Roger M. Barker
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199576814
- eISBN:
- 9780191722509
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199576814.003.0004
- Subject:
- Business and Management, International Business, Corporate Governance and Accountability
An evaluation is made of various ways in which corporate governance can be operationalized as part of a panel data econometric analysis. Corporate governance is not a concept that can be directly ...
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An evaluation is made of various ways in which corporate governance can be operationalized as part of a panel data econometric analysis. Corporate governance is not a concept that can be directly observed. Consequently, it is necessary to identify suitable proxy variables. Given the pros and cons of different measures of corporate governance, it is decided to undertake the empirical analysis with three plausible proxies – equity share, value traded, and international equity issuance – rather than to base conclusions on a single measure. Other potential measures of corporate governance – such as ownership concentration, corporate governance ratings, and measures of corporate governance regulation – are not utilized for various conceptual and practical reasons.Less
An evaluation is made of various ways in which corporate governance can be operationalized as part of a panel data econometric analysis. Corporate governance is not a concept that can be directly observed. Consequently, it is necessary to identify suitable proxy variables. Given the pros and cons of different measures of corporate governance, it is decided to undertake the empirical analysis with three plausible proxies – equity share, value traded, and international equity issuance – rather than to base conclusions on a single measure. Other potential measures of corporate governance – such as ownership concentration, corporate governance ratings, and measures of corporate governance regulation – are not utilized for various conceptual and practical reasons.
John Child, David Faulkner, and Stephen B. Tallman
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199266241
- eISBN:
- 9780191699139
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266241.003.0011
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Strategy, Organization Studies
Control proves to be an important aspect of management, and managers are held accountable for the actions and decisions they make for the alliance. Management or other related groups initiate and ...
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Control proves to be an important aspect of management, and managers are held accountable for the actions and decisions they make for the alliance. Management or other related groups initiate and monitor the operations in line with their expectations and goals, and assure that agents are operating in their best interests. This chapter looks into the basis and nature of control observed in alliances and the available options for imposing control. It differentiates operational control from strategic control and control in collaborations and in JVs. Since bargaining power, resource provision, and equity share serve as the foundations for partner control, it looks into the issue of whether dominant control proves to be more conducive to performance and management. The chapter explores the relationship between performance and alliance control while also drawing attention to useful policy guidelines.Less
Control proves to be an important aspect of management, and managers are held accountable for the actions and decisions they make for the alliance. Management or other related groups initiate and monitor the operations in line with their expectations and goals, and assure that agents are operating in their best interests. This chapter looks into the basis and nature of control observed in alliances and the available options for imposing control. It differentiates operational control from strategic control and control in collaborations and in JVs. Since bargaining power, resource provision, and equity share serve as the foundations for partner control, it looks into the issue of whether dominant control proves to be more conducive to performance and management. The chapter explores the relationship between performance and alliance control while also drawing attention to useful policy guidelines.
