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I concluded in the previous chapter that the Complementizer‐layer includes a position for the speaker's temporal coordinate. The issue I consider here is whether this position can ever be overtly realized by some specific element in the syntax, recognizable as a first person marked item. I show that the position projected by the speaker's coordinates is visible in some peculiar structures and that it is actually occupied by a verbal form overtly marked with first person features expressing an epistemic meaning, such as credo (I believe/I think), penso (I think), immagino (I imagine), and the like. By analysing the properties of credo (I believe/think) — the subject‐less first person present tense verbal form of the epistemic verb credere (to believe/ to think) — I show that the sequence credo (I think) + clause must be considered as a mono‐clausal structure and that credo occupies in these cases the left‐most position in the Complementizer‐layer.

By drawing parallels to neuro-philosophical approaches to self-consciousness that give up the notion of an a priori psychological self, Zeman argues that linguistic self-reference does not reflect the self as a holistic subject of consciousness, but as a set of different ‘selves’ that are commonly neutralized behind the personal pronoun ‘I’. The argument is grounded in an investigation of ‘multiple-perspective constructions’ (MPC) like the epistemic use of modal verbs, Free Indirect Discourse, and the ‘Future of Fate’ constructions where the subject is split in more than one dimension. The analysis shows that the impression of a holistic self emerges as a discourse effect based on the integration of the hierarchical relations between (i) an ‘internal’ and ‘external’ self with respect to the mental content, and (ii) ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ perspectives with respect to the communicative roles.

Many studies have supported the idea that human interaction relies on cooperation and joint action, implying that everyday communication has primarily a social motivation. According to Grice, interlocutors are expected to meet the informational needs of their interactional partner(s) in both accuracy and informativeness. However, conversional principles incompatible with Grice’s maxims have been found to be implicitly applied in traditional societies from Madagascar, the Pacific Islands, and Mesoamerica. This chapter considers the management of epistemicity among the Yucatec Mayas of Mexico, focusing on the function and use of evidential particles and the broader cultural context into which they fit. Another is to present the implicit rules that adults and children follow to evaluate and endorse claims of knowledge. Such rules might explain why Yucatec Mayas tend to be linguistically accurate in stating and evaluating knowledge sources. Because they expect others to lie or withhold information, they constantly monitor how their and others’ assertions and information are shared.

Aguaruna speakers maintain a rich oral culture in which traditional knowledge is embodied in stories and songs. Narratives are characterized by elaborate clause-chaining constructions making use of dependent clauses, nominalizations and tail-head linkage, and a striking feature of traditional stories is the frequent use of nominalizations functioning as finite verbs. The chapter argues that this latter use of nominalizations operates as an evidentiality strategy and marks non-firsthand information source, in contrast to finite verbs that are neutral with respect to information source. Aguaruna is not unique in using nominalizations in place of finite verbs, nor in developing an evidentiality strategy, and the chapter also discusses some typological and areal considerations arising from the data.