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The Illusion of Nomic Contingency

Alexander Bird

in Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780199227013
eISBN:
9780191711121
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227013.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The laws of nature are widely held to be contingent. As Chapter 3 showed, dispositional essentialism is committed to the necessity of the laws of nature. This argues that the apparent contingency of ... More


Intuition and Modal Error

George Bealer

in Epistemology: New Essays

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
September 2008
ISBN:
9780199264933
eISBN:
9780191718472
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Modal intuitions are not only the primary source of modal knowledge but also the primary source of modal error. An explanation of how modal error arises — and, in particular, how erroneous modal ... More


Epistemology factualized

Ori Simchen

in Necessary Intentionality: A Study in the Metaphysics of Aboutness

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199608515
eISBN:
9780191738241
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608515.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

This chapter discusses ramifications of the fact that terms in language and thought can be necessarily about whatever they are about for a problem inherited from Kripke: how to reconcile commitment ... More


Anti-Individualism, Self-Knowledge, and Epistemic Possibility: Further Reflections on a Puzzle about Doubt

Gary Ebbs

in Self-Knowledge

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199590728
eISBN:
9780191725456
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter argues that we cannot have any justification for believing that a given description of a possible world w that is subjectively indistinguishable to us from the actual world supports ... More


Kripke on Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility: Two Routes to the Necessary a Posteriori

Scott Soames

in Analytic Philosophy in America: And Other Historical and Contemporary Essays

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780691160726
eISBN:
9781400850464
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691160726.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, American Philosophy

This chapter discusses Saul Kripke’s treatment of the necessary a posteriori and concomitant distinction between epistemic and metaphysical possibility. It extracts the enduring lessons of his ... More


The Multidisjunctive Conception of Hallucination

Benj Hellie

in Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780262019200
eISBN:
9780262315050
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262019200.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter asks: if one wishes to endorse a direct realist view of perception, in which in a case of seeing, seen objects or their particular features are somehow parts of the experience one ... More


On the Armchair Justification of Conceptually Grounded Necessary Truths

David Henderson and Terry Horgan

in The A Priori in Philosophy

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199695331
eISBN:
9780191758218
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Armchair reflection commonly provides a low-grade a priori form of justification for certain claims which, if true at all, are necessarily true and are rendered necessarily true solely by virtue of ... More


Epistemic modals and probability operators

Sarah Moss

in Probabilistic Knowledge

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
March 2018
ISBN:
9780198792154
eISBN:
9780191861260
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198792154.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter defends a semantics for epistemic modals and probability operators. This semantics is probabilistic—that is, sentences containing these expressions have sets of probability spaces as ... More


Evolutionary Skepticism

J. L. Schellenberg

in Evolutionary Religion

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199673766
eISBN:
9780191757129
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673766.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Science

The skepticism defended by Colin McGinn, which might be called evolutionary, is greatly deepened when we take account of our place in time and epistemic possibilities concerning the future, exposed ... More


Hawthorne’s Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief

Christopher S. Hill and Joshua Schechter

in Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
April 2014
ISBN:
9780199665822
eISBN:
9780191766336
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665822.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

John Hawthorne has maintained that we cannot be said to be epistemically justified in believing propositions simply on the basis of their having a very high degree of probability. He urges that this ... More


Moderate Modal Skepticism

Margot Strohminger and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri

in Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
March 2018
ISBN:
9780198798705
eISBN:
9780191848469
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198798705.003.0016
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion

This chapter examines moderate modal skepticism, a form of skepticism about metaphysical modality defended by Peter van Inwagen in order to blunt the force of certain modal arguments in the ... More


The Purport of Reason-Conditionals

Ingmar Persson

in Reasons in Action: A Reductionist Account of Intentional Action

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
October 2019
ISBN:
9780198845034
eISBN:
9780191880391
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198845034.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, General

In everyday parlance we formulate reasons for action in many different ways, but it is here argued that they can all be rephrased as conditionals in which the antecedent is a description of the ... More


Competing views

Sven Rosenkranz

in Justification as Ignorance: An Essay in Epistemology

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
April 2021
ISBN:
9780198865636
eISBN:
9780191897979
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198865636.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The present account, which construes justification as a kind of epistemic possibility of knowing, or of being in a position to know, competes with three recently advanced theories of justification. ... More


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