Srinivasa Rao
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198079811
- eISBN:
- 9780199081707
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198079811.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Traditional Advaita holds that we experience false entities as is evident from rope-snake illusion. This chapter argues this thesis to be wrong on the ground that since the false snake is merely an ...
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Traditional Advaita holds that we experience false entities as is evident from rope-snake illusion. This chapter argues this thesis to be wrong on the ground that since the false snake is merely an imagined entity and a construction of our thought, it can never be an object of experience; it can only be regarded as an object of thought. Likewise, if the world is actually experienced by us, it has to be real and not false. Conversely, if it is false, it cannot be experienced by us. The very idea that something which is false is also experienced by us is absurd. Therefore the claim that the world is false and it is sublated upon our intuiting the Ultimate Reality should be rejected as wrong, illogical and completely groundless.Less
Traditional Advaita holds that we experience false entities as is evident from rope-snake illusion. This chapter argues this thesis to be wrong on the ground that since the false snake is merely an imagined entity and a construction of our thought, it can never be an object of experience; it can only be regarded as an object of thought. Likewise, if the world is actually experienced by us, it has to be real and not false. Conversely, if it is false, it cannot be experienced by us. The very idea that something which is false is also experienced by us is absurd. Therefore the claim that the world is false and it is sublated upon our intuiting the Ultimate Reality should be rejected as wrong, illogical and completely groundless.
Helen Steward
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250647
- eISBN:
- 9780191681318
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250647.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book puts forward a radical critique of the foundations of contemporary philosophy of mind, arguing that it relies too heavily on insecure assumptions about the nature of some of the sorts of ...
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This book puts forward a radical critique of the foundations of contemporary philosophy of mind, arguing that it relies too heavily on insecure assumptions about the nature of some of the sorts of mental entities it postulates: the nature of events, processes, and states. The book offers an investigation of these three categories, clarifying the distinction between them, and argues specifically that the assumption that states can be treated as particular, event-like entities has been a huge and serious mistake. The book argues that the category of token state should be rejected, and develops an alternative way of understanding those varieties of causal explanation which have sometimes been thought to require an ontology of token states for their elucidation. The book contends that many current theories of mind are rendered unintelligible once it is seen how these explanations really work. A number of prominent features of contemporary philosophy of mind token identity theories, the functionalists conception of causal role, a common form of argument for eliminative materialism, and the structure of the debate about the efficacy of mental content are impugned by the book's arguments. The book concludes that the modern mind-body problem needs to be substantially rethought.Less
This book puts forward a radical critique of the foundations of contemporary philosophy of mind, arguing that it relies too heavily on insecure assumptions about the nature of some of the sorts of mental entities it postulates: the nature of events, processes, and states. The book offers an investigation of these three categories, clarifying the distinction between them, and argues specifically that the assumption that states can be treated as particular, event-like entities has been a huge and serious mistake. The book argues that the category of token state should be rejected, and develops an alternative way of understanding those varieties of causal explanation which have sometimes been thought to require an ontology of token states for their elucidation. The book contends that many current theories of mind are rendered unintelligible once it is seen how these explanations really work. A number of prominent features of contemporary philosophy of mind token identity theories, the functionalists conception of causal role, a common form of argument for eliminative materialism, and the structure of the debate about the efficacy of mental content are impugned by the book's arguments. The book concludes that the modern mind-body problem needs to be substantially rethought.
Andreas Osiander
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780198294511
- eISBN:
- 9780191717048
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198294511.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This book challenges the habit of conventional historiography of taking the ‘essential’ state – a ‘bounded entity’ equipped with a ‘sovereign’ central power — for granted in any period and of not ...
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This book challenges the habit of conventional historiography of taking the ‘essential’ state – a ‘bounded entity’ equipped with a ‘sovereign’ central power — for granted in any period and of not taking period political terminology seriously. It refutes the idea, current both in historiography and in International Relations theory (in particular Realism), that the fundamental nature of ‘international’ politics is historically immutable. Nothing akin to what we call the ‘state’ existed before the 19th century: it is a recent invention and the assumption that it is timeless, necessary for society, is simply part of its legitimating myth. The development over the past three millennia of the political structures of western civilization is shown here to have been a succession of unrepeatable but path-dependent stages. In examining structural change, the book adopts a constructivist approach based on the analysis of period political discourse. This approach both reflects and illuminates the evolution of western political thought: on the one hand, political thought is a vehicle of the political discourse of its period. On the other hand, the assumption that political theory must in any age somehow be centred on the ‘state’ has forced our understanding of it into a straight-jacket: abandoning this assumption permits fresh and unexpected insights into the political thinking of earlier eras. Close attention, however, is also paid to the material constraints and opportunities (e.g., ecological and economic factors, or military technology) impacting on the evolution of society.Less
This book challenges the habit of conventional historiography of taking the ‘essential’ state – a ‘bounded entity’ equipped with a ‘sovereign’ central power — for granted in any period and of not taking period political terminology seriously. It refutes the idea, current both in historiography and in International Relations theory (in particular Realism), that the fundamental nature of ‘international’ politics is historically immutable. Nothing akin to what we call the ‘state’ existed before the 19th century: it is a recent invention and the assumption that it is timeless, necessary for society, is simply part of its legitimating myth. The development over the past three millennia of the political structures of western civilization is shown here to have been a succession of unrepeatable but path-dependent stages. In examining structural change, the book adopts a constructivist approach based on the analysis of period political discourse. This approach both reflects and illuminates the evolution of western political thought: on the one hand, political thought is a vehicle of the political discourse of its period. On the other hand, the assumption that political theory must in any age somehow be centred on the ‘state’ has forced our understanding of it into a straight-jacket: abandoning this assumption permits fresh and unexpected insights into the political thinking of earlier eras. Close attention, however, is also paid to the material constraints and opportunities (e.g., ecological and economic factors, or military technology) impacting on the evolution of society.
John P. Burgess and Gideon Rosen
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250128
- eISBN:
- 9780191597138
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250126.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Numbers and other mathematical objects are exceptional in having no locations in space and time and no causes or effects in the physical world. This makes it difficult to account for the possibility ...
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Numbers and other mathematical objects are exceptional in having no locations in space and time and no causes or effects in the physical world. This makes it difficult to account for the possibility of mathematical knowledge, leading many philosophers to embrace nominalism, the doctrine that there are no abstract entities. It has also led some of them to embark on ambitious projects for interpreting mathematics so as to preserve the subject while eliminating its objects, eliminating so‐called ontological commitment to numbers, sets, and the like. These projects differ considerably in the apparatus they employ, and the spirit in which they are put forward. Some employ synthetic geometry, others modal logic. Some are put forward as revolutionary replacements for existing mathematics and science, others hermeneutic hypotheses about what they have meant all along. We attempt to cut through technicalities that have obscured previous discussions of these projects, and to present concise accounts with minimal prerequisites of a dozen strategies for nominalistic interpretation of mathematics. We also examine critically the aims and claims of such interpretations, suggesting that what they really achieve is something quite different from what the authors of such projects usually assume.Less
Numbers and other mathematical objects are exceptional in having no locations in space and time and no causes or effects in the physical world. This makes it difficult to account for the possibility of mathematical knowledge, leading many philosophers to embrace nominalism, the doctrine that there are no abstract entities. It has also led some of them to embark on ambitious projects for interpreting mathematics so as to preserve the subject while eliminating its objects, eliminating so‐called ontological commitment to numbers, sets, and the like. These projects differ considerably in the apparatus they employ, and the spirit in which they are put forward. Some employ synthetic geometry, others modal logic. Some are put forward as revolutionary replacements for existing mathematics and science, others hermeneutic hypotheses about what they have meant all along. We attempt to cut through technicalities that have obscured previous discussions of these projects, and to present concise accounts with minimal prerequisites of a dozen strategies for nominalistic interpretation of mathematics. We also examine critically the aims and claims of such interpretations, suggesting that what they really achieve is something quite different from what the authors of such projects usually assume.
Nancy Cartwright
- Published in print:
- 1983
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198247043
- eISBN:
- 9780191597152
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198247044.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Nancy Cartwright argues for a novel conception of the role of fundamental scientific laws in modern natural science. If we attend closely to the manner in which theoretical laws figure in the ...
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Nancy Cartwright argues for a novel conception of the role of fundamental scientific laws in modern natural science. If we attend closely to the manner in which theoretical laws figure in the practice of science, we see that despite their great explanatory power these laws do not describe reality. Instead, fundamental laws describe highly idealized objects in models. Thus, the correct account of explanation in science is not the traditional covering law view, but the ‘simulacrum’ account. On this view, explanation is a matter of constructing a model that may employ, but need not be consistent with, a theoretical framework, in which phenomenological laws that are true of the empirical case in question can be derived. Anti‐realism about theoretical laws does not, however, commit one to anti‐realism about theoretical entities. Belief in theoretical entities can be grounded in well‐tested localized causal claims about concrete physical processes, sometimes now called ‘entity realism’. Such causal claims provide the basis for partial realism and they are ineliminable from the practice of explanation and intervention in nature.Less
Nancy Cartwright argues for a novel conception of the role of fundamental scientific laws in modern natural science. If we attend closely to the manner in which theoretical laws figure in the practice of science, we see that despite their great explanatory power these laws do not describe reality. Instead, fundamental laws describe highly idealized objects in models. Thus, the correct account of explanation in science is not the traditional covering law view, but the ‘simulacrum’ account. On this view, explanation is a matter of constructing a model that may employ, but need not be consistent with, a theoretical framework, in which phenomenological laws that are true of the empirical case in question can be derived. Anti‐realism about theoretical laws does not, however, commit one to anti‐realism about theoretical entities. Belief in theoretical entities can be grounded in well‐tested localized causal claims about concrete physical processes, sometimes now called ‘entity realism’. Such causal claims provide the basis for partial realism and they are ineliminable from the practice of explanation and intervention in nature.
Emile van der Zee and Jon Slack (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199260195
- eISBN:
- 9780191717345
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199260195.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics
This book considers how it is possible for people to use directions like above the table or over the city. How does our brain or any other information processing system represent a direction as a ...
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This book considers how it is possible for people to use directions like above the table or over the city. How does our brain or any other information processing system represent a direction as a spatial entity? And how is it possible to link such a representation to language, so that we talk about a direction we have in mind? When we look at or imagine a scene, what entities can be employed for representing a direction, and what are the parts in language that can be used to talk about directions? This book brings together research from linguistics, psychology, philosophy, computer science, anthropology, and neuroscience to answer these intriguing questions. By considering direction representation across different languages and in different information processing systems, this book gives an overview of the main issues in this area.Less
This book considers how it is possible for people to use directions like above the table or over the city. How does our brain or any other information processing system represent a direction as a spatial entity? And how is it possible to link such a representation to language, so that we talk about a direction we have in mind? When we look at or imagine a scene, what entities can be employed for representing a direction, and what are the parts in language that can be used to talk about directions? This book brings together research from linguistics, psychology, philosophy, computer science, anthropology, and neuroscience to answer these intriguing questions. By considering direction representation across different languages and in different information processing systems, this book gives an overview of the main issues in this area.
Nicholas Jolley
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238195
- eISBN:
- 9780191597824
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238193.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
The concept of an idea plays a central role in seventeenth‐century theories of mind and knowledge. However, philosophers of the period were seriously divided over the nature of ideas. The Light of ...
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The concept of an idea plays a central role in seventeenth‐century theories of mind and knowledge. However, philosophers of the period were seriously divided over the nature of ideas. The Light of the Soul examines the important but neglected debate on this issue between Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes. In reaction to Descartes, Malebranche argues that ideas are not mental but abstract, logical entities. Leibniz in turn replies to Malebranche by reclaiming ideas for psychology. Nicholas Jolley explores the theological dimension of the debate by showing how the three philosophers make use of biblical and patristic teaching. The debate has important implications for such major issues in early modern philosophy as innate ideas, self‐knowledge, scepticism, the mind–body problem, and the creation of the eternal truths. Jolley goes on to consider the relevance of the seventeenth‐century controversy to modern discussions of the relation between logic and psychology.Less
The concept of an idea plays a central role in seventeenth‐century theories of mind and knowledge. However, philosophers of the period were seriously divided over the nature of ideas. The Light of the Soul examines the important but neglected debate on this issue between Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes. In reaction to Descartes, Malebranche argues that ideas are not mental but abstract, logical entities. Leibniz in turn replies to Malebranche by reclaiming ideas for psychology. Nicholas Jolley explores the theological dimension of the debate by showing how the three philosophers make use of biblical and patristic teaching. The debate has important implications for such major issues in early modern philosophy as innate ideas, self‐knowledge, scepticism, the mind–body problem, and the creation of the eternal truths. Jolley goes on to consider the relevance of the seventeenth‐century controversy to modern discussions of the relation between logic and psychology.
Joshua M. Epstein
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691158884
- eISBN:
- 9781400848256
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691158884.001.0001
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Applied Mathematics
This book introduces a new theoretical entity: Agent_Zero. This software individual, or “agent,” is endowed with distinct emotional/affective, cognitive/deliberative, and social modules. Grounded in ...
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This book introduces a new theoretical entity: Agent_Zero. This software individual, or “agent,” is endowed with distinct emotional/affective, cognitive/deliberative, and social modules. Grounded in contemporary neuroscience, these internal components interact to generate observed, often far-from-rational, individual behavior. When multiple agents of this new type move and interact spatially, they collectively generate an astonishing range of dynamics spanning the fields of social conflict, psychology, public health, law, network science, and economics. The book weaves a computational tapestry with threads from Plato, David Hume, Charles Darwin, Ivan Pavlov, Adam Smith, Leo Tolstoy, Karl Marx, William James, and Fyodor Dostoevsky, among others. This transformative synthesis of social philosophy, cognitive neuroscience, and agent-based modeling will fascinate scholars and students of every stripe. Computer programs are provided in the book or available online. This book is a signal departure in what it includes (e.g., a new synthesis of neurally grounded internal modules), what it eschews (e.g., standard behavioral imitation), the phenomena it generates (from genocide to financial panic), and the modeling arsenal it offers the scientific community. For generative social science, this book presents a ground-breaking vision and the tools to realize it.Less
This book introduces a new theoretical entity: Agent_Zero. This software individual, or “agent,” is endowed with distinct emotional/affective, cognitive/deliberative, and social modules. Grounded in contemporary neuroscience, these internal components interact to generate observed, often far-from-rational, individual behavior. When multiple agents of this new type move and interact spatially, they collectively generate an astonishing range of dynamics spanning the fields of social conflict, psychology, public health, law, network science, and economics. The book weaves a computational tapestry with threads from Plato, David Hume, Charles Darwin, Ivan Pavlov, Adam Smith, Leo Tolstoy, Karl Marx, William James, and Fyodor Dostoevsky, among others. This transformative synthesis of social philosophy, cognitive neuroscience, and agent-based modeling will fascinate scholars and students of every stripe. Computer programs are provided in the book or available online. This book is a signal departure in what it includes (e.g., a new synthesis of neurally grounded internal modules), what it eschews (e.g., standard behavioral imitation), the phenomena it generates (from genocide to financial panic), and the modeling arsenal it offers the scientific community. For generative social science, this book presents a ground-breaking vision and the tools to realize it.
Naomi R. Lamoreaux
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199251902
- eISBN:
- 9780191719059
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251902.003.0002
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Business History
This chapter argues that a focus on big business has distorted the understanding of the legal history of the corporation. The relevant context for understanding the evolution of the form must be ...
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This chapter argues that a focus on big business has distorted the understanding of the legal history of the corporation. The relevant context for understanding the evolution of the form must be broadened to include two related but somewhat contradictory trends: first, the democratization of the corporate form of enterprise (that is, its adoption by increasing numbers of small businesses); and second, a growing tendency in the general culture to see enterprises as manifestations of collective action rather than individual initiative. These trends forced courts and policy makers to reconsider the nature of corporations and also created considerable confusion about how corporations differed from the other main organizational form employed by small businesses — partnerships. The end result of this reconsideration was a rigid definition of the two forms that severely limited the contractual freedom of small businesses.Less
This chapter argues that a focus on big business has distorted the understanding of the legal history of the corporation. The relevant context for understanding the evolution of the form must be broadened to include two related but somewhat contradictory trends: first, the democratization of the corporate form of enterprise (that is, its adoption by increasing numbers of small businesses); and second, a growing tendency in the general culture to see enterprises as manifestations of collective action rather than individual initiative. These trends forced courts and policy makers to reconsider the nature of corporations and also created considerable confusion about how corporations differed from the other main organizational form employed by small businesses — partnerships. The end result of this reconsideration was a rigid definition of the two forms that severely limited the contractual freedom of small businesses.
Erik O. Eriksen
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199572519
- eISBN:
- 9780191722400
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572519.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union, Democratization
This chapter addresses the legitimacy problems of the Union and how they can be alleviated. The EU, as every system of domination, is in need of justification, but this may take different forms and ...
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This chapter addresses the legitimacy problems of the Union and how they can be alleviated. The EU, as every system of domination, is in need of justification, but this may take different forms and may refer to different institutional solutions. Three such are outlined, respectively depicting the EU as a problem‐solving entity, as a value‐based community, and as a rights‐based union. As it becomes clear that neither a scaling down of the EU to the form of an international organization, nor a value‐based conception, making the EU into a unified nation state, are viable options, we are left with the third option: the EU as a post‐national, rights‐based union. This chapter shows that this conception is reflected in the constitution‐making process.Less
This chapter addresses the legitimacy problems of the Union and how they can be alleviated. The EU, as every system of domination, is in need of justification, but this may take different forms and may refer to different institutional solutions. Three such are outlined, respectively depicting the EU as a problem‐solving entity, as a value‐based community, and as a rights‐based union. As it becomes clear that neither a scaling down of the EU to the form of an international organization, nor a value‐based conception, making the EU into a unified nation state, are viable options, we are left with the third option: the EU as a post‐national, rights‐based union. This chapter shows that this conception is reflected in the constitution‐making process.
Oisín Tansey
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199561032
- eISBN:
- 9780191721496
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199561032.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Democratization
The exercise of international administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina dates from 1995, when a High Representative of the international community was established to oversee the implementation of the ...
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The exercise of international administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina dates from 1995, when a High Representative of the international community was established to oversee the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. This chapter explores the international and domestic interactions in Bosnia, and highlights in detail how the international presence has combined with local forces to shape the country's political transition. The first section of this chapter provides an overview of the Dayton Agreement itself, and outlines the structure of the international mission in Bosnia. Subsequent sections examine international involvement in three key arenas of political transition, and explore the ways in which international authorities in Bosnia have shaped democratic development and contributed heavily to the development and evolution of Bosnia's complex political regime. The result has been a mode of transition in Bosnia that has at times entailed international and domestic cooperation and consensus, but that has also frequently been marked by international imposition in the face of domestic opposition. Democratic regime-building in Bosnia has been a contested process.Less
The exercise of international administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina dates from 1995, when a High Representative of the international community was established to oversee the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. This chapter explores the international and domestic interactions in Bosnia, and highlights in detail how the international presence has combined with local forces to shape the country's political transition. The first section of this chapter provides an overview of the Dayton Agreement itself, and outlines the structure of the international mission in Bosnia. Subsequent sections examine international involvement in three key arenas of political transition, and explore the ways in which international authorities in Bosnia have shaped democratic development and contributed heavily to the development and evolution of Bosnia's complex political regime. The result has been a mode of transition in Bosnia that has at times entailed international and domestic cooperation and consensus, but that has also frequently been marked by international imposition in the face of domestic opposition. Democratic regime-building in Bosnia has been a contested process.
Sydney Shoemaker
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199214396
- eISBN:
- 9780191706738
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214396.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that there can be coincident entities, numerically different things, having different persistence conditions, that are composed of exactly the same micro-entities. This means that ...
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This chapter argues that there can be coincident entities, numerically different things, having different persistence conditions, that are composed of exactly the same micro-entities. This means that the higher-order properties of such entities do not supervene on, and are not realized by, the ‘thin’ physical properties that are shared by the coincident entities. They are realized by ‘thick’ physical properties, ones individuated by the persistence conditions of the things that have them. The nature of the causal profiles of properties is argued to be incompatible with the four-dimensionalist, perdurance account of the nature of persisting entities. It is argued that these causal profiles provide a basis for saying what it is for a set of microentities to make up a single object.Less
This chapter argues that there can be coincident entities, numerically different things, having different persistence conditions, that are composed of exactly the same micro-entities. This means that the higher-order properties of such entities do not supervene on, and are not realized by, the ‘thin’ physical properties that are shared by the coincident entities. They are realized by ‘thick’ physical properties, ones individuated by the persistence conditions of the things that have them. The nature of the causal profiles of properties is argued to be incompatible with the four-dimensionalist, perdurance account of the nature of persisting entities. It is argued that these causal profiles provide a basis for saying what it is for a set of microentities to make up a single object.
Hidemi Suganami
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198277712
- eISBN:
- 9780191598890
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198277717.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The doctrine of the equality of sovereign states is one of the central postulates in the theory and practice of international law and international relations in the contemporary world. Grotius's ...
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The doctrine of the equality of sovereign states is one of the central postulates in the theory and practice of international law and international relations in the contemporary world. Grotius's major work, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, is consistent with the view that all states have equality before the law. Grotius is less clear that all states have equal capacity for rights, but nothing in his work suggests that he believed in an international caste system that would divide sovereign states into separate classes with varying degrees of capacity for rights. Even those non‐state entities that do not have full sovereignty are nonetheless under the protection of natural law.Less
The doctrine of the equality of sovereign states is one of the central postulates in the theory and practice of international law and international relations in the contemporary world. Grotius's major work, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, is consistent with the view that all states have equality before the law. Grotius is less clear that all states have equal capacity for rights, but nothing in his work suggests that he believed in an international caste system that would divide sovereign states into separate classes with varying degrees of capacity for rights. Even those non‐state entities that do not have full sovereignty are nonetheless under the protection of natural law.
Carol S Dweck and Daniel C Molden
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195189636
- eISBN:
- 9780199868605
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189636.003.0004
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
The nature of free will is a philosophical issue; whether people believe they have it is a psychological one; and whether people actually have it is in the terrain in between. This chapter shows how ...
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The nature of free will is a philosophical issue; whether people believe they have it is a psychological one; and whether people actually have it is in the terrain in between. This chapter shows how people's self-theories — their conceptions of human qualities as fixed or as malleable — create different perceptions and experiences of free will. Interestingly, these different perceptions mirror those of different philosophical traditions. The chapter then shows how self-theories lead people to different psychological solutions for issues allied with free will, such as issues of moral responsibility and blame. How much free will do people actually have? The debate has often turned on whether the physical laws of nature allow for free will. To a psychologist, this seems surprising. Thus, the chapter ends by proposing that the issue of free will may, at least in part, turn on questions of human nature and how best to conceive of it.Less
The nature of free will is a philosophical issue; whether people believe they have it is a psychological one; and whether people actually have it is in the terrain in between. This chapter shows how people's self-theories — their conceptions of human qualities as fixed or as malleable — create different perceptions and experiences of free will. Interestingly, these different perceptions mirror those of different philosophical traditions. The chapter then shows how self-theories lead people to different psychological solutions for issues allied with free will, such as issues of moral responsibility and blame. How much free will do people actually have? The debate has often turned on whether the physical laws of nature allow for free will. To a psychologist, this seems surprising. Thus, the chapter ends by proposing that the issue of free will may, at least in part, turn on questions of human nature and how best to conceive of it.
Julian Dodd
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199284375
- eISBN:
- 9780191713743
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284375.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This is the first of two chapters that examine the ontological nature of types, and thereby shed light on the type/token theory's philosophical commitments. Treating word-types as paradigmatic, the ...
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This is the first of two chapters that examine the ontological nature of types, and thereby shed light on the type/token theory's philosophical commitments. Treating word-types as paradigmatic, the chapter's key theses are the following: (i) pace the views of Eddy Zemach, types are abstract entities (i.e., entities that have no spatial location); (ii) types are unstructured items (i.e. items that lack proper parts); and (iii) following Guy Rohrbaugh, it is argued that types are both modally and temporally inflexible.Less
This is the first of two chapters that examine the ontological nature of types, and thereby shed light on the type/token theory's philosophical commitments. Treating word-types as paradigmatic, the chapter's key theses are the following: (i) pace the views of Eddy Zemach, types are abstract entities (i.e., entities that have no spatial location); (ii) types are unstructured items (i.e. items that lack proper parts); and (iii) following Guy Rohrbaugh, it is argued that types are both modally and temporally inflexible.
Jan J. Koenderink
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197262962
- eISBN:
- 9780191734533
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197262962.003.0011
- Subject:
- Archaeology, Methodology and Techniques
When an observer is faced with a straight photograph, the observer can either look at the image or look into the photograph. This manner of observing photographs presents a difference that is ...
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When an observer is faced with a straight photograph, the observer can either look at the image or look into the photograph. This manner of observing photographs presents a difference that is crucial. In the former case, the observer is aware of the photograph as a physical object in a physical space while in the latter, the observer is aware of the pictorial object in a pictorial space. This chapter focuses on the current understanding of pictorial perception and the structure of pictorial space. Pictorial space is different from physical space in that it does not exist outside of the observer's awareness. It is a thread of consciousness and a purely mental object. In contrast, the photograph as a physical object is a mere planar sheet composed of pigments in a certain simultaneous order. The concepts of pictorial object and scene is not limited to the earlier existence of a physical space that figured casually in the present existence of the photograph. The theory of pictorial space is largely derived from psychophysical data. The measurement of it depends on the idiosyncratic movements of the mental eye. It is purely an ‘intentional entity’ that makes its elusive to physiological methods and susceptible to misconception.Less
When an observer is faced with a straight photograph, the observer can either look at the image or look into the photograph. This manner of observing photographs presents a difference that is crucial. In the former case, the observer is aware of the photograph as a physical object in a physical space while in the latter, the observer is aware of the pictorial object in a pictorial space. This chapter focuses on the current understanding of pictorial perception and the structure of pictorial space. Pictorial space is different from physical space in that it does not exist outside of the observer's awareness. It is a thread of consciousness and a purely mental object. In contrast, the photograph as a physical object is a mere planar sheet composed of pigments in a certain simultaneous order. The concepts of pictorial object and scene is not limited to the earlier existence of a physical space that figured casually in the present existence of the photograph. The theory of pictorial space is largely derived from psychophysical data. The measurement of it depends on the idiosyncratic movements of the mental eye. It is purely an ‘intentional entity’ that makes its elusive to physiological methods and susceptible to misconception.
Ronald W. Langacker
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195331967
- eISBN:
- 9780199868209
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331967.003.0009
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology
Grounding is the grammaticized means of relating the thing profiled by a nominal, or the process profiled by a finite clause, to the ground (the speech event and its participants). As narrowly ...
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Grounding is the grammaticized means of relating the thing profiled by a nominal, or the process profiled by a finite clause, to the ground (the speech event and its participants). As narrowly defined, grounding elements make very fundamental specifications of a basically epistemic nature. Moreover, they construe the ground subjectively—leaving it implicit as the offstage locus of conception—with the profiled entity being the focused, onstage object of conception. Whereas a lexical noun or verb merely names a type of thing or process, a full nominal or finite clause designates and grounds an instance of the type. An instance differs from a type by being thought of as having a particular location in the domain of instantiation, one that distinguishes it from other instances. The profiled instance is not necessarily an actual individual, but may also be a virtual (or fictive) entity confined to a special mental space. A nominal referent is generally identified through a combination of description, which selects a set of eligible candidates, and grounding, which directs attention to a member of this set. Two basic grounding strategies are deixis (abstract pointing) and quantification. The deictic grounding elements—demonstratives and the definite article—are definite: they single out the intended referent independently of the content of the clause containing the nominal. By contrast, with indefinite grounding elements the referent is initially virtual, pending its identification by means of the clausal content (in the case of indefinite articles), or is necessarily virtual (in the case of quantifiers). Clausal grounding is less concerned with identification than with existence, i.e. whether or not an event occurs. For English the basic grounding elements are tense and the modals. The tense opposition present vs. past is a special case of the more schematic value of immediate vs. non-immediate (with respect to the ground). The absence of a modal indicates that the speaker accepts the profiled occurrence as part of the speaker's conception of reality. The presence of a modal indicates that it does not yet have this status, but is still a target for realization. The choice of modal registers the impetus for speaker control, which occurs on either of two levels: effective vs. epistemic control (corresponding to root vs. epistemic modals).Less
Grounding is the grammaticized means of relating the thing profiled by a nominal, or the process profiled by a finite clause, to the ground (the speech event and its participants). As narrowly defined, grounding elements make very fundamental specifications of a basically epistemic nature. Moreover, they construe the ground subjectively—leaving it implicit as the offstage locus of conception—with the profiled entity being the focused, onstage object of conception. Whereas a lexical noun or verb merely names a type of thing or process, a full nominal or finite clause designates and grounds an instance of the type. An instance differs from a type by being thought of as having a particular location in the domain of instantiation, one that distinguishes it from other instances. The profiled instance is not necessarily an actual individual, but may also be a virtual (or fictive) entity confined to a special mental space. A nominal referent is generally identified through a combination of description, which selects a set of eligible candidates, and grounding, which directs attention to a member of this set. Two basic grounding strategies are deixis (abstract pointing) and quantification. The deictic grounding elements—demonstratives and the definite article—are definite: they single out the intended referent independently of the content of the clause containing the nominal. By contrast, with indefinite grounding elements the referent is initially virtual, pending its identification by means of the clausal content (in the case of indefinite articles), or is necessarily virtual (in the case of quantifiers). Clausal grounding is less concerned with identification than with existence, i.e. whether or not an event occurs. For English the basic grounding elements are tense and the modals. The tense opposition present vs. past is a special case of the more schematic value of immediate vs. non-immediate (with respect to the ground). The absence of a modal indicates that the speaker accepts the profiled occurrence as part of the speaker's conception of reality. The presence of a modal indicates that it does not yet have this status, but is still a target for realization. The choice of modal registers the impetus for speaker control, which occurs on either of two levels: effective vs. epistemic control (corresponding to root vs. epistemic modals).
Massimo Poesio
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195331639
- eISBN:
- 9780199867981
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331639.003.0009
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
Reliable techniques were developed to annotate corpora with the information to test several instantiations of Centering, and software that could be used to automatically compute CFs and CB of ...
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Reliable techniques were developed to annotate corpora with the information to test several instantiations of Centering, and software that could be used to automatically compute CFs and CB of utterances according to a variety of proposals.These methods were then used to evaluate several claims concerning discourse topics. Support was found for a variant of proposals by Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharski concerning when demonstratives will be used to realize a discourse entity. Secondly, it was found that the transitions in which CB=CP are most predictive of subject pronominalization. The third studyrevealed a clear, but not very predictive, correlation between segment boundaries and the use of `discontinuous' transitions in which one or both of the utterances have no CB. Finally, support was found for the claim by Hitzeman and Poesio that only entities that have been CBs serve as the antecedent of long-distance pronouns.Less
Reliable techniques were developed to annotate corpora with the information to test several instantiations of Centering, and software that could be used to automatically compute CFs and CB of utterances according to a variety of proposals.These methods were then used to evaluate several claims concerning discourse topics. Support was found for a variant of proposals by Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharski concerning when demonstratives will be used to realize a discourse entity. Secondly, it was found that the transitions in which CB=CP are most predictive of subject pronominalization. The third studyrevealed a clear, but not very predictive, correlation between segment boundaries and the use of `discontinuous' transitions in which one or both of the utterances have no CB. Finally, support was found for the claim by Hitzeman and Poesio that only entities that have been CBs serve as the antecedent of long-distance pronouns.
Ruben Lee
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691133539
- eISBN:
- 9781400836970
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691133539.003.0006
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Macro- and Monetary Economics
The chapter provides an overview of how market infrastructure institutions in the cash equity markets around the world were governed as of September 2006. The 90 member exchanges of the World ...
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The chapter provides an overview of how market infrastructure institutions in the cash equity markets around the world were governed as of September 2006. The 90 member exchanges of the World Federation of Exchanges, and their associated clearing and settlement entities, were examined. For exchanges, the dominant control model, at 40 percent of the population, was that of a private company; 27.8 percent of the population were under mutual control, 16.7 percent were listed, and 15.6 percent were government controlled. For clearing institutions, the dominant control models were exchange control at 37.9 percent of the population and user control at 40.2 percent. Government control was low at 13.8 percent, as was control by independent entities at 7.8 percent. For settlement entities, user control was the dominant model at 45.1 percent of the population, with exchange control still common at 28.1 percent, although less important than for clearing entities.Less
The chapter provides an overview of how market infrastructure institutions in the cash equity markets around the world were governed as of September 2006. The 90 member exchanges of the World Federation of Exchanges, and their associated clearing and settlement entities, were examined. For exchanges, the dominant control model, at 40 percent of the population, was that of a private company; 27.8 percent of the population were under mutual control, 16.7 percent were listed, and 15.6 percent were government controlled. For clearing institutions, the dominant control models were exchange control at 37.9 percent of the population and user control at 40.2 percent. Government control was low at 13.8 percent, as was control by independent entities at 7.8 percent. For settlement entities, user control was the dominant model at 45.1 percent of the population, with exchange control still common at 28.1 percent, although less important than for clearing entities.
John M. Anderson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199297412
- eISBN:
- 9780191711176
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297412.003.0008
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Theoretical Linguistics
This chapter elaborates the categorial structures associated with the functions of names. It is only as an argument that they have the syntax of a determinative, expressed either inherently (English) ...
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This chapter elaborates the categorial structures associated with the functions of names. It is only as an argument that they have the syntax of a determinative, expressed either inherently (English) or analytically (Greek). The act of nomination bestows a fixed reference on a name; it makes it active, identificatory, and thus definite; the syntactic role in nominations of the up-'till-then inactive name is appositional. By deixis, rather than fixed reference, other definites can also be identificatory of particular entities. Vocatives are active names converted into performative predicators. The name itself is unspecified as to word-class; it is the basic entity-word, opposed to relational words. Other word classes introduce notional categories elaborating on this basic distinction: nouns denote classes of entities, not entities, and the presence of a determiner enables reference to particulars, possibly identifiable; verbs denote types of possibly polyvalent predicational relations, not a simple relation, which is associated with functors.Less
This chapter elaborates the categorial structures associated with the functions of names. It is only as an argument that they have the syntax of a determinative, expressed either inherently (English) or analytically (Greek). The act of nomination bestows a fixed reference on a name; it makes it active, identificatory, and thus definite; the syntactic role in nominations of the up-'till-then inactive name is appositional. By deixis, rather than fixed reference, other definites can also be identificatory of particular entities. Vocatives are active names converted into performative predicators. The name itself is unspecified as to word-class; it is the basic entity-word, opposed to relational words. Other word classes introduce notional categories elaborating on this basic distinction: nouns denote classes of entities, not entities, and the presence of a determiner enables reference to particulars, possibly identifiable; verbs denote types of possibly polyvalent predicational relations, not a simple relation, which is associated with functors.
