Bonnie Mann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187458
- eISBN:
- 9780199786565
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187458.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
In the 1980s, this book contends, an uncritical affirmation of anti-essentialism turned this important feminist critique into a disciplinary dogmatism that constrained and homogenized feminist ...
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In the 1980s, this book contends, an uncritical affirmation of anti-essentialism turned this important feminist critique into a disciplinary dogmatism that constrained and homogenized feminist thinking. Feminist work in the academy became forgetful of both women and nature, and began to exchange an engaged politics for the intensity of sublime experience in its postmodern form. This book works between the modern and postmodern notions of the sublime to show that the gendered politics and effacement of nature, central to the modern sublime, especially in Kant's account, are at the heart of the postmodern sublime as well. It turns to Lyotard's postmodern sublime to argue that this sublime is hard at work in feminist poststructuralism, especially the early texts of Judith Butler. The melting away of the extra-discursively real in these accounts tends to make feminist thinking incapable of meaningfully articulating our relations to the natural world and to one another. Yet these very relations are necessarily tied to powerful aesthetic experiences of beauty and sublimity.Less
In the 1980s, this book contends, an uncritical affirmation of anti-essentialism turned this important feminist critique into a disciplinary dogmatism that constrained and homogenized feminist thinking. Feminist work in the academy became forgetful of both women and nature, and began to exchange an engaged politics for the intensity of sublime experience in its postmodern form. This book works between the modern and postmodern notions of the sublime to show that the gendered politics and effacement of nature, central to the modern sublime, especially in Kant's account, are at the heart of the postmodern sublime as well. It turns to Lyotard's postmodern sublime to argue that this sublime is hard at work in feminist poststructuralism, especially the early texts of Judith Butler. The melting away of the extra-discursively real in these accounts tends to make feminist thinking incapable of meaningfully articulating our relations to the natural world and to one another. Yet these very relations are necessarily tied to powerful aesthetic experiences of beauty and sublimity.
Penelope Mackie
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272204
- eISBN:
- 9780191604034
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272204.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
What are the essential properties of ordinary individuals such as people, cats, trees, and tables? The question is notoriously difficult, yet must be answered to obtain a satisfying account of the ...
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What are the essential properties of ordinary individuals such as people, cats, trees, and tables? The question is notoriously difficult, yet must be answered to obtain a satisfying account of the ways in which such individuals could and could not have been different from the way that they are. The book provides a novel treatment of this issue, in the context of a set of debates initiated by the revival of interest in essentialism and de re modality generated by the work of Kripke and others in the 1970s. Via a critical examination of rival theories, it argues for ‘minimalist essentialism’: an unorthodox theory according to which ordinary individuals have relatively few interesting essential properties. The book therefore presents a challenge to stronger versions of essentialism, including the view that ordinary individuals have non-trivial individual essences; versions of Kripke’s necessity of origin thesis; and the widely held theory of ‘sortal essentialism’, according to which an individual belongs essentially to some sort or kind that determines its conditions for identity over time. The book includes discussion of the rivalry between the interpretation of de re modality in terms of identity across possible worlds and its interpretation in terms of counterpart theory. It provides a detailed defence of the apparently paradoxical claim that there can be possible worlds that differ from one another only in the identities of some of the individuals that they contain, and hence that identities across possible worlds may be ‘bare’ identities. The book also contains a discussion of the relation between essentialism about individuals and essentialism about natural kinds, and a critical examination of the connection between semantics and natural kind essentialism.Less
What are the essential properties of ordinary individuals such as people, cats, trees, and tables? The question is notoriously difficult, yet must be answered to obtain a satisfying account of the ways in which such individuals could and could not have been different from the way that they are. The book provides a novel treatment of this issue, in the context of a set of debates initiated by the revival of interest in essentialism and de re modality generated by the work of Kripke and others in the 1970s. Via a critical examination of rival theories, it argues for ‘minimalist essentialism’: an unorthodox theory according to which ordinary individuals have relatively few interesting essential properties. The book therefore presents a challenge to stronger versions of essentialism, including the view that ordinary individuals have non-trivial individual essences; versions of Kripke’s necessity of origin thesis; and the widely held theory of ‘sortal essentialism’, according to which an individual belongs essentially to some sort or kind that determines its conditions for identity over time. The book includes discussion of the rivalry between the interpretation of de re modality in terms of identity across possible worlds and its interpretation in terms of counterpart theory. It provides a detailed defence of the apparently paradoxical claim that there can be possible worlds that differ from one another only in the identities of some of the individuals that they contain, and hence that identities across possible worlds may be ‘bare’ identities. The book also contains a discussion of the relation between essentialism about individuals and essentialism about natural kinds, and a critical examination of the connection between semantics and natural kind essentialism.
Anne Phillips
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294153
- eISBN:
- 9780191600098
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294158.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
A number of contemporary democracies have introduced measures to ensure a more equitable representation of women and/or ethnic minority citizens within elected assemblies. These measures have ...
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A number of contemporary democracies have introduced measures to ensure a more equitable representation of women and/or ethnic minority citizens within elected assemblies. These measures have included the use of gender quotas in the selection of parliamentary candidates, and the use of ‘race‐conscious’ districting to increase the electoral chances of ethnic minority representatives. Drawing on a distinction between the politics of ideas and the politics of presence, this book explores and defends the case for such measures. The politics of ideas considers accountability in relation to declared polices and programmes, and sees the sex or race of the representative as a matter of relative indifference. In the politics of presence, by contrast, the gender or ethnic composition of elected assemblies becomes a legitimate matter of democratic concern. This book addresses the concern that the case for political presence could encourage essentialist understandings of group identity or group interest. It argues against an either/or alternative between the politics of ideas and the politics of presence and for a new combination of these two models of representation.Less
A number of contemporary democracies have introduced measures to ensure a more equitable representation of women and/or ethnic minority citizens within elected assemblies. These measures have included the use of gender quotas in the selection of parliamentary candidates, and the use of ‘race‐conscious’ districting to increase the electoral chances of ethnic minority representatives. Drawing on a distinction between the politics of ideas and the politics of presence, this book explores and defends the case for such measures. The politics of ideas considers accountability in relation to declared polices and programmes, and sees the sex or race of the representative as a matter of relative indifference. In the politics of presence, by contrast, the gender or ethnic composition of elected assemblies becomes a legitimate matter of democratic concern. This book addresses the concern that the case for political presence could encourage essentialist understandings of group identity or group interest. It argues against an either/or alternative between the politics of ideas and the politics of presence and for a new combination of these two models of representation.
Alexander Bird
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199227013
- eISBN:
- 9780191711121
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227013.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
What are the laws of nature, and what explains their existence? This book develops the proposal that the laws of nature are grounded in the essences of properties. It is argued that fundamental ...
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What are the laws of nature, and what explains their existence? This book develops the proposal that the laws of nature are grounded in the essences of properties. It is argued that fundamental natural properties have dispositional essences — they are potencies (pure powers). After explaining this proposal, the book goes on to show how this accounts for the existence of the laws of nature. A distinctive feature of this account is that it ensures that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. This account has advantages over the regularity and nomic necessitation accounts associated with Lewis and Armstrong, while the dispositional essentialist view of properties has corresponding advantages over the categoricalist view of properties, according to which properties are quidditistic and do not have qualitative essences, merely primitive identity and difference. The relationship between potencies and modality, and also intentionality is explored. Other potential criticisms are raised and the view defended against them. For example it is claimed that if all properties are potencies, then a vicious regress ensues; it is shown that this does not follow. Geometrical and other ‘structural’ properties are raised as counterexamples, being properties that seem categorical; it is argued that this is the case only if one takes a particular view of the role of spacetime in physical theories. It is held that laws are metaphysically contingent whereas dispositional essentialism makes them necessary; it is argued that the contingency of laws is an illusion. An account of laws is developed in the face of Mumford's claim that neither dispositional essentialism nor science has need of laws.Less
What are the laws of nature, and what explains their existence? This book develops the proposal that the laws of nature are grounded in the essences of properties. It is argued that fundamental natural properties have dispositional essences — they are potencies (pure powers). After explaining this proposal, the book goes on to show how this accounts for the existence of the laws of nature. A distinctive feature of this account is that it ensures that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. This account has advantages over the regularity and nomic necessitation accounts associated with Lewis and Armstrong, while the dispositional essentialist view of properties has corresponding advantages over the categoricalist view of properties, according to which properties are quidditistic and do not have qualitative essences, merely primitive identity and difference. The relationship between potencies and modality, and also intentionality is explored. Other potential criticisms are raised and the view defended against them. For example it is claimed that if all properties are potencies, then a vicious regress ensues; it is shown that this does not follow. Geometrical and other ‘structural’ properties are raised as counterexamples, being properties that seem categorical; it is argued that this is the case only if one takes a particular view of the role of spacetime in physical theories. It is held that laws are metaphysically contingent whereas dispositional essentialism makes them necessary; it is argued that the contingency of laws is an illusion. An account of laws is developed in the face of Mumford's claim that neither dispositional essentialism nor science has need of laws.
Gyula Klima
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195176223
- eISBN:
- 9780199871957
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176223.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Church History
John Buridan (ca. 1300–1362) has worked out perhaps the most comprehensive account of nominalism in the history of Western thought, the philosophical doctrine according to which the only universals ...
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John Buridan (ca. 1300–1362) has worked out perhaps the most comprehensive account of nominalism in the history of Western thought, the philosophical doctrine according to which the only universals in reality are “names”: the common terms of our language and the common concepts of our minds. But these items are universal only in their signification; they are just as singular entities themselves as are any other items in reality. This book critically examines what is most intriguing to contemporary readers in Buridan’s medieval philosophical system: his nominalist account of the relationships among language, thought, and reality. The main focus of the discussion is Buridan’s deployment of the Ockhamist conception of a “mental language” for mapping the complex structures of written and spoken human languages onto a parsimoniously construed reality. Concerning these linguistic structures themselves, the book carefully analyzes Buridan’s conception of the radical conventionality of written and spoken languages, in contrast to the natural semantic features of concepts. The discussion pays special attention to Buridan’s token-based semantics of terms and propositions, his conception of existential import, ontological commitment, truth, and logical validity. Finally, the book presents a detailed discussion of how these logical devices allow Buridan to maintain his nominalist position without giving up Aristotelian essentialism or yielding to skepticism, always relating the discussion to contemporary concerns with these issues.Less
John Buridan (ca. 1300–1362) has worked out perhaps the most comprehensive account of nominalism in the history of Western thought, the philosophical doctrine according to which the only universals in reality are “names”: the common terms of our language and the common concepts of our minds. But these items are universal only in their signification; they are just as singular entities themselves as are any other items in reality. This book critically examines what is most intriguing to contemporary readers in Buridan’s medieval philosophical system: his nominalist account of the relationships among language, thought, and reality. The main focus of the discussion is Buridan’s deployment of the Ockhamist conception of a “mental language” for mapping the complex structures of written and spoken human languages onto a parsimoniously construed reality. Concerning these linguistic structures themselves, the book carefully analyzes Buridan’s conception of the radical conventionality of written and spoken languages, in contrast to the natural semantic features of concepts. The discussion pays special attention to Buridan’s token-based semantics of terms and propositions, his conception of existential import, ontological commitment, truth, and logical validity. Finally, the book presents a detailed discussion of how these logical devices allow Buridan to maintain his nominalist position without giving up Aristotelian essentialism or yielding to skepticism, always relating the discussion to contemporary concerns with these issues.
Abdulaziz Sachedina
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195378504
- eISBN:
- 9780199869688
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195378504.003.0009
- Subject:
- Religion, Islam
The epilogue undertakes to assess the intellectual exchange between religious communities and medical researchers in the Muslim world for the development of biomedical ethics. The problem-solving ...
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The epilogue undertakes to assess the intellectual exchange between religious communities and medical researchers in the Muslim world for the development of biomedical ethics. The problem-solving method adopted by the prestigious Islamic Juridical Council of the World Muslim League in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, is founded upon searching for normative responsa based on revealed sources only. The Council, represented by Sunni and Shi‘ite jurists, has deemphasized human dimension of medical enterprise by ignoring to evaluate human moral action and its ramifications for Islamic biomedical ethics. The classical juridical heritage, as demonstrated in this study, instead of functioning as a template for further moral reflection about critical human conditions and vulnerability in the context of modern healthcare institutions, has simply been retrieved to advance or obstruct legitimate advancements in biomedicine. Normative essentialism attached to evolving interhuman relationships has reduced Islamic jurisprudence to the search in the revealed texts rather than in theological ethics to estimate human nature and its ability to take the responsibility of actions performed cognitively and volitionally under variable circumstances. Religious and moral empowerment of average human person appears to be out of question for the Islamic religious establishment across Muslim world. It is this lack of empowerment of an individual capable of discerning right from wrong that makes Islamic juridical rulings in biomedicine inconsonant with international standards of human dignity and autonomous moral agency.Less
The epilogue undertakes to assess the intellectual exchange between religious communities and medical researchers in the Muslim world for the development of biomedical ethics. The problem-solving method adopted by the prestigious Islamic Juridical Council of the World Muslim League in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, is founded upon searching for normative responsa based on revealed sources only. The Council, represented by Sunni and Shi‘ite jurists, has deemphasized human dimension of medical enterprise by ignoring to evaluate human moral action and its ramifications for Islamic biomedical ethics. The classical juridical heritage, as demonstrated in this study, instead of functioning as a template for further moral reflection about critical human conditions and vulnerability in the context of modern healthcare institutions, has simply been retrieved to advance or obstruct legitimate advancements in biomedicine. Normative essentialism attached to evolving interhuman relationships has reduced Islamic jurisprudence to the search in the revealed texts rather than in theological ethics to estimate human nature and its ability to take the responsibility of actions performed cognitively and volitionally under variable circumstances. Religious and moral empowerment of average human person appears to be out of question for the Islamic religious establishment across Muslim world. It is this lack of empowerment of an individual capable of discerning right from wrong that makes Islamic juridical rulings in biomedicine inconsonant with international standards of human dignity and autonomous moral agency.
Marc Lange
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195328134
- eISBN:
- 9780199870042
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195328134.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Laws of nature have long puzzled philosophers. What distinguishes laws from facts about the world that do not rise to the level of laws? How can laws be contingent and nevertheless necessary? In what ...
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Laws of nature have long puzzled philosophers. What distinguishes laws from facts about the world that do not rise to the level of laws? How can laws be contingent and nevertheless necessary? In what sense are the laws necessary like the broadly logical truths, yet not as necessary as those truths? What are the “lawmakers”: the facts in virtue of which the laws are laws? This book offers provocative and original answers to these questions. It argues that laws are distinguished by their necessity, which is grounded in primitive subjunctive facts (expressed by counterfactual conditionals). This view avoids the notorious circularity afflicting the view that the laws are the truths that would still have held had things been different in any fashion that is logically consistent with … the laws! While recognizing that natural necessity is distinct from logical, metaphysical, and mathematical necessity, the book explains how natural necessity constitutes a species of the same genus as those other varieties of necessity. The book discusses the relation between laws and objective chances, the completeness of the laws of physics, and the laws' immutability, as well as meta-laws such as the symmetry principles so prominent in contemporary physics. It is argued that David Lewis's Humean approach to law fails to do justice the laws' necessity, and that scientific essentialist approaches fail to accommodate the way certain laws transcend the details of others.Less
Laws of nature have long puzzled philosophers. What distinguishes laws from facts about the world that do not rise to the level of laws? How can laws be contingent and nevertheless necessary? In what sense are the laws necessary like the broadly logical truths, yet not as necessary as those truths? What are the “lawmakers”: the facts in virtue of which the laws are laws? This book offers provocative and original answers to these questions. It argues that laws are distinguished by their necessity, which is grounded in primitive subjunctive facts (expressed by counterfactual conditionals). This view avoids the notorious circularity afflicting the view that the laws are the truths that would still have held had things been different in any fashion that is logically consistent with … the laws! While recognizing that natural necessity is distinct from logical, metaphysical, and mathematical necessity, the book explains how natural necessity constitutes a species of the same genus as those other varieties of necessity. The book discusses the relation between laws and objective chances, the completeness of the laws of physics, and the laws' immutability, as well as meta-laws such as the symmetry principles so prominent in contemporary physics. It is argued that David Lewis's Humean approach to law fails to do justice the laws' necessity, and that scientific essentialist approaches fail to accommodate the way certain laws transcend the details of others.
Penelope Mackie
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272204
- eISBN:
- 9780191604034
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272204.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter characterizes essentialism, and distinguishes essentialism about individuals from essentialism about natural kinds, arguing that the first does, but the second need not, involve de re ...
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This chapter characterizes essentialism, and distinguishes essentialism about individuals from essentialism about natural kinds, arguing that the first does, but the second need not, involve de re (as opposed to de dicto) modality. It is argued that given certain plausible assumptions, essentialism about individuals involves a commitment to necessary a posteriori truth, although the commitment is not inevitable. The implications of the concepts of possible worlds and identity across possible worlds (‘transworld identity’) are discussed.Less
This chapter characterizes essentialism, and distinguishes essentialism about individuals from essentialism about natural kinds, arguing that the first does, but the second need not, involve de re (as opposed to de dicto) modality. It is argued that given certain plausible assumptions, essentialism about individuals involves a commitment to necessary a posteriori truth, although the commitment is not inevitable. The implications of the concepts of possible worlds and identity across possible worlds (‘transworld identity’) are discussed.
Tariq Modood
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780198297703
- eISBN:
- 9780191602948
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019829770X.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Essentialist and anti‐essentialist views of multicultural society are discussed, using data from the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities in Britain, which was undertaken in 1994. One of the ...
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Essentialist and anti‐essentialist views of multicultural society are discussed, using data from the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities in Britain, which was undertaken in 1994. One of the survey findings was that there is much empirical support for those theorists who have emphasized the fluid and hybrid nature of contemporary post‐immigration ethnicities in Britain. It is argued that the political challenge is to reach for a multicultural Britishness that is happy with this hybridity, but also has space for religious identities, which have been largely neglected by theorists. The last part of the chapter discusses the importance of recognizing religious communities further.Less
Essentialist and anti‐essentialist views of multicultural society are discussed, using data from the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities in Britain, which was undertaken in 1994. One of the survey findings was that there is much empirical support for those theorists who have emphasized the fluid and hybrid nature of contemporary post‐immigration ethnicities in Britain. It is argued that the political challenge is to reach for a multicultural Britishness that is happy with this hybridity, but also has space for religious identities, which have been largely neglected by theorists. The last part of the chapter discusses the importance of recognizing religious communities further.
Bonnie Mann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187458
- eISBN:
- 9780199786565
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187458.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
This chapter focuses on Judith Butler's early work in order to clarify some central stakes (or mis-takes) of feminist postmodernism. It begins by acknowledging and responding to her insistence that ...
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This chapter focuses on Judith Butler's early work in order to clarify some central stakes (or mis-takes) of feminist postmodernism. It begins by acknowledging and responding to her insistence that the term “postmodernism” is misleading and masks a “ruse of authority” that distorts rather than clarifies the issues at hand. It is argued that establishing the feminist postmodern over and against a foreclosed“essentialism” amounts to a disavowal of the realm of necessity. A dual conception of “nature” as “human nature” and the natural world is foreclosed at the moment that inaugurates the textual space in which feminist postmodernism sets to work. This disavowed realm returns on the inside of Butler's theory as a discursive “nature,” which makes constant trouble in regards to the subject's agency, the subject's freedom. It is shown that Butler's approach to the relation between extradiscursive being and speech authorizes the displacement of feminism from its foundation, but not a foundation in the unitary subject so much as a foundation in a certain set of historical projects. The return of the repressed realm of necessity (or otherwise said, the repressed relation to the earth) in Butler's early texts, its return as discursive determinacy, pushes toward exactly what Butler turns to in her later work: the theme of embodied vulnerability in relation to other persons.Less
This chapter focuses on Judith Butler's early work in order to clarify some central stakes (or mis-takes) of feminist postmodernism. It begins by acknowledging and responding to her insistence that the term “postmodernism” is misleading and masks a “ruse of authority” that distorts rather than clarifies the issues at hand. It is argued that establishing the feminist postmodern over and against a foreclosed“essentialism” amounts to a disavowal of the realm of necessity. A dual conception of “nature” as “human nature” and the natural world is foreclosed at the moment that inaugurates the textual space in which feminist postmodernism sets to work. This disavowed realm returns on the inside of Butler's theory as a discursive “nature,” which makes constant trouble in regards to the subject's agency, the subject's freedom. It is shown that Butler's approach to the relation between extradiscursive being and speech authorizes the displacement of feminism from its foundation, but not a foundation in the unitary subject so much as a foundation in a certain set of historical projects. The return of the repressed realm of necessity (or otherwise said, the repressed relation to the earth) in Butler's early texts, its return as discursive determinacy, pushes toward exactly what Butler turns to in her later work: the theme of embodied vulnerability in relation to other persons.
Bonnie Mann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187458
- eISBN:
- 9780199786565
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187458.003.intro
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the alliance between feminism and postmodernism in the US American academy. It discusses the emphatic anti-essentialism in the alliance between ...
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This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the alliance between feminism and postmodernism in the US American academy. It discusses the emphatic anti-essentialism in the alliance between feminism and postmodernism. It then considers how both anti-essentialist feminists and their critics have addressed the problem of essentialism primarily as a problem of the one and the many.Less
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the alliance between feminism and postmodernism in the US American academy. It discusses the emphatic anti-essentialism in the alliance between feminism and postmodernism. It then considers how both anti-essentialist feminists and their critics have addressed the problem of essentialism primarily as a problem of the one and the many.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The distinction between natural necessity and metaphysical necessity is examined. An account is advanced of the logical form of statements of natural law, contrasting with that of D. M. Armstrong. ...
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The distinction between natural necessity and metaphysical necessity is examined. An account is advanced of the logical form of statements of natural law, contrasting with that of D. M. Armstrong. The relationship between law-statements and counterfactual conditionals is discussed. The claim of scientific essentialists that natural laws are metaphysically necessary is challenged as resting on a questionable account of the identity conditions of properties. It is argued that Saul Kripke’s model of a posteriori knowledge of necessary truths does not enable us to understand how knowledge of natural laws is possible on the scientific essentialist view of them.Less
The distinction between natural necessity and metaphysical necessity is examined. An account is advanced of the logical form of statements of natural law, contrasting with that of D. M. Armstrong. The relationship between law-statements and counterfactual conditionals is discussed. The claim of scientific essentialists that natural laws are metaphysically necessary is challenged as resting on a questionable account of the identity conditions of properties. It is argued that Saul Kripke’s model of a posteriori knowledge of necessary truths does not enable us to understand how knowledge of natural laws is possible on the scientific essentialist view of them.
Penelope Mackie
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272204
- eISBN:
- 9780191604034
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272204.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Following Nathan Salmon and D. H. Mellor, this chapter argues that natural kind essentialism of the type advocated by Kripke and Putnam is not an inevitable consequence of the adoption of an ...
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Following Nathan Salmon and D. H. Mellor, this chapter argues that natural kind essentialism of the type advocated by Kripke and Putnam is not an inevitable consequence of the adoption of an anti-descriptivist semantic theory of natural kind terms. It attempts to clarify various issues about the characteristics of natural kind essentialism and its relation to semantic theory, as well as reinforcing the distinction made earlier in the book between essentialism about individuals and essentialism about natural kinds. The author remains agnostic on the question of the truth of essentialism about natural kinds, but suggests reasons for scepticism about its plausibility in comparison with some weaker views, such as the theory that a natural kind has a Lockean ‘real essence’ which need not belong to the kind in all possible worlds.Less
Following Nathan Salmon and D. H. Mellor, this chapter argues that natural kind essentialism of the type advocated by Kripke and Putnam is not an inevitable consequence of the adoption of an anti-descriptivist semantic theory of natural kind terms. It attempts to clarify various issues about the characteristics of natural kind essentialism and its relation to semantic theory, as well as reinforcing the distinction made earlier in the book between essentialism about individuals and essentialism about natural kinds. The author remains agnostic on the question of the truth of essentialism about natural kinds, but suggests reasons for scepticism about its plausibility in comparison with some weaker views, such as the theory that a natural kind has a Lockean ‘real essence’ which need not belong to the kind in all possible worlds.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1978
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198244141
- eISBN:
- 9780191598241
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198244142.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is a study of the concept of necessity. In the first three chapters, I clarify and defend the distinction between modality de re and modality de dicto. Also, I show how to explain de re ...
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This book is a study of the concept of necessity. In the first three chapters, I clarify and defend the distinction between modality de re and modality de dicto. Also, I show how to explain de re modality in terms of de dicto modality. In Ch. 4, I explicate the concept of a possible world and define what it is for an object x to have a property P essentially. I then use the concept of an essential property to give an account of essences and their relationship to proper names. In Ch. 6, I argue that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals—even when fortified with Counterpart Theory—is false. Chapters 7 and 8 address the subject of possible but non‐existent objects; I argue here for the conclusion that there is no good reason to think that there are any such objects. In Ch. 9, I apply my theory of modality to the Problem of Evil in an effort to show that the Free Will Defense defeats this particular objection to theism. In Ch. 10, I present a sound modal version of the ontological argument for the existence of God. Finally, in the appendix, I address Quinean objections to quantified modal logic.Less
This book is a study of the concept of necessity. In the first three chapters, I clarify and defend the distinction between modality de re and modality de dicto. Also, I show how to explain de re modality in terms of de dicto modality. In Ch. 4, I explicate the concept of a possible world and define what it is for an object x to have a property P essentially. I then use the concept of an essential property to give an account of essences and their relationship to proper names. In Ch. 6, I argue that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals—even when fortified with Counterpart Theory—is false. Chapters 7 and 8 address the subject of possible but non‐existent objects; I argue here for the conclusion that there is no good reason to think that there are any such objects. In Ch. 9, I apply my theory of modality to the Problem of Evil in an effort to show that the Free Will Defense defeats this particular objection to theism. In Ch. 10, I present a sound modal version of the ontological argument for the existence of God. Finally, in the appendix, I address Quinean objections to quantified modal logic.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The sense in which laws are necessary is reviewed. The relationship between natural laws and natural kinds is emphasized. The relationship between natural laws and causal powers is further explored, ...
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The sense in which laws are necessary is reviewed. The relationship between natural laws and natural kinds is emphasized. The relationship between natural laws and causal powers is further explored, focusing on the advantages of an approach based on the four-category ontology over alternative theories of these matters. The claim of scientific essentialists that natural laws are metaphysically necessary is reviewed in the light of the problem known as ‘Bradley’s regress’, and is accepted in the case of fundamental laws but not in other cases. The idea that so-called natural or nomic necessity constitutes a genuine kind of necessity is challenged.Less
The sense in which laws are necessary is reviewed. The relationship between natural laws and natural kinds is emphasized. The relationship between natural laws and causal powers is further explored, focusing on the advantages of an approach based on the four-category ontology over alternative theories of these matters. The claim of scientific essentialists that natural laws are metaphysically necessary is reviewed in the light of the problem known as ‘Bradley’s regress’, and is accepted in the case of fundamental laws but not in other cases. The idea that so-called natural or nomic necessity constitutes a genuine kind of necessity is challenged.
Penelope Mackie
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272204
- eISBN:
- 9780191604034
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272204.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines versions of so-called ‘sortal essentialism’. This is the view that some sortal concepts (roughly, concepts that provide criteria of identity or principles of individuation) ...
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This chapter examines versions of so-called ‘sortal essentialism’. This is the view that some sortal concepts (roughly, concepts that provide criteria of identity or principles of individuation) represent essential properties of the things to which they apply. This chapter argues against Baruch Brody’s version of sortal essentialism, which appeals to a version of an ‘overlap requirement’ on de re possibilities, in order to argue that substance sortals — sortal concepts that must apply to an object throughout its existence if they apply to it at all — are essential sortals.Less
This chapter examines versions of so-called ‘sortal essentialism’. This is the view that some sortal concepts (roughly, concepts that provide criteria of identity or principles of individuation) represent essential properties of the things to which they apply. This chapter argues against Baruch Brody’s version of sortal essentialism, which appeals to a version of an ‘overlap requirement’ on de re possibilities, in order to argue that substance sortals — sortal concepts that must apply to an object throughout its existence if they apply to it at all — are essential sortals.
Penelope Mackie
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272204
- eISBN:
- 9780191604034
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272204.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines David Wiggins’s version of sortal essentialism, which relies on the EPI thesis, that a thing’s principle of individuation is essential to it in order to derive the result that ...
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This chapter examines David Wiggins’s version of sortal essentialism, which relies on the EPI thesis, that a thing’s principle of individuation is essential to it in order to derive the result that certain sortals (‘ultimate sortals’) are essential sortals. It argues that the attempt to defend sortal essentialism by appeal to EPI faces a dilemma: either the thesis is vacuous, and lends no support to sortal essentialism, or it is a substantial thesis, but one that we have no good reason to accept. It concludes that even if it is true that, for any given individual, there are some sorts or kinds to which it could not have belonged, there is insufficient reason to believe the sortal essentialist’s explanation that this is because there is some sortal kind to which it belongs essentially.Less
This chapter examines David Wiggins’s version of sortal essentialism, which relies on the EPI thesis, that a thing’s principle of individuation is essential to it in order to derive the result that certain sortals (‘ultimate sortals’) are essential sortals. It argues that the attempt to defend sortal essentialism by appeal to EPI faces a dilemma: either the thesis is vacuous, and lends no support to sortal essentialism, or it is a substantial thesis, but one that we have no good reason to accept. It concludes that even if it is true that, for any given individual, there are some sorts or kinds to which it could not have belonged, there is insufficient reason to believe the sortal essentialist’s explanation that this is because there is some sortal kind to which it belongs essentially.
Penelope Mackie
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272204
- eISBN:
- 9780191604034
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272204.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Having rejected the standard views about the essential properties of ordinary individuals, this chapter confronts the question whether such individuals have any interesting essential properties at ...
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Having rejected the standard views about the essential properties of ordinary individuals, this chapter confronts the question whether such individuals have any interesting essential properties at all. It defends a version of ‘extreme haecceitism’, also known as ‘minimalist essentialism’, according to which ordinary individuals have relatively few interesting essential properties. According to this theory, many properties that might be assumed to be essential properties of ordinary individuals are not, strictly speaking, essential, but rather ‘tenacious’ or ‘quasi-essential’, where this implies that the possibility that the thing should lack the property is so remote as normally to be ignored in the context of counterfactual speculation. It is argued that the appearance of conflict between this version of extreme haecceitism and our intuitions may largely be dispelled, partly by appeal to the fact that in many contexts in which we make de re modal claims, we restrict ourselves to what all theorists must acknowledge to be a limited subset of the full range of de re possibilities. It is also argued that extreme haecceitism need not undermine the role played by an appeal to essential properties in various philosophical arguments, such as the debate between psychological and biological theorists concerning personal identity and a standard form of argument that appeals to modal distinctions, in order to establish the numerical distinctness of coincident entities.Less
Having rejected the standard views about the essential properties of ordinary individuals, this chapter confronts the question whether such individuals have any interesting essential properties at all. It defends a version of ‘extreme haecceitism’, also known as ‘minimalist essentialism’, according to which ordinary individuals have relatively few interesting essential properties. According to this theory, many properties that might be assumed to be essential properties of ordinary individuals are not, strictly speaking, essential, but rather ‘tenacious’ or ‘quasi-essential’, where this implies that the possibility that the thing should lack the property is so remote as normally to be ignored in the context of counterfactual speculation. It is argued that the appearance of conflict between this version of extreme haecceitism and our intuitions may largely be dispelled, partly by appeal to the fact that in many contexts in which we make de re modal claims, we restrict ourselves to what all theorists must acknowledge to be a limited subset of the full range of de re possibilities. It is also argued that extreme haecceitism need not undermine the role played by an appeal to essential properties in various philosophical arguments, such as the debate between psychological and biological theorists concerning personal identity and a standard form of argument that appeals to modal distinctions, in order to establish the numerical distinctness of coincident entities.
Beth Felker Jones
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195309812
- eISBN:
- 9780199785353
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195309812.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter sets up the problems of the book by giving historical and doctrinal perspective on Christian theologies of the body. It also introduces feminist concerns (dualism, essentialism, and ...
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This chapter sets up the problems of the book by giving historical and doctrinal perspective on Christian theologies of the body. It also introduces feminist concerns (dualism, essentialism, and constructivism) to be considered in a theology of the body that accounts for gender. Theologically, the problem of the body is brokenness and death, not materiality as such. Feminism aids in analyzing this problem, but a theological anthropology is needed in order to deal with the problem.Less
This chapter sets up the problems of the book by giving historical and doctrinal perspective on Christian theologies of the body. It also introduces feminist concerns (dualism, essentialism, and constructivism) to be considered in a theology of the body that accounts for gender. Theologically, the problem of the body is brokenness and death, not materiality as such. Feminism aids in analyzing this problem, but a theological anthropology is needed in order to deal with the problem.
Bobby Sayyid and Lilian Zac
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198292371
- eISBN:
- 9780191600159
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198292376.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, Reference
Introducing central conceptual themes employed in discourse analysis, another challenge to the positivist assumptions underlying conventional social science. The concepts covered are ...
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Introducing central conceptual themes employed in discourse analysis, another challenge to the positivist assumptions underlying conventional social science. The concepts covered are anti‐foundationalism; anti‐essentialism; identity and difference; post‐structuralism; hegemony; subjects and identities. How these concepts are used in discourse theoretical approaches to analysing socio‐political phenomena is outlined.Less
Introducing central conceptual themes employed in discourse analysis, another challenge to the positivist assumptions underlying conventional social science. The concepts covered are anti‐foundationalism; anti‐essentialism; identity and difference; post‐structuralism; hegemony; subjects and identities. How these concepts are used in discourse theoretical approaches to analysing socio‐political phenomena is outlined.
