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Argues that excessive concern with environmental security at the national level obfuscates necessary attention to the plurality of environmental security concerns at the micro‐level at which Hobbesian competition is actually conducted. An environmental policy framework that reduces plurality will merely serve to destroy the network of trust and cooperation that needs to operate at the micro‐level, and upon which macro‐level security architectures are ultimately based. To avoid this, it is necessary to devise an anti‐reductionist approach based on two objectives: first, to dismantle the ‘realist’ model of international relations (and of security generally) that focuses on states as unitary actors in sole occupation of the policy stage; second, to introduce a more comprehensive concept of security as a spectrum of interlocking entities, from the macro‐ to the micro‐level, each requiring the development and consolidation of trust relationships. Taken together, these objectives imply that environmental security be considered as a mainstream component of a stable international order and not as a mere sideshow. The chapter concludes with an analysis of four behavioural styles, which form a key cultural aspect of the micro‐level dimension of anti‐reductionism–hierarchist, individualist, egalitarian, and fatalist. Each of these implies a different approach to self‐organization, a different sort of social solidarity, and a different set of expectations from environmental security.

This chapter examines security’s place at the heart of international relations theory. The chapter also situates CIM at the nexus of complementary discourses. On the one hand, recent decades have seen a growing emphasis on the securitization of the environment and climate change. Concomitantly, on the other hand, there has been a gradual injection of security imperatives into the interdiction of immigration. Climate-induced migration bridges and knits together these discourses to provide a new, additional rationale for security officials and electorates anxious about immigration and the impact of climate change. Since most CIM is not directed toward the North Atlantic, the political reaction serves an ancillary purpose as part of anti-immigration efforts.

The phrase ‘creeping jurisdiction’ has been applied by a number of publicists to the gradual extension of state jurisdiction offshore in the law of the sea through the course of the 20th century. Under the current United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), and confirmed by international practice, the territorial sea is 12 nautical miles wide. It might have been thought that jurisdictional creep had ended with the conclusion of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) in 1982. This chapter examines whether contemporary practice may lead to a further creeping of jurisdiction, not in a further grab for resources, but in an effort by states to provide themselves with greater security from threats from the sea. It examines contemporary and emerging practice in respect of maritime security, and discusses whether seeking greater control over security — which covers military security and environmental security — is the next generation of jurisdictional creep. Beyond the territorial sea, the LOSC also confirms that there is freedom of navigation for all vessels. This is essentially applicable for the exclusive economic zone and high seas areas beyond it.

By examining the current state of NATO's science and environmental initiatives, this chapter also draws some conclusions about the distinctiveness of its sponsorship in the last sixty years of its existence. The chapter examines in particular how NATO's changes in the new millennium have catered to a comprehensive revision of its sponsorship strategy; partly as a result of the adoption of new strategic doctrines. The most striking consequence of these transitions is a new emphasis on using scientific patronage in the relationship with prospective members of the alliance and a reduced emphasis on the study of the natural environment.

This chapter looks at the possible futures associated with climate change, in particular the ecological crisis it will bring for many people around the planet. It does this with a special focus on the political challenges that will accompany this crisis, especially as they relate to democratic politics. It asks how states will manage, and in some cases even survive, in the face of a very serious or catastrophic social-ecological crisis. Toward this end, it examines the long history of a crisis orientation in environmentalism generally, with an emphasis on climate change as the example par excellence. It then examines the worst-case scenarios, including the concept of “fortress world.” It concludes with a discussion of environmental security, the role of the military during the crisis, and the politics of “survivalism.”

This chapter lays out the theoretical and practical underpinnings of the term “environmental diplomacy.” Several new strands of scholarship have emerged that are introduced briefly. These include: environmental security, global environmental governance, and environmental peace-building. This chapter frames the goals of “environmental diplomacy” as a blending of these sets of ideas and as a means of achieving practical agreements that can improve environmental performance, resolve environmental conflicts, and where possible lead to improved international relations given the “global commons” quality of environmental impacts. In particular, this chapter lays out the salience of climate change and argues that the broader environmental diplomatic agenda should not be exclusively viewed through the lens of climatic change.

Diverse studies of traffic, baseball, crime-temperature relationships, and others, support the hypothesis that heat breeds violence at a time when, in the US, violent crime is on the wane. Droughts and deluges lead to environmental insecurity by many mechanisms as reflected in an examination of social conflicts in Africa. Rising food prices also foster riots. Climate change is an important factor that has led to societal collapse. Other weather and climate changes, such as those associated with El Niño, are also linked to societal disruption. These relationships have contributed to the current violence in the Middle East.

As noted in the Introduction, it is frequently assumed that the costs of collective action between political jurisdictions are lower when they are part of the same country. A web of shared institutions and relationships, the thinking goes, helps to lower these costs relative to the international level, where cooperation is likely to be rarer and costlier. But, as this chapter explains, where political power is extensively decentralized, considerable constraints are placed on interjurisdictional collective action. In particular, because it distributes power between different levels of government, decentralization exacerbates the interjurisdictional and intersectoral coordination problems that are inherent to water resource management. This chapter explains how existing institutions often fail to prevent and resolve interjurisdictional water conflicts. It proceeds in three sections. The first section sets the stage for this discussion by exploring in greater detail the relationship between shared institutions and conflict potential, particularly in relation to other proposed sources of water conflict like geography and scarcity. The second section explains why decentralization creates specific barriers to interjurisdictional collective action, especially at the river basin scale. In particular, bureaucratic fragmentation, electoral incentives, and information asymmetries often create disincentives to establish institutional structures for river basin management. The third section, finally, explains why, as a result, collective action in shared river basins is often ad hoc and confined to relatively simple issues like point-source pollution control, rather than more complex and contentious issues like allocation. In combination, these challenges explain why existing institutional mechanisms so often fail to prevent interjurisdictional water conflicts from arising and to resolve them once they begin. This primary purpose of this chapter is to explore the institutional dimensions of subnational hydropolitics and in particular the role of decentralization. Doing so requires first understanding how institutions influence conflict and cooperation over shared water resources, especially in contrast to factors like geography and scarcity. This section accordingly discusses the two primary theoretical traditions concerning the causes of water conflict.