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Epistemic Luck

Duncan Pritchard

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

One of the key supposed ‘platitudes’ of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can ... More


Closure and Context

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemic Luck

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I critically examine two of the main responses to the closure-based sceptical argument. In particular, I look at the case that has been made for the rejection of closure by, for example, Fred Dretske ... More


Two Varieties of Epistemic Luck

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemic Luck

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I examine two species of epistemic luck that I claim are not benign and explain how they feature in the main epistemological debates. The first species of epistemic luck—what I call ‘veritic’ ... More


Epistemic Angst

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemic Luck

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I discuss the difficulty posed by the ineliminability of reflective epistemic luck and offer one way of responding to this difficulty. I begin by considering Wittgenstein’s remarks on knowledge from ... More


The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis

David K. Henderson and Terence Horgan

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199608546
eISBN:
9780191729584
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608546.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This book argues for several dramatic breaks with the epistemological tradition, while also arguing for significant continuity with epistemology as it has come to be practiced. At important ... More


Entitlement: The Basis for Empirical Epistemic Warrant

Tyler Burge

in Epistemic Entitlement

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
March 2020
ISBN:
9780198713524
eISBN:
9780191781940
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198713524.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, American Philosophy

The chapter is comprised of five sections. First, it situates knowledge and epistemic warrant in a frame of representational and epistemic norms. It distinguishes two types of epistemic ... More


Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Epistemic Externalism/Internalism Distinction

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemological Disjunctivism

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199557912
eISBN:
9780191743290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Part of the great promise of epistemological disjunctivism lies in its apparent ability to incorporate key insights from both sides of the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction. In order to ... More


Cognitive Responsibility and the Epistemic Virtues

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemic Luck

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I argue that the notion of reflective epistemic luck raises important questions about the centrality to epistemology of a conception of justification that demands that one is able to take cognitive ... More


Epistemic Planning, Epistemic Internalism, and Luminosity

Karl Schafer

in Metaepistemology

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
December 2018
ISBN:
9780198805366
eISBN:
9780191843433
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198805366.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

In this chapter, a “doxastic planning model” of epistemic evaluation is employed to argue for a form of epistemic internalism. In doing so, a response is first given to Schoenfield’s recent argument ... More


The Problem of the Criterion

Ernest Sosa

in A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780199297023
eISBN:
9780191711411
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297023.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter confronts the Pyrrhonian problematic based on the fearsome circle/regress/foundations trilemma using the animal/reflective epistemology developed in earlier chapters. It is argued that ... More


Neo-Mooreanism

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemic Luck

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I contend that in so far as the contemporary debate about scepticism has formulated the sceptical problem correctly, and in so far as one is entitled to adopt epistemological externalism as part of ... More


Scepticism and Epistemic Luck

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemic Luck

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I discuss the sceptical challenge in the light of the distinction between veritic and reflective epistemic luck and argue that the inadequacy of the main anti-sceptical proposals in the contemporary ... More


The Source of Scepticism

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemic Luck

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199280384
eISBN:
9780191602290
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019928038X.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I maintain that the neo-Moorean response to scepticism is unable, by itself at any rate, to completely resolve the sceptical problem. The reason for this is that the contemporary discussion of ... More


An Overview

David Henderson and Terence Horgan

in The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199608546
eISBN:
9780191729584
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608546.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter provides an overview of the chapters to follow, their central arguments, and how the various pieces of the view developed in the book fit together. Two of the subsequent chapters are ... More


Phenomenal Conservatism and the Dilemma for Internalism

Michael Bergmann

in Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199899494
eISBN:
9780199367719
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899494.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

In previous work I have argued against internalism by means of a dilemma intended to force all internalists to accept one of two undesirable options: either their internalism is unmotivated or it is ... More


Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism

Chris Tucker (ed.)

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199899494
eISBN:
9780199367719
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899494.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

You believe that there is a paper document (or a computer screen) in front of you because it seems visually that way. I believe that I ate cereal for breakfast because I seem to remember ... More


Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View

Joëlle Proust

in The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199602162
eISBN:
9780191758096
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199602162.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Metacognitive abilities seem to provide ammunition for epistemic internalism in that they offer both non-inferential introspective access to one’s mental agency and a way of evaluating its adequacy ... More


Phenomenal Seemings and Sensible Dogmatism

Berit Brogaard

in Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199899494
eISBN:
9780199367719
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899494.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

According to phenomenal conservatism, if it seems to S that P, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has some degree of justification for believing P. Phenomenal conservatism has received its ... More


Staying Indoors: How Phenomenal Dogmatism Solves the Skeptical Problem without Going Externalist

Berit Brogaard

in Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
April 2016
ISBN:
9780198719632
eISBN:
9780191788727
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719632.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Many naive realists and theorists who hold related positions (e.g., disjunctivism) are primarily motivated by epistemological considerations. They argue that unless we accept naive realism or related ... More


Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: The “Bad Basis” Counterexamples

Matthew McGrath

in Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199899494
eISBN:
9780199367719
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899494.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

Phenomenal conservatism (PC) is plausible, especially if it is restricted to perceptual seemings, but so are the apparent counterexamples involving cognitively penetrated perceptual seemings—the “bad ... More


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