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The chapter critically assesses the traditional distinction between three types of equity: equity infra, praeter, and contra legem. It argues that while this taxonomy offers a conceptual framework to help comprehend three roles that equity can assume, it remains a heuristic construct; strict divisions between different kinds of equity are unsustainable. In addition, the traditional breakdown of equity fails to account properly for the relationship between contra legem equity and law. Against this background, the chapter reviews a classic example of contra legem equity in Antigone and revisits the concept. It concludes that ultimately the most important limitation of the tripartite typology is that it does not account for the fact that equity may never truly function contra legem, since equity is an element of law.

The book’s concluding chapter summarises its main findings and arguments. The book has tried to make sense of the legal concept of equity as it operates in the international law of the 21st century, setting it on a new basis and dealing with some common misconceptions about it. The thrust of its argument is that equity is a legal concept and a source of international law whose reach stretches beyond what has previously been conceded. Equity contributes to the development of international law and, as international law grows, the value of equity grows with it. By definition circumstance-specific, equity must remain flexible in order to fulfil its function qua justice. As time goes by, equity will still inform new international law and it will continue to be relevant, as an imperative of law as justice that international courts and tribunals are bound to apply.

The chapter analyses variations on equity and related concepts that originate in equity. In particular, it studies equality, reasonableness, estoppel, acquiescence, good faith, unjust enrichment, the clean hands doctrine, abuse of rights, and proportionality. The chapter probes these concepts to demonstrate that equity lies deep in the international law mainstream and is applied even if we are not constantly aware of this. The chapter further aims to topple the myth that some forms of equity, notably contra legem equity, are only applied if the parties agree. It suggests that some such variations on equity or equitable principles, notably the clean hands doctrine and abuse of rights, can be seen as permissible applications of contra legem equity without the parties’ agreement – with the caveat that equity cannot truly exist contra legem.

If court statutes and arbitration rules often provide for ex aequo et bono adjudication, international adjudicatory bodies rarely use it. Less successful than its predecessor, absolute equity, ex aequo et bono adjudication is limited in contemporary times to less than a handful of investment arbitration cases. The chapter considers ex aequo et bono in light of the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals, it explores the types of dispute for which an ex aequo et bono mandate is suitable and its compatibility with the judicial function. The chapter argues that ex aequo et bono powers must not be conflated with equity that international courts and tribunals can apply anyway, that ex aequo et bono adjudication is legal adjudication, and it shows that on the rare occasions when tribunals have been granted ex aequo et bono powers, they have tended to interpret them narrowly.