Penelope Mackie
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272204
- eISBN:
- 9780191604034
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272204.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
What are the essential properties of ordinary individuals such as people, cats, trees, and tables? The question is notoriously difficult, yet must be answered to obtain a satisfying account of the ...
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What are the essential properties of ordinary individuals such as people, cats, trees, and tables? The question is notoriously difficult, yet must be answered to obtain a satisfying account of the ways in which such individuals could and could not have been different from the way that they are. The book provides a novel treatment of this issue, in the context of a set of debates initiated by the revival of interest in essentialism and de re modality generated by the work of Kripke and others in the 1970s. Via a critical examination of rival theories, it argues for ‘minimalist essentialism’: an unorthodox theory according to which ordinary individuals have relatively few interesting essential properties. The book therefore presents a challenge to stronger versions of essentialism, including the view that ordinary individuals have non-trivial individual essences; versions of Kripke’s necessity of origin thesis; and the widely held theory of ‘sortal essentialism’, according to which an individual belongs essentially to some sort or kind that determines its conditions for identity over time. The book includes discussion of the rivalry between the interpretation of de re modality in terms of identity across possible worlds and its interpretation in terms of counterpart theory. It provides a detailed defence of the apparently paradoxical claim that there can be possible worlds that differ from one another only in the identities of some of the individuals that they contain, and hence that identities across possible worlds may be ‘bare’ identities. The book also contains a discussion of the relation between essentialism about individuals and essentialism about natural kinds, and a critical examination of the connection between semantics and natural kind essentialism.Less
What are the essential properties of ordinary individuals such as people, cats, trees, and tables? The question is notoriously difficult, yet must be answered to obtain a satisfying account of the ways in which such individuals could and could not have been different from the way that they are. The book provides a novel treatment of this issue, in the context of a set of debates initiated by the revival of interest in essentialism and de re modality generated by the work of Kripke and others in the 1970s. Via a critical examination of rival theories, it argues for ‘minimalist essentialism’: an unorthodox theory according to which ordinary individuals have relatively few interesting essential properties. The book therefore presents a challenge to stronger versions of essentialism, including the view that ordinary individuals have non-trivial individual essences; versions of Kripke’s necessity of origin thesis; and the widely held theory of ‘sortal essentialism’, according to which an individual belongs essentially to some sort or kind that determines its conditions for identity over time. The book includes discussion of the rivalry between the interpretation of de re modality in terms of identity across possible worlds and its interpretation in terms of counterpart theory. It provides a detailed defence of the apparently paradoxical claim that there can be possible worlds that differ from one another only in the identities of some of the individuals that they contain, and hence that identities across possible worlds may be ‘bare’ identities. The book also contains a discussion of the relation between essentialism about individuals and essentialism about natural kinds, and a critical examination of the connection between semantics and natural kind essentialism.
Andrew C. Dole
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195341171
- eISBN:
- 9780199866908
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341171.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This book reconstructs Friedrich Schleiermacher's understanding of religion and sets this reconstruction into the intellectual and political context of Schleiermacher's work. It is common in the ...
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This book reconstructs Friedrich Schleiermacher's understanding of religion and sets this reconstruction into the intellectual and political context of Schleiermacher's work. It is common in the English literature to see Schleiermacher described as a theorist of “religious experience” or as a hermeneutician of religion, but these views fundamentally misrepresent both the central concerns and the contents of his writings. The reconstruction focuses on Schleiermacher's account of religion as a historically and culturally embedded phenomenon that extends from a core or “essence” within human subjectivity into the realm of interpersonal relations, practices, and material productions. The book calls particular attention to Schleiermacher's lectures in ethics at Halle and Berlin, wherein he developed an understanding of religion as a process of the social formation of feeling. Schleiermacher should be regarded as a thinker who attempted to ground not only academic theology but also the collective self‐understanding of religious persons on an understanding of religion as a natural phenomenon unfolding within history and subject to investigation by the entire range of the natural and human sciences.Less
This book reconstructs Friedrich Schleiermacher's understanding of religion and sets this reconstruction into the intellectual and political context of Schleiermacher's work. It is common in the English literature to see Schleiermacher described as a theorist of “religious experience” or as a hermeneutician of religion, but these views fundamentally misrepresent both the central concerns and the contents of his writings. The reconstruction focuses on Schleiermacher's account of religion as a historically and culturally embedded phenomenon that extends from a core or “essence” within human subjectivity into the realm of interpersonal relations, practices, and material productions. The book calls particular attention to Schleiermacher's lectures in ethics at Halle and Berlin, wherein he developed an understanding of religion as a process of the social formation of feeling. Schleiermacher should be regarded as a thinker who attempted to ground not only academic theology but also the collective self‐understanding of religious persons on an understanding of religion as a natural phenomenon unfolding within history and subject to investigation by the entire range of the natural and human sciences.
Stephen Yablo
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199266487
- eISBN:
- 9780191594274
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266487.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This book contains a collection of twelve metaphysical chapters that address a range of first-order topics, including identity, coincidence, essence, causation, and properties. Some first-order ...
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This book contains a collection of twelve metaphysical chapters that address a range of first-order topics, including identity, coincidence, essence, causation, and properties. Some first-order debates are not worth pursuing, the book argues; there is nothing at issue in them. Several of the chapters explore the metaontology of abstract objects, and more generally of objects that are ‘preconceived’, their principal features being settled already by their job-descriptions. The book rejects standard forms of fictionalism, opting ultimately for a view that puts presupposition in the role normally played by pretense.Less
This book contains a collection of twelve metaphysical chapters that address a range of first-order topics, including identity, coincidence, essence, causation, and properties. Some first-order debates are not worth pursuing, the book argues; there is nothing at issue in them. Several of the chapters explore the metaontology of abstract objects, and more generally of objects that are ‘preconceived’, their principal features being settled already by their job-descriptions. The book rejects standard forms of fictionalism, opting ultimately for a view that puts presupposition in the role normally played by pretense.
Bede Rundle
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199270507
- eISBN:
- 9780191601392
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199270503.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
If, as the theist maintains, God is a being who exists of necessity, his existence explains why there is something rather than nothing. However, a less demanding explanation is also possible: not ...
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If, as the theist maintains, God is a being who exists of necessity, his existence explains why there is something rather than nothing. However, a less demanding explanation is also possible: not that there is some particular being that has to be, but simply that there has to be something or other. Reasons are given in favour of this weaker claim, and it is then argued that if anything at all exists, the physical exists. The priority of the physical is supported by eliminating rival contenders: the supernatural is dismissed, and while other forms of being, notably the abstract and the mental, are not reducible to the physical, they presuppose its existence. The question whether ultimate explanations can be given is forever in the background, and the book concludes with an investigation of this issue and of the possibility that the universe could have existed for an infinite time. Other topics discussed include causation, verification, essence, existence, spirit, force, fine tuning, and laws of Nature.Less
If, as the theist maintains, God is a being who exists of necessity, his existence explains why there is something rather than nothing. However, a less demanding explanation is also possible: not that there is some particular being that has to be, but simply that there has to be something or other. Reasons are given in favour of this weaker claim, and it is then argued that if anything at all exists, the physical exists. The priority of the physical is supported by eliminating rival contenders: the supernatural is dismissed, and while other forms of being, notably the abstract and the mental, are not reducible to the physical, they presuppose its existence. The question whether ultimate explanations can be given is forever in the background, and the book concludes with an investigation of this issue and of the possibility that the universe could have existed for an infinite time. Other topics discussed include causation, verification, essence, existence, spirit, force, fine tuning, and laws of Nature.
Ori Simchen
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199608515
- eISBN:
- 9780191738241
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608515.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
Are words and thoughts necessarily about what they are about or are they only contingently so? This book defends the former alternative against the latter by articulating a requisite modal background ...
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Are words and thoughts necessarily about what they are about or are they only contingently so? This book defends the former alternative against the latter by articulating a requisite modal background and then bringing this background to bear on cognitive matters—notably the intentionality of cognitive episodes and states. The modal picture that emerges from the first two chapters is a strongly particularist approach whereby all possibilities reduce to possibilities for particular things, where the latter are determined by the natures of the particular things involved. The ensuing three chapters are devoted to the aboutness of referring terms in language and thought. The approach espoused is, once again, strongly particularist in allotting explanatory priority to cognitive episodes and states regarding particular things. The emerging view is that a given use of a name to refer to a particular thing, or a given thought about the thing, could not be what it is without being about the thing it is actually about.Less
Are words and thoughts necessarily about what they are about or are they only contingently so? This book defends the former alternative against the latter by articulating a requisite modal background and then bringing this background to bear on cognitive matters—notably the intentionality of cognitive episodes and states. The modal picture that emerges from the first two chapters is a strongly particularist approach whereby all possibilities reduce to possibilities for particular things, where the latter are determined by the natures of the particular things involved. The ensuing three chapters are devoted to the aboutness of referring terms in language and thought. The approach espoused is, once again, strongly particularist in allotting explanatory priority to cognitive episodes and states regarding particular things. The emerging view is that a given use of a name to refer to a particular thing, or a given thought about the thing, could not be what it is without being about the thing it is actually about.
Henny Fiskå Hägg
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199288083
- eISBN:
- 9780191604164
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199288089.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
Apophatic theology claims that God is unknowable, and this book investigates the earliest stages of Christian apophaticism. It focuses on the writings of Clement of Alexandria (around AD 200): his ...
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Apophatic theology claims that God is unknowable, and this book investigates the earliest stages of Christian apophaticism. It focuses on the writings of Clement of Alexandria (around AD 200): his view of language and esotericism, various aspects of his concept of God, his Logos-theology as well as his epistemology in relation to God. Clement holds that God is unknowable. God’s unknowability, however, concerns only his essence, not his energies, or powers. The traditional view today is that the distinction between essence and energies is first developed by the Cappadocian Fathers in the late 4th century. It is the author’s claim, however, that an apophatic view of God as well as the distinction between essence and energies can already be found in Clement. In order to understand better Clement’s theological priorities and emphases, his social, religious, and philosophical milieu in ancient Alexandria is also taken into consideration. In addition, Clement’s thinking is seen against the background of Middle Platonism and its concept of God.Less
Apophatic theology claims that God is unknowable, and this book investigates the earliest stages of Christian apophaticism. It focuses on the writings of Clement of Alexandria (around AD 200): his view of language and esotericism, various aspects of his concept of God, his Logos-theology as well as his epistemology in relation to God. Clement holds that God is unknowable. God’s unknowability, however, concerns only his essence, not his energies, or powers. The traditional view today is that the distinction between essence and energies is first developed by the Cappadocian Fathers in the late 4th century. It is the author’s claim, however, that an apophatic view of God as well as the distinction between essence and energies can already be found in Clement. In order to understand better Clement’s theological priorities and emphases, his social, religious, and philosophical milieu in ancient Alexandria is also taken into consideration. In addition, Clement’s thinking is seen against the background of Middle Platonism and its concept of God.
Melchisedec TÖrÖnen
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199296118
- eISBN:
- 9780191712258
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296118.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
Discusses the principles of Maximus' Trinitarian theology. Notions such as essence, hypostasis, and person are presented. The chapter argues that hypostasis or person is any concrete and individual ...
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Discusses the principles of Maximus' Trinitarian theology. Notions such as essence, hypostasis, and person are presented. The chapter argues that hypostasis or person is any concrete and individual instance of any kind of being. This, then, is contrasted with modern personalist interpretations of the same notions.Less
Discusses the principles of Maximus' Trinitarian theology. Notions such as essence, hypostasis, and person are presented. The chapter argues that hypostasis or person is any concrete and individual instance of any kind of being. This, then, is contrasted with modern personalist interpretations of the same notions.
Alvin Plantinga
Matthew Davidson (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195103762
- eISBN:
- 9780199833573
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195103769.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William ...
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This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William Kneale and W. V. Quine, and an elaboration on the notions of possible worlds and essences. In the third chapter, I conclude that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals is false, even when fortified with Counterpart Theory. Chapter 4 contains an argument for the conclusion that there neither are, nor could have been, possible but nonexistent objects. In the next chapter, I develop this theme in greater detail and argue for the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. Both Chs. 6 and 7 contain an account of the relationship between proper names and essences, my view being that proper names express essences and that sometimes different proper names for the same object express different essences of that object. The end of Ch. 7 and all of Ch. 8 are an examination of existentialism (the theory that propositions and states of affairs ontologically depend on their subjects) and arguments against it. In Ch. 9, I defend my theory of modality against objections raised by John Pollock. In Ch. 10, I sketch out what the commitments of modal realism are, and argue that David Lewis's modal theory is not a modal realist theory. Finally, in the concluding chapter I argue that propositions cannot be concrete objects.Less
This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William Kneale and W. V. Quine, and an elaboration on the notions of possible worlds and essences. In the third chapter, I conclude that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals is false, even when fortified with Counterpart Theory. Chapter 4 contains an argument for the conclusion that there neither are, nor could have been, possible but nonexistent objects. In the next chapter, I develop this theme in greater detail and argue for the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. Both Chs. 6 and 7 contain an account of the relationship between proper names and essences, my view being that proper names express essences and that sometimes different proper names for the same object express different essences of that object. The end of Ch. 7 and all of Ch. 8 are an examination of existentialism (the theory that propositions and states of affairs ontologically depend on their subjects) and arguments against it. In Ch. 9, I defend my theory of modality against objections raised by John Pollock. In Ch. 10, I sketch out what the commitments of modal realism are, and argue that David Lewis's modal theory is not a modal realist theory. Finally, in the concluding chapter I argue that propositions cannot be concrete objects.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1978
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198244141
- eISBN:
- 9780191598241
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198244142.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is a study of the concept of necessity. In the first three chapters, I clarify and defend the distinction between modality de re and modality de dicto. Also, I show how to explain de re ...
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This book is a study of the concept of necessity. In the first three chapters, I clarify and defend the distinction between modality de re and modality de dicto. Also, I show how to explain de re modality in terms of de dicto modality. In Ch. 4, I explicate the concept of a possible world and define what it is for an object x to have a property P essentially. I then use the concept of an essential property to give an account of essences and their relationship to proper names. In Ch. 6, I argue that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals—even when fortified with Counterpart Theory—is false. Chapters 7 and 8 address the subject of possible but non‐existent objects; I argue here for the conclusion that there is no good reason to think that there are any such objects. In Ch. 9, I apply my theory of modality to the Problem of Evil in an effort to show that the Free Will Defense defeats this particular objection to theism. In Ch. 10, I present a sound modal version of the ontological argument for the existence of God. Finally, in the appendix, I address Quinean objections to quantified modal logic.Less
This book is a study of the concept of necessity. In the first three chapters, I clarify and defend the distinction between modality de re and modality de dicto. Also, I show how to explain de re modality in terms of de dicto modality. In Ch. 4, I explicate the concept of a possible world and define what it is for an object x to have a property P essentially. I then use the concept of an essential property to give an account of essences and their relationship to proper names. In Ch. 6, I argue that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals—even when fortified with Counterpart Theory—is false. Chapters 7 and 8 address the subject of possible but non‐existent objects; I argue here for the conclusion that there is no good reason to think that there are any such objects. In Ch. 9, I apply my theory of modality to the Problem of Evil in an effort to show that the Free Will Defense defeats this particular objection to theism. In Ch. 10, I present a sound modal version of the ontological argument for the existence of God. Finally, in the appendix, I address Quinean objections to quantified modal logic.
Henny Fiskå Hägg
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199288083
- eISBN:
- 9780191604164
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199288089.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
Clement’s model for a distinction between God’s essence and his powers or energies is presented. Clement’s emphasis is on unknowability versus knowability — God as essence is unknowable, God as the ...
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Clement’s model for a distinction between God’s essence and his powers or energies is presented. Clement’s emphasis is on unknowability versus knowability — God as essence is unknowable, God as the Son, or as his power, is knowable. It is argued that the distinction is structurally equivalent with, and anticipates, the dogma of the distinction between God’s essence and energies that became so important in later Orthodox theology.Less
Clement’s model for a distinction between God’s essence and his powers or energies is presented. Clement’s emphasis is on unknowability versus knowability — God as essence is unknowable, God as the Son, or as his power, is knowable. It is argued that the distinction is structurally equivalent with, and anticipates, the dogma of the distinction between God’s essence and energies that became so important in later Orthodox theology.
Henny Fiskå Hägg
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199288083
- eISBN:
- 9780191604164
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199288089.003.0009
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
Clement’s solution to the problem of the relationship between the knowable and the unknowable aspects of God is seen in a wider perspective. How and why, for centuries, Clement was seen as ...
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Clement’s solution to the problem of the relationship between the knowable and the unknowable aspects of God is seen in a wider perspective. How and why, for centuries, Clement was seen as doctrinally suspect is discussed. It is also claimed that his importance in the development of theology lies in his coupling of apophaticism with a distinction between essence and energies, anticipating the later dogma of the Orthodox Church.Less
Clement’s solution to the problem of the relationship between the knowable and the unknowable aspects of God is seen in a wider perspective. How and why, for centuries, Clement was seen as doctrinally suspect is discussed. It is also claimed that his importance in the development of theology lies in his coupling of apophaticism with a distinction between essence and energies, anticipating the later dogma of the Orthodox Church.
Jon M. Robertson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199212606
- eISBN:
- 9780191707360
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199212606.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This introductory chapter explores the perplexity of scholarly approaches to the early Arian controversy. It identifies recent approaches to the period that are inadequate due to erroneous ...
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This introductory chapter explores the perplexity of scholarly approaches to the early Arian controversy. It identifies recent approaches to the period that are inadequate due to erroneous presuppositions or the imposition of later concepts. The term ‘Arianism’, for example, is often used without thought of any clear theological content from the 4th-century movement. Much of the confusion in approach to the post-Nicene debate also stems from a predilection on the part of many to treat theological terminology wihtout considering their original context. Terms and phrases such as ‘essence’, ‘hypostasis’, ‘consubstantial’, and ‘godhead’ can only be fruitfully understood within their theological situ. Related to this is a third problem of the inadequate categorization of the various groups of the early controversy. Classifications built upon the mere occurrence of terms, based on geographical distinctions, or imposed by later decisions of orthodoxy conceal more than they reveal.Less
This introductory chapter explores the perplexity of scholarly approaches to the early Arian controversy. It identifies recent approaches to the period that are inadequate due to erroneous presuppositions or the imposition of later concepts. The term ‘Arianism’, for example, is often used without thought of any clear theological content from the 4th-century movement. Much of the confusion in approach to the post-Nicene debate also stems from a predilection on the part of many to treat theological terminology wihtout considering their original context. Terms and phrases such as ‘essence’, ‘hypostasis’, ‘consubstantial’, and ‘godhead’ can only be fruitfully understood within their theological situ. Related to this is a third problem of the inadequate categorization of the various groups of the early controversy. Classifications built upon the mere occurrence of terms, based on geographical distinctions, or imposed by later decisions of orthodoxy conceal more than they reveal.
Penelope Mackie
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272204
- eISBN:
- 9780191604034
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272204.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Following Nathan Salmon and D. H. Mellor, this chapter argues that natural kind essentialism of the type advocated by Kripke and Putnam is not an inevitable consequence of the adoption of an ...
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Following Nathan Salmon and D. H. Mellor, this chapter argues that natural kind essentialism of the type advocated by Kripke and Putnam is not an inevitable consequence of the adoption of an anti-descriptivist semantic theory of natural kind terms. It attempts to clarify various issues about the characteristics of natural kind essentialism and its relation to semantic theory, as well as reinforcing the distinction made earlier in the book between essentialism about individuals and essentialism about natural kinds. The author remains agnostic on the question of the truth of essentialism about natural kinds, but suggests reasons for scepticism about its plausibility in comparison with some weaker views, such as the theory that a natural kind has a Lockean ‘real essence’ which need not belong to the kind in all possible worlds.Less
Following Nathan Salmon and D. H. Mellor, this chapter argues that natural kind essentialism of the type advocated by Kripke and Putnam is not an inevitable consequence of the adoption of an anti-descriptivist semantic theory of natural kind terms. It attempts to clarify various issues about the characteristics of natural kind essentialism and its relation to semantic theory, as well as reinforcing the distinction made earlier in the book between essentialism about individuals and essentialism about natural kinds. The author remains agnostic on the question of the truth of essentialism about natural kinds, but suggests reasons for scepticism about its plausibility in comparison with some weaker views, such as the theory that a natural kind has a Lockean ‘real essence’ which need not belong to the kind in all possible worlds.
Francesca Aran Murphy
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199219285
- eISBN:
- 9780191711664
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219285.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter is about arguments for the existence of God. It shows how grammatical Thomists like Herbert McCabe and Denys Turner make proving that God exists into a matter of proving that it is ...
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This chapter is about arguments for the existence of God. It shows how grammatical Thomists like Herbert McCabe and Denys Turner make proving that God exists into a matter of proving that it is rational to question whether God exists. Their leading question, ‘why is there something rather than nothing?’ assumes rather than proves that the world is contingent: it takes us around the ‘story’ of God's existence from the inside of faith, and does not refer to any specific creative action of God. Circulating thus within human psychological acts, the grammatical Thomist argument is focussed on the act of questioning rather as a movie holds our attention by repeatedly posing new questions, causing us to suspend disbelief but not to credit it with real agency. The way in which story Barthians use the ‘ontological argument’ makes the Biblical stories about God into an evidential basis of God's existence. Robert Jenson's ‘story Thomism’ takes Thomistic and Barthian narrative theology to a logical conclusion by making ‘God’ a character within a wider story, whose plot requires ‘contingent’ and ‘Creator’ characters.Less
This chapter is about arguments for the existence of God. It shows how grammatical Thomists like Herbert McCabe and Denys Turner make proving that God exists into a matter of proving that it is rational to question whether God exists. Their leading question, ‘why is there something rather than nothing?’ assumes rather than proves that the world is contingent: it takes us around the ‘story’ of God's existence from the inside of faith, and does not refer to any specific creative action of God. Circulating thus within human psychological acts, the grammatical Thomist argument is focussed on the act of questioning rather as a movie holds our attention by repeatedly posing new questions, causing us to suspend disbelief but not to credit it with real agency. The way in which story Barthians use the ‘ontological argument’ makes the Biblical stories about God into an evidential basis of God's existence. Robert Jenson's ‘story Thomism’ takes Thomistic and Barthian narrative theology to a logical conclusion by making ‘God’ a character within a wider story, whose plot requires ‘contingent’ and ‘Creator’ characters.
Francesca Aran Murphy
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199219285
- eISBN:
- 9780191711664
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219285.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter first reiterates the argument of Chapter III under the form that proving God's existence via the distinction of essence and existence is ultimately experiential, coming down to a ...
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This chapter first reiterates the argument of Chapter III under the form that proving God's existence via the distinction of essence and existence is ultimately experiential, coming down to a psychological conviction that death, as endangering my existence, is poetically unjust. A better argument for God's existence would begin below the level of conceptual language, starting from animality and movement. It then describes Etienne Gilson's re-statement of Thomas' Five Ways (moves, causes, necessity/contingency, perfections, design), in order to give a satisfactory argument for God's existence, that is, Hans Urs von Balthasar's ‘four distinctions’. Based on the ‘Five Ways’ and building on their empirical character, the ‘four distinctions’ give an argument to God which is primarily objective and realistic, but which takes the subject and his experience into account, by beginning from the dialogue between mother and child which first ‘moves’ the child into reality.Less
This chapter first reiterates the argument of Chapter III under the form that proving God's existence via the distinction of essence and existence is ultimately experiential, coming down to a psychological conviction that death, as endangering my existence, is poetically unjust. A better argument for God's existence would begin below the level of conceptual language, starting from animality and movement. It then describes Etienne Gilson's re-statement of Thomas' Five Ways (moves, causes, necessity/contingency, perfections, design), in order to give a satisfactory argument for God's existence, that is, Hans Urs von Balthasar's ‘four distinctions’. Based on the ‘Five Ways’ and building on their empirical character, the ‘four distinctions’ give an argument to God which is primarily objective and realistic, but which takes the subject and his experience into account, by beginning from the dialogue between mother and child which first ‘moves’ the child into reality.
Penelope Mackie
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272204
- eISBN:
- 9780191604034
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272204.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter introduces the question of whether ordinary individuals have non-trivial individual essences: essential properties that are not only necessary but also sufficient for their identities in ...
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This chapter introduces the question of whether ordinary individuals have non-trivial individual essences: essential properties that are not only necessary but also sufficient for their identities in all possible worlds. It argues that the issue is important, for if there are no such non-trivial individual essences for ordinary individuals, we are forced to choose from what may seem to be an unpalatable list of options: either the identities of these individuals across possible worlds can be ‘bare’ identities, or their transworld identities can be ‘extrinsically determined’, or — unless we abandon de re modal claims about such individuals entirely — we must interpret those de re modal claims in terms of counterpart theory rather than identity across possible worlds. Two arguments for non-trivial individual essences are considered. The first is an ‘indiscernibility argument’ that is related to an argument presented by Robert Adams for ‘primitive thisness’. The second is based on an argument presented by Graeme Forbes. The distinction between ‘trivial’ and ‘non-trivial’ individual essences is explained, and the relation between the theses that there can be ‘bare’ transworld identities and that there can be ‘haecceitistic’ (non-qualitative) differences between possible worlds is discussed.Less
This chapter introduces the question of whether ordinary individuals have non-trivial individual essences: essential properties that are not only necessary but also sufficient for their identities in all possible worlds. It argues that the issue is important, for if there are no such non-trivial individual essences for ordinary individuals, we are forced to choose from what may seem to be an unpalatable list of options: either the identities of these individuals across possible worlds can be ‘bare’ identities, or their transworld identities can be ‘extrinsically determined’, or — unless we abandon de re modal claims about such individuals entirely — we must interpret those de re modal claims in terms of counterpart theory rather than identity across possible worlds. Two arguments for non-trivial individual essences are considered. The first is an ‘indiscernibility argument’ that is related to an argument presented by Robert Adams for ‘primitive thisness’. The second is based on an argument presented by Graeme Forbes. The distinction between ‘trivial’ and ‘non-trivial’ individual essences is explained, and the relation between the theses that there can be ‘bare’ transworld identities and that there can be ‘haecceitistic’ (non-qualitative) differences between possible worlds is discussed.
Penelope Mackie
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272204
- eISBN:
- 9780191604034
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272204.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Graeme Forbes has argued that many ordinary persisting things (including people, animals, and plants) can be attributed non-trivial individual essences that include distinctive features of their ...
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Graeme Forbes has argued that many ordinary persisting things (including people, animals, and plants) can be attributed non-trivial individual essences that include distinctive features of their origins. According to Forbes, this enables us to interpret de re modal claims about such individuals in terms of identity across possible worlds without embracing ‘bare identities’. This chapter considers various problems that Forbes’s proposal confronts, and concludes that there are no plausible candidates for non-trivial individual essences of the type that his theory requires. A version of Chisholm’s Paradox about identity across possible worlds, and of the ‘Four Worlds Paradox’ identified by Nathan Salmon are discussed.Less
Graeme Forbes has argued that many ordinary persisting things (including people, animals, and plants) can be attributed non-trivial individual essences that include distinctive features of their origins. According to Forbes, this enables us to interpret de re modal claims about such individuals in terms of identity across possible worlds without embracing ‘bare identities’. This chapter considers various problems that Forbes’s proposal confronts, and concludes that there are no plausible candidates for non-trivial individual essences of the type that his theory requires. A version of Chisholm’s Paradox about identity across possible worlds, and of the ‘Four Worlds Paradox’ identified by Nathan Salmon are discussed.
Penelope Mackie
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272204
- eISBN:
- 9780191604034
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272204.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses the proposal that identities across possible worlds may be determined by ‘extrinsic’ features, and compares this with an analogous ‘best-candidate’ account of identity over ...
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This chapter discusses the proposal that identities across possible worlds may be determined by ‘extrinsic’ features, and compares this with an analogous ‘best-candidate’ account of identity over time, according to which the identity of an object that exists at one time with an object that exists at another time may depend on the presence or absence of ‘competing candidates’. It argues that even if a best-candidate account of identity over time is acceptable, the ‘extrinsic determination’ account of identity across possible worlds should be rejected in favour of either a ‘bare identities’ or a counterpart-theoretic account.Less
This chapter discusses the proposal that identities across possible worlds may be determined by ‘extrinsic’ features, and compares this with an analogous ‘best-candidate’ account of identity over time, according to which the identity of an object that exists at one time with an object that exists at another time may depend on the presence or absence of ‘competing candidates’. It argues that even if a best-candidate account of identity over time is acceptable, the ‘extrinsic determination’ account of identity across possible worlds should be rejected in favour of either a ‘bare identities’ or a counterpart-theoretic account.
Torstein Theodor Tollefsen
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199605965
- eISBN:
- 9780191738227
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199605965.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies, Religion in the Ancient World
This book is an investigation into two basic concepts of ancient pagan and Christian thought, namely activity and participation. It shows how activity in Christian thought is connected with the topic ...
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This book is an investigation into two basic concepts of ancient pagan and Christian thought, namely activity and participation. It shows how activity in Christian thought is connected with the topic of participation: for the lower levels of being to participate in the higher means to receive the divine activity into their own ontological constitution. It is mainly a discussion of some important Church Fathers. Against a background of Aristotelian and Neoplatonist philosophy, the book discusses Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor, and culminates with a chapter on Gregory Palamas before some conclusions are drawn. The concern of the author is to highlight how the Christians think energeia (i.e. activity or energy) is manifested as divine activity in the eternal constitution of the Trinity, the creation of the cosmos, the Incarnation of Christ, and in salvation understood as deification. Terms such as essence and energy are associated with the theology and spirituality of the fourteenth-century Byzantine thinker Gregory Palamas. One purpose of this book is to show how Palamas’ theology is in accordance with Greek patristic thinking, with its background in a definite trend in ancient pagan philosophy.Less
This book is an investigation into two basic concepts of ancient pagan and Christian thought, namely activity and participation. It shows how activity in Christian thought is connected with the topic of participation: for the lower levels of being to participate in the higher means to receive the divine activity into their own ontological constitution. It is mainly a discussion of some important Church Fathers. Against a background of Aristotelian and Neoplatonist philosophy, the book discusses Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor, and culminates with a chapter on Gregory Palamas before some conclusions are drawn. The concern of the author is to highlight how the Christians think energeia (i.e. activity or energy) is manifested as divine activity in the eternal constitution of the Trinity, the creation of the cosmos, the Incarnation of Christ, and in salvation understood as deification. Terms such as essence and energy are associated with the theology and spirituality of the fourteenth-century Byzantine thinker Gregory Palamas. One purpose of this book is to show how Palamas’ theology is in accordance with Greek patristic thinking, with its background in a definite trend in ancient pagan philosophy.
Colin McGinn
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199856145
- eISBN:
- 9780199919567
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199856145.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
What kind of subject is philosophy? This book takes up this perennial question, defending the view that philosophy consists of conceptual analysis, construed broadly. Conceptual analysis is ...
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What kind of subject is philosophy? This book takes up this perennial question, defending the view that philosophy consists of conceptual analysis, construed broadly. Conceptual analysis is understood to involve the search for de re essences, but the book takes up various challenges to this meta-philosophy: that some concepts are merely family resemblance concepts with no definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (“game”, “language”); that it is impossible to provide sufficient conditions for some philosophically important concepts without circularity (“knowledge”, “intentional action”); that there exists an unsolved paradox of analysis; that there is no well-defined analytic-synthetic distinction; that names have no definition; and that conceptual analysis is not properly naturalistic. Ultimately, the text finds none of these objections convincing: analysis emerges as both possible and fruitful. At the same time, it rejects the idea of the “linguistic turn”, arguing that analysis is not directed to language as such, but at reality. Going on to distinguish several types of analysis, with an emphasis on classical decompositional analysis, this book shows different philosophical traditions to be engaged in conceptual analysis when properly understood. Philosophical activity has the kind of value possessed by play, the text claims, which differs from the kind of value possessed by scientific activity. The book concludes with an analytic discussion of the prospects for traditional ontology and the nature of instantiation.Less
What kind of subject is philosophy? This book takes up this perennial question, defending the view that philosophy consists of conceptual analysis, construed broadly. Conceptual analysis is understood to involve the search for de re essences, but the book takes up various challenges to this meta-philosophy: that some concepts are merely family resemblance concepts with no definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (“game”, “language”); that it is impossible to provide sufficient conditions for some philosophically important concepts without circularity (“knowledge”, “intentional action”); that there exists an unsolved paradox of analysis; that there is no well-defined analytic-synthetic distinction; that names have no definition; and that conceptual analysis is not properly naturalistic. Ultimately, the text finds none of these objections convincing: analysis emerges as both possible and fruitful. At the same time, it rejects the idea of the “linguistic turn”, arguing that analysis is not directed to language as such, but at reality. Going on to distinguish several types of analysis, with an emphasis on classical decompositional analysis, this book shows different philosophical traditions to be engaged in conceptual analysis when properly understood. Philosophical activity has the kind of value possessed by play, the text claims, which differs from the kind of value possessed by scientific activity. The book concludes with an analytic discussion of the prospects for traditional ontology and the nature of instantiation.
