Chris Heffer
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- August 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190923280
- eISBN:
- 9780190923327
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190923280.003.0007
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
This chapter sets out a systematic but exploratory framework for analyzing epistemically irresponsible discourse pathologies. It begins with the bridge category of bullshitting, which is both ...
More
This chapter sets out a systematic but exploratory framework for analyzing epistemically irresponsible discourse pathologies. It begins with the bridge category of bullshitting, which is both insincere and irresponsible. It then explores in turn the three main discourse pathologies: dogma, distortion, and bullshit. Dogma, or closed-minded discourse that disregards counter-evidence, underlies both distortion and bullshit. Distortion (e.g. overstatement) misrepresents the evidence and/or the epistemic confidence we can justifiably have in it. Finally, bullshit is a form of radical distortion that misrepresents the evidence by appearing to ignore altogether the need for evidential grounding. Given our susceptibility to being epistemically irresponsible, the bar is set high for moral culpability. For speakers to commit epistemic negligence, they must (a) be performing a role requiring a duty of epistemic care; (b) fail to investigate sufficiently in accordance with that duty; and (c) fail to hedge their claims in proportion to the evidence.Less
This chapter sets out a systematic but exploratory framework for analyzing epistemically irresponsible discourse pathologies. It begins with the bridge category of bullshitting, which is both insincere and irresponsible. It then explores in turn the three main discourse pathologies: dogma, distortion, and bullshit. Dogma, or closed-minded discourse that disregards counter-evidence, underlies both distortion and bullshit. Distortion (e.g. overstatement) misrepresents the evidence and/or the epistemic confidence we can justifiably have in it. Finally, bullshit is a form of radical distortion that misrepresents the evidence by appearing to ignore altogether the need for evidential grounding. Given our susceptibility to being epistemically irresponsible, the bar is set high for moral culpability. For speakers to commit epistemic negligence, they must (a) be performing a role requiring a duty of epistemic care; (b) fail to investigate sufficiently in accordance with that duty; and (c) fail to hedge their claims in proportion to the evidence.
Chris Heffer
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- August 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190923280
- eISBN:
- 9780190923327
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190923280.003.0009
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
This chapter summarizes the main analytical moves in the TRUST heuristic for analyzing untruthfulness. It then applies the heuristic to three short texts that have been widely called out as lies: ...
More
This chapter summarizes the main analytical moves in the TRUST heuristic for analyzing untruthfulness. It then applies the heuristic to three short texts that have been widely called out as lies: Trump’s tweet about large-scale voter fraud just before the 2016 presidential elections; the “Brexit Battle Bus” claim that the United Kingdom sent £350 million per week to the European Union; and Tony Blair’s 2002 statement to Parliament about Iraq possessing weapons of mass destruction. The cases share a common theme: the capacity of untruthful public discourse to undermine democratic legitimacy by, respectively, questioning the integrity of electoral procedures, harming the capacity of voters to make a rational choice, and undermining faith in the rational and responsible deliberation of one’s leaders. The chapter troubles the simple attribution of lying in these cases and shows how a TRUST analysis can lead to a deeper understanding of the types and ethical value of untruthfulness.Less
This chapter summarizes the main analytical moves in the TRUST heuristic for analyzing untruthfulness. It then applies the heuristic to three short texts that have been widely called out as lies: Trump’s tweet about large-scale voter fraud just before the 2016 presidential elections; the “Brexit Battle Bus” claim that the United Kingdom sent £350 million per week to the European Union; and Tony Blair’s 2002 statement to Parliament about Iraq possessing weapons of mass destruction. The cases share a common theme: the capacity of untruthful public discourse to undermine democratic legitimacy by, respectively, questioning the integrity of electoral procedures, harming the capacity of voters to make a rational choice, and undermining faith in the rational and responsible deliberation of one’s leaders. The chapter troubles the simple attribution of lying in these cases and shows how a TRUST analysis can lead to a deeper understanding of the types and ethical value of untruthfulness.
Chris Heffer
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- August 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190923280
- eISBN:
- 9780190923327
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190923280.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
In a post-factual world in which claims are often held to be true only to the extent that they partisanly confirm one’s preexisting beliefs, this book asks the following crucial questions: How can ...
More
In a post-factual world in which claims are often held to be true only to the extent that they partisanly confirm one’s preexisting beliefs, this book asks the following crucial questions: How can one identify the many forms of untruthfulness in discourse? How can one know when their use is ethically wrong? How can one judge untruthfulness in the messiness of situated discourse? Drawing on pragmatics, philosophy, psychology, and law, All Bullshit and Lies? develops a comprehensive framework for analyzing untruthful discourse in situated context. The TRUST (Trust-Related Untruthfulness in Situated Text) framework sees untruthfulness as encompassing not just deliberate manipulations of what you believe to be the truth (the insincerity of withholding, misleading, and lying), but also the distortions that arise pathologically from an irresponsible attitude toward the truth (dogma, distortion, and bullshit). Truth is often not “in play” (as in jokes or fiction), or concealing it can achieve a greater good (as in saving another’s face). Untruthfulness becomes unethical in discourse, though, when it unjustifiably breaches the trust an interlocutor invests in the speaker. In such cases, the speaker becomes willfully insincere or epistemically negligent and thus culpable to a greater or lesser degree. In addition to the theoretical framework, the book provides a clear, practical heuristic for analyzing discursive untruthfulness and applies it to such cases of public discourse as the Brexit “battle bus,” Trump’s tweet about voter fraud, Blair’s and Bush’s claims about weapons of mass destruction, and the multiple forms of untruthfulness associated with the Skripal poisoning case.Less
In a post-factual world in which claims are often held to be true only to the extent that they partisanly confirm one’s preexisting beliefs, this book asks the following crucial questions: How can one identify the many forms of untruthfulness in discourse? How can one know when their use is ethically wrong? How can one judge untruthfulness in the messiness of situated discourse? Drawing on pragmatics, philosophy, psychology, and law, All Bullshit and Lies? develops a comprehensive framework for analyzing untruthful discourse in situated context. The TRUST (Trust-Related Untruthfulness in Situated Text) framework sees untruthfulness as encompassing not just deliberate manipulations of what you believe to be the truth (the insincerity of withholding, misleading, and lying), but also the distortions that arise pathologically from an irresponsible attitude toward the truth (dogma, distortion, and bullshit). Truth is often not “in play” (as in jokes or fiction), or concealing it can achieve a greater good (as in saving another’s face). Untruthfulness becomes unethical in discourse, though, when it unjustifiably breaches the trust an interlocutor invests in the speaker. In such cases, the speaker becomes willfully insincere or epistemically negligent and thus culpable to a greater or lesser degree. In addition to the theoretical framework, the book provides a clear, practical heuristic for analyzing discursive untruthfulness and applies it to such cases of public discourse as the Brexit “battle bus,” Trump’s tweet about voter fraud, Blair’s and Bush’s claims about weapons of mass destruction, and the multiple forms of untruthfulness associated with the Skripal poisoning case.
