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 Problems of Causal Redundancy

Amie L. Thomasson

in Ordinary Objects

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780195319910
eISBN:
9780199869602
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195319910.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Causal redundancy arguments allege that all the causal work attributed to ordinary macroscopic objects is really performed (jointly) by their microscopic parts, making ordinary objects epiphenomenal. ... More


The Automaticity Juggernaut—or, Are We Automatons After All?

John F Kihlstrom

in Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780195189636
eISBN:
9780199868605
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189636.003.0008
Subject:
Psychology, Social Psychology

The distinction between automatic and controlled cognitive processes was imported into social psychology, and formed the basis for a new generation of “dual-process” theories of social cognition and ... More


Could Volitions Be Epiphenomenal?

E. J. Lowe

in Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199217144
eISBN:
9780191712418
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217144.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter looks at the claims of some philosophers and philosophically-minded psychologists that volitions or acts of will are merely epiphenomenal, in the sense that they do not actually play the ... More


Mind and Mentality

John Heil

in The Universe As We Find It

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199596201
eISBN:
9780191741876
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596201.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General

The mental–physical distinction is scrutinized, and the possibility (defended by Spinoza and by Davidson) that the distinction is not a ‘real distinction’, but one of conception only, is defended. ... More


Emergence

Jonardon Ganeri

in The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199652365
eISBN:
9780191740718
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652365.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, History of Philosophy

This chapter distinguishes between emergentist and epiphenomenalist strands in early Cārvāka theory, and demonstrates that Cārvāka emergentists are committed to supervenience. Emergentism seeks ... More


Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind

Jaegwon Kim

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199585878
eISBN:
9780191595349
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585878.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This book is a collection of 14 essays; 11 of these have been previously published and three are new. All but one of them have been written since 1993 when my essay collection Supervenience and Mind ... More


Can Supervenience and “Non‐Strict” Laws Save Anomalous Monism?

Jaegwon Kim

in Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199585878
eISBN:
9780191595349
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585878.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

“Can Supervenience and ‘Non‐Strict’ Laws Save Anomalous Monism?” is a reply to Donald Davidson's defense of his anomalous monism against the charge that it leads to epiphenomenalism. In “Thinking ... More


The Self‐Consciousness Argument: Functionalism and the Corruption of Content

George Bealer

in The Waning of Materialism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199556182
eISBN:
9780191721014
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter targets functionalism as the most cogent form of contemporary materialism. In particular, it takes aim at ‘ontic’ or reductive functionalism: a theory that attempts to specify the ... More


Cause and Essence

Stephen Yablo

in Things: Papers on Objects, Events, and Properties

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199266487
eISBN:
9780191594274
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266487.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

Some essential properties are of course causal, as it is essential to footprints to have been caused by feet. But this chapter is less in causation's role in essence than the reverse: the bearing a ... More


Nietzsche on the Will: An Analysis of BGE 19

Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick

in Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199231560
eISBN:
9780191716119
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231560.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, General

Nietzsche is commonly thought to endorse a version of naturalism that debunks the traditional conception of the will; he is thought to deny that willing brings about or causes actions. BGE 19 is ... More


Nietzsche's Theory of the Will *

Brian Leiter

in Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199231560
eISBN:
9780191716119
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231560.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This chapter offers a philosophical reconstruction of Nietzsche's theory of the will, focusing on: (i) Nietzsche's account of the phenomenology of ‘willing’ an action, the experience we have which ... More


Zombies and Minimal Physicalism

Robert Kirk

in Zombies and Consciousness

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780199285488
eISBN:
9780191603150
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199285489.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Epiphenomenalism accepts the causal closure of the physical, hence the possibility of zombies. But it is argued, via consideration of the ‘redescription thesis’, that physicalism involves commitment ... More


Zapping the Zombie Idea

Robert Kirk

in Zombies and Consciousness

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780199285488
eISBN:
9780191603150
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199285489.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Although the zombie idea seems to fit in with some ‘natural and plain’ intuitions (Chalmers), it conflicts with others. Reinforced by the ‘jacket fallacy’, it both feeds on and feeds an incoherent ... More


Raw Feeling and the Intelligibility Gap

Robert Kirk

in Raw Feeling: A philosophical account of the essence of consciousness

Published in print:
1996
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198236795
eISBN:
9780191679353
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236795.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter seeks to justify the contention that the notion of raw feeling is sound. It also makes clear what the intelligibility gap is. Another aim — the main one — is to develop solutions to the ... More


Purposes

Richard Swinburne

in The Evolution of the Soul

Published in print:
1997
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198236986
eISBN:
9780191598593
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198236980.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Intentional actions consist in agents purposing, that is ‘trying’, to bring about effects (where ‘trying’ carries no implication of difficulty or failure) or allowing some effect to occur. Purposing ... More


“All in My Brain” Materialism

Joseph Levine

in Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195132359
eISBN:
9780199833375
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195132351.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The doctrine of materialism, or physicalism, is articulated and defended, based on the causal role of conscious states. Three objections are dealt with: epiphenomenalism, the explanatory exclusion ... More


An Argument for the Identity Theory

David Lewis

in Philosophical Papers Volume I

Published in print:
1983
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195032048
eISBN:
9780199833382
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195032047.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, General

Lewis offers a functionalist argument for the type‐type psychophysical identity theory, according to which, as a matter of fact, mental experiences are type‐identical with certain neuro‐chemical ... More


Epiphenomenalism and Eliminativism

Trenton Merricks

in Objects and Persons

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199245369
eISBN:
9780191598036
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199245363.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I argue that anything a baseball causes—if baseballs exist—is also caused by the baseball's atoms working in concert. Moreover, a baseball is ‘causally irrelevant’ to what its atoms cause. These two ... More


Enter qualia

Jeffrey Gray

in Consciousness: Creeping up on the hard problem

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
April 2010
ISBN:
9780198520917
eISBN:
9780191584916
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198520917.003.0006
Subject:
Psychology, Cognitive Psychology

This chapter begins with a discussion of the heart of the problem of consciousness: qualia. It explores animal consciousness and shows that animals, mammals in particular, have qualia, which rules ... More


Are agent-causal powers reducible to microproperties?

Erasmus Mayr

in Understanding Human Agency

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199606214
eISBN:
9780191731631
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606214.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Even if powers are not reducible to non-power properties, still a human agent's abilities to act might be reducible to microproperties, which would leave the agent himself devoid of a truly causal ... More


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