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Actions That Make Us Know

Johan van Benthem

in New Essays on the Knowability Paradox

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199285495
eISBN:
9780191713972
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285495.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This chapter looks at the Paradox of the Knower in a dynamic-epistemic perspective where learning means changing the current epistemic model. The problematic Moore sentence driving the paradox turns ... More


Formal Problems About Knowledge

Roy Sorensen

in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195130058
eISBN:
9780199833481
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195130057.003.0020
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

In ”Formal Problems about Knowledge,” Roy Sorensen examines epistemological issues that have logical aspects. He uses Fitch's proof for unknowables and the surprise test paradox to illustrate the ... More


Margins for Error in Context

Denis Bonnay and Paul Egré

in Relative Truth

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199234950
eISBN:
9780191715846
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234950.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

Williamson's margin for error semantics for knowledge implies that knowledge cannot systematically imply knowledge of one's knowledge. Each new iteration of knowledge requires what is known to remain ... More


The Logical Antinomies of Knowledge

Herbert Gintis

in The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780691160849
eISBN:
9781400851348
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691160849.003.0006
Subject:
Sociology, Economic Sociology

The critique of common knowledge of rationality (CKR) developed in the preceding chapters should convince researchers interested in explaining social reality to simply avoid the concept. The actual ... More


The logic of being informed

Luciano Floridi

in The Philosophy of Information

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199232383
eISBN:
9780191594809
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232383.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, General, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

The chapter defends the view that the axiom schemata of the normal modal logic KTB (also known as B or Br or Brouwer's system) are well suited to model the relation of ‘being informed’. After having ... More


Semantic information and the network theory of account

Luciano Floridi

in The Philosophy of Information

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199232383
eISBN:
9780191594809
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232383.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, General, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

The chapter provides the last necessary ingredient, in terms of a theory of account, in order to upgrade semantic information to knowledge. After an introductory section, Section 12.2 argues that, ... More


Evidential Probability

Timothy Williamson

in Knowledge and its Limits

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199256563
eISBN:
9780191598678
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019925656X.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The chapter bases a theory of evidential probability on the equation of knowledge with evidence. It is a form of objective rather than subjective Bayesianism. Updating on new evidence is structured ... More


On the Logics of Knowledge and Belief

Robert C. Stalnaker

in Knowledge and Conditionals: Essays on the Structure of Inquiry

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
August 2019
ISBN:
9780198810346
eISBN:
9780191847332
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198810346.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A model theory for a logic of both knowledge and belief (epistemic logic) is spelled out and defended. The chapter explores some consequences of the assumptions that motivate the theory, some ... More


The logical unsolvability of the Gettier problem

Luciano Floridi

in The Philosophy of Information

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199232383
eISBN:
9780191594809
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232383.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, General, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

The chapter eliminates a potential obstacle towards an informational analysis of knowledge. In the last decades, epistemology has been largely confined to the tripartite account of propositional, ... More


Evidence of Evidence in Epistemic Logic

Timothy Williamson

in Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
November 2019
ISBN:
9780198829775
eISBN:
9780191868276
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198829775.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The slogan ‘Evidence of evidence is evidence’ is obscure. It has been applied to connect evidence in one situation to evidence in another. The link may be diachronic or interpersonal. Is present ... More


Impossible Worlds

Francesco Berto and Mark Jago

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
August 2019
ISBN:
9780198812791
eISBN:
9780191850585
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198812791.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The latter half of the twentieth century witnessed an ‘intensional revolution’, a great collective effort to analyse notions which are absolutely fundamental to our understanding of the world and of ... More


Knowability Remixed

Heinrich Wansing

in Foundations of Logical Consequence

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
June 2015
ISBN:
9780198715696
eISBN:
9780191783388
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715696.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

In this chapter, the quantificational pattern in the standard natural language explication of 'it is knowable that p' is rearranged. As a result, versions of the anti-realist thesis about truth are ... More


Contextualism and the Logic of Knowledge

Robert C. Stalnaker

in Knowledge and Conditionals: Essays on the Structure of Inquiry

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
August 2019
ISBN:
9780198810346
eISBN:
9780191847332
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198810346.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A discussion of contextualist accounts of knowledge, and of the epistemic logic that is appropriate to them. David Lewis’s account is compared and contrasted with an alternative, a version of an ... More


Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays

Mattias Skipper and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds)

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
November 2019
ISBN:
9780198829775
eISBN:
9780191868276
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198829775.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

We often have reason to doubt our own ability to form rational beliefs, or to doubt that some particular belief of ours is rational. Perhaps we learn that a trusted friend disagrees with us about ... More


Higher-Order Uncertainty

Kevin Dorst

in Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
November 2019
ISBN:
9780198829775
eISBN:
9780191868276
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198829775.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

You have higher-order uncertainty iff you are uncertain of what opinions you should have. This chapter defends three claims about it. First, the higher-order evidence debate can be helpfully reframed ... More


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