Ernest Sosa
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199297023
- eISBN:
- 9780191711411
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297023.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book presents the six Locke Lectures given in Oxford in May and June of 2005. They appear now very nearly as delivered; they argue for two levels of knowledge — the animal and the reflective — ...
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This book presents the six Locke Lectures given in Oxford in May and June of 2005. They appear now very nearly as delivered; they argue for two levels of knowledge — the animal and the reflective — each viewed as a distinctive human accomplishment. Sceptics would deny us any such accomplishment, and the account of knowledge here is framed by confrontations with the two sceptics. A lecture on dream scepticism begins the volume, and one on the problem of the criterion ends it. The core positive account of knowledge is presented in the second lecture and developed further in the fifth. These two lectures detail how the account solves the problem of external world scepticism, and the sixth how it solves the problem of the criterion. In the middle lectures, the account is used to illuminate two central issues of epistemology: intuitions and their place in philosophy, in the third; and the nature of epistemic normativity, in the fourth. The lectures aim to present a kind of virtue epistemology in line with a tradition found in Aristotle, Aquinas, Reid, and especially Descartes (though none of these advocates it in all its parts), and to shine its light on varieties of skepticism, on the nature and status of intuitions, and on epistemic normativity.Less
This book presents the six Locke Lectures given in Oxford in May and June of 2005. They appear now very nearly as delivered; they argue for two levels of knowledge — the animal and the reflective — each viewed as a distinctive human accomplishment. Sceptics would deny us any such accomplishment, and the account of knowledge here is framed by confrontations with the two sceptics. A lecture on dream scepticism begins the volume, and one on the problem of the criterion ends it. The core positive account of knowledge is presented in the second lecture and developed further in the fifth. These two lectures detail how the account solves the problem of external world scepticism, and the sixth how it solves the problem of the criterion. In the middle lectures, the account is used to illuminate two central issues of epistemology: intuitions and their place in philosophy, in the third; and the nature of epistemic normativity, in the fourth. The lectures aim to present a kind of virtue epistemology in line with a tradition found in Aristotle, Aquinas, Reid, and especially Descartes (though none of these advocates it in all its parts), and to shine its light on varieties of skepticism, on the nature and status of intuitions, and on epistemic normativity.
Ernest Sosa
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199297023
- eISBN:
- 9780191711411
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297023.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter gives a distinctive account of the normativity that is constitutive of knowledge. This account is used to throw light on the much discussed value problem that derives from Plato's Meno: ...
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This chapter gives a distinctive account of the normativity that is constitutive of knowledge. This account is used to throw light on the much discussed value problem that derives from Plato's Meno: how can knowledge (as such) be better than the corresponding true belief?Less
This chapter gives a distinctive account of the normativity that is constitutive of knowledge. This account is used to throw light on the much discussed value problem that derives from Plato's Meno: how can knowledge (as such) be better than the corresponding true belief?
Hilary Kornblith
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199246311
- eISBN:
- 9780191597862
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199246319.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Critics of naturalistic epistemology often argue that any account of knowledge that is descriptive thereby loses its ability to account for epistemic normativity. This chapter presents an account of ...
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Critics of naturalistic epistemology often argue that any account of knowledge that is descriptive thereby loses its ability to account for epistemic normativity. This chapter presents an account of epistemic normativity that flows from the descriptive account of knowledge as a natural kind presented in Ch. 2. Epistemic norms are argued to be hypothetical imperatives, contingent on having desires of any sort at all. Epistemic norms are thus universal, even if only hypothetical.Less
Critics of naturalistic epistemology often argue that any account of knowledge that is descriptive thereby loses its ability to account for epistemic normativity. This chapter presents an account of epistemic normativity that flows from the descriptive account of knowledge as a natural kind presented in Ch. 2. Epistemic norms are argued to be hypothetical imperatives, contingent on having desires of any sort at all. Epistemic norms are thus universal, even if only hypothetical.
Phyllis Rooney
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199855469
- eISBN:
- 9780199932788
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199855469.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
Attempts to identify feminist epistemology by picking out particular topics or projects that supposedly all feminist epistemologists engage, or by focusing on specific claims or theories about ...
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Attempts to identify feminist epistemology by picking out particular topics or projects that supposedly all feminist epistemologists engage, or by focusing on specific claims or theories about knowledge (justification, objectivity) to which all or most feminist epistemologists subscribe, often end up mischaracterizing the field. I argue that what makes feminist epistemology distinctive, a quarter century into its development, is best determined by examining what makes mainstream epistemology still so distinctively non‐feminist. For example, feminist epistemology includes a critical examination of historical and contemporary forms of epistemic subordination and disempowerment that it seeks to bring out from the shadows of traditional theorizing in epistemology, that is, forms of exclusion or distancing of women and other “others” from domains, conceptions, and idealizations of knowledge and of epistemology. This feminist project, though it encompasses quite a range of specific inquiries, is distinctive to the extent that proponents of mainstream projects or perspectives in epistemology remain hostile to, dismissive of, or notably ignorant of it. Mainstream marginalizations and dismissals of feminist work are underwritten by distinctively limited understandings of specific features of epistemological theorizing that come to the fore in an examination of the relationship between feminist and mainstream work in epistemology. These features include: a recognition of the historical situatedness of epistemology; an appreciation of different types of relationships between epistemology and politics; the promotion of epistemological reflexivity; critical re-assessments of starting concepts and questions in epistemology; and recognition of important connections between epistemic normativity and moral or political normativity.Less
Attempts to identify feminist epistemology by picking out particular topics or projects that supposedly all feminist epistemologists engage, or by focusing on specific claims or theories about knowledge (justification, objectivity) to which all or most feminist epistemologists subscribe, often end up mischaracterizing the field. I argue that what makes feminist epistemology distinctive, a quarter century into its development, is best determined by examining what makes mainstream epistemology still so distinctively non‐feminist. For example, feminist epistemology includes a critical examination of historical and contemporary forms of epistemic subordination and disempowerment that it seeks to bring out from the shadows of traditional theorizing in epistemology, that is, forms of exclusion or distancing of women and other “others” from domains, conceptions, and idealizations of knowledge and of epistemology. This feminist project, though it encompasses quite a range of specific inquiries, is distinctive to the extent that proponents of mainstream projects or perspectives in epistemology remain hostile to, dismissive of, or notably ignorant of it. Mainstream marginalizations and dismissals of feminist work are underwritten by distinctively limited understandings of specific features of epistemological theorizing that come to the fore in an examination of the relationship between feminist and mainstream work in epistemology. These features include: a recognition of the historical situatedness of epistemology; an appreciation of different types of relationships between epistemology and politics; the promotion of epistemological reflexivity; critical re-assessments of starting concepts and questions in epistemology; and recognition of important connections between epistemic normativity and moral or political normativity.
Hazlett Allan
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199674800
- eISBN:
- 9780191761164
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674800.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The “problem of the source of epistemic normativity,” which is the problem of explaining the appropriateness of epistemic evaluation and epistemic reasons attribution, is introduced. Accounts of ...
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The “problem of the source of epistemic normativity,” which is the problem of explaining the appropriateness of epistemic evaluation and epistemic reasons attribution, is introduced. Accounts of epistemic value in terms of wellbeing and social value are rejected, and an alternative type of account, “epistemic essentialism,” is introduced. The meaning of “epistemic” is discussed. On naturalistic grounds, it is argued that positing irreducible normativity should be avoided.Less
The “problem of the source of epistemic normativity,” which is the problem of explaining the appropriateness of epistemic evaluation and epistemic reasons attribution, is introduced. Accounts of epistemic value in terms of wellbeing and social value are rejected, and an alternative type of account, “epistemic essentialism,” is introduced. The meaning of “epistemic” is discussed. On naturalistic grounds, it is argued that positing irreducible normativity should be avoided.
Carlos Montemayor and Harry Haroutioun Haladjian
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- September 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780262028974
- eISBN:
- 9780262327497
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262028974.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter focuses on the philosophical theories about consciousness and how they might relate to our understanding of visual attention. By examining several theoretical considerations, a robust ...
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This chapter focuses on the philosophical theories about consciousness and how they might relate to our understanding of visual attention. By examining several theoretical considerations, a robust form of dissociation between consciousness and attention is apparent. It is argued that dissociation is not only a plausible view, but that the more severe forms of dissociation (e.g., Type-B or Type-C dissociations), seem to be entailed by the standard distinctions used in consciousness research. This approach helps disambiguate terms that need to be reconciled in order to improve exchanges between theorists, and also systematically unifies debates that have been largely isolated from one another. The account presented in this chapter reveals several affinities among the extant views that have not been properly understood. The chapter’s main conclusion is that many of the current debates show that a more comprehensive theory of consciousness and attention is needed, and that a dissociation between the twois an essential feature of this theory.Less
This chapter focuses on the philosophical theories about consciousness and how they might relate to our understanding of visual attention. By examining several theoretical considerations, a robust form of dissociation between consciousness and attention is apparent. It is argued that dissociation is not only a plausible view, but that the more severe forms of dissociation (e.g., Type-B or Type-C dissociations), seem to be entailed by the standard distinctions used in consciousness research. This approach helps disambiguate terms that need to be reconciled in order to improve exchanges between theorists, and also systematically unifies debates that have been largely isolated from one another. The account presented in this chapter reveals several affinities among the extant views that have not been properly understood. The chapter’s main conclusion is that many of the current debates show that a more comprehensive theory of consciousness and attention is needed, and that a dissociation between the twois an essential feature of this theory.
Ernest Sosa
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691143972
- eISBN:
- 9781400836918
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691143972.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter takes up ways in which the epistemic realm admits a kind of agency and how this bears on the performance normativity proper to that realm. It argues that epistemic normativity is just ...
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This chapter takes up ways in which the epistemic realm admits a kind of agency and how this bears on the performance normativity proper to that realm. It argues that epistemic normativity is just the special case of AAA (accurate, adroit, apt) normativity where the performances are epistemic performances, mainly beliefs. Performances with an aim fall under this AAA structure, according to which a performance will be accurate or successful only if it attains its aim. There must hence be such a thing as the aim of a performance. Performances of interest will then be restricted to those with an essential aim—the aim that defines a given performance as a particular endeavoring.Less
This chapter takes up ways in which the epistemic realm admits a kind of agency and how this bears on the performance normativity proper to that realm. It argues that epistemic normativity is just the special case of AAA (accurate, adroit, apt) normativity where the performances are epistemic performances, mainly beliefs. Performances with an aim fall under this AAA structure, according to which a performance will be accurate or successful only if it attains its aim. There must hence be such a thing as the aim of a performance. Performances of interest will then be restricted to those with an essential aim—the aim that defines a given performance as a particular endeavoring.
Ernest Sosa
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691143972
- eISBN:
- 9781400836918
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691143972.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book explains the nature of knowledge through an approach originated by the author years ago, known as virtue epistemology. The book provides a comprehensive account of the author's views on ...
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This book explains the nature of knowledge through an approach originated by the author years ago, known as virtue epistemology. The book provides a comprehensive account of the author's views on epistemic normativity as a form of performance normativity on two levels. On a first level is found the normativity of the apt performance, whose success manifests the performer's competence. On a higher level is found the normativity of the meta-apt performance, which manifests not necessarily first-order skill or competence but rather the reflective good judgment required for proper risk assessment. The book develops this bi-level account in multiple ways, by applying it to issues much disputed in recent epistemology: epistemic agency, how knowledge is normatively related to action, the knowledge norm of assertion, and the Meno problem as to how knowledge exceeds merely true belief. A full chapter is devoted to how experience should be understood if it is to figure in the epistemic competence that must be manifest in the truth of any belief apt enough to constitute knowledge. Another takes up the epistemology of testimony from the performance–theoretic perspective. Two other chapters are dedicated to comparisons with ostensibly rival views, such as classical internalist foundationalism, a knowledge-first view, and attributor contextualism. The book concludes with a defense of the epistemic circularity inherent in meta-aptness and thereby in the full aptness of knowing full well.Less
This book explains the nature of knowledge through an approach originated by the author years ago, known as virtue epistemology. The book provides a comprehensive account of the author's views on epistemic normativity as a form of performance normativity on two levels. On a first level is found the normativity of the apt performance, whose success manifests the performer's competence. On a higher level is found the normativity of the meta-apt performance, which manifests not necessarily first-order skill or competence but rather the reflective good judgment required for proper risk assessment. The book develops this bi-level account in multiple ways, by applying it to issues much disputed in recent epistemology: epistemic agency, how knowledge is normatively related to action, the knowledge norm of assertion, and the Meno problem as to how knowledge exceeds merely true belief. A full chapter is devoted to how experience should be understood if it is to figure in the epistemic competence that must be manifest in the truth of any belief apt enough to constitute knowledge. Another takes up the epistemology of testimony from the performance–theoretic perspective. Two other chapters are dedicated to comparisons with ostensibly rival views, such as classical internalist foundationalism, a knowledge-first view, and attributor contextualism. The book concludes with a defense of the epistemic circularity inherent in meta-aptness and thereby in the full aptness of knowing full well.
Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- December 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198805366
- eISBN:
- 9780191843433
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198805366.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter considers some neglected costs of epistemic realism. It argues that those responding to the realist’s main argument against epistemic expressivism—the so-called perspective ...
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This chapter considers some neglected costs of epistemic realism. It argues that those responding to the realist’s main argument against epistemic expressivism—the so-called perspective objection—have overestimated the power of that argument, since a central premise of it can actually be used to turn the tables on the realist. More specifically, the premise entails that, unless the realist accepts a far-reaching scepticism, she must do two things. First, she must reject the idea that true belief is a central epistemic goal. Second, she must hold that the diversity of views in discussions about epistemic normativity is a sign of cognitive-behavioural incoherence, if not of widespread irrationality, on the part of epistemologists. Such are the costs of epistemic realism.Less
This chapter considers some neglected costs of epistemic realism. It argues that those responding to the realist’s main argument against epistemic expressivism—the so-called perspective objection—have overestimated the power of that argument, since a central premise of it can actually be used to turn the tables on the realist. More specifically, the premise entails that, unless the realist accepts a far-reaching scepticism, she must do two things. First, she must reject the idea that true belief is a central epistemic goal. Second, she must hold that the diversity of views in discussions about epistemic normativity is a sign of cognitive-behavioural incoherence, if not of widespread irrationality, on the part of epistemologists. Such are the costs of epistemic realism.
Hille Paakkunainen
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- December 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198805366
- eISBN:
- 9780191843433
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198805366.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Instrumentalist and teleologist views in metaepistemology hold that epistemic reasons are goal-relative or value-relative. In the face of counterexamples involving apparently pointless or ...
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Instrumentalist and teleologist views in metaepistemology hold that epistemic reasons are goal-relative or value-relative. In the face of counterexamples involving apparently pointless or counterproductive beliefs that are nonetheless supported by excellent epistemic reasons, some have retreated to the following view: while even pointless or counterproductive beliefs can be supported by excellent epistemic reasons in a not-genuinely-normative sense, we can have genuinely normative epistemic reasons only for beliefs that do serve some goal or value. In this chapter doubts are raised about the distinction between genuinely normative and not-genuinely-normative epistemic reasons employed here. It is suggested that there’s no real need or intuitive motivation for the distinction, beyond the ad hoc need of salvaging instrumentalist and teleologist views from counterexamples. The sense in which all epistemic reasons—even reasons for apparently pointless or counterproductive beliefs—seem to be equally normative is explained; and the implications for instrumentalists and teleologists are outlined.Less
Instrumentalist and teleologist views in metaepistemology hold that epistemic reasons are goal-relative or value-relative. In the face of counterexamples involving apparently pointless or counterproductive beliefs that are nonetheless supported by excellent epistemic reasons, some have retreated to the following view: while even pointless or counterproductive beliefs can be supported by excellent epistemic reasons in a not-genuinely-normative sense, we can have genuinely normative epistemic reasons only for beliefs that do serve some goal or value. In this chapter doubts are raised about the distinction between genuinely normative and not-genuinely-normative epistemic reasons employed here. It is suggested that there’s no real need or intuitive motivation for the distinction, beyond the ad hoc need of salvaging instrumentalist and teleologist views from counterexamples. The sense in which all epistemic reasons—even reasons for apparently pointless or counterproductive beliefs—seem to be equally normative is explained; and the implications for instrumentalists and teleologists are outlined.
Sanford C. Goldberg
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- April 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198793670
- eISBN:
- 9780191853203
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198793670.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that the sort of normativity that is at the heart of epistemology is the sort of normativity involved in assessments of whether a subject’s belief satisfies the distinctly ...
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This chapter argues that the sort of normativity that is at the heart of epistemology is the sort of normativity involved in assessments of whether a subject’s belief satisfies the distinctly epistemic standards on knowledge. It introduces the term ‘epistemically proper’ to designate the status a belief has when it satisfies these standards. The author argues against the view that nothing short of knowledge itself can provide the standards, and proceeds to argue for the view that the theory of epistemic justification is in the business of articulating the relevant standards. Appealing to his construal of the internalism/externalism dispute in the theory of justification, the author concludes by motivating a desideratum on any such account: it should regard epistemic propriety as involving both a reliability dimension and a responsibilist dimension.Less
This chapter argues that the sort of normativity that is at the heart of epistemology is the sort of normativity involved in assessments of whether a subject’s belief satisfies the distinctly epistemic standards on knowledge. It introduces the term ‘epistemically proper’ to designate the status a belief has when it satisfies these standards. The author argues against the view that nothing short of knowledge itself can provide the standards, and proceeds to argue for the view that the theory of epistemic justification is in the business of articulating the relevant standards. Appealing to his construal of the internalism/externalism dispute in the theory of justification, the author concludes by motivating a desideratum on any such account: it should regard epistemic propriety as involving both a reliability dimension and a responsibilist dimension.
Ernest Sosa
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691143972
- eISBN:
- 9781400836918
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691143972.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter considers the epistemic normativity that constitutes our knowledge. It introduces two of Plato's best-known dialogues, which are both inquiries about knowledge. The Theaetetus inquires ...
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This chapter considers the epistemic normativity that constitutes our knowledge. It introduces two of Plato's best-known dialogues, which are both inquiries about knowledge. The Theaetetus inquires into its nature; the Meno into its value. Each dialogue, the chapter suggests, involves the same basic question: What sort of normativity is constitutive of our knowledge? A belief that falls short of knowledge is thereby inferior. It is better to know than to get it wrong, of course, and also better than to get it right just by luck. The chapter then asks what is involved in such an evaluation, and in addressing this question the chapter draws out a solution for both Platonic problems.Less
This chapter considers the epistemic normativity that constitutes our knowledge. It introduces two of Plato's best-known dialogues, which are both inquiries about knowledge. The Theaetetus inquires into its nature; the Meno into its value. Each dialogue, the chapter suggests, involves the same basic question: What sort of normativity is constitutive of our knowledge? A belief that falls short of knowledge is thereby inferior. It is better to know than to get it wrong, of course, and also better than to get it right just by luck. The chapter then asks what is involved in such an evaluation, and in addressing this question the chapter draws out a solution for both Platonic problems.
Allan Hazlett
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199674800
- eISBN:
- 9780191761164
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674800.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The value of true belief has played a central role in history of philosophy – consider Socrates’ slogan that the unexamined life is not worth living, and Aristotle’s claim that everyone naturally ...
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The value of true belief has played a central role in history of philosophy – consider Socrates’ slogan that the unexamined life is not worth living, and Aristotle’s claim that everyone naturally wants knowledge – as well as in contemporary epistemology, where questions about the value of knowledge have recently taken center stage. It has usually been assumed that accurate representation – true belief – is valuable, either instrumentally or for its own sake. This book is a critical study of that assumption, and of the main ways in which it can be defended. It is argued that true belief is at most sometimes valuable. In the first part of the book, the view that true belief is normally better for us than false belief is targeted, and it is argued that false beliefs about ourselves – for example, unrealistic optimism about our futures – and about other people – for example, overly positive views of our friends – are often valuable vis-à-vis our wellbeing. In the second part, the view that truth is the “aim of belief” is targeted, and anti-realism about the epistemic value of true belief is defended. Together, these arguments comprise a challenge to the philosophical assumption of the value of true belief, and suggest an alternative picture, on which the fact that some people love of truth is all there is to the “value of true belief.”Less
The value of true belief has played a central role in history of philosophy – consider Socrates’ slogan that the unexamined life is not worth living, and Aristotle’s claim that everyone naturally wants knowledge – as well as in contemporary epistemology, where questions about the value of knowledge have recently taken center stage. It has usually been assumed that accurate representation – true belief – is valuable, either instrumentally or for its own sake. This book is a critical study of that assumption, and of the main ways in which it can be defended. It is argued that true belief is at most sometimes valuable. In the first part of the book, the view that true belief is normally better for us than false belief is targeted, and it is argued that false beliefs about ourselves – for example, unrealistic optimism about our futures – and about other people – for example, overly positive views of our friends – are often valuable vis-à-vis our wellbeing. In the second part, the view that truth is the “aim of belief” is targeted, and anti-realism about the epistemic value of true belief is defended. Together, these arguments comprise a challenge to the philosophical assumption of the value of true belief, and suggest an alternative picture, on which the fact that some people love of truth is all there is to the “value of true belief.”
Matti Eklund
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198717829
- eISBN:
- 9780191787331
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198717829.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The discussion up to here has focused on central, or thin, normative concepts. The present chapter focuses on thick concepts and discusses how the conceptual framework introduced can be used to ...
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The discussion up to here has focused on central, or thin, normative concepts. The present chapter focuses on thick concepts and discusses how the conceptual framework introduced can be used to characterize what it is for a concept to be thick, as well as how taking thick concepts into account might problematize matters. In the discussion, the notion of an objectionable thick concept plays a central role. In connection with the discussion of thick concepts, certain related matters are discussed: the distinction between robust and formal normativity, and the question of how to understand epistemic normativity. A suggestion regarding what it is for a property to be thick is presented.Less
The discussion up to here has focused on central, or thin, normative concepts. The present chapter focuses on thick concepts and discusses how the conceptual framework introduced can be used to characterize what it is for a concept to be thick, as well as how taking thick concepts into account might problematize matters. In the discussion, the notion of an objectionable thick concept plays a central role. In connection with the discussion of thick concepts, certain related matters are discussed: the distinction between robust and formal normativity, and the question of how to understand epistemic normativity. A suggestion regarding what it is for a property to be thick is presented.
Davide Fassio and Anne Meylan
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- December 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198805366
- eISBN:
- 9780191843433
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198805366.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
While buck-passing accounts are widely discussed in the literature, there have been surprisingly few attempts to apply buck-passing analyses to specific normative domains such as aesthetics and ...
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While buck-passing accounts are widely discussed in the literature, there have been surprisingly few attempts to apply buck-passing analyses to specific normative domains such as aesthetics and epistemology. In particular, there have been very few works which have tried to provide complete and detailed buck-passing analyses of epistemic values and norms. These analyses are, however, both interesting and important. On the one hand, they can bring to the surface the advantages and difficulties of extending the buck-passing account to specific normative spheres, either providing further support for the approach or highlighting substantive difficulties. On the other hand, epistemic buck-passing analyses can be beneficial for normative epistemology, providing new perspectives on traditional epistemological problems, and possibly providing fresh approaches to such problems. This chapter aims at partially filling this gap.Less
While buck-passing accounts are widely discussed in the literature, there have been surprisingly few attempts to apply buck-passing analyses to specific normative domains such as aesthetics and epistemology. In particular, there have been very few works which have tried to provide complete and detailed buck-passing analyses of epistemic values and norms. These analyses are, however, both interesting and important. On the one hand, they can bring to the surface the advantages and difficulties of extending the buck-passing account to specific normative spheres, either providing further support for the approach or highlighting substantive difficulties. On the other hand, epistemic buck-passing analyses can be beneficial for normative epistemology, providing new perspectives on traditional epistemological problems, and possibly providing fresh approaches to such problems. This chapter aims at partially filling this gap.
Hilary Kornblith
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- March 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198712459
- eISBN:
- 9780191780783
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712459.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines the source and content of epistemic norms. In virtue of what is it that epistemic norms have their normative force? Semantic accounts, such as the one offered by Alvin Goldman, ...
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This chapter examines the source and content of epistemic norms. In virtue of what is it that epistemic norms have their normative force? Semantic accounts, such as the one offered by Alvin Goldman, are seen to have substantial problems. Accounts seeking to ground epistemic norms in our desires, as suggested, for example, by Stephen Stich, are argued to be most promising. All of these latter accounts make epistemic norms a variety of hypothetical imperative. Such accounts typically are grounded in particular desires, such as the desire for true beliefs, which are not universally held. It is argued, however, that a hypothetical imperatives account may be offered, which grounds our epistemic norms in the mere fact that we have desires, thereby making epistemic norms universal, even if hypothetical.Less
This chapter examines the source and content of epistemic norms. In virtue of what is it that epistemic norms have their normative force? Semantic accounts, such as the one offered by Alvin Goldman, are seen to have substantial problems. Accounts seeking to ground epistemic norms in our desires, as suggested, for example, by Stephen Stich, are argued to be most promising. All of these latter accounts make epistemic norms a variety of hypothetical imperative. Such accounts typically are grounded in particular desires, such as the desire for true beliefs, which are not universally held. It is argued, however, that a hypothetical imperatives account may be offered, which grounds our epistemic norms in the mere fact that we have desires, thereby making epistemic norms universal, even if hypothetical.
Sanford C. Goldberg
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- April 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198793670
- eISBN:
- 9780191853203
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198793670.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
We expect certain things of each other as epistemic subjects, and it is the normativity of these expectations that underwrites the normativity of epistemic assessment itself. In developing this claim ...
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We expect certain things of each other as epistemic subjects, and it is the normativity of these expectations that underwrites the normativity of epistemic assessment itself. In developing this claim Sanford C. Goldberg aims to honor the insights of both internalist and externalist approaches to epistemic justification. With the internalist he embraces the idea that knowledgeable belief requires belief that is formed and maintained in an epistemically responsible fashion; with the externalist he embraces the idea that knowledgeable belief requires belief that is formed and sustained through a reliable process. In this book Goldberg proposes to marry these two dimensions into a single account of the standards of epistemic assessment. This marriage reflects our profound and ineliminable dependence on one another for what we know of the world—a dependence which is rationalized by the expectations we are entitled to have of one another as epistemic subjects. The expectations in question are those through which we hold each other accountable to standards of both (epistemic) reliability and (epistemic) responsibility. The resulting theory has far-reaching implications not only for the theory of epistemic normativity, but also for our understanding of epistemic defeat, the theory of epistemic responsibility, and for a full appreciation of the various social dimensions of knowledge.Less
We expect certain things of each other as epistemic subjects, and it is the normativity of these expectations that underwrites the normativity of epistemic assessment itself. In developing this claim Sanford C. Goldberg aims to honor the insights of both internalist and externalist approaches to epistemic justification. With the internalist he embraces the idea that knowledgeable belief requires belief that is formed and maintained in an epistemically responsible fashion; with the externalist he embraces the idea that knowledgeable belief requires belief that is formed and sustained through a reliable process. In this book Goldberg proposes to marry these two dimensions into a single account of the standards of epistemic assessment. This marriage reflects our profound and ineliminable dependence on one another for what we know of the world—a dependence which is rationalized by the expectations we are entitled to have of one another as epistemic subjects. The expectations in question are those through which we hold each other accountable to standards of both (epistemic) reliability and (epistemic) responsibility. The resulting theory has far-reaching implications not only for the theory of epistemic normativity, but also for our understanding of epistemic defeat, the theory of epistemic responsibility, and for a full appreciation of the various social dimensions of knowledge.
Peter J. Graham
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199642632
- eISBN:
- 9780191807145
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199642632.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
What kind of norms are epistemic norms? Constitutive, prudential, functional, moral? Is epistemic normativity normativity sui generis or does epistemic normativity reduce to some other kind of ...
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What kind of norms are epistemic norms? Constitutive, prudential, functional, moral? Is epistemic normativity normativity sui generis or does epistemic normativity reduce to some other kind of normativity? This chapter argues that some epistemic norms—norms with epistemic content—are social norms—norms in the sense of prescribed regularities in behavior. This is not to reduce epistemic normativity to social normativity, but to understand how some epistemic norms might also be social norms. Social norms are ubiquitous in human life. Many social norms are pro-social, prescribing socially helpful cooperative behavior. The epistemic norms isolated are norms associated with truth-telling. These epistemic norms are then prescriptions for socially helpful behavior, for we benefit by learning from others. There should be such pro-social norms for humans who have undergone group selection for helpful pro-social social norms. We should expect such norms to emerge and to persist.Less
What kind of norms are epistemic norms? Constitutive, prudential, functional, moral? Is epistemic normativity normativity sui generis or does epistemic normativity reduce to some other kind of normativity? This chapter argues that some epistemic norms—norms with epistemic content—are social norms—norms in the sense of prescribed regularities in behavior. This is not to reduce epistemic normativity to social normativity, but to understand how some epistemic norms might also be social norms. Social norms are ubiquitous in human life. Many social norms are pro-social, prescribing socially helpful cooperative behavior. The epistemic norms isolated are norms associated with truth-telling. These epistemic norms are then prescriptions for socially helpful behavior, for we benefit by learning from others. There should be such pro-social norms for humans who have undergone group selection for helpful pro-social social norms. We should expect such norms to emerge and to persist.
Kate Nolfi
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- March 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198758709
- eISBN:
- 9780191818622
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198758709.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
At least when we restrict our attention to the epistemic domain, it seems clear that only considerations which bear on whether p can render a subject’s belief that p epistemically justified, by ...
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At least when we restrict our attention to the epistemic domain, it seems clear that only considerations which bear on whether p can render a subject’s belief that p epistemically justified, by constituting the reasons on the basis of which she believes that p. And we ought to expect any account of epistemic normativity to explain why this is so. Extant accounts generally appeal to the idea that belief aims at truth, in an effort to explain why there is a kind of evidential constraint on the sorts of considerations that can be epistemic reasons. However, there are grounds for doubting that belief, in fact, aims at truth in the way that these accounts propose. This chapter develops an alternative explanation of why it is that non-evidential considerations cannot be epistemic reasons by taking seriously the idea that the constitutive aim of belief is fundamentally action-oriented.Less
At least when we restrict our attention to the epistemic domain, it seems clear that only considerations which bear on whether p can render a subject’s belief that p epistemically justified, by constituting the reasons on the basis of which she believes that p. And we ought to expect any account of epistemic normativity to explain why this is so. Extant accounts generally appeal to the idea that belief aims at truth, in an effort to explain why there is a kind of evidential constraint on the sorts of considerations that can be epistemic reasons. However, there are grounds for doubting that belief, in fact, aims at truth in the way that these accounts propose. This chapter develops an alternative explanation of why it is that non-evidential considerations cannot be epistemic reasons by taking seriously the idea that the constitutive aim of belief is fundamentally action-oriented.
Mikkel Gerken
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198803454
- eISBN:
- 9780191841637
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198803454.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Chapter 6 concerns the normative relationship between action and knowledge ascriptions. Arguments are provided against a Knowledge Norm of Action (KNAC) and in favor of the Warrant-Action norm (WA). ...
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Chapter 6 concerns the normative relationship between action and knowledge ascriptions. Arguments are provided against a Knowledge Norm of Action (KNAC) and in favor of the Warrant-Action norm (WA). According to WA, S must be adequately warranted in believing that p relative to her deliberative context to meet the epistemic requirements for acting on p. WA is developed by specifying the deliberative context and by arguing that its explanatory power exceeds that of knowledge norms. A general conclusion is that the knowledge norm is an important example of a folk epistemological principle that does not pass muster as an epistemological principle. More generally, Chapter 6 introduces the debates about epistemic normativity and develops a specific epistemic norm of action.Less
Chapter 6 concerns the normative relationship between action and knowledge ascriptions. Arguments are provided against a Knowledge Norm of Action (KNAC) and in favor of the Warrant-Action norm (WA). According to WA, S must be adequately warranted in believing that p relative to her deliberative context to meet the epistemic requirements for acting on p. WA is developed by specifying the deliberative context and by arguing that its explanatory power exceeds that of knowledge norms. A general conclusion is that the knowledge norm is an important example of a folk epistemological principle that does not pass muster as an epistemological principle. More generally, Chapter 6 introduces the debates about epistemic normativity and develops a specific epistemic norm of action.
