Peter Achinstein
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195143898
- eISBN:
- 9780199833023
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195143892.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Using as an example the results of Hertz's experiments on cathode rays in 1883, in which no electrical effects of these rays were observed, four concepts of evidence are introduced: ES (epistemic ...
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Using as an example the results of Hertz's experiments on cathode rays in 1883, in which no electrical effects of these rays were observed, four concepts of evidence are introduced: ES (epistemic situation), subjective, potential, and veridical. It is argued that although all four types are used in science, veridical evidence, which is entirely objective and requires the truth of the hypothesis, is the most important for scientists.Less
Using as an example the results of Hertz's experiments on cathode rays in 1883, in which no electrical effects of these rays were observed, four concepts of evidence are introduced: ES (epistemic situation), subjective, potential, and veridical. It is argued that although all four types are used in science, veridical evidence, which is entirely objective and requires the truth of the hypothesis, is the most important for scientists.
Peter Achinstein
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195143898
- eISBN:
- 9780199833023
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195143892.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
What is required for a fact to be evidence for a hypothesis? In this book Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, which he calls potential, veridical, epistemic‐situation, and subjective. He ...
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What is required for a fact to be evidence for a hypothesis? In this book Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, which he calls potential, veridical, epistemic‐situation, and subjective. He defines the last three by reference to the first, and then characterizes potential evidence using a new objective epistemic interpretation of probability. The resulting theory is used to provide solutions to four ”paradoxes of evidence” (grue, ravens, lottery, and old evidence) and to a series of questions, including whether explanations or predictions furnish more evidential weight; whether individual hypotheses or only entire theoretical systems can receive evidential support (the Duhem‐Quine problem); and what counts as a scientific discovery and what evidence it requires. Two historical scientific cases are examined using the theory of evidence developed: Jean Perrin's argument for molecules (did he have noncircular evidence for their existence?), and J.J. Thomson's argument for electrons (what sort of evidence did this argument provide?).Less
What is required for a fact to be evidence for a hypothesis? In this book Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, which he calls potential, veridical, epistemic‐situation, and subjective. He defines the last three by reference to the first, and then characterizes potential evidence using a new objective epistemic interpretation of probability. The resulting theory is used to provide solutions to four ”paradoxes of evidence” (grue, ravens, lottery, and old evidence) and to a series of questions, including whether explanations or predictions furnish more evidential weight; whether individual hypotheses or only entire theoretical systems can receive evidential support (the Duhem‐Quine problem); and what counts as a scientific discovery and what evidence it requires. Two historical scientific cases are examined using the theory of evidence developed: Jean Perrin's argument for molecules (did he have noncircular evidence for their existence?), and J.J. Thomson's argument for electrons (what sort of evidence did this argument provide?).
Richard A. Richards
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199738625
- eISBN:
- 9780199894642
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738625.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Peter Achinstein began his Book of Evidence with the claim that standard philosophical theories of evidence are and ought to be ignored by scientists. He could have gone further: historians of ...
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Peter Achinstein began his Book of Evidence with the claim that standard philosophical theories of evidence are and ought to be ignored by scientists. He could have gone further: historians of science should ignore standard philosophical theories of evidence as well. The problem is that these theories are prescriptive, formal, and a priori. Consequently, they are unable to help us understand what counted as evidence for actual scientists and they are insensitive to context, in particular to scientists’ beliefs about empirical facts. What historians of science need is, first, a descriptive concept of evidence that can help us understand when something was actually evidence for some person at some time; second, a prescriptive concept that is sensitive to context and empirical knowledge. Achinstein's framework gives us both: first, in his subjective concept of evidence, which is relativized to persons, and second, in his epistemic concept, which is relativized to context. These concepts can help us better understand complex historical cases such as Darwin's acceptance of branching evolution on the basis of the taxonomic facts, and his apparently conflicting views about whether these facts were evidentially sufficient.Less
Peter Achinstein began his Book of Evidence with the claim that standard philosophical theories of evidence are and ought to be ignored by scientists. He could have gone further: historians of science should ignore standard philosophical theories of evidence as well. The problem is that these theories are prescriptive, formal, and a priori. Consequently, they are unable to help us understand what counted as evidence for actual scientists and they are insensitive to context, in particular to scientists’ beliefs about empirical facts. What historians of science need is, first, a descriptive concept of evidence that can help us understand when something was actually evidence for some person at some time; second, a prescriptive concept that is sensitive to context and empirical knowledge. Achinstein's framework gives us both: first, in his subjective concept of evidence, which is relativized to persons, and second, in his epistemic concept, which is relativized to context. These concepts can help us better understand complex historical cases such as Darwin's acceptance of branching evolution on the basis of the taxonomic facts, and his apparently conflicting views about whether these facts were evidentially sufficient.
