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Moral Belief and the Possibility of Error

Alan Thomas

in Value and Context: The Nature of Moral and Political Knowledge

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780198250173
eISBN:
9780191604072
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198250177.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A contextualist defence of cognitivism is open to the charge that it cannot supply a convincing theory of error for when moral judgements diverge. This chapter rebuts this concern: conditions have ... More


The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism

Terence Cuneo

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2008
ISBN:
9780199218837
eISBN:
9780191711749
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218837.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Antirealist views about morality claim that moral facts do not exist. An interesting question to raise about these views is whether they imply that other types of normative facts, such as epistemic ... More


Mental Agency and Metaethics

Matthew Evans and Nishi Shah

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 7

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199653492
eISBN:
9780191741661
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter argues that none of the traditional anti-realist metaethical views—error theory, non-cognitivism, and constructivism—can fully accommodate certain central features of mental agency. It ... More


Moral Arguments and Natural Signs for God

C. Stephen Evans

in Natural Signs and Knowledge of God: A New Look at Theistic Arguments

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199217168
eISBN:
9780191712401
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217168.003.0005
Subject:
Religion, Theology, Philosophy of Religion

This chapter considers a theoretical moral argument for God's existence: if there are objectively binding moral obligations, then God exists. There are such obligations. So, probably God exists. This ... More


Sidgwick's Metaethics

David Phillips

in Sidgwickian Ethics

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199778911
eISBN:
9780199919093
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199778911.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

I argue that non-naturalism is the core of Sidgwick's metaethical position; that it represents a fundamental commitment of his, in that he draws from it epistemological implications central to his ... More


The Accidental Error Theorist

Richard Joyce

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 6

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199606375
eISBN:
9780191729478
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606375.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The moral error theorist faces many kinds of opposition. One kind of opponent offers an identity claim between moral properties and certain naturalistic properties (e.g., of the format “Goodness = ... More


A World without “Isms”

Paul Horwich

in Truth -- Meaning -- Reality

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199268900
eISBN:
9780191708459
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199268900.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

Humdrum material facts — e.g., that the cat is on the mat — are typically regarded as philosophically unproblematic. But with within certain domains, such as mathematics, morality, modal discourse, ... More


The Quest for Reality: Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Colour

Barry Stroud

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195151886
eISBN:
9780199867189
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195151887.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Explores the metaphysical question of the relation between reality and human perceptions, thoughts and beliefs with reference to colours. Posits an absolute independent reality of which knowledge is ... More


Discomforts and Distortions of Metaphysical Theory

Barry Stroud

in The Quest for Reality: Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Colour

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195151886
eISBN:
9780199867189
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195151887.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Discusses the failure of the metaphysical unmasking project, referring to the difference between knowledge of and perception of colour. Argues that the relativity of perception of colour is not ... More


Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Time

Cheryl K. Chen

in The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Reflections on the Thought of Barry Stroud

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780195381658
eISBN:
9780199918317
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381658.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, General, History of Philosophy

In The Quest for Reality, Barry Stroud argues that the subjectivist about color cannot meet the conditions for ascribing color beliefs to people if she claims that none of those beliefs accurately ... More


Philosophical Renegades

Bryan Frances

in The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199698370
eISBN:
9780191748899
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698370.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

If you retain your belief upon learning that a large number and percentage of your recognized epistemic superiors disagree with you, then what happens to the epistemic status of your belief? Bryan ... More


Believing the Error Theory

Bart Streumer

in Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory about All Normative Judgements

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
September 2017
ISBN:
9780198785897
eISBN:
9780191848070
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198785897.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter first describes the author’s inability to believe the error theory, and argues that this inability is evidence that we cannot believe this theory. It then offers an explanation of why we ... More


Are Any Moral Beliefs True?

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

in Moral Skepticisms

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780195187724
eISBN:
9780199786121
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195187725.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter explores moral nihilism and error theories, which hold that moral beliefs are truth-apt but never true. Arguments for such views from relativity, evolution, and epistemological, ... More


The Sceptical Solution

Bryan Frances

in Scepticism Comes Alive

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
October 2005
ISBN:
9780199282135
eISBN:
9780191602917
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199282137.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

It is argued that most of the counterintuitive elements of traditional sceptical theories do not apply to the live sceptical theories, and that the live sceptic’s argument is identical in form to ... More


Commonsense Objectivism and the Persistence of Moral Judgment

Shaun Nichols

in Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgement

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780195169348
eISBN:
9780199835041
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195169344.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Many philosophers maintain that common sense is committed to a kind of moral objectivism. This chapter exploits recent empirical work to defend this claim. The chapter also maintains that the account ... More


Descriptivism and the Error Theory

R. M. Hare

in Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point

Published in print:
1981
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198246602
eISBN:
9780191597596
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198246609.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Hare explicates descriptivism and J. L. Mackie's error theory and explains what is wrong with them with respect to moral disagreement and the prescriptive force of moral terms. The meaning of moral ... More


Error Management

Daniel Nettle

in Evolution and the Mechanisms of Decision Making

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2016
ISBN:
9780262018081
eISBN:
9780262306027
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262018081.003.0005
Subject:
Psychology, Social Psychology

This chapter briefly introduces error management theory, an evolutionary framework for understanding how natural selection should be expected to shape decision-making mechanisms. Selection minimizes ... More


Pluralistic Realism

Mohan Matthen

in Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199268504
eISBN:
9780191602283
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199268509.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

A catalogue of mismatches between experienced colour and the physical counterparts of colour is presented. Does it show, as C. L. Hardin has argued, that colour is not real? No. It is proposed that a ... More


Doing with Less

David Enoch

in Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199579969
eISBN:
9780191729010
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579969.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter critically discusses three families of attempts to give the metaethical or meta-normative realist pretty much all that she wants, without resorting to the metaphysical extravagance of ... More


Additional Sceptical Hypotheses

Bryan Frances

in Scepticism Comes Alive

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
October 2005
ISBN:
9780199282135
eISBN:
9780191602917
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199282137.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The argument template of chapter 3 is taken together with other live hypotheses to generate other kinds of live scepticism. For instance, one can focus on error theories with regard to colour, or ... More


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