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Epistemic Rationality

Alison Hills

in The Beloved Self: Morality and the Challenge from Egoism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199213306
eISBN:
9780191594212
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213306.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

There are some striking differences between the way in which we form beliefs about moral matters and the way we form beliefs about non-moral matters of fact. We do not suspend judgements about moral ... More


Arguments for Supra‐evidential Fideism

John Bishop

in Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
May 2007
ISBN:
9780199205547
eISBN:
9780191709432
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205547.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion

This chapter considers three strategies: assimilation to cases of inter-personal trust; appeal to consequentialism (on which Pascal's Wager bears), and a ‘tu quoque’, which maintains that everyone ... More


The Rationality of Natural Theology

Herman Philipse

in God in the Age of Science?: A Critique of Religious Reason

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199697533
eISBN:
9780191738470
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697533.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The central question of Chapter 5 is to which type of rationality natural theology (also called rational theology) should aspire. Many types of rationality are identified, and various notions of ... More


Moral Testimony and Moral Disagreement

Alison Hills

in The Beloved Self: Morality and the Challenge from Egoism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199213306
eISBN:
9780191594212
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213306.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

If you want to have and to use moral understanding in a way that could result in morally worthy action, you must not place your trust in moral testimony, defer to moral experts, or suspend judgement ... More


LOGIC AND RATIONAL BELIEF

David Christensen

in Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199263257
eISBN:
9780191602603
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199263256.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

Sets up parameters for the book's approach — focuses on epistemic (rather than pragmatic) rationality; looks at conditions on simultaneous rational beliefs (rather than on rational changes of ... More


Love’s Blindness (2): Love’s Friendly Eye

Troy Jollimore

in Love's Vision

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780691148724
eISBN:
9781400838677
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691148724.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter explains that we have already seen that love encourages the lover to be effectively blind to a great many properties of and facts about people other than her beloved—facts and properties ... More


Can it be Rational to Have Faith?

Lara Buchak

in Probability in the Philosophy of Religion

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199604760
eISBN:
9780191741548
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604760.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter provides an account of what it is to have faith in a proposition p, in both religious and mundane contexts. It is argued that faith in p doesn’t require adopting a degree of belief that ... More


Higher-Order Evidence

Declan Smithies

in The Epistemic Role of Consciousness

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
August 2019
ISBN:
9780199917662
eISBN:
9780199345588
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199917662.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapter 10 explores a puzzle about epistemic akrasia: if you can have misleading higher-order evidence about what your evidence supports, then your total evidence can make it rationally permissible ... More


Against Egoism

Alison Hills

in The Beloved Self: Morality and the Challenge from Egoism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199213306
eISBN:
9780191594212
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213306.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Since it is typically not epistemically rational to suspend judgement in response to moral disagreements, someone who accepts common sense morality and therefore the premises of a modest vindication ... More


Disagreement

Alison Hills

in The Beloved Self: Morality and the Challenge from Egoism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199213306
eISBN:
9780191594212
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213306.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter sets out in detail another serious problem for modest vindications of morality: the problem of disagreement. When there is disagreement of a certain type over whether a proposition is ... More


Pluralist Consequentialist Anti-Scepticism

Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen

in Epistemic Entitlement

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
March 2020
ISBN:
9780198713524
eISBN:
9780191781940
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198713524.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, American Philosophy

How could it be warranted and rational to accept anti-sceptical hypotheses (I’m not a brain in a vat, There is an external world, etc.) in the absence of evidence supporting such propositions? ... More


Seemings

Declan Smithies

in The Epistemic Role of Consciousness

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
August 2019
ISBN:
9780199917662
eISBN:
9780199345588
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199917662.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapter 12 concludes the book by contrasting phenomenal accessibilism with Michael Huemer’s phenomenal conservatism. Section 12.1 defines phenomenal conservatism as the global principle that you have ... More


BAYESIANISM

James M. Joyce

in The Oxford Handbook of Rationality

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780195145397
eISBN:
9780199752393
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195145399.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Bayesianism claims to provide a unified theory of epistemic and practical rationality based on the principle of mathematical expectation. In its epistemic guise it requires believers to obey the laws ... More


Doubts about “Genuinely Normative” Epistemic Reasons

Hille Paakkunainen

in Metaepistemology

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
December 2018
ISBN:
9780198805366
eISBN:
9780191843433
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198805366.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Instrumentalist and teleologist views in metaepistemology hold that epistemic reasons are goal-relative or value-relative. In the face of counterexamples involving apparently pointless or ... More


Epistemic Akrasia

Declan Smithies

in The Epistemic Role of Consciousness

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
August 2019
ISBN:
9780199917662
eISBN:
9780199345588
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199917662.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapter 9 argues that accessibilism is needed to explain the epistemic irrationality of epistemic akrasia—roughly, believing things you believe you shouldn’t believe. Section 9.1 defines epistemic ... More


Definitions of Rationality in Philosophy, Cognitive Science, and Lay Discourse

Keith E. Stanovich, Richard F. West, and Maggie E. Toplak

in The Rationality Quotient: Toward a Test of Rational Thinking

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
May 2017
ISBN:
9780262034845
eISBN:
9780262336819
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262034845.003.0001
Subject:
Psychology, Cognitive Psychology

Because rationality is an issue across many disciplines, it has acquired many different definitions. This chapter describes definitions of rationality from cognitive science that are amenable to a ... More


Introspection

Declan Smithies

in The Epistemic Role of Consciousness

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
August 2019
ISBN:
9780199917662
eISBN:
9780199345588
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199917662.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapter 5 explores the epistemic role of consciousness in introspection. Section 5.1 presents a simple theory of introspection, which says that some mental states provide introspective justification ... More


MOTIVATED IRRATIONALITY

Alfred R. Mele

in The Oxford Handbook of Rationality

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780195145397
eISBN:
9780199752393
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195145399.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Mele explores two kinds of motivated irrationality and reviews philosophical literature on them: akratic action (action exhibiting so-called weakness of will or deficient self-control) and ... More


Epistemic Normativity

Jonathan L. Kvanvig

in Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
May 2014
ISBN:
9780199660025
eISBN:
9780191772672
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Human beings are rational animals, not in the sense of never being irrational, but in the sense of having a capacity at least occasionally displayed in thought and behavior. The display of this ... More


Emotion, reason, and virtue

PETER GOLDIE

in Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
March 2012
ISBN:
9780198528975
eISBN:
9780191689604
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198528975.003.0013
Subject:
Psychology, Cognitive Psychology

This chapter looks at the issue of the rationality of the emotions from a slightly different angle, focusing on the relationship between emotions and epistemic rationality. It observes that emotions ... More


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