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Epistemic Luck

Duncan Pritchard

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

One of the key supposed ‘platitudes’ of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can ... More


Two Varieties of Epistemic Luck

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemic Luck

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I examine two species of epistemic luck that I claim are not benign and explain how they feature in the main epistemological debates. The first species of epistemic luck—what I call ‘veritic’ ... More


Luck

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemic Luck

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I offer an overview of the various claims that have been made concerning epistemic luck and present an elucidation of the concept of luck in the light of this discussion that, I argue, captures the ... More


Cognitive Responsibility and the Epistemic Virtues

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemic Luck

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I argue that the notion of reflective epistemic luck raises important questions about the centrality to epistemology of a conception of justification that demands that one is able to take cognitive ... More


Epistemic Angst

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemic Luck

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I discuss the difficulty posed by the ineliminability of reflective epistemic luck and offer one way of responding to this difficulty. I begin by considering Wittgenstein’s remarks on knowledge from ... More


Postscript: Moral Luck

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemic Luck

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I outline how an analysis of epistemic luck has ramifications for the supposedly parallel debate regarding moral luck. Focusing on the two classic papers on moral luck by Thomas Nagel and Bernard ... More


The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations

Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar, and Adrian Haddock

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199586264
eISBN:
9780191723360
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General

The three parts of the book comprise three distinct investigations under a common theme: enquiry into inter-relationships between issues about the nature of knowledge and issues about the value of ... More


Scepticism and Epistemic Luck

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemic Luck

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I discuss the sceptical challenge in the light of the distinction between veritic and reflective epistemic luck and argue that the inadequacy of the main anti-sceptical proposals in the contemporary ... More


Anti‐Luck Virtue Epistemology

Duncan Pritchard

in The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199586264
eISBN:
9780191723360
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General

This chapter canvasses two master intuitions about knowledge: the ability intuition and the anti-luck intuition. It argues that a robust anti-luck epistemology, which takes the anti-luck intuition as ... More


Understanding

Duncan Pritchard

in The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199586264
eISBN:
9780191723360
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General

This chapter offers a new account of the nature of achievements, which can avoid the problems facing the old account put forward by robust virtue epistemology. It argues that achievements, so ... More


Knowledge and Final Value

Duncan Pritchard

in The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199586264
eISBN:
9780191723360
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General

This chapter describes two forms of virtue epistemology: modest and robust. The latter is uniquely able to make a plausible case for the thesis that knowledge is a cognitive form of achievement. ... More


Scepticism in Contemporary Debate

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemic Luck

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I examine one key way in which the problem of radical scepticism is motivated via an appeal to an infallibility thesis—as expressed, for example, in the work of Peter Unger—and highlight how this ... More


Virtue, Luck, and Credit

Ernest Sosa

in A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780199297023
eISBN:
9780191711411
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297023.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter presents a more developed defence of the account of knowledge than that offered in Chapter 2, which exploits the animal/reflective distinction towards solving traditional sceptical ... More


The Argument from Luck: The Role of Descriptions

Peter Baumann

in Epistemic Contextualism: A Defense

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
November 2016
ISBN:
9780198754312
eISBN:
9780191815980
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198754312.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter argues against the very common view that knowledge excludes epistemic luck of a certain interesting and relevant type. This view turns out to be just another dogma of epistemology in ... More


The Evidence for the Evidence: Arguing for Gettier Judgments

Max Deutsch

in The Myth of the Intuitive: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Method

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
September 2015
ISBN:
9780262028950
eISBN:
9780262327374
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262028950.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This chapter focuses on Gettier’s argument against the JTB theory of knowledge. Its central claim is that this argument is more complex than ordinarily recognized because Gettier not only argues ... More


The Nature of Knowledge

Peter D. Klein

in Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
December 2017
ISBN:
9780198724551
eISBN:
9780191840142
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198724551.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The purpose of the chapter is to show that the defeasibility theory of knowledge provides the best solution to the most philosophically interesting way of characterizing the Gettier Problem. I will ... More


What’s the Point of Understanding?

Michael Hannon

in What's the Point of Knowledge?: A Function-First Epistemology

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
January 2019
ISBN:
9780190914721
eISBN:
9780190914752
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190914721.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This final chapter extends the function-first approach to human understanding. It is argued that the concept of understanding serves the practical function of identifying good explainers, which is an ... More


Gettier Cases: Transworld Identity and Counterparts

Stephen Hetherington

in Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
December 2017
ISBN:
9780198724551
eISBN:
9780191840142
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198724551.003.0023
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Epistemologists in general have long agreed that a belief’s being gettiered precludes its being knowledge. However, they have long disagreed on how to understand or explicate that preclusion ... More


Epistemic Contextualism: A Defense

Peter Baumann

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
November 2016
ISBN:
9780198754312
eISBN:
9780191815980
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198754312.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This book develops and defends a version of epistemic contextualism, that is, of the view that the truth conditions or the meaning of knowledge attributions of the form “S knows that p” can vary with ... More


Mechanisms of Internal Deliberation

Ana Tanasoca

in Deliberation Naturalized: Improving Real Existing Deliberative Democracy

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
October 2020
ISBN:
9780198851479
eISBN:
9780191886089
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198851479.003.0004
Subject:
Political Science, Political Theory

Chapter 4 explores the mechanisms of reflection and internal deliberation: how citizens assess deliberative inputs and update their beliefs in light of them. It discusses, first, how epistemic ... More


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