David J. Chalmers
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195311105
- eISBN:
- 9780199870851
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter starts by presenting the central arguments against materialism, which involve establishing an epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal, and moves from there to an ...
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This chapter starts by presenting the central arguments against materialism, which involve establishing an epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal, and moves from there to an ontological gap. It then distinguishes between the three most important sorts of materialist opposition to these arguments: type-A materialism (which denies the epistemic gap), type-B materialism (which accepts the epistemic gap but denies the ontological gap), and type-C materialism (which holds that there is a deep epistemic gap but one that will be closed in the limit). It argues that each of these three views should be rejected. The second half of the chapter investigates the most important nonreductive views that result: type-D dualism (or interactionism), type-E dualism (or epiphenomenalism), and type-F monism (Russellian monism, or panprotopsychism). It discusses the pros and cons of each, suggesting that all three have significant attractions and that none has fatal flaws.Less
This chapter starts by presenting the central arguments against materialism, which involve establishing an epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal, and moves from there to an ontological gap. It then distinguishes between the three most important sorts of materialist opposition to these arguments: type-A materialism (which denies the epistemic gap), type-B materialism (which accepts the epistemic gap but denies the ontological gap), and type-C materialism (which holds that there is a deep epistemic gap but one that will be closed in the limit). It argues that each of these three views should be rejected. The second half of the chapter investigates the most important nonreductive views that result: type-D dualism (or interactionism), type-E dualism (or epiphenomenalism), and type-F monism (Russellian monism, or panprotopsychism). It discusses the pros and cons of each, suggesting that all three have significant attractions and that none has fatal flaws.
Janet Levin
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195171655
- eISBN:
- 9780199871339
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter presents a version of the phenomenal concept strategy based on a limited defense of the “demonstrative account” of phenomenal concepts. In this account, phenomenal concepts pick out ...
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This chapter presents a version of the phenomenal concept strategy based on a limited defense of the “demonstrative account” of phenomenal concepts. In this account, phenomenal concepts pick out their referents directly, much like demonstratives, without mediation by any mode of presentation. It is argued that this shows that many type-B materialists appeal to this account to help explain why there is an epistemic gap but no metaphysical gap, and that the account can meet objections present elsewhere. It is further argued that recent emendations to the account, including those by Katalin Balog, Block, Papineau, and Levine, concede too much to the antiphysicalists while accomplishing too little. Demonstrative theorists are urged to return to their roots.Less
This chapter presents a version of the phenomenal concept strategy based on a limited defense of the “demonstrative account” of phenomenal concepts. In this account, phenomenal concepts pick out their referents directly, much like demonstratives, without mediation by any mode of presentation. It is argued that this shows that many type-B materialists appeal to this account to help explain why there is an epistemic gap but no metaphysical gap, and that the account can meet objections present elsewhere. It is further argued that recent emendations to the account, including those by Katalin Balog, Block, Papineau, and Levine, concede too much to the antiphysicalists while accomplishing too little. Demonstrative theorists are urged to return to their roots.
Daniel Dennett
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195171655
- eISBN:
- 9780199871339
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter further develops a line of argument Daniel Dennett presented in his 1991 book, Consciousness Explained, where he argued that we should reject the intuition that Mary gains knowledge when ...
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This chapter further develops a line of argument Daniel Dennett presented in his 1991 book, Consciousness Explained, where he argued that we should reject the intuition that Mary gains knowledge when she leaves the room. In his view, this intuition derives from a failure to appreciate the implications of knowing all the physical facts. Dennet gives a more detailed account of his case. Specifically, he (1) criticizes attempts to defend the intuition; (2) devises variations on the Mary case to illustrate how a deduction from physical information of what it's like to see in color might actually proceed; and (3) defends his arguments against objections. He affirmatively answers the question: could a proper understanding of phenomenal concepts/knowledge show that there is or is not an epistemic gap? He argues that a proper understanding of phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge helps to show that there is no epistemic gap.Less
This chapter further develops a line of argument Daniel Dennett presented in his 1991 book, Consciousness Explained, where he argued that we should reject the intuition that Mary gains knowledge when she leaves the room. In his view, this intuition derives from a failure to appreciate the implications of knowing all the physical facts. Dennet gives a more detailed account of his case. Specifically, he (1) criticizes attempts to defend the intuition; (2) devises variations on the Mary case to illustrate how a deduction from physical information of what it's like to see in color might actually proceed; and (3) defends his arguments against objections. He affirmatively answers the question: could a proper understanding of phenomenal concepts/knowledge show that there is or is not an epistemic gap? He argues that a proper understanding of phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge helps to show that there is no epistemic gap.
Laurence Nemirow
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195171655
- eISBN:
- 9780199871339
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter focuses on the objective grounds for and against the ability hypothesis (AH), which was developed as a response to the Knowledge Argument (KA) — a purported proof of the existence of ...
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This chapter focuses on the objective grounds for and against the ability hypothesis (AH), which was developed as a response to the Knowledge Argument (KA) — a purported proof of the existence of “phenomenal information”. It argues that while KA capitalizes on the mysticism inspired by “So this is what it's like” and embraces the existence of propositional knowledge that cannot be put into words, AH provides a more worldly account that explains both the cognitive role of knowing what it's like and its essential connection with firsthand experience. This approach engenders almost religious objection. But the test of a philosophical theory is not the fervor of the criticism it engenders, but the strength of the available rejoinders; and AH proves to be reasonably resilient to assault.Less
This chapter focuses on the objective grounds for and against the ability hypothesis (AH), which was developed as a response to the Knowledge Argument (KA) — a purported proof of the existence of “phenomenal information”. It argues that while KA capitalizes on the mysticism inspired by “So this is what it's like” and embraces the existence of propositional knowledge that cannot be put into words, AH provides a more worldly account that explains both the cognitive role of knowing what it's like and its essential connection with firsthand experience. This approach engenders almost religious objection. But the test of a philosophical theory is not the fervor of the criticism it engenders, but the strength of the available rejoinders; and AH proves to be reasonably resilient to assault.