Andrew Mason
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199264414
- eISBN:
- 9780191718489
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264414.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This chapter begins with an examination of the simple view that equality of opportunity requires open competition for advantaged social positions. It is argued that this idea is not really so simple. ...
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This chapter begins with an examination of the simple view that equality of opportunity requires open competition for advantaged social positions. It is argued that this idea is not really so simple. The notion of an open competition and the idea of a qualification which it presupposes are more complicated than they seem, and need to be looked at in a broad account of justice in general, or equality of opportunity in particular. The simple view must be regarded as incomplete: it is implausible to suppose, for example, that open competition for advantaged social positions is a sufficient condition of equality of opportunity. Reflection upon the simple view suggests that any adequate account of equality of opportunity must include at least two components: the idea that there should be open competition for advantaged social positions, and that there should be fair access to the qualifications required for success in these competitions.Less
This chapter begins with an examination of the simple view that equality of opportunity requires open competition for advantaged social positions. It is argued that this idea is not really so simple. The notion of an open competition and the idea of a qualification which it presupposes are more complicated than they seem, and need to be looked at in a broad account of justice in general, or equality of opportunity in particular. The simple view must be regarded as incomplete: it is implausible to suppose, for example, that open competition for advantaged social positions is a sufficient condition of equality of opportunity. Reflection upon the simple view suggests that any adequate account of equality of opportunity must include at least two components: the idea that there should be open competition for advantaged social positions, and that there should be fair access to the qualifications required for success in these competitions.
David Miller
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199235056
- eISBN:
- 9780191715792
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199235056.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
This book presents a non-cosmopolitan theory of global justice. In contrast to theories that seek to extend principles of social justice, such as equality of opportunity or resources, to the world as ...
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This book presents a non-cosmopolitan theory of global justice. In contrast to theories that seek to extend principles of social justice, such as equality of opportunity or resources, to the world as a whole, it argues that in a world made up of self-determining national communities, a different conception is needed. The book presents and defends an account of national responsibility which entails that nations may justifiably claim the benefits that their decisions and policies produce, while also being held liable for harms that they inflict on other peoples. Such collective responsibility extends to responsibility for the national past, so the present generation may owe redress to those who have been harmed by the actions of their predecessors. Global justice, therefore, must be understood not in terms of equality, but in terms of a minimum set of basic rights that belong to human beings everywhere. Where these rights are being violated or threatened, remedial responsibility may fall on outsiders. The book considers how this responsibility should be allocated, and how far citizens of democratic societies must limit their pursuit of domestic objectives in order to discharge their global obligations.Less
This book presents a non-cosmopolitan theory of global justice. In contrast to theories that seek to extend principles of social justice, such as equality of opportunity or resources, to the world as a whole, it argues that in a world made up of self-determining national communities, a different conception is needed. The book presents and defends an account of national responsibility which entails that nations may justifiably claim the benefits that their decisions and policies produce, while also being held liable for harms that they inflict on other peoples. Such collective responsibility extends to responsibility for the national past, so the present generation may owe redress to those who have been harmed by the actions of their predecessors. Global justice, therefore, must be understood not in terms of equality, but in terms of a minimum set of basic rights that belong to human beings everywhere. Where these rights are being violated or threatened, remedial responsibility may fall on outsiders. The book considers how this responsibility should be allocated, and how far citizens of democratic societies must limit their pursuit of domestic objectives in order to discharge their global obligations.
Thomas Pogge
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195136364
- eISBN:
- 9780199867691
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195136364.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter discusses the second principle of justice, which is made up of the opportunity principle and the difference principle. The difference principle and how it is meant to operate as an ...
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This chapter discusses the second principle of justice, which is made up of the opportunity principle and the difference principle. The difference principle and how it is meant to operate as an element of the basic structure is illustrated in detail, and supplemented with an example of how it might be applied to a hypothetical society. What the opportunity principle entails and why its lexical priority over the difference principles might be agreed to in the original position are described. Differences in different social regimes are considered in terms of how well they would satisfy Rawls's criterion.Less
This chapter discusses the second principle of justice, which is made up of the opportunity principle and the difference principle. The difference principle and how it is meant to operate as an element of the basic structure is illustrated in detail, and supplemented with an example of how it might be applied to a hypothetical society. What the opportunity principle entails and why its lexical priority over the difference principles might be agreed to in the original position are described. Differences in different social regimes are considered in terms of how well they would satisfy Rawls's criterion.
David Miller
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195337396
- eISBN:
- 9780199868681
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195337396.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
Noting that Okin placed the family at the center of concerns about justice, this chapter explores the relationship between the family and the achievement of equality of opportunity. The chapter ...
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Noting that Okin placed the family at the center of concerns about justice, this chapter explores the relationship between the family and the achievement of equality of opportunity. The chapter contrasts several conceptions of equality of opportunity and explores each conception's ability to accommodate the family. It also discusses the possibility of reconciliation between the family and equality of opportunity in the light of the social science literature on intergenerational transmission of inequality.Less
Noting that Okin placed the family at the center of concerns about justice, this chapter explores the relationship between the family and the achievement of equality of opportunity. The chapter contrasts several conceptions of equality of opportunity and explores each conception's ability to accommodate the family. It also discusses the possibility of reconciliation between the family and equality of opportunity in the light of the social science literature on intergenerational transmission of inequality.
Wojciech Sadurski
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199545179
- eISBN:
- 9780191719905
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199545179.003.0002
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter claims that the intuitive and widespread legitimating power of majority rule (MR) arises from the link between majority rule and the principle of equality of political opportunity. The ...
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This chapter claims that the intuitive and widespread legitimating power of majority rule (MR) arises from the link between majority rule and the principle of equality of political opportunity. The egalitarian character of MR is established by exploring ‘puzzles’ in democratic theory, such as the insensitivity of democratic voting procedures to unequal intensity of citizens' preferences, the inalienability of voting rights, and the relationship between the principle of unanimity (sometimes thought better to respect citizens' equality) and MR. Special attention is directed to the relationship between political equality and equality in the outcomes of political decisions: the claim is made that the language of equal political opportunity captures well the idea of equal political influence, in the circumstance of disagreement about what is required to achieve equal treatment through the outcomes of political decisions.Less
This chapter claims that the intuitive and widespread legitimating power of majority rule (MR) arises from the link between majority rule and the principle of equality of political opportunity. The egalitarian character of MR is established by exploring ‘puzzles’ in democratic theory, such as the insensitivity of democratic voting procedures to unequal intensity of citizens' preferences, the inalienability of voting rights, and the relationship between the principle of unanimity (sometimes thought better to respect citizens' equality) and MR. Special attention is directed to the relationship between political equality and equality in the outcomes of political decisions: the claim is made that the language of equal political opportunity captures well the idea of equal political influence, in the circumstance of disagreement about what is required to achieve equal treatment through the outcomes of political decisions.
DIVYA VAID and ANTHONY HEATH
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197264515
- eISBN:
- 9780191734403
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264515.003.0006
- Subject:
- Sociology, Politics, Social Movements and Social Change
This chapter discusses intergenerational class mobility, which is the extent to which sons — and even daughters — follow in their father's footsteps. It asks how ‘open’ India is, and whether it is ...
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This chapter discusses intergenerational class mobility, which is the extent to which sons — and even daughters — follow in their father's footsteps. It asks how ‘open’ India is, and whether it is becoming more ‘open’ with greater equality of opportunity as it slowly modernises. The discussion is limited to the patterns of intergenerational mobility of men and women who are actually in paid employment.Less
This chapter discusses intergenerational class mobility, which is the extent to which sons — and even daughters — follow in their father's footsteps. It asks how ‘open’ India is, and whether it is becoming more ‘open’ with greater equality of opportunity as it slowly modernises. The discussion is limited to the patterns of intergenerational mobility of men and women who are actually in paid employment.
Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195150162
- eISBN:
- 9780199833924
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195150163.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Once we abandon the idea that justice in taxation is a matter of determining a fair share of tax burdens, we must ask what the legitimate ends of government are, and what the legitimate means of ...
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Once we abandon the idea that justice in taxation is a matter of determining a fair share of tax burdens, we must ask what the legitimate ends of government are, and what the legitimate means of pursuing those ends are, particularly insofar as they involve the taxing power. Is the legitimate role of government limited to the provision of public goods, or does it include providing benefits for (worse-off) people and promoting equality of opportunity or welfare? Consequentialist and deontological theories of social justice provide importantly different approaches to these and other questions that stand behind tax policy--such as the moral standing of the market, the importance of individual responsibility, and the proper understanding of the moral value of liberty.Less
Once we abandon the idea that justice in taxation is a matter of determining a fair share of tax burdens, we must ask what the legitimate ends of government are, and what the legitimate means of pursuing those ends are, particularly insofar as they involve the taxing power. Is the legitimate role of government limited to the provision of public goods, or does it include providing benefits for (worse-off) people and promoting equality of opportunity or welfare? Consequentialist and deontological theories of social justice provide importantly different approaches to these and other questions that stand behind tax policy--such as the moral standing of the market, the importance of individual responsibility, and the proper understanding of the moral value of liberty.
Gillian Brock
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199230938
- eISBN:
- 9780191710957
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230938.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter develops and defends a novel cosmopolitan model of global justice. The model includes the view that global justice requires all to be adequately positioned to enjoy the prospects for a ...
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This chapter develops and defends a novel cosmopolitan model of global justice. The model includes the view that global justice requires all to be adequately positioned to enjoy the prospects for a decent life, so that all are enabled to meet basic needs, basic liberties are protected, and there are fair terms of co‐operation in collective endeavors. This also calls on us to ensure that there are social and political arrangements that can underwrite these important goods. (Later chapters discuss the kinds of reforms necessary to secure the elements of global justice.) The chapter also considers whether we should endorse a principle promoting global equality of opportunity or a global difference principle. The chapter argues that securing decent opportunities for all should be a key focus of accounts of global justice, and that a global difference principle is not superior to the principles of global distributive justice she endorses. The chapter compares the account with capabilities and human rights approaches.Less
This chapter develops and defends a novel cosmopolitan model of global justice. The model includes the view that global justice requires all to be adequately positioned to enjoy the prospects for a decent life, so that all are enabled to meet basic needs, basic liberties are protected, and there are fair terms of co‐operation in collective endeavors. This also calls on us to ensure that there are social and political arrangements that can underwrite these important goods. (Later chapters discuss the kinds of reforms necessary to secure the elements of global justice.) The chapter also considers whether we should endorse a principle promoting global equality of opportunity or a global difference principle. The chapter argues that securing decent opportunities for all should be a key focus of accounts of global justice, and that a global difference principle is not superior to the principles of global distributive justice she endorses. The chapter compares the account with capabilities and human rights approaches.
Carl Knight and Zofia Stemplowska (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199565801
- eISBN:
- 9780191725463
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565801.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Under what conditions are people responsible for their choices and the outcomes of those choices? How could such conditions be fostered by liberal societies? Should what people are due as a matter of ...
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Under what conditions are people responsible for their choices and the outcomes of those choices? How could such conditions be fostered by liberal societies? Should what people are due as a matter of justice depend on what they are responsible for? For example, how far should healthcare provision depend on patients' past choices? What values would be realized and which hampered by making justice sensitive to responsibility? Would it give people what they deserve? Would it advance or hinder equality? The explosion of philosophical interest in such questions has been fuelled by increased focus on individual responsibility in political debates. Political philosophers, especially egalitarians, have responded to such developments by attempting to map out the proper place for responsibility in theories of justice. This book both reflects on these recent developments in normative political theory and moves the debate forwards.Less
Under what conditions are people responsible for their choices and the outcomes of those choices? How could such conditions be fostered by liberal societies? Should what people are due as a matter of justice depend on what they are responsible for? For example, how far should healthcare provision depend on patients' past choices? What values would be realized and which hampered by making justice sensitive to responsibility? Would it give people what they deserve? Would it advance or hinder equality? The explosion of philosophical interest in such questions has been fuelled by increased focus on individual responsibility in political debates. Political philosophers, especially egalitarians, have responded to such developments by attempting to map out the proper place for responsibility in theories of justice. This book both reflects on these recent developments in normative political theory and moves the debate forwards.
Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195150162
- eISBN:
- 9780199833924
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195150163.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Setting aside spurious considerations about double taxation and fairness to donors, the real moral question concerning taxation and inheritance is whether gratuitous transfers require special tax ...
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Setting aside spurious considerations about double taxation and fairness to donors, the real moral question concerning taxation and inheritance is whether gratuitous transfers require special tax treatment on the ground of equality of opportunity. Some place such a high value on personal responsibility that confiscation of all such transfers has ethical appeal. A more appealing view holds that opportunities need not be strictly equal, so long as they are adequate for all. On such a view there is no ground for the confiscation of gratuitous transfers, but neither is there ground for the current exemption of such transfers from the tax base of donees.Less
Setting aside spurious considerations about double taxation and fairness to donors, the real moral question concerning taxation and inheritance is whether gratuitous transfers require special tax treatment on the ground of equality of opportunity. Some place such a high value on personal responsibility that confiscation of all such transfers has ethical appeal. A more appealing view holds that opportunities need not be strictly equal, so long as they are adequate for all. On such a view there is no ground for the confiscation of gratuitous transfers, but neither is there ground for the current exemption of such transfers from the tax base of donees.
Gillian Brock
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199230938
- eISBN:
- 9780191710957
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230938.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter argues that the model of global justice developed in this book adequately reflects our moral equality and also can defensibly claim to be cosmopolitan. The chapter begins by considering ...
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This chapter argues that the model of global justice developed in this book adequately reflects our moral equality and also can defensibly claim to be cosmopolitan. The chapter begins by considering the kind of equality a model of global justice should reflect. An account of relational equality (in general) and democratic equality (in particular) is endorsed. There are problems and opportunities extending such an account from the domestic to the global sphere, which are addressed. It is argued that the account captures our equality better than rival conceptions (such as those that reflect a commitment to a global difference principle, global equality of opportunity, or global basic income). Altogether the account shows strong support for our equal moral worth and supports our equality on multiple levels, as is shown using examples. The kind of cosmopolitanism endorsed is also located using familiar distinctions and introducing some new ones.Less
This chapter argues that the model of global justice developed in this book adequately reflects our moral equality and also can defensibly claim to be cosmopolitan. The chapter begins by considering the kind of equality a model of global justice should reflect. An account of relational equality (in general) and democratic equality (in particular) is endorsed. There are problems and opportunities extending such an account from the domestic to the global sphere, which are addressed. It is argued that the account captures our equality better than rival conceptions (such as those that reflect a commitment to a global difference principle, global equality of opportunity, or global basic income). Altogether the account shows strong support for our equal moral worth and supports our equality on multiple levels, as is shown using examples. The kind of cosmopolitanism endorsed is also located using familiar distinctions and introducing some new ones.
Mark Bell
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199297849
- eISBN:
- 9780191711565
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297849.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Human Rights and Immigration, EU Law
This chapter examines the meaning of equality, in the context of racism. It identifies two dominant concepts of equality: formal and substantive. It analyses critically the usefulness and ...
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This chapter examines the meaning of equality, in the context of racism. It identifies two dominant concepts of equality: formal and substantive. It analyses critically the usefulness and shortcomings of both of these concepts, and includes a discussion of data collection and ethnic origin. It finds that substantive equality fits better with a concept of institutional racism. It notes, though, that themes of diversity and intersectionality pose challenges to substantive equality and its perceived focus on group disadvantage.Less
This chapter examines the meaning of equality, in the context of racism. It identifies two dominant concepts of equality: formal and substantive. It analyses critically the usefulness and shortcomings of both of these concepts, and includes a discussion of data collection and ethnic origin. It finds that substantive equality fits better with a concept of institutional racism. It notes, though, that themes of diversity and intersectionality pose challenges to substantive equality and its perceived focus on group disadvantage.
Meir Yaish
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199258451
- eISBN:
- 9780191601491
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199258457.003.0013
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
Engages with the long lasting debate in sociology concerning the consequences of industrialization process for social mobility. It is argued that Israeli society provides one of the most adequate ...
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Engages with the long lasting debate in sociology concerning the consequences of industrialization process for social mobility. It is argued that Israeli society provides one of the most adequate tests of this thesis. In this context, then, the analysis in this chapter is guided by two main questions: (1) has equality of opportunity in Israeli mobility increased over time, (2) has the mobility process in Israeli society become more meritocratic over time. The analysis in this chapter is based on data from two nationally representative surveys that were tailored to the study of social mobility–the 1974 and the 1991 Israeli mobility surveys. It is shown that Israelis (men and women alike) experience high level of social mobility and fluidity–but with little temporal variations. It is also shown that while the Israeli stratification system has some meritocratic components, these did not gain in strength over time. Thus it is concluded that, in the Israeli context, social mobility, and the industrialization process do not go hand in hand.Less
Engages with the long lasting debate in sociology concerning the consequences of industrialization process for social mobility. It is argued that Israeli society provides one of the most adequate tests of this thesis. In this context, then, the analysis in this chapter is guided by two main questions: (1) has equality of opportunity in Israeli mobility increased over time, (2) has the mobility process in Israeli society become more meritocratic over time. The analysis in this chapter is based on data from two nationally representative surveys that were tailored to the study of social mobility–the 1974 and the 1991 Israeli mobility surveys. It is shown that Israelis (men and women alike) experience high level of social mobility and fluidity–but with little temporal variations. It is also shown that while the Israeli stratification system has some meritocratic components, these did not gain in strength over time. Thus it is concluded that, in the Israeli context, social mobility, and the industrialization process do not go hand in hand.
Aaron James
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199846153
- eISBN:
- 9780199933389
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199846153.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter elaborates and defends three basic principles of structural equity. A first requires that “losers” be compensated, in light of a proposed general conception of when a person or social ...
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This chapter elaborates and defends three basic principles of structural equity. A first requires that “losers” be compensated, in light of a proposed general conception of when a person or social class is harmed by trade. The second and third principles concern how the gains of trade are distributed, across and within societies. For reasons of “priority for the worse off,” departures from equality of gain are justifiable when unequal gains flow to developing countries. The chapter also challenges appeals to utilitarianism, economic liberty, legitimate expectations, equality of opportunity, fair-risk imposition, and “cosmopolitan” conceptions of fairness.Less
This chapter elaborates and defends three basic principles of structural equity. A first requires that “losers” be compensated, in light of a proposed general conception of when a person or social class is harmed by trade. The second and third principles concern how the gains of trade are distributed, across and within societies. For reasons of “priority for the worse off,” departures from equality of gain are justifiable when unequal gains flow to developing countries. The chapter also challenges appeals to utilitarianism, economic liberty, legitimate expectations, equality of opportunity, fair-risk imposition, and “cosmopolitan” conceptions of fairness.
Zofia Stemplowska
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199565801
- eISBN:
- 9780191725463
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565801.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Are those who suffer disadvantage due to their own choices entitled to assistance from others as a matter of egalitarian justice? Responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism and social egalitarianism are ...
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Are those who suffer disadvantage due to their own choices entitled to assistance from others as a matter of egalitarian justice? Responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism and social egalitarianism are usually thought to offer conflicting answers to this question. This chapter argues that the extent of conflict has been exaggerated. It proposes that responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism should be disambiguated into three models — (simple) equality of opportunity, equality of opportunity for maximum advantage, and equality of opportunity for equal interests — that each take a different stance on egalitarian claim to assistance. It argues that the most widespread interpretation of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism is unattractive and offers an alternative interpretation grounded in the equality of moral status. It explains why social egalitarianism itself should adopt this version of responsibility-sensitivity as a side constraint on its own egalitarian recommendations.Less
Are those who suffer disadvantage due to their own choices entitled to assistance from others as a matter of egalitarian justice? Responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism and social egalitarianism are usually thought to offer conflicting answers to this question. This chapter argues that the extent of conflict has been exaggerated. It proposes that responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism should be disambiguated into three models — (simple) equality of opportunity, equality of opportunity for maximum advantage, and equality of opportunity for equal interests — that each take a different stance on egalitarian claim to assistance. It argues that the most widespread interpretation of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism is unattractive and offers an alternative interpretation grounded in the equality of moral status. It explains why social egalitarianism itself should adopt this version of responsibility-sensitivity as a side constraint on its own egalitarian recommendations.
Thomas E. Malloy
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195300314
- eISBN:
- 9780199868698
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300314.003.0016
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter describes the Intergroup Relations Model, which asserts that the move to peaceful intergroup relations hinges on ensuring that the adversarial groups perceive equality of opportunities ...
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This chapter describes the Intergroup Relations Model, which asserts that the move to peaceful intergroup relations hinges on ensuring that the adversarial groups perceive equality of opportunities to procure material and social resources.Less
This chapter describes the Intergroup Relations Model, which asserts that the move to peaceful intergroup relations hinges on ensuring that the adversarial groups perceive equality of opportunities to procure material and social resources.
Carl Knight and Zofia Stemplowska
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199565801
- eISBN:
- 9780191725463
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565801.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This introductory chapter provides an overview of the recent debate about responsibility and distributive justice. It traces the recent philosophical focus on distributive justice to John Rawls and ...
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This introductory chapter provides an overview of the recent debate about responsibility and distributive justice. It traces the recent philosophical focus on distributive justice to John Rawls and examines two arguments in his work which might be taken to contain the seeds of the focus on responsibility in later theories of distributive justice. It examines Ronald Dworkin's ‘equality of resources’, the ‘luck egalitarianism’ of Richard Arneson and G. A. Cohen, as well as the criticisms of their work put forward by Elizabeth Anderson, Marc Fleurbaey, Susan Hurley, and Jonathan Wolff. Key concepts such as responsibility (individual and collective), luck (thin and thick; brute and option), control, desert, and equality of opportunity are delineated, and the implementation of responsibility-sensitive accounts of justice is considered. The chapters of this book are positioned in relation to the wider literature on responsibility and distributive justice, and a brief outline of the chapters is provided.Less
This introductory chapter provides an overview of the recent debate about responsibility and distributive justice. It traces the recent philosophical focus on distributive justice to John Rawls and examines two arguments in his work which might be taken to contain the seeds of the focus on responsibility in later theories of distributive justice. It examines Ronald Dworkin's ‘equality of resources’, the ‘luck egalitarianism’ of Richard Arneson and G. A. Cohen, as well as the criticisms of their work put forward by Elizabeth Anderson, Marc Fleurbaey, Susan Hurley, and Jonathan Wolff. Key concepts such as responsibility (individual and collective), luck (thin and thick; brute and option), control, desert, and equality of opportunity are delineated, and the implementation of responsibility-sensitive accounts of justice is considered. The chapters of this book are positioned in relation to the wider literature on responsibility and distributive justice, and a brief outline of the chapters is provided.
Michael Otsuka
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199243952
- eISBN:
- 9780191598142
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199243956.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Delineates the nature of a libertarian right of self‐ownership. Assesses Robert Nozick's claim that taxation is on a par with forced labour. Contends that the most defensible version of the Lockean ...
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Delineates the nature of a libertarian right of self‐ownership. Assesses Robert Nozick's claim that taxation is on a par with forced labour. Contends that the most defensible version of the Lockean ‘enough and as good’ proviso calls for acquisition of unowned natural resources that is consistent with equality of opportunity for welfare. Argues, contrary to both Nozick and G. A. Cohen, that a robust right of self‐ownership is compatible with this welfare‐egalitarian proviso across a wide range of circumstances.Less
Delineates the nature of a libertarian right of self‐ownership. Assesses Robert Nozick's claim that taxation is on a par with forced labour. Contends that the most defensible version of the Lockean ‘enough and as good’ proviso calls for acquisition of unowned natural resources that is consistent with equality of opportunity for welfare. Argues, contrary to both Nozick and G. A. Cohen, that a robust right of self‐ownership is compatible with this welfare‐egalitarian proviso across a wide range of circumstances.
Michael Otsuka
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199243952
- eISBN:
- 9780191598142
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199243956.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The aim of this book is to vindicate left‐libertarianism, a political philosophy which combines stringent rights of control over one's own mind, body, and life with egalitarian rights of ownership of ...
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The aim of this book is to vindicate left‐libertarianism, a political philosophy which combines stringent rights of control over one's own mind, body, and life with egalitarian rights of ownership of the world. The book shows how John Locke's Second Treatise of Government provides the theoretical foundations for a left‐libertarianism that is both more libertarian and more egalitarian than the Kantian liberal theories of John Rawls and Thomas Nagel. The author's libertarianism is founded on a right of self‐ownership. Unlike ‘right‐wing’ libertarians such as Robert Nozick who also endorse such a right, the author argues that self‐ownership is compatible with a fully egalitarian principle of equal opportunity for welfare. In embracing this principle, his version of left‐libertarianism is more strongly egalitarian than others which are well known. The author argues that an account of legitimate political authority based upon the free consent of each is strengthened by the adoption of such an egalitarian principle. He defends a pluralistic, decentralized ideal of political society as a confederation of voluntary associations.Less
The aim of this book is to vindicate left‐libertarianism, a political philosophy which combines stringent rights of control over one's own mind, body, and life with egalitarian rights of ownership of the world. The book shows how John Locke's Second Treatise of Government provides the theoretical foundations for a left‐libertarianism that is both more libertarian and more egalitarian than the Kantian liberal theories of John Rawls and Thomas Nagel. The author's libertarianism is founded on a right of self‐ownership. Unlike ‘right‐wing’ libertarians such as Robert Nozick who also endorse such a right, the author argues that self‐ownership is compatible with a fully egalitarian principle of equal opportunity for welfare. In embracing this principle, his version of left‐libertarianism is more strongly egalitarian than others which are well known. The author argues that an account of legitimate political authority based upon the free consent of each is strengthened by the adoption of such an egalitarian principle. He defends a pluralistic, decentralized ideal of political society as a confederation of voluntary associations.
Henry Phelps Brown
- Published in print:
- 1988
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198286486
- eISBN:
- 9780191596773
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198286481.003.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
Points out and elaborates on the facts that aspiration to greater equality has become widespread in contemporary societies and that this belief is not restricted just to socialists, but is also ...
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Points out and elaborates on the facts that aspiration to greater equality has become widespread in contemporary societies and that this belief is not restricted just to socialists, but is also maintained by a wider political spectrum. It goes on to discuss the meaning of equality, treating three aspects of it separately––equal treatment, equality of opportunity, and equality of consideration. It is noted that through most of the twentieth century, public policy in the UK has promoted all three types of equality. The historical changes in attitude that this has required are traced in the context of explaining that this is what Part I of the book addresses. It is also emphasized that a historical study is necessary for the appraisal of ‘modern’ egalitarianism advanced in Part III, and that such an assessment requires in addition a detailed knowledge of modern circumstances as represented by the statistical study of income and wealth distribution presented in Part II.Less
Points out and elaborates on the facts that aspiration to greater equality has become widespread in contemporary societies and that this belief is not restricted just to socialists, but is also maintained by a wider political spectrum. It goes on to discuss the meaning of equality, treating three aspects of it separately––equal treatment, equality of opportunity, and equality of consideration. It is noted that through most of the twentieth century, public policy in the UK has promoted all three types of equality. The historical changes in attitude that this has required are traced in the context of explaining that this is what Part I of the book addresses. It is also emphasized that a historical study is necessary for the appraisal of ‘modern’ egalitarianism advanced in Part III, and that such an assessment requires in addition a detailed knowledge of modern circumstances as represented by the statistical study of income and wealth distribution presented in Part II.
