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Two Purposes of Arguing and Two Epistemic Projects

Martin Davies

in Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199267989
eISBN:
9780191708268
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.003.0015
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter borrows what Frank Jackson says about propounding arguments, a phenomenon in the dialectical domain, and transposes it to the epistemological domain. It seeks to clarify the notion of ... More


Externalism, Architecturalism, and Epistemic Warrant *

Martin Davies

in Knowing Our Own Minds

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199241408
eISBN:
9780191598692
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199241406.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Externalism about some mental property, M, is the thesis that whether a person has M conceptually depends, in part, on the person's environment. Architecturalism about M is the thesis that whether a ... More


Pluralist Consequentialist Anti-Scepticism

Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen

in Epistemic Entitlement

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
March 2020
ISBN:
9780198713524
eISBN:
9780191781940
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198713524.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, American Philosophy

How could it be warranted and rational to accept anti-sceptical hypotheses (I’m not a brain in a vat, There is an external world, etc.) in the absence of evidence supporting such propositions? ... More


Self-Knowledge

Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.)

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199590728
eISBN:
9780191725456
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Self-knowledge has always been a central topic of philosophical inquiry. It is hard to think of a major philosopher, from ancient times to the present, who refrained from pronouncing on the nature, ... More


Relativism in Buddhist Philosophy: Candrakīrti on Mutual Dependence and the Basis of Convention

Elena Walsh

in The Moon Points Back

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
August 2015
ISBN:
9780190226862
eISBN:
9780190226893
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190226862.003.0010
Subject:
Religion, Buddhism

This chapter considers the Madhyamīka claim that knowledge is merely conventional or relative (saṃvṛti). In his Prasannapadā, Candrakīrti and an unnamed interlocutor (whose position closely resembles ... More


First‐Person Authority and the Internal Reality of Beliefs

Diana Raffman

in Knowing Our Own Minds

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199241408
eISBN:
9780191598692
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199241406.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The paper is a response to Davies, arguing that he misdiagnoses the difficulties with the architecturalist and externalist arguments he targets. Whether or not there are independent grounds for the ... More


Closure and Moorean Reasoning

Michael Blome-Tillmann

in Knowledge and Presuppositions

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
August 2014
ISBN:
9780199686087
eISBN:
9780191766046
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686087.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter offers an account of our intuitions concerning the phenomenon of (apparent) transmission failure. More specifically, the account offered combines Crispin Wright’s notion of epistemic ... More


Defining Pseudoscience and Science

Sven Ove Hansson

in Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780226051796
eISBN:
9780226051826
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
University of Chicago Press
DOI:
10.7208/chicago/9780226051826.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

This chapter recasts the demarcation problem in terms of epistemic warrant. It proposes a definition of pseudoscience that differs from most previous proposals by operating on a higher level of ... More


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