Roger Crisp
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199290338
- eISBN:
- 9780191710476
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290338.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book answers some of the oldest questions in moral philosophy. Claiming that a fundamental issue in normative ethics is what ultimate reasons for action we might have, it argues that the best ...
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This book answers some of the oldest questions in moral philosophy. Claiming that a fundamental issue in normative ethics is what ultimate reasons for action we might have, it argues that the best statements of such reasons will not employ moral concepts. The book investigates and explains the nature of reasons themselves; its account of how we come to know them combines an intuitionist epistemology with elements of Pyrrhonist scepticism. It defends a hedonistic theory of well-being and an account of practical reason according to which we can give some, though not overriding, priority to our own good over that of others. The book develops original lines of argument within a framework of some traditional but currently less popular views.Less
This book answers some of the oldest questions in moral philosophy. Claiming that a fundamental issue in normative ethics is what ultimate reasons for action we might have, it argues that the best statements of such reasons will not employ moral concepts. The book investigates and explains the nature of reasons themselves; its account of how we come to know them combines an intuitionist epistemology with elements of Pyrrhonist scepticism. It defends a hedonistic theory of well-being and an account of practical reason according to which we can give some, though not overriding, priority to our own good over that of others. The book develops original lines of argument within a framework of some traditional but currently less popular views.
Michael Bergmann
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199275748
- eISBN:
- 9780191603907
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199275742.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence, or perhaps it must be reliably formed, ...
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Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence, or perhaps it must be reliably formed, or perhaps there is some other ‘good-making’ features it must have. But does a belief’s justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists insist that such awareness is required for justification whereas externalists insist that it is not. The first part of this book argues that internalism faces an inescapable dilemma: either it leads to vicious regress problems and, ultimately, radical skepticism or it is entirely unmotivated. The second part of the book begins by developing the author’s own externalist theory of justification, one imposing both a proper function and a no-defeater requirement. It concludes by demonstrating the failure of two prominent critiques of externalism: that it is infected with epistemic circularity and that it cannot respond adequately to skepticism. Together, the two parts of the book provide a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism.Less
Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence, or perhaps it must be reliably formed, or perhaps there is some other ‘good-making’ features it must have. But does a belief’s justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists insist that such awareness is required for justification whereas externalists insist that it is not. The first part of this book argues that internalism faces an inescapable dilemma: either it leads to vicious regress problems and, ultimately, radical skepticism or it is entirely unmotivated. The second part of the book begins by developing the author’s own externalist theory of justification, one imposing both a proper function and a no-defeater requirement. It concludes by demonstrating the failure of two prominent critiques of externalism: that it is infected with epistemic circularity and that it cannot respond adequately to skepticism. Together, the two parts of the book provide a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism.
Jason Stanley
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199288038
- eISBN:
- 9780191603679
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199288038.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The thesis of this book is that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e., by how much is at stake for that person at ...
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The thesis of this book is that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e., by how much is at stake for that person at that time. Thus, whether a true belief is knowledge is not merely a matter of supporting beliefs or reliability; in the case of knowledge, practical rationality and theoretical rationality are intertwined. This thesis, called Interest-Relative Invariantism about knowledge, is defended against alternative accounts of the phenomena that motivate it, such as the claim that knowledge attributions are linguistically context-sensitive and the claim that the truth of a knowledge claim is somehow relative to the person making the claim. The strategies available for resolving skepticism to the strategies available for resolving other philosophical paradoxes are compared. For example, contextualist solutions to the sorites paradox and the liar paradox, as well as interest-relative accounts of the sorites paradox are considered. It is shown that the argument for the interest-relative character of epistemic notions is not the result of an application of a general strategy for resolving philosophical quandaries, but arises from the distinctive nature of epistemic properties.Less
The thesis of this book is that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e., by how much is at stake for that person at that time. Thus, whether a true belief is knowledge is not merely a matter of supporting beliefs or reliability; in the case of knowledge, practical rationality and theoretical rationality are intertwined. This thesis, called Interest-Relative Invariantism about knowledge, is defended against alternative accounts of the phenomena that motivate it, such as the claim that knowledge attributions are linguistically context-sensitive and the claim that the truth of a knowledge claim is somehow relative to the person making the claim. The strategies available for resolving skepticism to the strategies available for resolving other philosophical paradoxes are compared. For example, contextualist solutions to the sorites paradox and the liar paradox, as well as interest-relative accounts of the sorites paradox are considered. It is shown that the argument for the interest-relative character of epistemic notions is not the result of an application of a general strategy for resolving philosophical quandaries, but arises from the distinctive nature of epistemic properties.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195169720
- eISBN:
- 9780199786343
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169727.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Skepticism poses a central challenge in epistemology, but its opponents focus on Cartesian or Academic skepticism, whereas almost all actual defenders of skepticism are Pyrrhonians who suspend belief ...
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Skepticism poses a central challenge in epistemology, but its opponents focus on Cartesian or Academic skepticism, whereas almost all actual defenders of skepticism are Pyrrhonians who suspend belief about Cartesian skepticism and its denial. To remedy this imbalance, this volume explores the history of Pyrrhonian skepticism and then looks at objections to Pyrrhonian skepticism and its relation to other alternatives in contemporary epistemology.Less
Skepticism poses a central challenge in epistemology, but its opponents focus on Cartesian or Academic skepticism, whereas almost all actual defenders of skepticism are Pyrrhonians who suspend belief about Cartesian skepticism and its denial. To remedy this imbalance, this volume explores the history of Pyrrhonian skepticism and then looks at objections to Pyrrhonian skepticism and its relation to other alternatives in contemporary epistemology.
Miranda Fricker
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198237907
- eISBN:
- 9780191706844
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. In epistemology, the very idea that there is a first-order ethical ...
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Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. In epistemology, the very idea that there is a first-order ethical dimension to our epistemic practices — the idea that there is such a thing as epistemic justice — remains obscure until we adjust the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. This book argues that there is a distinctively epistemic genus of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower, wronged therefore in a capacity essential to human value. The book identifies two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. In doing so, it charts the ethical dimension of two fundamental epistemic practices: gaining knowledge by being told and making sense of our social experiences. As the account unfolds, the book travels through a range of philosophical problems. Thus, the book finds an analysis of social power; an account of prejudicial stereotypes; a characterization of two hybrid intellectual-ethical virtues; a revised account of the State of Nature used in genealogical explanations of the concept of knowledge; a discussion of objectification and ‘silencing’; and a framework for a virtue epistemological account of testimony. The book reveals epistemic injustice as a potent yet largely silent dimension of discrimination, analyses the wrong it perpetrates, and constructs two hybrid ethical-intellectual virtues of epistemic justice which aim to forestall it.Less
Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. In epistemology, the very idea that there is a first-order ethical dimension to our epistemic practices — the idea that there is such a thing as epistemic justice — remains obscure until we adjust the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. This book argues that there is a distinctively epistemic genus of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower, wronged therefore in a capacity essential to human value. The book identifies two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. In doing so, it charts the ethical dimension of two fundamental epistemic practices: gaining knowledge by being told and making sense of our social experiences. As the account unfolds, the book travels through a range of philosophical problems. Thus, the book finds an analysis of social power; an account of prejudicial stereotypes; a characterization of two hybrid intellectual-ethical virtues; a revised account of the State of Nature used in genealogical explanations of the concept of knowledge; a discussion of objectification and ‘silencing’; and a framework for a virtue epistemological account of testimony. The book reveals epistemic injustice as a potent yet largely silent dimension of discrimination, analyses the wrong it perpetrates, and constructs two hybrid ethical-intellectual virtues of epistemic justice which aim to forestall it.
Quentin Smith (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199264933
- eISBN:
- 9780191718472
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book offers a view of the current state of play in epistemology in the form of twelve chapters by some of the philosophers who have most influenced the course of debates in recent years. Topics ...
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This book offers a view of the current state of play in epistemology in the form of twelve chapters by some of the philosophers who have most influenced the course of debates in recent years. Topics include epistemic justification, solipsism, scepticism, and modal, moral, naturalistic, and probabilistic epistemology. Such approaches as reliabilism, evidentialism, infinitism, and virtue epistemology are here developed further by the philosophers who pioneered them.Less
This book offers a view of the current state of play in epistemology in the form of twelve chapters by some of the philosophers who have most influenced the course of debates in recent years. Topics include epistemic justification, solipsism, scepticism, and modal, moral, naturalistic, and probabilistic epistemology. Such approaches as reliabilism, evidentialism, infinitism, and virtue epistemology are here developed further by the philosophers who pioneered them.
Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199283675
- eISBN:
- 9780191712661
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283675.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Some of the most interesting work in late-20th-century epistemology reintroduced, from ancient and medieval philosophy, the idea of an intellectual virtue and the related idea of proper epistemic ...
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Some of the most interesting work in late-20th-century epistemology reintroduced, from ancient and medieval philosophy, the idea of an intellectual virtue and the related idea of proper epistemic function. But most of that work employed such concepts, with questionable success, in the interest of defining justification, warrant, or knowledge; and little or none of it offered detailed analyses of intellectual virtues. This book proposes and illustrates a different purpose for epistemology, one that we see in early modern thinkers, especially John Locke — namely that of guiding, refining, and informing the epistemic practices of the intellectual segment of the population. One important aspect of the project of such a ‘regulative epistemology’ is the intellectual character of the epistemic agent. For this purpose, fairly detailed sketches of particular intellectual virtues and of virtues' relations to epistemic goods, epistemic faculties, and epistemic practices, gain special importance. An underlying thesis is that a strict dichotomy between the intellectual virtues and the moral virtues is a mistake.Less
Some of the most interesting work in late-20th-century epistemology reintroduced, from ancient and medieval philosophy, the idea of an intellectual virtue and the related idea of proper epistemic function. But most of that work employed such concepts, with questionable success, in the interest of defining justification, warrant, or knowledge; and little or none of it offered detailed analyses of intellectual virtues. This book proposes and illustrates a different purpose for epistemology, one that we see in early modern thinkers, especially John Locke — namely that of guiding, refining, and informing the epistemic practices of the intellectual segment of the population. One important aspect of the project of such a ‘regulative epistemology’ is the intellectual character of the epistemic agent. For this purpose, fairly detailed sketches of particular intellectual virtues and of virtues' relations to epistemic goods, epistemic faculties, and epistemic practices, gain special importance. An underlying thesis is that a strict dichotomy between the intellectual virtues and the moral virtues is a mistake.
Ernest Sosa
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199297023
- eISBN:
- 9780191711411
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297023.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
It has been argued powerfully by Alvin Plantinga that naturalism suffers a kind of epistemic self-refutation, for it cannot provide appropriately for the very possibility of its being accepted ...
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It has been argued powerfully by Alvin Plantinga that naturalism suffers a kind of epistemic self-refutation, for it cannot provide appropriately for the very possibility of its being accepted rationally and known to be true. This argument is explained carefully, and its merits assessed, by reference to the epistemology of apt belief and reflective knowledge.Less
It has been argued powerfully by Alvin Plantinga that naturalism suffers a kind of epistemic self-refutation, for it cannot provide appropriately for the very possibility of its being accepted rationally and known to be true. This argument is explained carefully, and its merits assessed, by reference to the epistemology of apt belief and reflective knowledge.
Jonathan Jacobs
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199542833
- eISBN:
- 9780191594359
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199542833.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Judaism
This is a study of the key features of the moral psychology and metaethics of three important medieval Jewish philosophers, Saadia Gaon, Bahya ibn Pakuda, and Moses Maimonides. They are selected ...
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This is a study of the key features of the moral psychology and metaethics of three important medieval Jewish philosophers, Saadia Gaon, Bahya ibn Pakuda, and Moses Maimonides. They are selected because of the depth and subtlety of their thought and because of their relevance to central, enduring issues in moral philosophy. The book examines their views of freedom of the will, the virtues, the rationality of moral requirements, and the relation between rational justification and revelation. Their appropriations of Neoplatonic and Aristotelian thought are explicated, showing how their theistic commitments make crucial differences to moral psychology and moral epistemology. All three thinkers developed rationalistic philosophies and sought to show how Judaism does not include doctrines in conflict with reason. Maimonides receives the fullest attention, given that he articulated the most systematic and influential accounts of the main issues. While explicating the main claims and arguments of these thinkers, the book also shows the respects in which their thought remains relevant to several important issues and debates in moral philosophy. These thinkers' views of ‘the reasons of the commandments’ (in Torah) include resources for a sophisticated moral epistemology of tradition. The points of contact and contrast between medieval Jewish moral thought and the practical wisdom approach to moral theory and also natural law approaches are examined in detail.Less
This is a study of the key features of the moral psychology and metaethics of three important medieval Jewish philosophers, Saadia Gaon, Bahya ibn Pakuda, and Moses Maimonides. They are selected because of the depth and subtlety of their thought and because of their relevance to central, enduring issues in moral philosophy. The book examines their views of freedom of the will, the virtues, the rationality of moral requirements, and the relation between rational justification and revelation. Their appropriations of Neoplatonic and Aristotelian thought are explicated, showing how their theistic commitments make crucial differences to moral psychology and moral epistemology. All three thinkers developed rationalistic philosophies and sought to show how Judaism does not include doctrines in conflict with reason. Maimonides receives the fullest attention, given that he articulated the most systematic and influential accounts of the main issues. While explicating the main claims and arguments of these thinkers, the book also shows the respects in which their thought remains relevant to several important issues and debates in moral philosophy. These thinkers' views of ‘the reasons of the commandments’ (in Torah) include resources for a sophisticated moral epistemology of tradition. The points of contact and contrast between medieval Jewish moral thought and the practical wisdom approach to moral theory and also natural law approaches are examined in detail.
Jon Williamson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199228003
- eISBN:
- 9780191711060
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228003.001.0001
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Probability / Statistics, Logic / Computer Science / Mathematical Philosophy
Bayesian epistemology aims to answer the following question: How strongly should an agent believe the various propositions expressible in her language? Subjective Bayesians hold that.it is largely ...
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Bayesian epistemology aims to answer the following question: How strongly should an agent believe the various propositions expressible in her language? Subjective Bayesians hold that.it is largely (though not entirely) up to the agent as to which degrees of belief to adopt. Objective Bayesians, on the other hand, maintain that appropriate degrees of belief are largely (though not entirely) determined by the agent's evidence. This book states and defends a version of objective Bayesian epistemology. According to this version, objective Bayesianism is characterized by three norms: (i) Probability: degrees of belief should be probabilities; (ii) Calibration: they should be calibrated with evidence; and (iii) Equivocation: they should otherwise equivocate between basic outcomes. Objective Bayesianism has been challenged on a number of different fronts: for example, it has been accused of being poorly motivated, of failing to handle qualitative evidence, of yielding counter‐intuitive degrees of belief after updating, of suffering from a failure to learn from experience, of being computationally intractable, of being susceptible to paradox, of being language dependent, and of not being objective enough. The book argues that these criticisms can be met and that objective Bayesianism is a promising theory with an exciting agenda for further research.Less
Bayesian epistemology aims to answer the following question: How strongly should an agent believe the various propositions expressible in her language? Subjective Bayesians hold that.it is largely (though not entirely) up to the agent as to which degrees of belief to adopt. Objective Bayesians, on the other hand, maintain that appropriate degrees of belief are largely (though not entirely) determined by the agent's evidence. This book states and defends a version of objective Bayesian epistemology. According to this version, objective Bayesianism is characterized by three norms: (i) Probability: degrees of belief should be probabilities; (ii) Calibration: they should be calibrated with evidence; and (iii) Equivocation: they should otherwise equivocate between basic outcomes. Objective Bayesianism has been challenged on a number of different fronts: for example, it has been accused of being poorly motivated, of failing to handle qualitative evidence, of yielding counter‐intuitive degrees of belief after updating, of suffering from a failure to learn from experience, of being computationally intractable, of being susceptible to paradox, of being language dependent, and of not being objective enough. The book argues that these criticisms can be met and that objective Bayesianism is a promising theory with an exciting agenda for further research.
Gillian Russell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199232192
- eISBN:
- 9780191715907
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence: synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because ...
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The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence: synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean, whereas analytic sentences — like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides — are different; they are true in virtue of meaning and so, no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will be true. The distinction seems powerful because analytic sentences seem to be knowable in a special way; one can know that all bachelors are unmarried, for example, just by thinking about what it means. But many 20th-century philosophers, with Quine in the lead, argued that there were no analytic sentences, that the idea of analyticity didn't even make sense and that the analytic/synthetic distinction was therefore an illusion. Others couldn't see how there could fail to be a distinction, however ingenious the arguments. But since the heyday of the debate, things have changed in the philosophy of language. Tools have been refined, confusions cleared up, and most significantly, many philosophers now accept a view of language — semantic externalism — on which it is possible to see how the distinction could fail. One might be tempted to think that ultimately the distinction has fallen for reasons other than those proposed in the original debate. This book argues that it hasn't. It uses the tools of contemporary philosophy of language to outline a view of analytic sentences which is compatible with semantic externalism, and defends that view against the old Quinean arguments. It then goes on to draw out some surprising epistemological consequences.Less
The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence: synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean, whereas analytic sentences — like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides — are different; they are true in virtue of meaning and so, no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will be true. The distinction seems powerful because analytic sentences seem to be knowable in a special way; one can know that all bachelors are unmarried, for example, just by thinking about what it means. But many 20th-century philosophers, with Quine in the lead, argued that there were no analytic sentences, that the idea of analyticity didn't even make sense and that the analytic/synthetic distinction was therefore an illusion. Others couldn't see how there could fail to be a distinction, however ingenious the arguments. But since the heyday of the debate, things have changed in the philosophy of language. Tools have been refined, confusions cleared up, and most significantly, many philosophers now accept a view of language — semantic externalism — on which it is possible to see how the distinction could fail. One might be tempted to think that ultimately the distinction has fallen for reasons other than those proposed in the original debate. This book argues that it hasn't. It uses the tools of contemporary philosophy of language to outline a view of analytic sentences which is compatible with semantic externalism, and defends that view against the old Quinean arguments. It then goes on to draw out some surprising epistemological consequences.
C. S. Jenkins
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199231577
- eISBN:
- 9780191716102
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231577.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This book is a philosophical discussion of arithmetical knowledge. No extant account, it seems, is able to respect simultaneously these three strong pre-theoretic intuitions: (a) that arithmetic is ...
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This book is a philosophical discussion of arithmetical knowledge. No extant account, it seems, is able to respect simultaneously these three strong pre-theoretic intuitions: (a) that arithmetic is an a priori discipline; (b) that arithmetical realism is correct, i.e.. that arithmetical claims are true independently of us; and (c) that empiricism is correct, i.e., that all knowledge of the independent world is obtained through the senses. This book investigates the possibility of a new kind of epistemology for arithmetic, one which will is specifically designed to respect all of (a)-(c). The book proposes that we could develop such an epistemology if we were prepared to accept three claims: (1) that arithmetical truths are known through an examination of our arithmetical concepts; (2) that (at least our basic) arithmetical concepts map the arithmetical structure of the independent world; and (3) that this mapping relationship obtains in virtue of the normal functioning of our sensory apparatus. Roughly speaking, the first of these claims protects a priorism, the second realism, and the third empiricism.Less
This book is a philosophical discussion of arithmetical knowledge. No extant account, it seems, is able to respect simultaneously these three strong pre-theoretic intuitions: (a) that arithmetic is an a priori discipline; (b) that arithmetical realism is correct, i.e.. that arithmetical claims are true independently of us; and (c) that empiricism is correct, i.e., that all knowledge of the independent world is obtained through the senses. This book investigates the possibility of a new kind of epistemology for arithmetic, one which will is specifically designed to respect all of (a)-(c). The book proposes that we could develop such an epistemology if we were prepared to accept three claims: (1) that arithmetical truths are known through an examination of our arithmetical concepts; (2) that (at least our basic) arithmetical concepts map the arithmetical structure of the independent world; and (3) that this mapping relationship obtains in virtue of the normal functioning of our sensory apparatus. Roughly speaking, the first of these claims protects a priorism, the second realism, and the third empiricism.
Quentin Smith
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199264933
- eISBN:
- 9780191718472
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This introductory chapter presents an overview of the different topics discussed in the subsequent chapters. These include process reliabilism, evidentialism, viral epistemology, anti-luminosity ...
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This introductory chapter presents an overview of the different topics discussed in the subsequent chapters. These include process reliabilism, evidentialism, viral epistemology, anti-luminosity argument, and modal epistemology.Less
This introductory chapter presents an overview of the different topics discussed in the subsequent chapters. These include process reliabilism, evidentialism, viral epistemology, anti-luminosity argument, and modal epistemology.
Jack C. Lyons
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195373578
- eISBN:
- 9780199871988
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195373578.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book addresses two central questions in epistemology: (1) which beliefs are epistemologically basic (i.e., noninferentially justified)? and (2) where does perception end and inferential ...
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This book addresses two central questions in epistemology: (1) which beliefs are epistemologically basic (i.e., noninferentially justified)? and (2) where does perception end and inferential cognition begin? The book offers a highly externalist theory, arguing that it is not introspectible features of the beliefs that determine their status as basic or as perceptual; instead, these are determined by the nature of the cognitive system, or module, that produced the beliefs. On this view, the sensory experiences that typically accompany perceptual beliefs play no indispensable role in the justification of these beliefs, and one can have perceptual beliefs—justified perceptual beliefs—even in the absence of any sensory experiences whatsoever. The book develops a general theory of basic beliefs and argues that perceptual beliefs are a species of basic beliefs. This results from the fact that perceptual modules are a special type of basic-belief-producing modules. Importantly, some beliefs are not the outputs of this class of cognitive module; these beliefs are nonbasic, thus requiring evidential support from other beliefs for their justification. This last point is used to defend a reliabilist epistemology against an important class of traditional objections (where the agent uses a reliable process that she doesn't know to be reliable). The overarching view defended in the book is a type of reliabilism, and the basic/nonbasic distinction developed here offers a version of reliabilism that takes inference seriously yet remains staunchly externalist.Less
This book addresses two central questions in epistemology: (1) which beliefs are epistemologically basic (i.e., noninferentially justified)? and (2) where does perception end and inferential cognition begin? The book offers a highly externalist theory, arguing that it is not introspectible features of the beliefs that determine their status as basic or as perceptual; instead, these are determined by the nature of the cognitive system, or module, that produced the beliefs. On this view, the sensory experiences that typically accompany perceptual beliefs play no indispensable role in the justification of these beliefs, and one can have perceptual beliefs—justified perceptual beliefs—even in the absence of any sensory experiences whatsoever. The book develops a general theory of basic beliefs and argues that perceptual beliefs are a species of basic beliefs. This results from the fact that perceptual modules are a special type of basic-belief-producing modules. Importantly, some beliefs are not the outputs of this class of cognitive module; these beliefs are nonbasic, thus requiring evidential support from other beliefs for their justification. This last point is used to defend a reliabilist epistemology against an important class of traditional objections (where the agent uses a reliable process that she doesn't know to be reliable). The overarching view defended in the book is a type of reliabilism, and the basic/nonbasic distinction developed here offers a version of reliabilism that takes inference seriously yet remains staunchly externalist.
Simon J. Evnine
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199239948
- eISBN:
- 9780191716898
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239948.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book discusses various epistemic aspects of what it is to be a person. Persons are defined as finite beings that have beliefs, including second‐order beliefs about their own and others' beliefs, ...
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This book discusses various epistemic aspects of what it is to be a person. Persons are defined as finite beings that have beliefs, including second‐order beliefs about their own and others' beliefs, and engage in agency, including the making of long‐term plans. It is argued that for any being meeting these conditions, a number of epistemic consequences obtain. First, all such beings must have certain logical concepts and be able to use them in certain ways. Secondly, there are at least two principles governing belief that it is rational for persons to satisfy and are such that nothing can be a person at all unless it satisfies them to a large extent. These principles are that one believe the conjunction of one's beliefs and that one treat one's future beliefs as, by and large, better than one's current beliefs. Thirdly, persons both occupy epistemic points of view on the world and show up within those views. This makes it impossible for them to be completely objective about their own beliefs. This ‘aspectual dualism’ is characteristic of treatments of persons in the Kantian tradition. In sum, these epistemic consequences add up to a fairly traditional view of the nature of persons, one in opposition to much recent theorizing.Less
This book discusses various epistemic aspects of what it is to be a person. Persons are defined as finite beings that have beliefs, including second‐order beliefs about their own and others' beliefs, and engage in agency, including the making of long‐term plans. It is argued that for any being meeting these conditions, a number of epistemic consequences obtain. First, all such beings must have certain logical concepts and be able to use them in certain ways. Secondly, there are at least two principles governing belief that it is rational for persons to satisfy and are such that nothing can be a person at all unless it satisfies them to a large extent. These principles are that one believe the conjunction of one's beliefs and that one treat one's future beliefs as, by and large, better than one's current beliefs. Thirdly, persons both occupy epistemic points of view on the world and show up within those views. This makes it impossible for them to be completely objective about their own beliefs. This ‘aspectual dualism’ is characteristic of treatments of persons in the Kantian tradition. In sum, these epistemic consequences add up to a fairly traditional view of the nature of persons, one in opposition to much recent theorizing.
John G. Stackhouse
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195138078
- eISBN:
- 9780199834679
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195138074.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Presents a conception of apologetics appropriate for the contemporary cultural context. This conception avoids the destructive and self‐defeating problems of dogmatism and triumphalism, ...
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Presents a conception of apologetics appropriate for the contemporary cultural context. This conception avoids the destructive and self‐defeating problems of dogmatism and triumphalism, all‐too‐typical of most apologetics. Part I locates apologetics within the context of contemporary culture, discussing the most salient challenges to apologetical conversation in contemporary North American culture: pluralism, postmodernity, the problem of plausibility, and consumerism. Part II moves from analysis of the cultural context of apologetical conversation to a theological and epistemological exploration of the definition of apologetics. It establishes that a proper understanding and practice of apologetics will be located within the context of God's overarching mission of conversion and will also recognize its own limitations in light of several basic principles of epistemology guiding all decision making. This section defines apologetics as including anything that commends the truth, beauty, and goodness of Christianity, thereby rendering it more plausible. Several modes and objectives of apologetics are defined and apologetics itself is defended as a worthy engagement for Christians. In Part III, apologetics is located within the context of basic principles of communication, patterned after the ministry of Jesus Christ. A variety of audience‐specific approaches to apologetics are defined and their usefulness is assessed in light of these principles. Practical applications are then drawn from these principles. The book concludes that apologetics must be reconceived as humble, i.e., as a defense of the faith that lovingly offers our neighbors what we think we know of the gospel of Jesus Christ, with the hope that God will bring others to encounter Jesus – as only he can.Less
Presents a conception of apologetics appropriate for the contemporary cultural context. This conception avoids the destructive and self‐defeating problems of dogmatism and triumphalism, all‐too‐typical of most apologetics. Part I locates apologetics within the context of contemporary culture, discussing the most salient challenges to apologetical conversation in contemporary North American culture: pluralism, postmodernity, the problem of plausibility, and consumerism. Part II moves from analysis of the cultural context of apologetical conversation to a theological and epistemological exploration of the definition of apologetics. It establishes that a proper understanding and practice of apologetics will be located within the context of God's overarching mission of conversion and will also recognize its own limitations in light of several basic principles of epistemology guiding all decision making. This section defines apologetics as including anything that commends the truth, beauty, and goodness of Christianity, thereby rendering it more plausible. Several modes and objectives of apologetics are defined and apologetics itself is defended as a worthy engagement for Christians. In Part III, apologetics is located within the context of basic principles of communication, patterned after the ministry of Jesus Christ. A variety of audience‐specific approaches to apologetics are defined and their usefulness is assessed in light of these principles. Practical applications are then drawn from these principles. The book concludes that apologetics must be reconceived as humble, i.e., as a defense of the faith that lovingly offers our neighbors what we think we know of the gospel of Jesus Christ, with the hope that God will bring others to encounter Jesus – as only he can.
Jason A. Springs
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195395044
- eISBN:
- 9780199866243
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Discontinued
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195395044.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Toward a Generous Orthodoxy provides a refined exposition of Hans Frei's christologically motivated engagement with Ludwig Wittgenstein, Clifford Geertz, Erich Auerbach, his use of ...
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Toward a Generous Orthodoxy provides a refined exposition of Hans Frei's christologically motivated engagement with Ludwig Wittgenstein, Clifford Geertz, Erich Auerbach, his use of ordinary language philosophy and nonfoundational philosophical insights, while illuminating and expanding his orientational indebtedness to Karl Barth's theology. By placing Frei's work into critical conversation with developments in pragmatist thought and cultural theory since his death, the rereading of Frei offered here aims to correct and resolve many of the complaints and misunderstandings that vex his theological legacy. The result is a clarification of the unity and coherence of Frei's work over the course of his career; a reframing of the complex relationship of his work to that of his Yale colleague George Lindbeck and successive "postliberal" theological trends; demonstration that Frei's uses of Barth, Wittgenstein, Auerbach, and Geertz do not relegate his theological approach to critical quietism, methodological separatism, epistemic fideism, or a so-called "theological ghetto"; explication and development of Frei's account of the "plain sense" of Scripture that evades charges of narrative foundationalism and essentialism on one hand and, on the other, avoids criticisms that any account so emphasizing culture, language, and practice will reduce scriptural meaning to the ways the text is used in Christian practice and community. What emerges from Toward a Generous Orthodoxy is a sharpened account of the christologically anchored, interdisciplinary, and conversational character of Frei's theology, which he came to describe as a "generous orthodoxy," modeling a way for academic theological voices to take seriously both their vocation to the Christian church and their roles as interlocutors in the academic discourse.Less
Toward a Generous Orthodoxy provides a refined exposition of Hans Frei's christologically motivated engagement with Ludwig Wittgenstein, Clifford Geertz, Erich Auerbach, his use of ordinary language philosophy and nonfoundational philosophical insights, while illuminating and expanding his orientational indebtedness to Karl Barth's theology. By placing Frei's work into critical conversation with developments in pragmatist thought and cultural theory since his death, the rereading of Frei offered here aims to correct and resolve many of the complaints and misunderstandings that vex his theological legacy. The result is a clarification of the unity and coherence of Frei's work over the course of his career; a reframing of the complex relationship of his work to that of his Yale colleague George Lindbeck and successive "postliberal" theological trends; demonstration that Frei's uses of Barth, Wittgenstein, Auerbach, and Geertz do not relegate his theological approach to critical quietism, methodological separatism, epistemic fideism, or a so-called "theological ghetto"; explication and development of Frei's account of the "plain sense" of Scripture that evades charges of narrative foundationalism and essentialism on one hand and, on the other, avoids criticisms that any account so emphasizing culture, language, and practice will reduce scriptural meaning to the ways the text is used in Christian practice and community. What emerges from Toward a Generous Orthodoxy is a sharpened account of the christologically anchored, interdisciplinary, and conversational character of Frei's theology, which he came to describe as a "generous orthodoxy," modeling a way for academic theological voices to take seriously both their vocation to the Christian church and their roles as interlocutors in the academic discourse.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199812875
- eISBN:
- 9780199933150
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812875.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This is a collection of chapters by the leading proponent of process reliabilism, explaining its relation to rival and/or neighboring theories including evidentialism, other forms of reliabilism, and ...
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This is a collection of chapters by the leading proponent of process reliabilism, explaining its relation to rival and/or neighboring theories including evidentialism, other forms of reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. It addresses other prominent themes in contemporary epistemology, such as the internalism/externalism debate, the epistemological upshots of experimental challenges to intuitional methodology, the source of epistemic value, and social epistemology. The Introduction addresses late-breaking responses to ongoing exchanges with friends, rivals, and critics of reliabilism.Less
This is a collection of chapters by the leading proponent of process reliabilism, explaining its relation to rival and/or neighboring theories including evidentialism, other forms of reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. It addresses other prominent themes in contemporary epistemology, such as the internalism/externalism debate, the epistemological upshots of experimental challenges to intuitional methodology, the source of epistemic value, and social epistemology. The Introduction addresses late-breaking responses to ongoing exchanges with friends, rivals, and critics of reliabilism.
Gary Kemp
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199695621
- eISBN:
- 9780191738524
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695621.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
So far as language and meaning are concerned, Donald Davidson and Willard Van Orman Quine are typically regarded as birds of a feather. This book urges first of all that they cannot be. Quine’s most ...
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So far as language and meaning are concerned, Donald Davidson and Willard Van Orman Quine are typically regarded as birds of a feather. This book urges first of all that they cannot be. Quine’s most basic and general philosophical commitment is to his methodological naturalism, which is incompatible with Davidson’s main commitments. In particular, it is not possible to endorse, from Quine’s perspective, the roles played by the concepts truth and reference in Davidson’s philosophy of language; Davidson’s employment of the concept of truth is from Quine’s point of view needlessly ambitious; and his use of the concept of reference cannot be divorced from unscientific ‘intuition’. Second, the book puts the case positively in favour of Quine’s naturalism and its corollary, naturalized epistemology. It is possible to give a consistent account of language without problematic uses of the concepts truth and reference, which in turn makes a strident naturalism much more plausible.Less
So far as language and meaning are concerned, Donald Davidson and Willard Van Orman Quine are typically regarded as birds of a feather. This book urges first of all that they cannot be. Quine’s most basic and general philosophical commitment is to his methodological naturalism, which is incompatible with Davidson’s main commitments. In particular, it is not possible to endorse, from Quine’s perspective, the roles played by the concepts truth and reference in Davidson’s philosophy of language; Davidson’s employment of the concept of truth is from Quine’s point of view needlessly ambitious; and his use of the concept of reference cannot be divorced from unscientific ‘intuition’. Second, the book puts the case positively in favour of Quine’s naturalism and its corollary, naturalized epistemology. It is possible to give a consistent account of language without problematic uses of the concepts truth and reference, which in turn makes a strident naturalism much more plausible.
Paul Helm
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199256631
- eISBN:
- 9780191698330
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256631.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This book studies the nature of religious faith, investigating what makes it reasonable. Religious belief needs to meet and sustain philosophical scrutiny just as any other type of belief does; ...
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This book studies the nature of religious faith, investigating what makes it reasonable. Religious belief needs to meet and sustain philosophical scrutiny just as any other type of belief does; nothing about religion purchases immunity from this. But at the same time religious epistemology must also respect the contours of religion, the distinctiveness of the subject-matter of religious belief. The book looks sympathetically at two currently prominent ways of defending the rationality of religious belief: ‘Reformed’ epistemology and the cumulative case for theism. It argues that the reasonableness of faith depends not only on beliefs about the world but also on beliefs about oneself (for instance about what one wants, about one's hopes and fears) and on what one is willing to trust. The book goes on to look at the relations between belief and trust, and between faith and virtue, and concludes with an exploration of one particular type of belief about oneself, the belief that one is oneself a believer.Less
This book studies the nature of religious faith, investigating what makes it reasonable. Religious belief needs to meet and sustain philosophical scrutiny just as any other type of belief does; nothing about religion purchases immunity from this. But at the same time religious epistemology must also respect the contours of religion, the distinctiveness of the subject-matter of religious belief. The book looks sympathetically at two currently prominent ways of defending the rationality of religious belief: ‘Reformed’ epistemology and the cumulative case for theism. It argues that the reasonableness of faith depends not only on beliefs about the world but also on beliefs about oneself (for instance about what one wants, about one's hopes and fears) and on what one is willing to trust. The book goes on to look at the relations between belief and trust, and between faith and virtue, and concludes with an exploration of one particular type of belief about oneself, the belief that one is oneself a believer.
