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Consciousness and Its Place in Nature

David J. Chalmers

in The Character of Consciousness

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780195311105
eISBN:
9780199870851
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter starts by presenting the central arguments against materialism, which involve establishing an epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal, and moves from there to an ... More


 What Is a Phenomenal Concept?

Janet Levin

in Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195171655
eISBN:
9780199871339
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter presents a version of the phenomenal concept strategy based on a limited defense of the “demonstrative account” of phenomenal concepts. In this account, phenomenal concepts pick out ... More


 What RoboMary Knows

Daniel Dennett

in Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195171655
eISBN:
9780199871339
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter further develops a line of argument Daniel Dennett presented in his 1991 book, Consciousness Explained, where he argued that we should reject the intuition that Mary gains knowledge when ... More


 So This Is What It's Like: A Defense of the Ability Hypothesis

Laurence Nemirow

in Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195171655
eISBN:
9780199871339
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter focuses on the objective grounds for and against the ability hypothesis (AH), which was developed as a response to the Knowledge Argument (KA) — a purported proof of the existence of ... More


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