Marcus Giaquinto
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199285945
- eISBN:
- 9780191713811
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285945.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Visual thinking — visual imagination or perception of diagrams and symbol arrays, and mental operations on them — is omnipresent in mathematics. Is this visual thinking merely a psychological aid, ...
More
Visual thinking — visual imagination or perception of diagrams and symbol arrays, and mental operations on them — is omnipresent in mathematics. Is this visual thinking merely a psychological aid, facilitating grasp of what is gathered by other means? Or does it also have epistemological functions, as a means of discovery, understanding, and even proof? This book argues that visual thinking in mathematics is rarely just a superfluous aid; it usually has epistemological value, often as a means of discovery. The book explores a major source of our grasp of mathematics, using examples from basic geometry, arithmetic, algebra, and real analysis. It shows how we can discern abstract general truths by means of specific images, how synthetic a priori knowledge is possible, and how visual means can help us grasp abstract structures. This book reopens the investigation of earlier thinkers from Plato to Kant into the nature and epistemology of an individual's basic mathematical beliefs and abilities, in the new light shed by the maturing cognitive sciences.Less
Visual thinking — visual imagination or perception of diagrams and symbol arrays, and mental operations on them — is omnipresent in mathematics. Is this visual thinking merely a psychological aid, facilitating grasp of what is gathered by other means? Or does it also have epistemological functions, as a means of discovery, understanding, and even proof? This book argues that visual thinking in mathematics is rarely just a superfluous aid; it usually has epistemological value, often as a means of discovery. The book explores a major source of our grasp of mathematics, using examples from basic geometry, arithmetic, algebra, and real analysis. It shows how we can discern abstract general truths by means of specific images, how synthetic a priori knowledge is possible, and how visual means can help us grasp abstract structures. This book reopens the investigation of earlier thinkers from Plato to Kant into the nature and epistemology of an individual's basic mathematical beliefs and abilities, in the new light shed by the maturing cognitive sciences.
William F. Bristow
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199290642
- eISBN:
- 9780191710421
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290642.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book presents a study of Hegel's hugely influential but notoriously difficult Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel describes the method of this work as a ‘way of despair’, meaning that the reader who ...
More
This book presents a study of Hegel's hugely influential but notoriously difficult Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel describes the method of this work as a ‘way of despair’, meaning that the reader who undertakes its inquiry must be open to the experience of self-loss through it. Whereas the existential dimension of Hegel's work has often been either ignored or regarded as romantic ornamentation, this book argues that it belongs centrally to Hegel's attempt to fulfil a demanding epistemological ambition. With his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant expressed a new epistemological demand with respect to rational knowledge and presented a new method for meeting this demand. This book reconstructs Hegel's objection to Kant's Critical Philosophy, according to which Kant's way of meeting the epistemological demand of philosophical critique presupposes subjectivism, that is, presupposes the restriction of our knowledge to things as they are merely for us. Whereas Hegel in his early Jena writings rejects Kant's critical project altogether on this basis, he comes to see that the epistemological demand expressed in Kant's project must be met. This book argues that Hegel's method in the Phenomenology of Spirit takes shape as his attempt to meet the epistemological demand of Kantian critique without presupposing subjectivism. The key to Hegel's transformation of Kant's critical procedure, by virtue of which subjectivism is to be avoided, is precisely the existential or self-transformational dimension of Hegel's criticism, the openness of the criticizing subject to being transformed through the epistemological procedure.Less
This book presents a study of Hegel's hugely influential but notoriously difficult Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel describes the method of this work as a ‘way of despair’, meaning that the reader who undertakes its inquiry must be open to the experience of self-loss through it. Whereas the existential dimension of Hegel's work has often been either ignored or regarded as romantic ornamentation, this book argues that it belongs centrally to Hegel's attempt to fulfil a demanding epistemological ambition. With his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant expressed a new epistemological demand with respect to rational knowledge and presented a new method for meeting this demand. This book reconstructs Hegel's objection to Kant's Critical Philosophy, according to which Kant's way of meeting the epistemological demand of philosophical critique presupposes subjectivism, that is, presupposes the restriction of our knowledge to things as they are merely for us. Whereas Hegel in his early Jena writings rejects Kant's critical project altogether on this basis, he comes to see that the epistemological demand expressed in Kant's project must be met. This book argues that Hegel's method in the Phenomenology of Spirit takes shape as his attempt to meet the epistemological demand of Kantian critique without presupposing subjectivism. The key to Hegel's transformation of Kant's critical procedure, by virtue of which subjectivism is to be avoided, is precisely the existential or self-transformational dimension of Hegel's criticism, the openness of the criticizing subject to being transformed through the epistemological procedure.
Luigi Gioia
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199553464
- eISBN:
- 9780191720796
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199553464.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology, Early Christian Studies
The book provides a fresh description and analysis of Augustine's monumental treatise, De Trinitate, working on a supposition of its unity and its coherence from structural, rhetorical, and ...
More
The book provides a fresh description and analysis of Augustine's monumental treatise, De Trinitate, working on a supposition of its unity and its coherence from structural, rhetorical, and theological points of view. The main arguments of the treatise are reviewed first: an examination of Scripture and the mystery of the Trinity; a discussion of ‘Arian’ logical and ontological categories; a comparison between the process of knowledge and formal aspects of the confession of the mystery of the Trinity; an account of the so‐called ‘psychological analogies’. These topics hold a predominantly instructive or polemical function. The unity and the coherence of the treatise become apparent especially when its description focuses on a truly theological understanding of the knowledge of God: Augustine aims at leading the reader to the vision and enjoyment of God the Trinity, in whose image we are created. This mystagogical aspect of the rhetoric of De Trinitate is unfolded through Christology, soteriology, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, and the doctrine of revelation. At the same time, from the vantage point of love, Augustine detects and powerfully depicts the epistemological consequences of human sinfulness, thus unmasking the fundamental deficiency of received theories of knowledge. Only love restores knowledge and enables phiolosophers to yield to the injunction which resumes philosophical enterprise as a whole, namely ‘know thyself.’Less
The book provides a fresh description and analysis of Augustine's monumental treatise, De Trinitate, working on a supposition of its unity and its coherence from structural, rhetorical, and theological points of view. The main arguments of the treatise are reviewed first: an examination of Scripture and the mystery of the Trinity; a discussion of ‘Arian’ logical and ontological categories; a comparison between the process of knowledge and formal aspects of the confession of the mystery of the Trinity; an account of the so‐called ‘psychological analogies’. These topics hold a predominantly instructive or polemical function. The unity and the coherence of the treatise become apparent especially when its description focuses on a truly theological understanding of the knowledge of God: Augustine aims at leading the reader to the vision and enjoyment of God the Trinity, in whose image we are created. This mystagogical aspect of the rhetoric of De Trinitate is unfolded through Christology, soteriology, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, and the doctrine of revelation. At the same time, from the vantage point of love, Augustine detects and powerfully depicts the epistemological consequences of human sinfulness, thus unmasking the fundamental deficiency of received theories of knowledge. Only love restores knowledge and enables phiolosophers to yield to the injunction which resumes philosophical enterprise as a whole, namely ‘know thyself.’
Ben Brice
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199290253
- eISBN:
- 9780191710483
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290253.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, 19th-century Literature and Romanticism
Coleridge tended to view objects in the natural world as if they were capable of articulating truths about his own poetic psyche. He also regarded such objects as if they were capable of illustrating ...
More
Coleridge tended to view objects in the natural world as if they were capable of articulating truths about his own poetic psyche. He also regarded such objects as if they were capable of illustrating and embodying truths about a transcendent spiritual realm. After 1805, he posited a series of analogical ‘likenesses’ connecting the rational principles that inform human cognition with the rational principles that he believed informed the teleological structure of the natural world. Although he intuitively felt that nature had been constructed as a ‘mirror’ of the human mind, and that both mind and nature were ‘mirrors’ of a transcendent spiritual realm, he never found an explanation of such experiences that was fully immune to his own sceptical doubts. This book examines the nature of these doubts, and offers a new explanatory account of why Coleridge was unable to affirm his religious intuitions. The book situates his work within two important intellectual traditions. The first — a tradition of epistemological ‘piety’ or ‘modesty’ — informs the work of key precursors such as Kant, Hume, Locke, Boyle, and Calvin, and relates to Protestant critiques of natural reason. The second — a tradition of theological voluntarism — emphasizes the omnipotence and transcendence of God, as well as the arbitrary relationship subsisting between God and the created world. It is argued that Coleridge's familiarity with both of these interrelated intellectual traditions undermined his confidence in his ability to read the symbolic language of God in nature.Less
Coleridge tended to view objects in the natural world as if they were capable of articulating truths about his own poetic psyche. He also regarded such objects as if they were capable of illustrating and embodying truths about a transcendent spiritual realm. After 1805, he posited a series of analogical ‘likenesses’ connecting the rational principles that inform human cognition with the rational principles that he believed informed the teleological structure of the natural world. Although he intuitively felt that nature had been constructed as a ‘mirror’ of the human mind, and that both mind and nature were ‘mirrors’ of a transcendent spiritual realm, he never found an explanation of such experiences that was fully immune to his own sceptical doubts. This book examines the nature of these doubts, and offers a new explanatory account of why Coleridge was unable to affirm his religious intuitions. The book situates his work within two important intellectual traditions. The first — a tradition of epistemological ‘piety’ or ‘modesty’ — informs the work of key precursors such as Kant, Hume, Locke, Boyle, and Calvin, and relates to Protestant critiques of natural reason. The second — a tradition of theological voluntarism — emphasizes the omnipotence and transcendence of God, as well as the arbitrary relationship subsisting between God and the created world. It is argued that Coleridge's familiarity with both of these interrelated intellectual traditions undermined his confidence in his ability to read the symbolic language of God in nature.
Nicola Luckhurst
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198160021
- eISBN:
- 9780191673740
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198160021.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, European Literature, 20th-century Literature and Modernism
Proust's A la recherche du temps perdu is a hybrid, a novel-essay, a capacious work of fiction containing a commonplace-book. It might, as Roland Barthes has suggested, be thought of as the product ...
More
Proust's A la recherche du temps perdu is a hybrid, a novel-essay, a capacious work of fiction containing a commonplace-book. It might, as Roland Barthes has suggested, be thought of as the product of profound and cherished indecision, Proust's indecision between two styles of writing, the moralistic and the fictive/novelistic/romanesque. This book is an exploration of this indecision. The shorter Proust, Proust the moraliste, is a prolific writer of maxims, from the laws of the passions to the aesthetic manifesto of the Temps retrouvé to the rapacious teeming/fertile/spawning/exuberant/luxuriant reflections on sexuality, politics, and society. Yet these maxims, whose grammar lays claim to timelessness, are bound up in narrative, the story of their evolution and disintegration. Proust's moralizing exposes our affective relationship with law statements, with authority, and it is this question that engages A la recherce in an epistemological debate that crosses the boundaries between the two cultures, art and science. What might be called the epistemological alertness of Proust's text is explored at this interface between ‘modernist’ science and literature.Less
Proust's A la recherche du temps perdu is a hybrid, a novel-essay, a capacious work of fiction containing a commonplace-book. It might, as Roland Barthes has suggested, be thought of as the product of profound and cherished indecision, Proust's indecision between two styles of writing, the moralistic and the fictive/novelistic/romanesque. This book is an exploration of this indecision. The shorter Proust, Proust the moraliste, is a prolific writer of maxims, from the laws of the passions to the aesthetic manifesto of the Temps retrouvé to the rapacious teeming/fertile/spawning/exuberant/luxuriant reflections on sexuality, politics, and society. Yet these maxims, whose grammar lays claim to timelessness, are bound up in narrative, the story of their evolution and disintegration. Proust's moralizing exposes our affective relationship with law statements, with authority, and it is this question that engages A la recherce in an epistemological debate that crosses the boundaries between the two cultures, art and science. What might be called the epistemological alertness of Proust's text is explored at this interface between ‘modernist’ science and literature.
John V. Kulvicki
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199290758
- eISBN:
- 9780191604010
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019929075X.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This chapter shows that the account of picture perception and pictorial content sheds light on the debate between the two most popular theories of picture perception: the recognition theory due to ...
More
This chapter shows that the account of picture perception and pictorial content sheds light on the debate between the two most popular theories of picture perception: the recognition theory due to Flint Schier and Dominic Lopes, and the experienced resemblance view due to Robert Hopkins. Though the present account sides with Lopes overall, Hopkins has captured something important about how we come to know pictures’ contents.Less
This chapter shows that the account of picture perception and pictorial content sheds light on the debate between the two most popular theories of picture perception: the recognition theory due to Flint Schier and Dominic Lopes, and the experienced resemblance view due to Robert Hopkins. Though the present account sides with Lopes overall, Hopkins has captured something important about how we come to know pictures’ contents.
Jean Bethke Elshtain and Christopher Beem
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294962
- eISBN:
- 9780191598708
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294964.003.0016
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
For most Americans, intense sectarian commitments embodied in congregations were central and helped to fuel the penchant for political liberty. The replacement of citizenship with a state-sanctioned, ...
More
For most Americans, intense sectarian commitments embodied in congregations were central and helped to fuel the penchant for political liberty. The replacement of citizenship with a state-sanctioned, consumerist-driven, perpetual childhood also explains our willingness, even eagerness, to orient our politics according to the dictates of pity–that is, the uncritical embrace of the victim. What we are seeing in this child-mindedness, this domestication of political imagery, is the reversal of the old standard in loco parentis: in the arenas of mental health, sexuality, values, we are all at sea, it seems, until others have clarified matters for us. As the epistemological status of civic claims has declined, it has become ever more difficult to counter the ethos of the “neutral” state; unless we can say that we understand that the good we seek reflects a truth, and that the grounds for that belief are universally accessible to all persons of good will, then there are no grounds for avoiding the counter-charge of coercion. Even the most ardent defenders of the procedural republic accept that democratic government requires a modicum of what is usually labeled civic virtue, but can one celebrate the idea of freedom as self-government without claiming that self-government and its exercise is good for its own sake?Less
For most Americans, intense sectarian commitments embodied in congregations were central and helped to fuel the penchant for political liberty. The replacement of citizenship with a state-sanctioned, consumerist-driven, perpetual childhood also explains our willingness, even eagerness, to orient our politics according to the dictates of pity–that is, the uncritical embrace of the victim. What we are seeing in this child-mindedness, this domestication of political imagery, is the reversal of the old standard in loco parentis: in the arenas of mental health, sexuality, values, we are all at sea, it seems, until others have clarified matters for us. As the epistemological status of civic claims has declined, it has become ever more difficult to counter the ethos of the “neutral” state; unless we can say that we understand that the good we seek reflects a truth, and that the grounds for that belief are universally accessible to all persons of good will, then there are no grounds for avoiding the counter-charge of coercion. Even the most ardent defenders of the procedural republic accept that democratic government requires a modicum of what is usually labeled civic virtue, but can one celebrate the idea of freedom as self-government without claiming that self-government and its exercise is good for its own sake?
Susan Mendus
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198297819
- eISBN:
- 9780191599880
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198297815.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Impartialist political philosophy must show how and why the priority of impartial justice can be reconciled with a belief in the permanence of pluralism. Although the argument from epistemological ...
More
Impartialist political philosophy must show how and why the priority of impartial justice can be reconciled with a belief in the permanence of pluralism. Although the argument from epistemological abstinence explains the permanence of pluralism, it cannot explain why justice should have motivational priority. It delivers only, and at most, a modus vivendi defence of toleration. The way to attain a defence that is more than a modus vivendi is to ground political impartialism in moral impartialism.Less
Impartialist political philosophy must show how and why the priority of impartial justice can be reconciled with a belief in the permanence of pluralism. Although the argument from epistemological abstinence explains the permanence of pluralism, it cannot explain why justice should have motivational priority. It delivers only, and at most, a modus vivendi defence of toleration. The way to attain a defence that is more than a modus vivendi is to ground political impartialism in moral impartialism.
Michael A Bishop and J. D. Trout
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195162295
- eISBN:
- 9780199835539
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195162293.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This introductory chapter presents an overview of the subsequent chapters in this book which will discuss topics such as epistemological theory, Statistical Prediction Rules, Strategic Reliabilism, ...
More
This introductory chapter presents an overview of the subsequent chapters in this book which will discuss topics such as epistemological theory, Statistical Prediction Rules, Strategic Reliabilism, and Standard Analytic Epistemology.Less
This introductory chapter presents an overview of the subsequent chapters in this book which will discuss topics such as epistemological theory, Statistical Prediction Rules, Strategic Reliabilism, and Standard Analytic Epistemology.
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199557912
- eISBN:
- 9780191743290
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0021
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter presents the simpleminded form of epistemological disjunctivist neo-Mooreanism. In the good+ case our agent — this chapter calls him ‘John’ — perceptually knows the target empirical ...
More
This chapter presents the simpleminded form of epistemological disjunctivist neo-Mooreanism. In the good+ case our agent — this chapter calls him ‘John’ — perceptually knows the target empirical proposition which entails that he is not a brain-in-a-vat (BIV) (the chapter calls this proposition p), where sufficient epistemic support for this knowledge is provided by the relevant reflectively accessible factive reason (i.e., his seeing that p). Like Zula, John does not need to take a view on whether he is a BIV in order to know that p (nor does it matter that he is unable to perceptually discriminate between the objects at issue in the two scenarios — hands and ‘vat-hands’, say). If, however, he is confronted with this hypothesis, then he needs to take a view on it and so either have an adequate epistemic basis for believing that not-BIV, or else no longer believe (and hence know) that p (and much else besides). But on the simpleminded view such epistemic support for believing that not-BIV is easy to come by, since John has reflectively available to him rational support for his belief that p which (he is fully aware) entails p and hence which entails not-BIV as well. Hence, by undertaking the relevant competent deduction he can come to know on this reflective basis that he is not a BIV.Less
This chapter presents the simpleminded form of epistemological disjunctivist neo-Mooreanism. In the good+ case our agent — this chapter calls him ‘John’ — perceptually knows the target empirical proposition which entails that he is not a brain-in-a-vat (BIV) (the chapter calls this proposition p), where sufficient epistemic support for this knowledge is provided by the relevant reflectively accessible factive reason (i.e., his seeing that p). Like Zula, John does not need to take a view on whether he is a BIV in order to know that p (nor does it matter that he is unable to perceptually discriminate between the objects at issue in the two scenarios — hands and ‘vat-hands’, say). If, however, he is confronted with this hypothesis, then he needs to take a view on it and so either have an adequate epistemic basis for believing that not-BIV, or else no longer believe (and hence know) that p (and much else besides). But on the simpleminded view such epistemic support for believing that not-BIV is easy to come by, since John has reflectively available to him rational support for his belief that p which (he is fully aware) entails p and hence which entails not-BIV as well. Hence, by undertaking the relevant competent deduction he can come to know on this reflective basis that he is not a BIV.
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199557912
- eISBN:
- 9780191743290
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0022
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that what is missing from the simpleminded version of epistemological disjunctivist neo-Mooreanism is an account of why the extent to which one needs to cite an independent ...
More
This chapter argues that what is missing from the simpleminded version of epistemological disjunctivist neo-Mooreanism is an account of why the extent to which one needs to cite an independent rational basis in order to dismiss an error-possibility can be dependent on whether the error-possibility has been epistemically motivated. In cases — whether sceptical or non-sceptical — where an agent has factive rational support available to her, she needs an independent rational basis to dismiss the target error-possibility (which is inconsistent with this rational basis) only where that error-possibility has been epistemically motivated. However, that radical sceptical error-possibilities are in their nature lacking in epistemic motivation. The net result is that epistemological disjunctivists are able to appeal to the factive reflectively accessible that is available to them in the good+ case in order to motivate a form of neo-Mooreanism after all, so long as they supply this additional account of why independent grounds for dismissing the target error-possibility are not required in this case.Less
This chapter argues that what is missing from the simpleminded version of epistemological disjunctivist neo-Mooreanism is an account of why the extent to which one needs to cite an independent rational basis in order to dismiss an error-possibility can be dependent on whether the error-possibility has been epistemically motivated. In cases — whether sceptical or non-sceptical — where an agent has factive rational support available to her, she needs an independent rational basis to dismiss the target error-possibility (which is inconsistent with this rational basis) only where that error-possibility has been epistemically motivated. However, that radical sceptical error-possibilities are in their nature lacking in epistemic motivation. The net result is that epistemological disjunctivists are able to appeal to the factive reflectively accessible that is available to them in the good+ case in order to motivate a form of neo-Mooreanism after all, so long as they supply this additional account of why independent grounds for dismissing the target error-possibility are not required in this case.
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199557912
- eISBN:
- 9780191743290
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0023
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter presents the radical sceptical paradox, at least insofar as it made use of the BIV sceptical hypothesis: BIV-Based Radical Scepticism qua Paradox — (BIV1) I don't know that I'm not a ...
More
This chapter presents the radical sceptical paradox, at least insofar as it made use of the BIV sceptical hypothesis: BIV-Based Radical Scepticism qua Paradox — (BIV1) I don't know that I'm not a BIV. (BIV2) If I know that I have two hands, then I know that I'm not a BIV. (BIV3) I do know that I have two hands. It is shown that epistemological disjunctivist neo-Mooreanism represents an undercutting anti-sceptical strategy, and as such it is in a position to offer an intellectually satisfying response to the radical sceptical paradox. Indeed, if the epistemological disjunctivist is right that this putative paradox is actually at root motivated by faulty philosophical theory rather than by intuition, then the net effect of this anti-sceptical strategy is that radical scepticism is not the paradox that it claims to be. As such, this anti-sceptical proposal is much better placed to deal with the sceptical problem than its epistemic externalist neo-Moorean rival, who is committed to offering a dialectically weaker overriding anti-sceptical strategy.Less
This chapter presents the radical sceptical paradox, at least insofar as it made use of the BIV sceptical hypothesis: BIV-Based Radical Scepticism qua Paradox — (BIV1) I don't know that I'm not a BIV. (BIV2) If I know that I have two hands, then I know that I'm not a BIV. (BIV3) I do know that I have two hands. It is shown that epistemological disjunctivist neo-Mooreanism represents an undercutting anti-sceptical strategy, and as such it is in a position to offer an intellectually satisfying response to the radical sceptical paradox. Indeed, if the epistemological disjunctivist is right that this putative paradox is actually at root motivated by faulty philosophical theory rather than by intuition, then the net effect of this anti-sceptical strategy is that radical scepticism is not the paradox that it claims to be. As such, this anti-sceptical proposal is much better placed to deal with the sceptical problem than its epistemic externalist neo-Moorean rival, who is committed to offering a dialectically weaker overriding anti-sceptical strategy.
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199557912
- eISBN:
- 9780191743290
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0024
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Although there are some important similarities, this particular undercutting way of responding to the radical sceptical problem is ultimately significantly different from a quietistic response to ...
More
Although there are some important similarities, this particular undercutting way of responding to the radical sceptical problem is ultimately significantly different from a quietistic response to this problem that is often associated with epistemological disjunctivism. This chapter explores what these differences are. John McDowell is the obvious case in point in this respect, since while he advances a form of epistemological disjunctivism that is very similar to that defended here, and while he also thinks that this proposal in a sense resolves the problem of radical scepticism, he is quite clear that he does not think of the view as offering a direct response to this problem in the way that we have set out.Less
Although there are some important similarities, this particular undercutting way of responding to the radical sceptical problem is ultimately significantly different from a quietistic response to this problem that is often associated with epistemological disjunctivism. This chapter explores what these differences are. John McDowell is the obvious case in point in this respect, since while he advances a form of epistemological disjunctivism that is very similar to that defended here, and while he also thinks that this proposal in a sense resolves the problem of radical scepticism, he is quite clear that he does not think of the view as offering a direct response to this problem in the way that we have set out.
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199557912
- eISBN:
- 9780191743290
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0026
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter summarizes the discussions in Part 3 of the book. It has been shown that epistemological disjunctivism can be successfully applied to the problem of radical scepticism, at least provided ...
More
This chapter summarizes the discussions in Part 3 of the book. It has been shown that epistemological disjunctivism can be successfully applied to the problem of radical scepticism, at least provided one embeds the view within some key wider claims. The anti-sceptical position that results is a form of neo-Mooreanism, albeit one that has important advantages over other neo-Moorean views that are cast along epistemic externalist or standard epistemic internalist lines. A crucial move in arguing for this position was to show that radical sceptical challenges are by their nature unmotivated, where this has a significant effect on the dialectical obligations incurred by the antisceptic. In particular, this means that the epistemological disjunctivist neo-Moorean is spared the impossible task of trying to demonstrate that agents have an independent reflectively accessible rational basis for excluding radical sceptical hypotheses. As a result, the path is cleared for this proposal to show how our knowledge of the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses could be supported by reflectively accessible factive reasons.Less
This chapter summarizes the discussions in Part 3 of the book. It has been shown that epistemological disjunctivism can be successfully applied to the problem of radical scepticism, at least provided one embeds the view within some key wider claims. The anti-sceptical position that results is a form of neo-Mooreanism, albeit one that has important advantages over other neo-Moorean views that are cast along epistemic externalist or standard epistemic internalist lines. A crucial move in arguing for this position was to show that radical sceptical challenges are by their nature unmotivated, where this has a significant effect on the dialectical obligations incurred by the antisceptic. In particular, this means that the epistemological disjunctivist neo-Moorean is spared the impossible task of trying to demonstrate that agents have an independent reflectively accessible rational basis for excluding radical sceptical hypotheses. As a result, the path is cleared for this proposal to show how our knowledge of the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses could be supported by reflectively accessible factive reasons.
Michael Williams
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195169720
- eISBN:
- 9780199786343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169727.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This essay argues that the Pyrrhonian regress argument presupposes a Prior Grounding conception of justification. This is contrasted with a Default and Challenge structure, which leads to a ...
More
This essay argues that the Pyrrhonian regress argument presupposes a Prior Grounding conception of justification. This is contrasted with a Default and Challenge structure, which leads to a contextualist picture of justification. Contextualism is said to incorporate the best features of its traditionalist rivals — foundationalism and coherentism — and also to avoid skepticism. It is argued that we should not ask which conception is really true, but instead give up epistemological realism.Less
This essay argues that the Pyrrhonian regress argument presupposes a Prior Grounding conception of justification. This is contrasted with a Default and Challenge structure, which leads to a contextualist picture of justification. Contextualism is said to incorporate the best features of its traditionalist rivals — foundationalism and coherentism — and also to avoid skepticism. It is argued that we should not ask which conception is really true, but instead give up epistemological realism.
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199557912
- eISBN:
- 9780191743290
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter suggests that the reason why epistemological disjunctivism is not widely adopted is because it is held to face several fatal theoretical problems. Accordingly, whatever commonsense ...
More
This chapter suggests that the reason why epistemological disjunctivism is not widely adopted is because it is held to face several fatal theoretical problems. Accordingly, whatever commonsense support it might have, it is thought to be a complete non-starter as a theoretical position. Epistemological disjunctivism is motivated by showing that this is an attractive position which we would want to hold if it were theoretically available, and further showing that it is theoretically available, contrary to the prevailing conventional wisdom in epistemology.Less
This chapter suggests that the reason why epistemological disjunctivism is not widely adopted is because it is held to face several fatal theoretical problems. Accordingly, whatever commonsense support it might have, it is thought to be a complete non-starter as a theoretical position. Epistemological disjunctivism is motivated by showing that this is an attractive position which we would want to hold if it were theoretically available, and further showing that it is theoretically available, contrary to the prevailing conventional wisdom in epistemology.
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199557912
- eISBN:
- 9780191743290
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter delineates three interrelated prima facie problems for epistemological disjunctivism. The first is the concern that such a view will directly generate a kind of ‘McKinsey-style’ problem ...
More
This chapter delineates three interrelated prima facie problems for epistemological disjunctivism. The first is the concern that such a view will directly generate a kind of ‘McKinsey-style’ problem — i.e., a problem of a parallel sort to that which is widely alleged to face the combination of first-person authority and content externalism. The second problem concerns the fact that if one does have reflective access to factive reasons in cases involving paradigmatic perceptual knowledge, then it is hard to see how one can reconcile this claim with the undeniable truth that there are parallel introspectively indistinguishable scenarios in which one lacks a factive reason but where, nonetheless, one continues blamelessly to suppose that one possesses it. The third problem concerns the very idea of a factive reason providing epistemic support for knowledge.Less
This chapter delineates three interrelated prima facie problems for epistemological disjunctivism. The first is the concern that such a view will directly generate a kind of ‘McKinsey-style’ problem — i.e., a problem of a parallel sort to that which is widely alleged to face the combination of first-person authority and content externalism. The second problem concerns the fact that if one does have reflective access to factive reasons in cases involving paradigmatic perceptual knowledge, then it is hard to see how one can reconcile this claim with the undeniable truth that there are parallel introspectively indistinguishable scenarios in which one lacks a factive reason but where, nonetheless, one continues blamelessly to suppose that one possesses it. The third problem concerns the very idea of a factive reason providing epistemic support for knowledge.
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199557912
- eISBN:
- 9780191743290
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines how epistemological disjunctivism relates to other disjunctivist positions in the literature. In particular, it is important to distinguish epistemological disjunctivism from ...
More
This chapter examines how epistemological disjunctivism relates to other disjunctivist positions in the literature. In particular, it is important to distinguish epistemological disjunctivism from the kind of metaphysical disjunctivism that has been widely discussed with regard to the philosophy of perceptual experience.Less
This chapter examines how epistemological disjunctivism relates to other disjunctivist positions in the literature. In particular, it is important to distinguish epistemological disjunctivism from the kind of metaphysical disjunctivism that has been widely discussed with regard to the philosophy of perceptual experience.
William F. Bristow
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199290642
- eISBN:
- 9780191710421
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290642.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter discusses an article Hegel published in the Critical Journal of Philosophy (in 1802) on the relation of philosophy to scepticism. It is shown that Hegel's attack on Schulze's scepticism ...
More
This chapter discusses an article Hegel published in the Critical Journal of Philosophy (in 1802) on the relation of philosophy to scepticism. It is shown that Hegel's attack on Schulze's scepticism — his strong rejection of Schulze's sceptical demands, taking the demands to be an expression, crude though they be, of distinctively modern epistemological demands — far from expressing Hegel's dismissal of epistemological scruples, itself expresses his strong epistemological scruples. Taking Hegel's case against Schulze's scepticism as a case against distinctively modern scepticism in general, Hegel's case calls to mind a strand of criticism of Cartesian or modern scepticism familiar to us in contemporary philosophy.Less
This chapter discusses an article Hegel published in the Critical Journal of Philosophy (in 1802) on the relation of philosophy to scepticism. It is shown that Hegel's attack on Schulze's scepticism — his strong rejection of Schulze's sceptical demands, taking the demands to be an expression, crude though they be, of distinctively modern epistemological demands — far from expressing Hegel's dismissal of epistemological scruples, itself expresses his strong epistemological scruples. Taking Hegel's case against Schulze's scepticism as a case against distinctively modern scepticism in general, Hegel's case calls to mind a strand of criticism of Cartesian or modern scepticism familiar to us in contemporary philosophy.
Luigi Gioia
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199553464
- eISBN:
- 9780191720796
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199553464.003.0010
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology, Early Christian Studies
From the vantage point of love, Augustine detects and powerfully describes the epistemological consequences of human sinfulness, thus unmasking the fundamental deficiency of received theories of ...
More
From the vantage point of love, Augustine detects and powerfully describes the epistemological consequences of human sinfulness, thus unmasking the fundamental deficiency of received theories of knowledge. Any pretension to independent philosophical enterprise—‘philosophizing without Christ’—overlooks the crucial condition of knowledge: love. Knowledge is either impaired by covetousness or freed by God's given love. There is no distinction, for Augustine, between natural and supernatural levels of knowledge, no possibility for a reason of carving out a field where it could fulfil its role autonomously. His epistemology rests on the impossibility of neutrality for the will, neither turning itself towards God nor averting itself from him, but simply ignoring both options. Charity stands in the end as the only condition for an harmonious cognitive life. Only love restores knowledge and enables philosophers to yield to the injunction which resumes philosophical enterprise as a whole, namely ‘Know thyself’.Less
From the vantage point of love, Augustine detects and powerfully describes the epistemological consequences of human sinfulness, thus unmasking the fundamental deficiency of received theories of knowledge. Any pretension to independent philosophical enterprise—‘philosophizing without Christ’—overlooks the crucial condition of knowledge: love. Knowledge is either impaired by covetousness or freed by God's given love. There is no distinction, for Augustine, between natural and supernatural levels of knowledge, no possibility for a reason of carving out a field where it could fulfil its role autonomously. His epistemology rests on the impossibility of neutrality for the will, neither turning itself towards God nor averting itself from him, but simply ignoring both options. Charity stands in the end as the only condition for an harmonious cognitive life. Only love restores knowledge and enables philosophers to yield to the injunction which resumes philosophical enterprise as a whole, namely ‘Know thyself’.
