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Linguistic Issues

Michael Blome-Tillmann

in Knowledge and Presuppositions

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
August 2014
ISBN:
9780199686087
eISBN:
9780191766046
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686087.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter discusses four objections to ‘generic’ or ‘bare’ epistemic contextualism. According to the Semantic Blindness Objection, contextualism is committed to an implausible error-theory—namely, ... More


Knowledge and Presuppositions

Michael Blome-Tillmann

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
August 2014
ISBN:
9780199686087
eISBN:
9780191766046
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686087.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This book develops a novel account of epistemic contextualism based on the idea that pragmatic presuppositions play a central role in the semantics of knowledge attributions. According to the main ... More


The Variability of Know(s)-that Judgments

Jody Azzouni

in Attributing Knowledge: What It Means to Know Something

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
October 2020
ISBN:
9780197508817
eISBN:
9780197508848
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The usage evidence—various scenarios that realistically depict where and when we attribute knowledge to ourselves and others—shows that all the alternatives (epistemic contextualism, ... More


Epistemic Contextualism: A Defense

Peter Baumann

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
November 2016
ISBN:
9780198754312
eISBN:
9780191815980
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198754312.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This book develops and defends a version of epistemic contextualism, that is, of the view that the truth conditions or the meaning of knowledge attributions of the form “S knows that p” can vary with ... More


Knowledge and Presuppositions

Michael Blome-Tillmann

in Knowledge and Presuppositions

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
August 2014
ISBN:
9780199686087
eISBN:
9780191766046
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686087.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter introduces the author’s account of the semantics of ‘knowledge’ attributions: Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism (PEC), according to which the content of ‘knows’ in a context C is ... More


Knowledge and Conclusive Evidence

David Hemp

in Knowledge and Skepticism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262014083
eISBN:
9780262265782
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262014083.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter uses recent work on epistemic contextualism to defend a version of Dretske’s claim that evidence must be conclusive when it is used as the basis of knowledge. Advocates of epistemic ... More


Introduction

Michael Blome-Tillmann

in Knowledge and Presuppositions

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
August 2014
ISBN:
9780199686087
eISBN:
9780191766046
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686087.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter introduces the main objectives and motivations of the book and offers a detailed outline of subsequent chapters. It describes the structure of the book, which begins by developing ... More


The Sceptical Puzzle

Michael Blome-Tillmann

in Knowledge and Presuppositions

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
August 2014
ISBN:
9780199686087
eISBN:
9780191766046
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686087.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapter 2 provides an in-depth discussion of sceptical puzzles. More specifically, Chapter 2 argues that the author’s approach to the semantics of ‘knows’ is explanatorily superior to more standard ... More


Objections and Replies

Michael Blome-Tillmann

in Knowledge and Presuppositions

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
August 2014
ISBN:
9780199686087
eISBN:
9780191766046
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686087.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter discusses six objections to PEC: that (i) PEC is troubled by the fact that ‘knowledge’-attributions have semantic values in ‘solitary contexts’; (ii) PEC makes it too easy to satisfy ... More


Further Puzzles

Michael Blome-Tillmann

in Knowledge and Presuppositions

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
August 2014
ISBN:
9780199686087
eISBN:
9780191766046
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686087.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter explores further explanatory virtues of PEC. More specifically, this chapter argues that PEC can handle Gettier examples elegantly and that it offers a solution to lottery cases by ... More


Skepticism

Sarah Moss

in Probabilistic Knowledge

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
March 2018
ISBN:
9780198792154
eISBN:
9780191861260
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198792154.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

Accepting probabilistic knowledge gives rise to a difficult puzzle: how can Smith know that it is at least .6 likely that Jones smokes, when he is happy to admit that there is a significant chance ... More


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