Webb Keane
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691167732
- eISBN:
- 9781400873593
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691167732.003.0002
- Subject:
- Anthropology, Social and Cultural Anthropology
This chapter explores some of the major findings in developmental, cognitive, and moral psychology that have been taken as evidence for the foundations of ethics. It looks at research on human ...
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This chapter explores some of the major findings in developmental, cognitive, and moral psychology that have been taken as evidence for the foundations of ethics. It looks at research on human capacities and propensities for things such as sharing and cooperation, intention-seeking, empathy, self-consciousness, norm-seeking and enforcement, discrimination, and role-swapping. While these human capacities are necessary, they are not sufficient conditions for ethical life. What they help explain is what it is about humans that makes them prone to taking an ethical stance. For the psychology of ethics to have a full social existence, it must be manifest in ways that are taken to be ethical by someone. Ethics must be embodied in certain palpable media such as words or deeds or bodily habits. The ethical implications must be at least potentially recognizable to other people.Less
This chapter explores some of the major findings in developmental, cognitive, and moral psychology that have been taken as evidence for the foundations of ethics. It looks at research on human capacities and propensities for things such as sharing and cooperation, intention-seeking, empathy, self-consciousness, norm-seeking and enforcement, discrimination, and role-swapping. While these human capacities are necessary, they are not sufficient conditions for ethical life. What they help explain is what it is about humans that makes them prone to taking an ethical stance. For the psychology of ethics to have a full social existence, it must be manifest in ways that are taken to be ethical by someone. Ethics must be embodied in certain palpable media such as words or deeds or bodily habits. The ethical implications must be at least potentially recognizable to other people.
Webb Keane
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691167732
- eISBN:
- 9781400873593
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691167732.001.0001
- Subject:
- Anthropology, Social and Cultural Anthropology
The human propensity to take an ethical stance toward oneself and others is found in every known society, yet we also know that values taken for granted in one society can contradict those in ...
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The human propensity to take an ethical stance toward oneself and others is found in every known society, yet we also know that values taken for granted in one society can contradict those in another. Does ethical life arise from human nature itself? Is it a universal human trait? Or is it a product of one's cultural and historical context? This book offers a new approach to the empirical study of ethical life that reconciles these questions, showing how ethics arise at the intersection of human biology and social dynamics. Drawing on the latest findings in psychology, conversational interaction, ethnography, and history, the book takes readers from inner city America to Samoa and the Inuit Arctic to reveal how we are creatures of our biology as well as our history—and how our ethical lives are contingent on both. The book looks at Melanesian theories of mind and the training of Buddhist monks, and discusses important social causes such as the British abolitionist movement and American feminism. It explores how styles of child rearing, notions of the person, and moral codes in different communities elaborate on certain basic human tendencies while suppressing or ignoring others. Certain to provoke debate, the book presents an entirely new way of thinking about ethics, morals, and the factors that shape them.Less
The human propensity to take an ethical stance toward oneself and others is found in every known society, yet we also know that values taken for granted in one society can contradict those in another. Does ethical life arise from human nature itself? Is it a universal human trait? Or is it a product of one's cultural and historical context? This book offers a new approach to the empirical study of ethical life that reconciles these questions, showing how ethics arise at the intersection of human biology and social dynamics. Drawing on the latest findings in psychology, conversational interaction, ethnography, and history, the book takes readers from inner city America to Samoa and the Inuit Arctic to reveal how we are creatures of our biology as well as our history—and how our ethical lives are contingent on both. The book looks at Melanesian theories of mind and the training of Buddhist monks, and discusses important social causes such as the British abolitionist movement and American feminism. It explores how styles of child rearing, notions of the person, and moral codes in different communities elaborate on certain basic human tendencies while suppressing or ignoring others. Certain to provoke debate, the book presents an entirely new way of thinking about ethics, morals, and the factors that shape them.
JOHN E. HARE
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198269571
- eISBN:
- 9780191683701
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269571.003.0009
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion, Theology
This chapter examines philosopher Soren Kirkegaard’s thoughts on the Christian doctrine of repentance in relation to the question on moral gap. It analyses the characters of Judge William, the ...
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This chapter examines philosopher Soren Kirkegaard’s thoughts on the Christian doctrine of repentance in relation to the question on moral gap. It analyses the characters of Judge William, the judge’s friend, and the pastor in Kirkegaard’s Either/Or. It shows that Judge William’s use of Christian doctrine is very similar to Immanuel Kant’s translation of this doctrine within the pure religion of reason. This chapter describes the stages of transition that Judge William sees from the aesthetic into the ethical life and explains the transition into the religious life using a retranslation of the judge’s account.Less
This chapter examines philosopher Soren Kirkegaard’s thoughts on the Christian doctrine of repentance in relation to the question on moral gap. It analyses the characters of Judge William, the judge’s friend, and the pastor in Kirkegaard’s Either/Or. It shows that Judge William’s use of Christian doctrine is very similar to Immanuel Kant’s translation of this doctrine within the pure religion of reason. This chapter describes the stages of transition that Judge William sees from the aesthetic into the ethical life and explains the transition into the religious life using a retranslation of the judge’s account.
H. S. Harris
- Published in print:
- 1983
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198246541
- eISBN:
- 9780191680991
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246541.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Hegel's first attempt to write a systematic treatise for use in connection with lectures on ‘natural law’ survived. This is the so-called ‘System of Ethical Life’. It presents a progressive ...
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Hegel's first attempt to write a systematic treatise for use in connection with lectures on ‘natural law’ survived. This is the so-called ‘System of Ethical Life’. It presents a progressive conceptual movement from an undeveloped intuition toward the conceptual whole that is implicit in it. What guides Hegel's whole argument is the positive intuition of the Absolute Idea. The rest of this chapter examines the intuition of life, the institution of property, the experience of liberty, and the Idea of the Community.Less
Hegel's first attempt to write a systematic treatise for use in connection with lectures on ‘natural law’ survived. This is the so-called ‘System of Ethical Life’. It presents a progressive conceptual movement from an undeveloped intuition toward the conceptual whole that is implicit in it. What guides Hegel's whole argument is the positive intuition of the Absolute Idea. The rest of this chapter examines the intuition of life, the institution of property, the experience of liberty, and the Idea of the Community.
Robert R. Williams
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199656059
- eISBN:
- 9780191744846
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656059.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter examines Hegel’s concept of tragedy from his Early Theological Writings, through the Phenomenology of Spirit to his Lectures on Aesthetics. Through the action of the tragic hero the main ...
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This chapter examines Hegel’s concept of tragedy from his Early Theological Writings, through the Phenomenology of Spirit to his Lectures on Aesthetics. Through the action of the tragic hero the main institutions of ethical life, the family and the state, come into conflict. In Hegel’s view the essence of tragedy is conflict, not a moral conflict between right and wrong, but a conflict between legitimate rights and institutions. Such conflict moves the unmovable, i.e., the norms and institutions of ethical life, threatening them with destruction. Such conflict arises out of the false consciousness of the tragic hero, who, convinced of his own rectitude, embodies a stubborn fixity of will that issues in one-sided action that both violates another legitimate right and plunges the hero into self-contradiction. S/he refuses to recognize what, if s/he were true to her/himself, s/he should honor. Like Aristotle Hegel believes in tragic resolution. In Hegel’s view the tragic resolution demands that the hero yield, give a little, recognize what s/he refuses, enlarge her perspective. If s/he yields, the drama does not have to end tragically; but if s/he refuses to yield, then the hero is destroyed by the very powers s/he refuses to recognize. The tragic resolution is constituted by a fundamental contrast: on the one hand, we are shattered by the destruction of one who is noble and excellent, but on the other we are fundamentally reconciled to this destruction because a conflict and loss of essential institutions that hold everything together would be even more unbearable. Hegel agrees with Nietzsche that the destruction of the hero, whose one-sided action threatens to destroy ethical life, is necessary, and is a healing, not as a fusion with primal being but rather the upholding of the essential rights and institutions of ethical life, the one as counterbalanced by the other.Less
This chapter examines Hegel’s concept of tragedy from his Early Theological Writings, through the Phenomenology of Spirit to his Lectures on Aesthetics. Through the action of the tragic hero the main institutions of ethical life, the family and the state, come into conflict. In Hegel’s view the essence of tragedy is conflict, not a moral conflict between right and wrong, but a conflict between legitimate rights and institutions. Such conflict moves the unmovable, i.e., the norms and institutions of ethical life, threatening them with destruction. Such conflict arises out of the false consciousness of the tragic hero, who, convinced of his own rectitude, embodies a stubborn fixity of will that issues in one-sided action that both violates another legitimate right and plunges the hero into self-contradiction. S/he refuses to recognize what, if s/he were true to her/himself, s/he should honor. Like Aristotle Hegel believes in tragic resolution. In Hegel’s view the tragic resolution demands that the hero yield, give a little, recognize what s/he refuses, enlarge her perspective. If s/he yields, the drama does not have to end tragically; but if s/he refuses to yield, then the hero is destroyed by the very powers s/he refuses to recognize. The tragic resolution is constituted by a fundamental contrast: on the one hand, we are shattered by the destruction of one who is noble and excellent, but on the other we are fundamentally reconciled to this destruction because a conflict and loss of essential institutions that hold everything together would be even more unbearable. Hegel agrees with Nietzsche that the destruction of the hero, whose one-sided action threatens to destroy ethical life, is necessary, and is a healing, not as a fusion with primal being but rather the upholding of the essential rights and institutions of ethical life, the one as counterbalanced by the other.
John E. Hare
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198269571
- eISBN:
- 9780191683701
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269571.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion, Theology
This book is about the gap between the moral demand on us and our natural capacities to meet it. The author starts with Kant’s statement of the moral demand and his acknowledgement of this gap. He ...
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This book is about the gap between the moral demand on us and our natural capacities to meet it. The author starts with Kant’s statement of the moral demand and his acknowledgement of this gap. He then analyses Kant’s use of the resources of the Christian tradition to make sense of this gap, especially the notions of revelation, providence, and God’s grace. Kant reflects the traditional way of making sense of this gap, which is to invoke God’s assistance in bridging it. The author goes on to examine various contemporary philosophers who do not use these resources. He considers three main strategies: exaggerating our natural capacities, diminishing the moral demand, and finding some naturalistic substitute for God’s assistance. He argues that these strategies do not work, and that we are therefore left with the gap and with the problem that it is unreasonable to demand of ourselves — a standard that we cannot reach. In the final section of the book, the author looks in more detail at the Christian doctrines of atonement, justification, and sanctification. He discusses Kierkegaard’s account of the relation between the ethical life and the Christian life, and ends by considering human forgiveness, and the ways in which God’s forgiveness is both like and unlike our forgiveness of each other.Less
This book is about the gap between the moral demand on us and our natural capacities to meet it. The author starts with Kant’s statement of the moral demand and his acknowledgement of this gap. He then analyses Kant’s use of the resources of the Christian tradition to make sense of this gap, especially the notions of revelation, providence, and God’s grace. Kant reflects the traditional way of making sense of this gap, which is to invoke God’s assistance in bridging it. The author goes on to examine various contemporary philosophers who do not use these resources. He considers three main strategies: exaggerating our natural capacities, diminishing the moral demand, and finding some naturalistic substitute for God’s assistance. He argues that these strategies do not work, and that we are therefore left with the gap and with the problem that it is unreasonable to demand of ourselves — a standard that we cannot reach. In the final section of the book, the author looks in more detail at the Christian doctrines of atonement, justification, and sanctification. He discusses Kierkegaard’s account of the relation between the ethical life and the Christian life, and ends by considering human forgiveness, and the ways in which God’s forgiveness is both like and unlike our forgiveness of each other.
KEN HIRSCHKOP
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198159612
- eISBN:
- 9780191673641
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198159612.003.0004
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
Bakhtin believed that the structure of language reflected the precepts of Christian ethics. He saw in language the substance of ethical life. The history of language was the history of social life. ...
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Bakhtin believed that the structure of language reflected the precepts of Christian ethics. He saw in language the substance of ethical life. The history of language was the history of social life. Bakhtin may have written a great deal about language and very little about religion but he may also have thought analysis of the first rendered discussion of the second superfluous. He argued that close attention to language reveals the ethical and event-like nature of the world. He attributed it to the aesthetic nature of language and later to the dialogical nature of language. He did not make the argument on the limitation of formal linguistics per se. He chose to discuss it in literary form, a novel. He made it clear that this self-confessed ‘system of languages’ was a model for the modern European vernaculars.Less
Bakhtin believed that the structure of language reflected the precepts of Christian ethics. He saw in language the substance of ethical life. The history of language was the history of social life. Bakhtin may have written a great deal about language and very little about religion but he may also have thought analysis of the first rendered discussion of the second superfluous. He argued that close attention to language reveals the ethical and event-like nature of the world. He attributed it to the aesthetic nature of language and later to the dialogical nature of language. He did not make the argument on the limitation of formal linguistics per se. He chose to discuss it in literary form, a novel. He made it clear that this self-confessed ‘system of languages’ was a model for the modern European vernaculars.
Karol Berger
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195128604
- eISBN:
- 9780199785803
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195128605.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
The repertory of mediated experiences allows us to begin deliberating on the question of how we should live, to choose the extent that it is possible through our actions and passions, and to justify ...
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The repertory of mediated experiences allows us to begin deliberating on the question of how we should live, to choose the extent that it is possible through our actions and passions, and to justify our choices. The most basic kinds of works — history, art, science, and philosophy — divide among themselves various tasks that allow us to understand ourselves and our world, to know how we should live. Since philosophy uses arguments to make explicit, criticize, and improve the norms that govern our already current practices, and hence its arguments cannot exist in separation from the representations of history and art, Hegel’s thesis of the end of art cannot stand. But art is more than an instrument of self-knowledge and self-invention; no less important than education is pleasure. The various views concerning the possible worth of the disinterested aesthetic pleasure that have been historically derived from Kant’s analysis: all variants of the claim that to the extent that we value human freedom, we must also value those activities in which the possibility of such freedom is most clearly and characteristically demonstrated, do not persuade; any pleasure, unless it is harmful, is self-evidently valuable and does not require any further arguments in its favor. It is argued that there is nothing inartistic or improper in deriving interested pleasures from the experience of art. Against puritanical moralists, it is argued that such interested pleasures may function not only as a means of self-escape or of corrupting the young and irresponsible, but also as a means of self-discovery, in which pleasure is edification.Less
The repertory of mediated experiences allows us to begin deliberating on the question of how we should live, to choose the extent that it is possible through our actions and passions, and to justify our choices. The most basic kinds of works — history, art, science, and philosophy — divide among themselves various tasks that allow us to understand ourselves and our world, to know how we should live. Since philosophy uses arguments to make explicit, criticize, and improve the norms that govern our already current practices, and hence its arguments cannot exist in separation from the representations of history and art, Hegel’s thesis of the end of art cannot stand. But art is more than an instrument of self-knowledge and self-invention; no less important than education is pleasure. The various views concerning the possible worth of the disinterested aesthetic pleasure that have been historically derived from Kant’s analysis: all variants of the claim that to the extent that we value human freedom, we must also value those activities in which the possibility of such freedom is most clearly and characteristically demonstrated, do not persuade; any pleasure, unless it is harmful, is self-evidently valuable and does not require any further arguments in its favor. It is argued that there is nothing inartistic or improper in deriving interested pleasures from the experience of art. Against puritanical moralists, it is argued that such interested pleasures may function not only as a means of self-escape or of corrupting the young and irresponsible, but also as a means of self-discovery, in which pleasure is edification.
Dean Moyar
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195391992
- eISBN:
- 9780199894659
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391992.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Chapter 4 gives an account of what agents do when they engage in ethical deliberation and an account of Hegel's model of justification in ethics. This chapter presents the work of Barbara Herman on ...
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Chapter 4 gives an account of what agents do when they engage in ethical deliberation and an account of Hegel's model of justification in ethics. This chapter presents the work of Barbara Herman on judgment and deliberation as a frame for understanding Hegel's concerns about moral reflection. The chapter argues that Hegel turns to the concepts of Spirit and Ethical Life as contexts of value that allow for objective resolutions of moral conflict. The operative model of justification is a Default and Challenge model, where individual beliefs are given default entitlement status but are subject to challenges from others. The chapter shows that Hegel's claims about the authority of conscience, and the dependence of conscience on the objective contexts of Ethical Life, show that he takes conscience to be the claim of default entitlement, and that properly understood it is subject to definite challenges but not to global skepticism.Less
Chapter 4 gives an account of what agents do when they engage in ethical deliberation and an account of Hegel's model of justification in ethics. This chapter presents the work of Barbara Herman on judgment and deliberation as a frame for understanding Hegel's concerns about moral reflection. The chapter argues that Hegel turns to the concepts of Spirit and Ethical Life as contexts of value that allow for objective resolutions of moral conflict. The operative model of justification is a Default and Challenge model, where individual beliefs are given default entitlement status but are subject to challenges from others. The chapter shows that Hegel's claims about the authority of conscience, and the dependence of conscience on the objective contexts of Ethical Life, show that he takes conscience to be the claim of default entitlement, and that properly understood it is subject to definite challenges but not to global skepticism.
Dean Moyar
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195391992
- eISBN:
- 9780199894659
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391992.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Chapter 6 brings the preceding analysis of practical reason to bear on the three main institutions in Hegel's account of Ethical Life, namely the family, Civil Society, and the State. One of the main ...
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Chapter 6 brings the preceding analysis of practical reason to bear on the three main institutions in Hegel's account of Ethical Life, namely the family, Civil Society, and the State. One of the main goals is to understand how individual subjectivity is respected and expressed within those institutions. The chapter shows that all three institutions exhibit structural features determined by the account of practical reason. In the case of Civil Society and the State the chapter show that there is a need for the authority of individual conscience even within the institutional contexts, and that the institutions are organized so that individuals can recognize institutional action as a function of their own agency. The institutions are not merely authorities over the actions of individuals, but they are contexts for the actions of individuals within which the right of self-consciousness can be satisfied.Less
Chapter 6 brings the preceding analysis of practical reason to bear on the three main institutions in Hegel's account of Ethical Life, namely the family, Civil Society, and the State. One of the main goals is to understand how individual subjectivity is respected and expressed within those institutions. The chapter shows that all three institutions exhibit structural features determined by the account of practical reason. In the case of Civil Society and the State the chapter show that there is a need for the authority of individual conscience even within the institutional contexts, and that the institutions are organized so that individuals can recognize institutional action as a function of their own agency. The institutions are not merely authorities over the actions of individuals, but they are contexts for the actions of individuals within which the right of self-consciousness can be satisfied.
Joseph Chan
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691158617
- eISBN:
- 9781400848690
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691158617.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter asserts that the principles of resource distribution in Menciuscan be conceived as principles of sufficiency. The aim of social justice, according to this perfectionist view, is to ...
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This chapter asserts that the principles of resource distribution in Menciuscan be conceived as principles of sufficiency. The aim of social justice, according to this perfectionist view, is to enable every member of a community to live a good life. What is morally significant is whether each person has sufficient resources to lead a good life, not whether each has the same amount. The Confucian conception of the good life sets a rough standard for sufficiency—namely, the amount a person generally needs to live a decent material life and feel secure enough to pursue the higher, ethical life. On the matter of distribution of resources, Confucian justice is not of an egalitarian but a sufficientarian view.Less
This chapter asserts that the principles of resource distribution in Menciuscan be conceived as principles of sufficiency. The aim of social justice, according to this perfectionist view, is to enable every member of a community to live a good life. What is morally significant is whether each person has sufficient resources to lead a good life, not whether each has the same amount. The Confucian conception of the good life sets a rough standard for sufficiency—namely, the amount a person generally needs to live a decent material life and feel secure enough to pursue the higher, ethical life. On the matter of distribution of resources, Confucian justice is not of an egalitarian but a sufficientarian view.
Terry Pinkard
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199860791
- eISBN:
- 9780199932986
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199860791.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
Whereas the Greek enlightenment brought Greek freedom to ruin, the modern European Enlightenment promises to bring Europe into a new state of freedom. That enlightened, rational freedom is, in ...
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Whereas the Greek enlightenment brought Greek freedom to ruin, the modern European Enlightenment promises to bring Europe into a new state of freedom. That enlightened, rational freedom is, in Hegel's view, now in the process of actualizing itself. That order consists of thinking of ourselves as having the normative status of “individuals,” which can be actualized only in determinate institutions and practices that support the even more determinate statuses of rights bearers and moral agents. Those two statuses themselves can be actualized only if our statuses as modern family members, burghers, and citizens is also actualized. Each of these statuses, however, brings in its wake a set of antinomies that threatens to undermine the whole.Less
Whereas the Greek enlightenment brought Greek freedom to ruin, the modern European Enlightenment promises to bring Europe into a new state of freedom. That enlightened, rational freedom is, in Hegel's view, now in the process of actualizing itself. That order consists of thinking of ourselves as having the normative status of “individuals,” which can be actualized only in determinate institutions and practices that support the even more determinate statuses of rights bearers and moral agents. Those two statuses themselves can be actualized only if our statuses as modern family members, burghers, and citizens is also actualized. Each of these statuses, however, brings in its wake a set of antinomies that threatens to undermine the whole.
Robert R. Williams
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199656059
- eISBN:
- 9780191744846
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656059.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter compares Aristotle, Hegel, and Nietzsche on the topic of friendship, love (philia), and community. Walter Kaufmann maintains that Nietzsche retrieves Aristotle’s view of noble friendship ...
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This chapter compares Aristotle, Hegel, and Nietzsche on the topic of friendship, love (philia), and community. Walter Kaufmann maintains that Nietzsche retrieves Aristotle’s view of noble friendship in the figure of the great soul (megalopsychos) because it includes relation to other in the self-relation, and thus appears to avoid the opposition between egoism and altruism that Nietzsche criticizes. However, Aristotle’s praise of megalopsychos is ambiguous because its relation to others is asymmetrical. Martha Nussbaum criticizes this asymmetry as a-social, and claims that the Nicomachean Ethics is an extended polemic against the view that virtue and the good life could be purely solitary. Aristotle’s claim is that the good life, including all the virtues, is social. It would be strange to make the good life solitary, for no one would choose the whole world on the condition of being alone, since man is a political creature and one whose nature it is to live with others. Moreover, Aristotle cannot formulate his concept of friendship (philia) without bringing in the concept of recognition. Hegel not only gets Aristotle’s point, but also agrees with Aristotle that love, philia, friendship are the intersubjective origins and foundations of justice and ethical life.Less
This chapter compares Aristotle, Hegel, and Nietzsche on the topic of friendship, love (philia), and community. Walter Kaufmann maintains that Nietzsche retrieves Aristotle’s view of noble friendship in the figure of the great soul (megalopsychos) because it includes relation to other in the self-relation, and thus appears to avoid the opposition between egoism and altruism that Nietzsche criticizes. However, Aristotle’s praise of megalopsychos is ambiguous because its relation to others is asymmetrical. Martha Nussbaum criticizes this asymmetry as a-social, and claims that the Nicomachean Ethics is an extended polemic against the view that virtue and the good life could be purely solitary. Aristotle’s claim is that the good life, including all the virtues, is social. It would be strange to make the good life solitary, for no one would choose the whole world on the condition of being alone, since man is a political creature and one whose nature it is to live with others. Moreover, Aristotle cannot formulate his concept of friendship (philia) without bringing in the concept of recognition. Hegel not only gets Aristotle’s point, but also agrees with Aristotle that love, philia, friendship are the intersubjective origins and foundations of justice and ethical life.
Shannon Sullivan and Dennis J. Schmidt
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- March 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823229734
- eISBN:
- 9780823235186
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823229734.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This introductory chapter talks about philosophy and its relation to thinking and living an ethical life. It presents an overview of the parts of the book, the essays included in this collection, and ...
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This introductory chapter talks about philosophy and its relation to thinking and living an ethical life. It presents an overview of the parts of the book, the essays included in this collection, and the key topics discussed in each essay.Less
This introductory chapter talks about philosophy and its relation to thinking and living an ethical life. It presents an overview of the parts of the book, the essays included in this collection, and the key topics discussed in each essay.
Andrew Kahn
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199234745
- eISBN:
- 9780191715747
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234745.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, 19th-century Literature and Romanticism, Poetry
Alexander Pushkin (1799-1837) is Russia's greatest poet, a ‘ founding father’ of modern Russian literature, and a major figure in world literature. His poetry and prose changed the course of Russian ...
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Alexander Pushkin (1799-1837) is Russia's greatest poet, a ‘ founding father’ of modern Russian literature, and a major figure in world literature. His poetry and prose changed the course of Russian culture, and his works inspired operas by Musorgsky and Tchaikovsky (as well as Peter Shaffer's Amadeus). This book's title refers to Pushkin's capacity to transform philosophical and aesthetic ideas into poetry. Arguing that Pushkin's poetry has often been misunderstood as transparently simple, this book traces the interrelation between his writing and the influences of English and European literature and cultural movements on his understanding of the creative process and the aims of art. The book approaches Pushkin's poetic texts through the history of ideas, and argues that in his poetry the clashes that matter are not about stylistic innovation and genre, as has often been suggested. Instead, the poems are shown to articulate a range of positions on key topics of the period, including the meaning of originality, the imagination, the status of the poet, the role of commercial success, the definition of genius, representation of nature, the definition of the hero, and the immortality of the soul. The book addresses how theories of inspiration informed Pushkin's thinking about classicism and Romanticism in the 1820s and 1830s. It looks at the intersection of Pushkin's knowledge of important ideas and artistic trends with poems about the creative imagination, psychology, sex and the body, heroism and the ethical life, and death.Less
Alexander Pushkin (1799-1837) is Russia's greatest poet, a ‘ founding father’ of modern Russian literature, and a major figure in world literature. His poetry and prose changed the course of Russian culture, and his works inspired operas by Musorgsky and Tchaikovsky (as well as Peter Shaffer's Amadeus). This book's title refers to Pushkin's capacity to transform philosophical and aesthetic ideas into poetry. Arguing that Pushkin's poetry has often been misunderstood as transparently simple, this book traces the interrelation between his writing and the influences of English and European literature and cultural movements on his understanding of the creative process and the aims of art. The book approaches Pushkin's poetic texts through the history of ideas, and argues that in his poetry the clashes that matter are not about stylistic innovation and genre, as has often been suggested. Instead, the poems are shown to articulate a range of positions on key topics of the period, including the meaning of originality, the imagination, the status of the poet, the role of commercial success, the definition of genius, representation of nature, the definition of the hero, and the immortality of the soul. The book addresses how theories of inspiration informed Pushkin's thinking about classicism and Romanticism in the 1820s and 1830s. It looks at the intersection of Pushkin's knowledge of important ideas and artistic trends with poems about the creative imagination, psychology, sex and the body, heroism and the ethical life, and death.
John E. Drabinski
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748641031
- eISBN:
- 9780748652617
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748641031.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter considers how Homi Bhabha's reflections on interstitial space and the problem of nation, narration, and counter-narration provide important occasions for thinking about the problem of ...
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This chapter considers how Homi Bhabha's reflections on interstitial space and the problem of nation, narration, and counter-narration provide important occasions for thinking about the problem of originary fracture. It explains that the force of difference in the hybrid and hybridising identity of Bhabha's subject fundamentally alters, yet remains engaged with, the fragile force of ethical life, and that he showed how the urgency of the postcolonial situation pushed matters of collectivity and migration to the fore. The chapter argues that Emmanuel Levinas's most important innovation in Otherwise Than Being never quite comes to terms with mixed identities, even as subjectivity is understood, as it crosses from the ethical to the worldliness of politics.Less
This chapter considers how Homi Bhabha's reflections on interstitial space and the problem of nation, narration, and counter-narration provide important occasions for thinking about the problem of originary fracture. It explains that the force of difference in the hybrid and hybridising identity of Bhabha's subject fundamentally alters, yet remains engaged with, the fragile force of ethical life, and that he showed how the urgency of the postcolonial situation pushed matters of collectivity and migration to the fore. The chapter argues that Emmanuel Levinas's most important innovation in Otherwise Than Being never quite comes to terms with mixed identities, even as subjectivity is understood, as it crosses from the ethical to the worldliness of politics.
James Carter
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198717157
- eISBN:
- 9780191785887
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717157.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This book presents systematic study of Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of ethical life, as found in his later philosophical writings. It argues that a reconstruction of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics presents ...
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This book presents systematic study of Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of ethical life, as found in his later philosophical writings. It argues that a reconstruction of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics presents his significant contribution to contemporary philosophy of religion and moral philosophy. What emerges is a moral religion that binds humans together universally on the basis of the life they share as capable beings. This concept of moral religion provides a crucial interpretive key with which to read Ricoeur’s philosophy as a whole, and also reveals a hitherto unforeseen thread in his writings concerning ethical life, pulled through his own readings of Spinoza, Aristotle, and Kant. Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is structured by a Kantian architectonic informed at different levels by these three philosophers, who ground a rich, holistic and ultimately rationalist account of ethical life and religion that resists the trappings of both positivism and postmodernism.Less
This book presents systematic study of Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of ethical life, as found in his later philosophical writings. It argues that a reconstruction of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics presents his significant contribution to contemporary philosophy of religion and moral philosophy. What emerges is a moral religion that binds humans together universally on the basis of the life they share as capable beings. This concept of moral religion provides a crucial interpretive key with which to read Ricoeur’s philosophy as a whole, and also reveals a hitherto unforeseen thread in his writings concerning ethical life, pulled through his own readings of Spinoza, Aristotle, and Kant. Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is structured by a Kantian architectonic informed at different levels by these three philosophers, who ground a rich, holistic and ultimately rationalist account of ethical life and religion that resists the trappings of both positivism and postmodernism.
Moshe Halbertal
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691152851
- eISBN:
- 9781400842353
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691152851.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This concluding chapter explains that sacrifice is an essential phenomenon of religious, ethical, and political life. In its two senses, as “sacrificing to” and “sacrificing for,” the linguistic use ...
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This concluding chapter explains that sacrifice is an essential phenomenon of religious, ethical, and political life. In its two senses, as “sacrificing to” and “sacrificing for,” the linguistic use of the term covers immensely diverse experiences. It touches on ritual, atonement, substitution, self-transcendence, war, the responsibility to the past, and the state. Yet there is something at the core of this varied, rich phenomenon that justifies the use of the same word to express both meanings in so many languages. The term has to do with the identification of the sacrifice with the noninstrumental realm.Less
This concluding chapter explains that sacrifice is an essential phenomenon of religious, ethical, and political life. In its two senses, as “sacrificing to” and “sacrificing for,” the linguistic use of the term covers immensely diverse experiences. It touches on ritual, atonement, substitution, self-transcendence, war, the responsibility to the past, and the state. Yet there is something at the core of this varied, rich phenomenon that justifies the use of the same word to express both meanings in so many languages. The term has to do with the identification of the sacrifice with the noninstrumental realm.
Sarah Lachance Adams
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231166751
- eISBN:
- 9780231537223
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231166751.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter explores the feminist philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir. She states that the failure to correlate with oneself is more than an inability to achieve one's self-serving goals. It also ...
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This chapter explores the feminist philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir. She states that the failure to correlate with oneself is more than an inability to achieve one's self-serving goals. It also demonstrates the impossibility of caring for others and liberating them completely—to rescue them from every crisis. More than any other person, this is what a mother is expected to do for her children; thus ethical failure is a constant threat to her. Beauvoir describes how motherhood increases the painful tensions of ethical life, and leads to an attitude of ambivalence toward one's children. Her depiction of the mother–child relationship is a vivid example of her philosophy of intersubjective ambiguity. She explains that even the most generous mother will rightfully feel a conflict between her child's needs and desires and her own. While a sense of mutuality may motivate the desire to nurture, dispute provokes recognition of interpersonal divergence.Less
This chapter explores the feminist philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir. She states that the failure to correlate with oneself is more than an inability to achieve one's self-serving goals. It also demonstrates the impossibility of caring for others and liberating them completely—to rescue them from every crisis. More than any other person, this is what a mother is expected to do for her children; thus ethical failure is a constant threat to her. Beauvoir describes how motherhood increases the painful tensions of ethical life, and leads to an attitude of ambivalence toward one's children. Her depiction of the mother–child relationship is a vivid example of her philosophy of intersubjective ambiguity. She explains that even the most generous mother will rightfully feel a conflict between her child's needs and desires and her own. While a sense of mutuality may motivate the desire to nurture, dispute provokes recognition of interpersonal divergence.
James Carter
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198717157
- eISBN:
- 9780191785887
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717157.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter undertakes a retrospective assessment of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of ethical life. This includes a critical summary of his attempt, via his appropriation of Spinoza, Aristotle, and Kant, ...
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This chapter undertakes a retrospective assessment of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of ethical life. This includes a critical summary of his attempt, via his appropriation of Spinoza, Aristotle, and Kant, to unveil the core of moral religion, that is, three dimensions of life—metaphysical, anthropological, and moral—which are shared by all human beings in their, however distinctive, pursuits of the good. The chapter claim that, by employing Ricoeur’s architectonic as an interpretative framework, the reader can trace moral religion, as presented here, as a constant theme in Ricoeur’s writings as far back as the philosophy of the will. The chapter then situates Ricoeur’s moral religion in relation to the fields of contemporary Ricoeur studies and recent developments in the philosophy of religion respectively.Less
This chapter undertakes a retrospective assessment of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of ethical life. This includes a critical summary of his attempt, via his appropriation of Spinoza, Aristotle, and Kant, to unveil the core of moral religion, that is, three dimensions of life—metaphysical, anthropological, and moral—which are shared by all human beings in their, however distinctive, pursuits of the good. The chapter claim that, by employing Ricoeur’s architectonic as an interpretative framework, the reader can trace moral religion, as presented here, as a constant theme in Ricoeur’s writings as far back as the philosophy of the will. The chapter then situates Ricoeur’s moral religion in relation to the fields of contemporary Ricoeur studies and recent developments in the philosophy of religion respectively.
