Jay Rosenberg
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251339
- eISBN:
- 9780191598326
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251339.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book offers an unorthodox, systematic view of the relationships among the concepts of knowledge, truth, and justification. It articulates and defends a conception of knowledge as adequately ...
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This book offers an unorthodox, systematic view of the relationships among the concepts of knowledge, truth, and justification. It articulates and defends a conception of knowledge as adequately justified belief. We correctly judge that S knows that p, whenever, from our de facto epistemic perspective, we judge S able adequately to justify his belief that p. A further ‘truth requirement’ is arguably vacuous and idle, since truth can function neither as the goal of enquiry nor as a constraining condition on any determinate epistemic policy or practice. The corresponding conception of justification is both proceduralist—what are fundamentally justified or unjustified are epistemic conducts and practices—and internalist—a person's belief is justified only to the extent that she is in a position to justify it. Enquiry is correlatively understood as always addressed to determinate questions, properly raised only within a context of defeasible, but settled background beliefs that guide and constrain the procedures and norms of epistemic activity. The theses that matter‐of‐factual knowledge both needs and has available incorrigible foundations are consequently rejected in favour of a resolute anti‐scepticism coupled with a thoroughgoing fallibilism.Less
This book offers an unorthodox, systematic view of the relationships among the concepts of knowledge, truth, and justification. It articulates and defends a conception of knowledge as adequately justified belief. We correctly judge that S knows that p, whenever, from our de facto epistemic perspective, we judge S able adequately to justify his belief that p. A further ‘truth requirement’ is arguably vacuous and idle, since truth can function neither as the goal of enquiry nor as a constraining condition on any determinate epistemic policy or practice. The corresponding conception of justification is both proceduralist—what are fundamentally justified or unjustified are epistemic conducts and practices—and internalist—a person's belief is justified only to the extent that she is in a position to justify it. Enquiry is correlatively understood as always addressed to determinate questions, properly raised only within a context of defeasible, but settled background beliefs that guide and constrain the procedures and norms of epistemic activity. The theses that matter‐of‐factual knowledge both needs and has available incorrigible foundations are consequently rejected in favour of a resolute anti‐scepticism coupled with a thoroughgoing fallibilism.
Simon J. Evnine
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199239948
- eISBN:
- 9780191716898
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239948.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Having beliefs means that persons occupy epistemic perspectives. Having a point of view is associated with transparency in belief. However, beliefs can also be visible to their bearers and, in that ...
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Having beliefs means that persons occupy epistemic perspectives. Having a point of view is associated with transparency in belief. However, beliefs can also be visible to their bearers and, in that case, demands of impartiality require that we form beliefs about our beliefs that parallel our beliefs about the beliefs of others. This conflicts with the ways in which those beliefs determine points of view. Thus, being a person, it is argued, means being unable to be fully objective about one's own beliefs. Persons are both inside and outside the world they represent to themselves. This view, aspectual dualism, is associated with Kant, Strawson, Nagel and Richard Moran among others.Less
Having beliefs means that persons occupy epistemic perspectives. Having a point of view is associated with transparency in belief. However, beliefs can also be visible to their bearers and, in that case, demands of impartiality require that we form beliefs about our beliefs that parallel our beliefs about the beliefs of others. This conflicts with the ways in which those beliefs determine points of view. Thus, being a person, it is argued, means being unable to be fully objective about one's own beliefs. Persons are both inside and outside the world they represent to themselves. This view, aspectual dualism, is associated with Kant, Strawson, Nagel and Richard Moran among others.
