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Justification without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism

Michael Bergmann

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780199275748
eISBN:
9780191603907
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199275742.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence, or perhaps it must be reliably formed, ... More


Epistemic Circularity

Michael Bergmann

in Justification without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780199275748
eISBN:
9780191603907
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199275742.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

One prominent objection to externalism is that it commits its adherents to approving of epistemic circularity. This chapter explains and then responds to this objection by giving two arguments for ... More


Epistemic Circularity

Ernest Sosa

in Knowing Full Well

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780691143972
eISBN:
9781400836918
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691143972.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter defends the epistemic circularity involved in meta-aptness and thereby in the full aptness of knowing full well. It begins by explaining two forms of bootstrapping: the inference from ... More


Transcendental and Circular Reasoning *

Ernest Sosa

in The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Reflections on the Thought of Barry Stroud

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780195381658
eISBN:
9780199918317
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381658.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, General, History of Philosophy

Epistemic circularity is discussed in four sections:1. Two forms of seemingly bad bootstrapping are explained. 2. Bootstrapping to the reliability of a competence that is not reason-involving also ... More


Epistemic Self-Trust and the Consensus Gentium Argument

Linda Zagzebski

in Evidence and Religious Belief

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199603718
eISBN:
9780191729287
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603718.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Religion

This chapter argues that epistemic self-trust is more basic than what we take to be reasons for belief, and that consistent self-trust commits us to trust in others. Epistemic self-trust is ... More


Inferential Knowledge

José L. Zalabardo

in Scepticism and Reliable Belief

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199656073
eISBN:
9780191742132
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656073.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

This chapter addresses the following question: assuming that E provides adequate support for H, as explicated in Chapter 4, how would a subject have to be related to E and to the relationship between ... More


The Epistemology of Silence

Sanford C. Goldberg

in Social Epistemology

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199577477
eISBN:
9780191595189
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

Epistemic disagreement is disagreement over epistemic principles, or principles concerning the reliability and extent of our epistemic methods. This chapter argues that disagreement over this sort ... More


Descartes and Virtue Epistemology 1

Ernest Sosa

in Reason, Metaphysics, and Mind: New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199766864
eISBN:
9780199932184
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199766864.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter aims to provide an account of Descartes's project in the Meditations that will fit various passages in the text that are incompatible with earlier interpretations. It emerges that ... More


Easy Knowledge and Epistemic Circularity

Michael Bergmann

in Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
August 2021
ISBN:
9780192898487
eISBN:
9780191924767
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter argues that the commonsense intuitionist particularist response to radical skepticism laid out in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight does not fall prey to the Problem of Easy Knowledge, ... More


Epistemic Intuition and Underdetermination

Michael Bergmann

in Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
August 2021
ISBN:
9780192898487
eISBN:
9780191924767
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

After briefly considering (in Section 1) the self-undermining worry that arguments for skepticism about epistemic intuition themselves rely on epistemic intuition, this chapter responds to ... More


Epistemic Circularity and Virtuous Coherence

Ram Neta

in Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
March 2016
ISBN:
9780198746942
eISBN:
9780191809156
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746942.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

In the final chapter of Knowing Full Well, Ernest Sosa argues that his virtue epistemology can solve the problem of epistemic circularity. This chapter argues that his solution is unsuccessful, ... More


Extended Circularity: A New Puzzle for Extended Cognition

J. Adam Carter and Jesper Kallestrup

in Extended Epistemology

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780198769811
eISBN:
9780191822643
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198769811.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

Mainstream epistemology has typically presumed a traditional picture of the metaphysics of mind, whereby cognitive processes (e.g., memory storage and retrieval) play out within the bounds of skull ... More


Cartesian Skepticism, Content Externalism, and Self‐Knowledge

Anthony Brueckner

in Essays on Skepticism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199585861
eISBN:
9780191595332
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585861.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter provides a rather more informal treatment of the Putnamian anti-sceptical landscape and represents the author's current thinking on the matter.


The Problem of Hijacked Experience

Susanna Siegel

in The Rationality of Perception

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
February 2017
ISBN:
9780198797081
eISBN:
9780191844348
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198797081.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Jill suspects that Jack is angry at her. But she doesn’t know that her suspicion will affect the way Jack looks when she sees him. If Jill’s suspicion that Jack is angry makes him appear angry, does ... More


A Puzzle

Eli Alshanetsky

in Articulating a Thought

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
April 2020
ISBN:
9780198785880
eISBN:
9780191881411
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198785880.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The chapter introduces a new puzzle—albeit one that is reminiscent of Meno’s famous puzzle about investigation. The puzzle that Plato formulates challenges the possibility of inquiry in general, ... More


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