Jonathan St B T Evans and David E Over
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- April 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780198525134
- eISBN:
- 9780191728174
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198525134.003.07
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Evolutionary Psychology
This chapter looks in some detail at the important topic of counterfactual conditionals, examining both philosophical and psychological contributions. It argues that there may be a significant ...
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This chapter looks in some detail at the important topic of counterfactual conditionals, examining both philosophical and psychological contributions. It argues that there may be a significant difference between indicative conditionals, or at least some of them, and counterfactuals. Some indicative conditionals at least, e.g. 7.2, 7.6, or 7.8, may express epistemic mental states, and counterfactuals may concern objective relations. Some philosophers have consequently argued for T3 for indicatives and T2 for counterfactuals. However, some indicative conditionals, e.g. 7.5, might be closely related to counterfactuals and about causal or other objective relations, and that could imply T2 for them at least.Less
This chapter looks in some detail at the important topic of counterfactual conditionals, examining both philosophical and psychological contributions. It argues that there may be a significant difference between indicative conditionals, or at least some of them, and counterfactuals. Some indicative conditionals at least, e.g. 7.2, 7.6, or 7.8, may express epistemic mental states, and counterfactuals may concern objective relations. Some philosophers have consequently argued for T3 for indicatives and T2 for counterfactuals. However, some indicative conditionals, e.g. 7.5, might be closely related to counterfactuals and about causal or other objective relations, and that could imply T2 for them at least.
