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Warrant

John Skorupski

in The Domain of Reasons

Self‐determining actors must be able to know what reasons they have. They must be able to audit those reasons, to assess whether they have warrant for a particular response. Chapter 5 defines warrant ... More

Self‐determining actors must be able to know what reasons they have. They must be able to audit those reasons, to assess whether they have warrant for a particular response. Chapter 5 defines warrant and discusses its structure, distinguishing it from justification and knowledge. It argues that if self‐determination is possible reason relations must be a priori.Less

An Epistemic Description Language for Social Interactions and Networks

Mihnea C. Moldoveanu and Joel A.C. Baum

in Epinets: The Epistemic Structure and Dynamics of Social Networks

This chapter introduces a modeling language for representing the epistemic states of networked human agents at both the individual and collective levels. The new ‘epistemic description language’, or ... More

This chapter introduces a modeling language for representing the epistemic states of networked human agents at both the individual and collective levels. The new ‘epistemic description language’, or ‘EDL’, has a graphical component and a syntactical component. The language is used to articulate the relationships between individuals and their beliefs as elementary blocks of interactive epistemic networks. The chapter shows how epinets can be used to capture causally relevant states of social networks, and argue for the compilation of an epistemic description language for social interactions and networks.Less

“I Know You Think She Thinks I Trust You—But I Don't”: Moves, Tactics, and Strategies Defined and Played in Epinets

Mihnea C. Moldoveanu and Joel A.C. Baum

in Epinets: The Epistemic Structure and Dynamics of Social Networks

This chapter extends the use of epinets to the characterization of dynamic processes in networks. Epinets are employed in two distinct ways: first as instruments for specifying changes in the ... More

This chapter extends the use of epinets to the characterization of dynamic processes in networks. Epinets are employed in two distinct ways: first as instruments for specifying changes in the epistemic states of linked or interacting agents, and second as a toolkit for representing strategic interactions. Using epinets to represent interactions among epistemically-linked agents resolves ambiguities inherent in game theoretic approaches and enables explicit modeling of subtle phenomena including mind games, dialogical games, and information brokerage games.Less

Why We Need an Epistemic Model of Social Networks

Mihnea C. Moldoveanu and Joel A.C. Baum

in Epinets: The Epistemic Structure and Dynamics of Social Networks

Using examples and unstructured intuitions that highlight the importance of knowledge, beliefs, and mutual beliefs to the outcomes of social situations and interpersonal relations, this chapter ... More

Using examples and unstructured intuitions that highlight the importance of knowledge, beliefs, and mutual beliefs to the outcomes of social situations and interpersonal relations, this chapter argues for the usefulness of epistemic models of human interactions and networks. The notions of an epistemic state – a link between individuals and propositions they may know or believe – and an epistemic tie among individuals – a link connecting individuals’ epistemic states to one another, are introduced. The chapter shows how the structure of epistemic networks formed by such links are relevant to the dynamics of human interactions, and how the dynamics of these networks are critical elements of complex interpersonal narratives.Less

“What You May Think We Think We Are Doing Here”: By Way of Conclusion

Mihnea C. Moldoveanu and Joel A.C. Baum

in Epinets: The Epistemic Structure and Dynamics of Social Networks

This chapter considers the Epistemic Description Language (EDL) introduced in the previous chapters through an epistemic prism, offering an interpretation of the development of an epistemic approach ... More

This chapter considers the Epistemic Description Language (EDL) introduced in the previous chapters through an epistemic prism, offering an interpretation of the development of an epistemic approach to social network analysis as a set of brokering and closure-producing moves, where brokering happens across research communities with different representational and methodological commitments (epistemic game theory, network sociology) and closure acts at the level of a nascent group interested in the epistemic structure and dynamics of networks. The chapter concludes with a discussion of future directions for research and development.Less

Beliefs and Believing

in Inside Man: The Discipline of Modeling Human Ways of Being

This chapter examines the modeling of human beliefs and the act of believing. It considers the probabilistic models of the personal degrees of belief that an individual holds regarding the truth ... More

This chapter examines the modeling of human beliefs and the act of believing. It considers the probabilistic models of the personal degrees of belief that an individual holds regarding the truth value of various propositions, and discusses the principles of the principal-agent model of affect and cognition. The chapter also suggests that modelers can use the basic probabilistic framework for measuring personal degrees of belief in order to understand and model the kinematics and dynamics of the epistemic states of the subject.Less

“I Think You Think I Think You're Lying”: Trust, Secrecy, Covertness, and Authentication in Social Networks

Mihnea C. Moldoveanu and Joel A.C. Baum

in Epinets: The Epistemic Structure and Dynamics of Social Networks

This chapter analyzes the epistemic structure of trust in social networks. Trust is defined in terms of the epistemic states of networked agents, and a model of trust is advanced in which trust is ... More

This chapter analyzes the epistemic structure of trust in social networks. Trust is defined in terms of the epistemic states of networked agents, and a model of trust is advanced in which trust is characterized as a form of confidence in the competence and integrity of another agent, wherein the trustful knows that the trusted would know a fact if that fact were true, and would say it if he or she knew it, is advanced and examined empirically. The approach is used to measure trust, and show how epistemically-defined trust relationships can function as safeguards for coordination and information flow in networks. This unpacking of trust permits exploration of the dark side of trust – how trust can be broken without appearing that way, as well as the interplay between breaches of trust in integrity and trust in competence.Less

Counterfactuals: philosophical and psychological difficulties

Jonathan St B T Evans and David E Over

in If

This chapter looks in some detail at the important topic of counterfactual conditionals, examining both philosophical and psychological contributions. It argues that there may be a significant ... More

This chapter looks in some detail at the important topic of counterfactual conditionals, examining both philosophical and psychological contributions. It argues that there may be a significant difference between indicative conditionals, or at least some of them, and counterfactuals. Some indicative conditionals at least, e.g. 7.2, 7.6, or 7.8, may express epistemic mental states, and counterfactuals may concern objective relations. Some philosophers have consequently argued for T3 for indicatives and T2 for counterfactuals. However, some indicative conditionals, e.g. 7.5, might be closely related to counterfactuals and about causal or other objective relations, and that could imply T2 for them at least.Less

Mental Acts as Natural Kinds 1

Joëlle Proust

in Decomposing the Will

This chapter examines whether, and in what sense, one can speak of agentive mental events. An adequate characterization of mental acts should respond to three main worries. First, mental acts cannot ... More

This chapter examines whether, and in what sense, one can speak of agentive mental events. An adequate characterization of mental acts should respond to three main worries. First, mental acts cannot have prespecified intentional contents, for this would jeopardize the normative requirements attached to epistemic states. Second, mental acts seem to depend crucially on receptive attitudes. Third, it does not seem that intentions play any role in mental action. A careful analysis of the role of normative requirements allows us to clarify the distinction between mental and bodily forms of action. Two kinds of motives must be present for a mental act to develop – one instrumental and one normative. These two motives actually correspond to different phases of a single mental act. It is shown that, conceived in this way, a characterization of mental acts avoids the three difficulties mentioned above.Less

Why Don’t Apes Understand False Beliefs?

Michael Tomasello and Henrike Moll

in Navigating the Social World: What Infants, Children, and Other Species Can Teach Us

The reasons why apes do not understand false beliefs are uknown. However, this chapter shows that looking at precisely what they do and do not understand about the psychological states of others in ... More

The reasons why apes do not understand false beliefs are uknown. However, this chapter shows that looking at precisely what they do and do not understand about the psychological states of others in general—what they understand about goals, intentions, perceptions, and epistemic states—can provide specific insight on what it takes to understand that someone has a false belief. It presents two possible explanations for the difference between knowledge and belief. The first is that understanding a belief as false involves some kind of conflict—a conflict in which the most salient alternative, namely the agent's own knowledge of what is the case, must be suppressed or ignored. The second explanation—which shares some features with the first but aims to specify more precisely why the difficulty arises in specific tasks—is that great apes lack some specific cognitive capacities that are needed in order to understand false beliefs. The chapter then considers the debate in developmental psychology about when young children understand false beliefs, and whether the current analysis of apes is relevant to this debate.Less

Introduction

Douglas Husak

in Ignorance of Law: A Philosophical Inquiry

How should the criminal law treat persons who breach penal laws of which they are ignorant? This is a crude approximation of the basic question addressed throughout this book. For three reasons, my ... More

How should the criminal law treat persons who breach penal laws of which they are ignorant? This is a crude approximation of the basic question addressed throughout this book. For three reasons, my conclusions resist a simple summary. First, I find it necessary to repeatedly refine and clarify the basic question itself. Second, the position I defend is complex, nuanced, and highly qualified. Third, large parts of my answer will be tentative; I admit to uncertainty about how many central issues should be resolved. Judgments about responsibility, which form the cornerstone of any inquiry into ignorance of law, are among the most controversial in all of philosophy. Still, an oversimplified summary of my provisional conclusions is helpful: an ideal penal code should grant an excuse for defendants who are ignorant of law far more frequently than is currently done in existing systems of Anglo-American criminal justice.Less