Susan Haack
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195128925
- eISBN:
- 9780199833764
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195128923.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Addresses the relation between epistemic and moral duty. Argues against what the writer calls the special case thesis, according to which epistemic appraisal is merely an instance of moral appraisal. ...
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Addresses the relation between epistemic and moral duty. Argues against what the writer calls the special case thesis, according to which epistemic appraisal is merely an instance of moral appraisal. Argues also against the correlation thesis, which asserts that the appropriateness of a positive (negative) epistemic appraisal entails the appropriateness of a positive (negative) moral appraisal. Accepts, however, the overlap thesis, according to which some epistemically unjustified beliefs deserve an unfavorable moral appraisal. Regarding the Clifford‐James debate, argues that it is always epistemically wrong, but not always morally wrong, to believe on the basis of insufficient evidence.Less
Addresses the relation between epistemic and moral duty. Argues against what the writer calls the special case thesis, according to which epistemic appraisal is merely an instance of moral appraisal. Argues also against the correlation thesis, which asserts that the appropriateness of a positive (negative) epistemic appraisal entails the appropriateness of a positive (negative) moral appraisal. Accepts, however, the overlap thesis, according to which some epistemically unjustified beliefs deserve an unfavorable moral appraisal. Regarding the Clifford‐James debate, argues that it is always epistemically wrong, but not always morally wrong, to believe on the basis of insufficient evidence.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199812875
- eISBN:
- 9780199933150
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812875.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This chapter summarizes social epistemology and its taxonomies. It presents a wider range of measures of epistemic appraisal, as well as a framework that classifies the varieties of social ...
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This chapter summarizes social epistemology and its taxonomies. It presents a wider range of measures of epistemic appraisal, as well as a framework that classifies the varieties of social epistemology in terms of different “actors” that are also the players of focal interest. The chapter shows that social epistemology is prepared to study individual doxastic agents who “choose” among other doxastic attitudes toward a proposition. The chapter also determines that social epistemology can imagine the existence of collective agents and can study social systems that house institutions and relationship patterns.Less
This chapter summarizes social epistemology and its taxonomies. It presents a wider range of measures of epistemic appraisal, as well as a framework that classifies the varieties of social epistemology in terms of different “actors” that are also the players of focal interest. The chapter shows that social epistemology is prepared to study individual doxastic agents who “choose” among other doxastic attitudes toward a proposition. The chapter also determines that social epistemology can imagine the existence of collective agents and can study social systems that house institutions and relationship patterns.
Alan Millar, Adrian Haddock, and Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199231188
- eISBN:
- 9780191710827
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The themes of the book—the value of knowledge and epistemic appraisal broadly conceived—are introduced in this chapter. The Meno problem is explained and related to the swamping problem as discussed ...
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The themes of the book—the value of knowledge and epistemic appraisal broadly conceived—are introduced in this chapter. The Meno problem is explained and related to the swamping problem as discussed by Jonathan Kvanvig. The stance of virtue epistemologists is outlined. This is followed by a brief discussion of the role of truth in epistemic appraisal. The remainder of the introduction summarises the contributions to the book.Less
The themes of the book—the value of knowledge and epistemic appraisal broadly conceived—are introduced in this chapter. The Meno problem is explained and related to the swamping problem as discussed by Jonathan Kvanvig. The stance of virtue epistemologists is outlined. This is followed by a brief discussion of the role of truth in epistemic appraisal. The remainder of the introduction summarises the contributions to the book.
Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199231188
- eISBN:
- 9780191710827
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book contains a collection of chapters on value in epistemology. Two themes loom large. One is about the value of knowledge. There are problems deriving from Plato's Meno concerning whether ...
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This book contains a collection of chapters on value in epistemology. Two themes loom large. One is about the value of knowledge. There are problems deriving from Plato's Meno concerning whether knowledge is more valuable than states implicating true belief but falling short of knowledge. The other theme is about epistemic value in a broad sense. Here the central issue is how to make sense of epistemic appraisal conceived broadly to include evaluation of beliefs with respect to whether they are, for instance, justified, or formed through methods or processes that reliably yield true beliefs. A common approach is to think of truth as the end for the sake of which we value a belief being justifiably or reliably formed. The themes are related. We might hope to explain why knowledge is valuable in terms of the value we place on truth. Yet an interest in epistemic appraisal can lead in other directions. For instance, it can prompt enquiry into why we should value truth, how the goal of truth should be conceived, and why, if at all, we should think of truth as the goal of enquiry. All of these issues are represented in this book.Less
This book contains a collection of chapters on value in epistemology. Two themes loom large. One is about the value of knowledge. There are problems deriving from Plato's Meno concerning whether knowledge is more valuable than states implicating true belief but falling short of knowledge. The other theme is about epistemic value in a broad sense. Here the central issue is how to make sense of epistemic appraisal conceived broadly to include evaluation of beliefs with respect to whether they are, for instance, justified, or formed through methods or processes that reliably yield true beliefs. A common approach is to think of truth as the end for the sake of which we value a belief being justifiably or reliably formed. The themes are related. We might hope to explain why knowledge is valuable in terms of the value we place on truth. Yet an interest in epistemic appraisal can lead in other directions. For instance, it can prompt enquiry into why we should value truth, how the goal of truth should be conceived, and why, if at all, we should think of truth as the goal of enquiry. All of these issues are represented in this book.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198716419
- eISBN:
- 9780191785054
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716419.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter considers what is being evaluated when we are engaged in epistemically normative judgments. The standard answer is that it is beliefs and other cognitive states. This standard answer is ...
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This chapter considers what is being evaluated when we are engaged in epistemically normative judgments. The standard answer is that it is beliefs and other cognitive states. This standard answer is criticized, and an alternative developed. The alternative view claims that it is propositional contents which are evaluated. This answer is then explained and extended to the topic of the defeasible nature of epistemic appraisal.Less
This chapter considers what is being evaluated when we are engaged in epistemically normative judgments. The standard answer is that it is beliefs and other cognitive states. This standard answer is criticized, and an alternative developed. The alternative view claims that it is propositional contents which are evaluated. This answer is then explained and extended to the topic of the defeasible nature of epistemic appraisal.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198716419
- eISBN:
- 9780191785054
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716419.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This work arises out of a dilemma for any theory of rationality. Any such theory begins with an account of natural rationality, the kind of response to the environment that we share with the beasts. ...
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This work arises out of a dilemma for any theory of rationality. Any such theory begins with an account of natural rationality, the kind of response to the environment that we share with the beasts. Once such an account is developed, one which makes understandable why some beliefs are more fitting in a given circumstance than other beliefs, there is still the possibility of the organism in question reflecting on the situation in question and coming to the conclusion that a different belief is better in those circumstances. Such an organism may even engage in cognitive training, so that believing something else becomes a habit. If all we have is a theory of natural rationality, we must conclude that such an organism is believing irrationally, in spite of following the light of reason as best it can. In order to avoid this conclusion, a theory of rationality that accommodates both the beastly dimension as well as the reflective dimension is needed.Less
This work arises out of a dilemma for any theory of rationality. Any such theory begins with an account of natural rationality, the kind of response to the environment that we share with the beasts. Once such an account is developed, one which makes understandable why some beliefs are more fitting in a given circumstance than other beliefs, there is still the possibility of the organism in question reflecting on the situation in question and coming to the conclusion that a different belief is better in those circumstances. Such an organism may even engage in cognitive training, so that believing something else becomes a habit. If all we have is a theory of natural rationality, we must conclude that such an organism is believing irrationally, in spite of following the light of reason as best it can. In order to avoid this conclusion, a theory of rationality that accommodates both the beastly dimension as well as the reflective dimension is needed.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198716419
- eISBN:
- 9780191785054
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716419.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This introduction explains the scope of the project and its motivation. The motivation arises because of the dilemma faced by any theory of rationality, the dilemma of conflating rationality for the ...
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This introduction explains the scope of the project and its motivation. The motivation arises because of the dilemma faced by any theory of rationality, the dilemma of conflating rationality for the beastly dimension with that of the reflective dimension. The scope of the project is then delineated in terms of a methodology that answers to value-driven issues, rather than ordinary language. The outline for the project is then presented, explaining what each chapter will accomplish.Less
This introduction explains the scope of the project and its motivation. The motivation arises because of the dilemma faced by any theory of rationality, the dilemma of conflating rationality for the beastly dimension with that of the reflective dimension. The scope of the project is then delineated in terms of a methodology that answers to value-driven issues, rather than ordinary language. The outline for the project is then presented, explaining what each chapter will accomplish.
