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The Assurance View of Testimony

Frederick F. Schmitt

in Social Epistemology

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199577477
eISBN:
9780191595189
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

According to the assurance view of testimony, we are often testimonially justified in believing a proposition p in virtue of the testifier's assurance that p or the recipient's acceptance of that ... More


Reasons: Practical and Adaptive

Joseph Raz

in From Normativity to Responsibility

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199693818
eISBN:
9780191731907
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693818.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Introducing a distinction between standard and non-standard reasons, based on the ability to directly follow them, the chapter uses it to solve the ‘right kind of reason’ and the Toxin Puzzle, and to ... More


From Normativity to Responsibility

Joseph Raz

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199693818
eISBN:
9780191731907
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693818.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

What are our duties or rights? What should we do? What are we responsible for? How do we determine the answers to these questions? This book examines and explains the philosophical issues underlying ... More


Austin, Dreams, and Scepticism

Adam Leite

in The Philosophy of J. L. Austin

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199219759
eISBN:
9780191730818
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219759.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

Austin maintained that standard waking experience is phenomenologically distinguishable from dreaming. In unpublished lectures delivered at UC Berkeley (one source for Sense and Sensibilia), Austin ... More


Pragmatism and Reasons for Belief

Gilbert Harman

in Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind

Published in print:
1999
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198238027
eISBN:
9780191597633
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198238029.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Discusses how to explain the distinction between epistemic and non‐epistemic reasons while allowing epistemic reasons to be affected by pragmatic considerations of simplicity, coherence, and ... More


The Problem of the Source of Epistemic Normativity

Hazlett Allan

in A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199674800
eISBN:
9780191761164
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674800.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The “problem of the source of epistemic normativity,” which is the problem of explaining the appropriateness of epistemic evaluation and epistemic reasons attribution, is introduced. Accounts of ... More


Doubts about “Genuinely Normative” Epistemic Reasons

Hille Paakkunainen

in Metaepistemology

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
December 2018
ISBN:
9780198805366
eISBN:
9780191843433
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198805366.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Instrumentalist and teleologist views in metaepistemology hold that epistemic reasons are goal-relative or value-relative. In the face of counterexamples involving apparently pointless or ... More


Why be an Internalist about Reasons? 1

Julia Markovits

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 6

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199606375
eISBN:
9780191729478
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606375.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Most internalists about practical reasons are drawn to internalism because they favor ethical naturalism or are persuaded of the Humean theory of motivation and think normative judgments necessarily ... More


Humean Approaches

Hazlett Allan

in A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199674800
eISBN:
9780191761164
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674800.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

“Humean” approaches to epistemic normativity, which explain epistemic normativity as a species of instrumental normativity, are articulated and criticized. A “teleological” conception of belief, on ... More


Epistemic Reasons and the Explanation of Belief

Paul A. Boghossian

in Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199287185
eISBN:
9780191713569
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287185.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General

This chapter takes up the final constructivist thesis: that our beliefs are never to be explained in terms of the evidence we have for them, but only in terms of our contingent needs and interests. ... More


Against Internalism-Parity

Christopher Cowie

in Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The Argument From Analogy

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
December 2019
ISBN:
9780198842736
eISBN:
9780191878664
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

It is argued that the first version of the parity premise—internalism-parity—is false. It is false because epistemic judgements are committed to the existence of ‘merely institutional’ reasons. Moral ... More


Ramifications of Moral Error Theory

Jonas Olson

in Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
April 2014
ISBN:
9780198701934
eISBN:
9780191771620
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701934.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Critics like Matt Bedke, Terence Cuneo, and David Enoch have recently argued that an error theory that targets irreducible normativity has deeply problematic ramifications for hypothetical reasons, ... More


Passing the Epistemic Buck

Davide Fassio and Anne Meylan

in Metaepistemology

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
December 2018
ISBN:
9780198805366
eISBN:
9780191843433
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198805366.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

While buck-passing accounts are widely discussed in the literature, there have been surprisingly few attempts to apply buck-passing analyses to specific normative domains such as aesthetics and ... More


The End of Practical Reasons

Ingmar Persson

in From Morality to the End of Reason: An Essay on Rights, Reasons, and Responsibility

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199676552
eISBN:
9780191755811
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199676552.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter begins by outlining an internalist account of epistemic and practical reasons according to which they are conceptual truths. It then goes on to criticize the non-naturalist view that ... More


Kantian Approaches

Hazlett Allan

in A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199674800
eISBN:
9780191761164
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674800.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

“Kantian” approaches to epistemic normativity, on which truth is belief’s constitutive standard of correctness (regardless of the desires of the believer), are articulated and criticized. A ... More


The End of Epistemic Reasons

Ingmar Persson

in From Morality to the End of Reason: An Essay on Rights, Reasons, and Responsibility

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199676552
eISBN:
9780191755811
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199676552.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

The aim of this chapter is to make it plausible by sketching some rough-and-ready considerations, largely familiar from the literature, that we can have no internally accessible, non-circular ... More


The Value-First Account and the Unity of the Normative

Richard Rowland

in The Normative and the Evaluative: The Buck-Passing Account of Value

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
April 2019
ISBN:
9780198833611
eISBN:
9780191872044
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198833611.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The Value-First Account (VFA) analyses reasons for pro-attitudes in terms of goodness or value. This chapter makes an argument against VFA. It argues that epistemic reasons for belief should not be ... More


Why Only Evidential Considerations Can Justify Belief

Kate Nolfi

in Normativity: Epistemic and Practical

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
March 2018
ISBN:
9780198758709
eISBN:
9780191818622
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198758709.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

At least when we restrict our attention to the epistemic domain, it seems clear that only considerations which bear on whether p can render a subject’s belief that p epistemically justified, by ... More


Why Be An Internalist About Reasons?

Julia Markovits

in Moral Reason

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
April 2014
ISBN:
9780199567171
eISBN:
9780191758966
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567171.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter argues that despite the failure of the standard arguments for internalism, there is a version of the internalist thesis that we should accept: on this view, facts give us reasons when ... More


Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion

Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri (eds)

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
May 2014
ISBN:
9780199660025
eISBN:
9780191772672
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Epistemic norms play an increasingly important role in many current debates in epistemology and beyond. Paramount among these are debates about belief, action, and assertion. Three primary questions ... More


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