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This chapter gives a distinctive account of the normativity that is constitutive of knowledge. This account is used to throw light on the much discussed value problem that derives from Plato's Meno: how can knowledge (as such) be better than the corresponding true belief?

Attempts to identify feminist epistemology by picking out particular topics or projects that supposedly all feminist epistemologists engage, or by focusing on specific claims or theories about knowledge (justification, objectivity) to which all or most feminist epistemologists subscribe, often end up mischaracterizing the field. I argue that what makes feminist epistemology distinctive, a quarter century into its development, is best determined by examining what makes mainstream epistemology still so distinctively non‐feminist. For example, feminist epistemology includes a critical examination of historical and contemporary forms of epistemic subordination and disempowerment that it seeks to bring out from the shadows of traditional theorizing in epistemology, that is, forms of exclusion or distancing of women and other “others” from domains, conceptions, and idealizations of knowledge and of epistemology. This feminist project, though it encompasses quite a range of specific inquiries, is distinctive to the extent that proponents of mainstream projects or perspectives in epistemology remain hostile to, dismissive of, or notably ignorant of it. Mainstream marginalizations and dismissals of feminist work are underwritten by distinctively limited understandings of specific features of epistemological theorizing that come to the fore in an examination of the relationship between feminist and mainstream work in epistemology. These features include: a recognition of the historical situatedness of epistemology; an appreciation of different types of relationships between epistemology and politics; the promotion of epistemological reflexivity; critical re-assessments of starting concepts and questions in epistemology; and recognition of important connections between epistemic normativity and moral or political normativity.

Critics of naturalistic epistemology often argue that any account of knowledge that is descriptive thereby loses its ability to account for epistemic normativity. This chapter presents an account of epistemic normativity that flows from the descriptive account of knowledge as a natural kind presented in Ch. 2. Epistemic norms are argued to be hypothetical imperatives, contingent on having desires of any sort at all. Epistemic norms are thus universal, even if only hypothetical.

The “problem of the source of epistemic normativity,” which is the problem of explaining the appropriateness of epistemic evaluation and epistemic reasons attribution, is introduced. Accounts of epistemic value in terms of wellbeing and social value are rejected, and an alternative type of account, “epistemic essentialism,” is introduced. The meaning of “epistemic” is discussed. On naturalistic grounds, it is argued that positing irreducible normativity should be avoided.

This chapter focuses on the philosophical theories about consciousness and how they might relate to our understanding of visual attention. By examining several theoretical considerations, a robust form of dissociation between consciousness and attention is apparent. It is argued that dissociation is not only a plausible view, but that the more severe forms of dissociation (e.g., Type-B or Type-C dissociations), seem to be entailed by the standard distinctions used in consciousness research. This approach helps disambiguate terms that need to be reconciled in order to improve exchanges between theorists, and also systematically unifies debates that have been largely isolated from one another. The account presented in this chapter reveals several affinities among the extant views that have not been properly understood. The chapter’s main conclusion is that many of the current debates show that a more comprehensive theory of consciousness and attention is needed, and that a dissociation between the twois an essential feature of this theory.

This chapter takes up ways in which the epistemic realm admits a kind of agency and how this bears on the performance normativity proper to that realm. It argues that epistemic normativity is just the special case of AAA (accurate, adroit, apt) normativity where the performances are epistemic performances, mainly beliefs. Performances with an aim fall under this AAA structure, according to which a performance will be accurate or successful only if it attains its aim. There must hence be such a thing as the aim of a performance. Performances of interest will then be restricted to those with an essential aim—the aim that defines a given performance as a particular endeavoring.

This chapter considers some neglected costs of epistemic realism. It argues that those responding to the realist’s main argument against epistemic expressivism—the so-called perspective objection—have overestimated the power of that argument, since a central premise of it can actually be used to turn the tables on the realist. More specifically, the premise entails that, unless the realist accepts a far-reaching scepticism, she must do two things. First, she must reject the idea that true belief is a central epistemic goal. Second, she must hold that the diversity of views in discussions about epistemic normativity is a sign of cognitive-behavioural incoherence, if not of widespread irrationality, on the part of epistemologists. Such are the costs of epistemic realism.

Instrumentalist and teleologist views in metaepistemology hold that epistemic reasons are goal-relative or value-relative. In the face of counterexamples involving apparently pointless or counterproductive beliefs that are nonetheless supported by excellent epistemic reasons, some have retreated to the following view: while even pointless or counterproductive beliefs can be supported by excellent epistemic reasons in a not-genuinely-normative sense, we can have genuinely normative epistemic reasons only for beliefs that do serve some goal or value. In this chapter doubts are raised about the distinction between genuinely normative and not-genuinely-normative epistemic reasons employed here. It is suggested that there’s no real need or intuitive motivation for the distinction, beyond the ad hoc need of salvaging instrumentalist and teleologist views from counterexamples. The sense in which all epistemic reasons—even reasons for apparently pointless or counterproductive beliefs—seem to be equally normative is explained; and the implications for instrumentalists and teleologists are outlined.

This chapter argues that the sort of normativity that is at the heart of epistemology is the sort of normativity involved in assessments of whether a subject’s belief satisfies the distinctly epistemic standards on knowledge. It introduces the term ‘epistemically proper’ to designate the status a belief has when it satisfies these standards. The author argues against the view that nothing short of knowledge itself can provide the standards, and proceeds to argue for the view that the theory of epistemic justification is in the business of articulating the relevant standards. Appealing to his construal of the internalism/externalism dispute in the theory of justification, the author concludes by motivating a desideratum on any such account: it should regard epistemic propriety as involving both a reliability dimension and a responsibilist dimension.

This chapter considers the epistemic normativity that constitutes our knowledge. It introduces two of Plato's best-known dialogues, which are both inquiries about knowledge. The Theaetetus inquires into its nature; the Meno into its value. Each dialogue, the chapter suggests, involves the same basic question: What sort of normativity is constitutive of our knowledge? A belief that falls short of knowledge is thereby inferior. It is better to know than to get it wrong, of course, and also better than to get it right just by luck. The chapter then asks what is involved in such an evaluation, and in addressing this question the chapter draws out a solution for both Platonic problems.

This chapter argues that professional inquirers, including professional philosophers, are subject to special epistemic obligations which require them to meet higher standards than those that are required for knowing. Perhaps the most obvious examples come from the experimental sciences, where professionals are required to employ rigorous methodological procedures to reduce the risk of error and bias; procedures such as double-blinding are obligatory in many experimental contexts, but no parallel bias-reducing measures are generally expected in ordinary epistemic activity. To expect such would, in fact, be over-demanding. I argue that this variation in epistemic requirements cannot be accounted for adequately via the usual standard-shifting accounts of knowledge, such as contextualism or subject-sensitive invariantism. Instead, it calls for a more pluralistic approach—it suggests that knowledge is simply not the only epistemic state worthy of philosophical attention.

The discussion up to here has focused on central, or thin, normative concepts. The present chapter focuses on thick concepts and discusses how the conceptual framework introduced can be used to characterize what it is for a concept to be thick, as well as how taking thick concepts into account might problematize matters. In the discussion, the notion of an objectionable thick concept plays a central role. In connection with the discussion of thick concepts, certain related matters are discussed: the distinction between robust and formal normativity, and the question of how to understand epistemic normativity. A suggestion regarding what it is for a property to be thick is presented.

While buck-passing accounts are widely discussed in the literature, there have been surprisingly few attempts to apply buck-passing analyses to specific normative domains such as aesthetics and epistemology. In particular, there have been very few works which have tried to provide complete and detailed buck-passing analyses of epistemic values and norms. These analyses are, however, both interesting and important. On the one hand, they can bring to the surface the advantages and difficulties of extending the buck-passing account to specific normative spheres, either providing further support for the approach or highlighting substantive difficulties. On the other hand, epistemic buck-passing analyses can be beneficial for normative epistemology, providing new perspectives on traditional epistemological problems, and possibly providing fresh approaches to such problems. This chapter aims at partially filling this gap.

This chapter examines the source and content of epistemic norms. In virtue of what is it that epistemic norms have their normative force? Semantic accounts, such as the one offered by Alvin Goldman, are seen to have substantial problems. Accounts seeking to ground epistemic norms in our desires, as suggested, for example, by Stephen Stich, are argued to be most promising. All of these latter accounts make epistemic norms a variety of hypothetical imperative. Such accounts typically are grounded in particular desires, such as the desire for true beliefs, which are not universally held. It is argued, however, that a hypothetical imperatives account may be offered, which grounds our epistemic norms in the mere fact that we have desires, thereby making epistemic norms universal, even if hypothetical.

What kind of norms are epistemic norms? Constitutive, prudential, functional, moral? Is epistemic normativity normativity sui generis or does epistemic normativity reduce to some other kind of normativity? This chapter argues that some epistemic norms—norms with epistemic content—are social norms—norms in the sense of prescribed regularities in behavior. This is not to reduce epistemic normativity to social normativity, but to understand how some epistemic norms might also be social norms. Social norms are ubiquitous in human life. Many social norms are pro-social, prescribing socially helpful cooperative behavior. The epistemic norms isolated are norms associated with truth-telling. These epistemic norms are then prescriptions for socially helpful behavior, for we benefit by learning from others. There should be such pro-social norms for humans who have undergone group selection for helpful pro-social social norms. We should expect such norms to emerge and to persist.

At least when we restrict our attention to the epistemic domain, it seems clear that only considerations which bear on whether p can render a subject’s belief that p epistemically justified, by constituting the reasons on the basis of which she believes that p. And we ought to expect any account of epistemic normativity to explain why this is so. Extant accounts generally appeal to the idea that belief aims at truth, in an effort to explain why there is a kind of evidential constraint on the sorts of considerations that can be epistemic reasons. However, there are grounds for doubting that belief, in fact, aims at truth in the way that these accounts propose. This chapter develops an alternative explanation of why it is that non-evidential considerations cannot be epistemic reasons by taking seriously the idea that the constitutive aim of belief is fundamentally action-oriented.