it should vindicate our fundamental moral commitments; explain ...
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This chapter evaluates Philippa Foot's moral philosophy, applying the three standards she sets for a satisfactory account — namely that it should vindicate our fundamental moral commitments; explain the epistemic access humans have to moral truths within a secular framework; and provide an adequate explanation of situations where human flourishing is not to be identified with maximising survival — for the individual or the collective. It considers in turn her account of the objective qualities and defects of living things in general; her application of this to human beings and their wills; and her account of why such facts ought to motivate agents to behave well. The chapter argues that her account only meets the first of her three standards — and that what is required is a notion of objective moral correctness which transcends the species-relative property of goodness upon which Foot has to rely.Less
This chapter evaluates Philippa Foot's moral philosophy, applying the three standards she sets for a satisfactory account — namely that it should vindicate our fundamental moral commitments; explain the epistemic access humans have to moral truths within a secular framework; and provide an adequate explanation of situations where human flourishing is not to be identified with maximising survival — for the individual or the collective. It considers in turn her account of the objective qualities and defects of living things in general; her application of this to human beings and their wills; and her account of why such facts ought to motivate agents to behave well. The chapter argues that her account only meets the first of her three standards — and that what is required is a notion of objective moral correctness which transcends the species-relative property of goodness upon which Foot has to rely.
Anthony J. Lisska
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199767175
- eISBN:
- 9780199979592
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199767175.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Recent scholarship argues that William of Ockham was not the radical voluntarist that historians of philosophy sometimes claimed. This “revisionist” account depends upon a reading of “recta ratio”. ...
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Recent scholarship argues that William of Ockham was not the radical voluntarist that historians of philosophy sometimes claimed. This “revisionist” account depends upon a reading of “recta ratio”. Brian Tierney posits Ockham as a “rationalist” while Janet Coleman suggests that Ockham's right action is “objectively rational”. This chapter articulates Aquinas's use of recta ratio, indicates differences with Ockham, and suggests that Ockham is at most a “good reasons philosopher.” Aquinas defines human nature as a natural kind determined by dispositional properties with the final cause rooted in the formal cause. Ockham rejects a cluster of concepts Aquinas uses in spelling out his theory of natural law—natural kind, substantial form, intellect superior to will, final cause—all of which are necessary conditions for Aquinas's Aristotelian-based meta-ethics, which is a form of ethical naturalism. Ockham's use of recta ratio is less robust; if Ockham is a rationalist, it is at best a quite limited version of medieval rationalism.Less
Recent scholarship argues that William of Ockham was not the radical voluntarist that historians of philosophy sometimes claimed. This “revisionist” account depends upon a reading of “recta ratio”. Brian Tierney posits Ockham as a “rationalist” while Janet Coleman suggests that Ockham's right action is “objectively rational”. This chapter articulates Aquinas's use of recta ratio, indicates differences with Ockham, and suggests that Ockham is at most a “good reasons philosopher.” Aquinas defines human nature as a natural kind determined by dispositional properties with the final cause rooted in the formal cause. Ockham rejects a cluster of concepts Aquinas uses in spelling out his theory of natural law—natural kind, substantial form, intellect superior to will, final cause—all of which are necessary conditions for Aquinas's Aristotelian-based meta-ethics, which is a form of ethical naturalism. Ockham's use of recta ratio is less robust; if Ockham is a rationalist, it is at best a quite limited version of medieval rationalism.
Frank Jackson
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- March 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780199653836
- eISBN:
- 9780191823916
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653836.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
A version of ethical naturalism is defended against Parfit’s criticisms. The implications of the grounding of the ethical in the non-ethical and of the supervenience of the ethical on the non-ethical ...
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A version of ethical naturalism is defended against Parfit’s criticisms. The implications of the grounding of the ethical in the non-ethical and of the supervenience of the ethical on the non-ethical play major roles here. Reasons for rejecting Parfit’s triviality argument, and the related argument from real disagreement, against naturalism are given. These reasons are set in the context of discussions of how to understand what is going on when theorists debate, for example, what it takes to be the hypothesis best supported by a body of data or the nature of motion. The version of naturalism defended is a species of reductionism in ethics akin to the doctrine Parfit refers to as hard naturalism, with the difference that the version defended insists on the importance of ethical concepts. However, the author agrees with Parfit that the doctrine he calls soft naturalism is to be rejected.Less
A version of ethical naturalism is defended against Parfit’s criticisms. The implications of the grounding of the ethical in the non-ethical and of the supervenience of the ethical on the non-ethical play major roles here. Reasons for rejecting Parfit’s triviality argument, and the related argument from real disagreement, against naturalism are given. These reasons are set in the context of discussions of how to understand what is going on when theorists debate, for example, what it takes to be the hypothesis best supported by a body of data or the nature of motion. The version of naturalism defended is a species of reductionism in ethics akin to the doctrine Parfit refers to as hard naturalism, with the difference that the version defended insists on the importance of ethical concepts. However, the author agrees with Parfit that the doctrine he calls soft naturalism is to be rejected.
Anthony Rudd
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199660049
- eISBN:
- 9780191744976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660049.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Moral Philosophy
Detailed critical consideration of Frankfurt’s evaluative anti-realism, Korsgaard’s constructivism and Philippa Foot’s neo-Aristotelian naturalism, gives further (negative) support to Kierkegaard’s ...
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Detailed critical consideration of Frankfurt’s evaluative anti-realism, Korsgaard’s constructivism and Philippa Foot’s neo-Aristotelian naturalism, gives further (negative) support to Kierkegaard’s Platonic thesis that a proper relationship to an objective Good is needed for the elements that are constitutive of selfhood to be held in creative tension. Frankfurt’s insistence that our basic cares and loves are brute psychological facts that cannot be further evaluated, unacceptably exaggerates our immanence. Korsgaard’s interpretation of autonomy leads her to reject the idea of objective values to which our choices should be answerable, and her consequent ultimate valuing of the sheer capacity for choice itself exaggerates our capacity for transcendence. And Foot’s naturalism, which tries to understand human goodness by analogy to the ‘natural goodness’ of other animals which realise their biological potentials, fails to fully recognize our capacity to stand back from our given natures, and thus also exaggerates our immanence.Less
Detailed critical consideration of Frankfurt’s evaluative anti-realism, Korsgaard’s constructivism and Philippa Foot’s neo-Aristotelian naturalism, gives further (negative) support to Kierkegaard’s Platonic thesis that a proper relationship to an objective Good is needed for the elements that are constitutive of selfhood to be held in creative tension. Frankfurt’s insistence that our basic cares and loves are brute psychological facts that cannot be further evaluated, unacceptably exaggerates our immanence. Korsgaard’s interpretation of autonomy leads her to reject the idea of objective values to which our choices should be answerable, and her consequent ultimate valuing of the sheer capacity for choice itself exaggerates our capacity for transcendence. And Foot’s naturalism, which tries to understand human goodness by analogy to the ‘natural goodness’ of other animals which realise their biological potentials, fails to fully recognize our capacity to stand back from our given natures, and thus also exaggerates our immanence.
Sylvia Berryman
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- April 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198835004
- eISBN:
- 9780191876561
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198835004.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
The use of substantive appeals to human nature to justify slavery and the subordination of women, as well as to argue for the polis as the ideal form of political organization, are prominent features ...
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The use of substantive appeals to human nature to justify slavery and the subordination of women, as well as to argue for the polis as the ideal form of political organization, are prominent features of Book One of Aristotle’s Politics. These appeals seem like evidence for an Archimedean ethical naturalism. I argue against this conclusion, however, on the grounds that the Politics is an early work, and does not exhibit a notion of nature that could be investigated from a value-neutral or descriptive point of view. The notion of phusis found in the Politics is out of step with that of the biological work, adhering closer to the sophistic nomos–phusis distinction, i.e. a stand-in for the notion that certain practices are legitimate and not arbitrary impositions. The chapter concludes that Politics Book One does not support the case for Archimedean naturalism.Less
The use of substantive appeals to human nature to justify slavery and the subordination of women, as well as to argue for the polis as the ideal form of political organization, are prominent features of Book One of Aristotle’s Politics. These appeals seem like evidence for an Archimedean ethical naturalism. I argue against this conclusion, however, on the grounds that the Politics is an early work, and does not exhibit a notion of nature that could be investigated from a value-neutral or descriptive point of view. The notion of phusis found in the Politics is out of step with that of the biological work, adhering closer to the sophistic nomos–phusis distinction, i.e. a stand-in for the notion that certain practices are legitimate and not arbitrary impositions. The chapter concludes that Politics Book One does not support the case for Archimedean naturalism.