David M. Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199590612
- eISBN:
- 9780191723391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The notion of a truthmaker is introduced, and the importance of the notion for metaphysics is stressed. Russell was a pioneer. All truth is a matter of correspondence of a proposition to reality, so ...
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The notion of a truthmaker is introduced, and the importance of the notion for metaphysics is stressed. Russell was a pioneer. All truth is a matter of correspondence of a proposition to reality, so truthmaker Maximalism should be accepted. It need not be a one—one correspondence. ‘What are your truthmakers?’ is superior to Quine's question ‘What do you quantify over?’ Minimalist theories of truth, descending from Frank Ramsey, are rejected. Minimal truthmakers, however, are not rejected except in the case of infinities. The relation of truths to their truthmakers is an internal one, depending solely on the terms involved, truth and truthmaker. Truthbearers, that is truths, are true propositions, but propositions are no more than what is believed, supposes that, entertains that, etc., what philosophers call ‘intentional objects’. They can include impossibilities. There is no realm of propositions. The important Entailment Principle says that if a proposition entails some further proposition, then a truthmaker for the premise is also truthmaker for the conclusion. This casts significant light on the nature of valid argument.Less
The notion of a truthmaker is introduced, and the importance of the notion for metaphysics is stressed. Russell was a pioneer. All truth is a matter of correspondence of a proposition to reality, so truthmaker Maximalism should be accepted. It need not be a one—one correspondence. ‘What are your truthmakers?’ is superior to Quine's question ‘What do you quantify over?’ Minimalist theories of truth, descending from Frank Ramsey, are rejected. Minimal truthmakers, however, are not rejected except in the case of infinities. The relation of truths to their truthmakers is an internal one, depending solely on the terms involved, truth and truthmaker. Truthbearers, that is truths, are true propositions, but propositions are no more than what is believed, supposes that, entertains that, etc., what philosophers call ‘intentional objects’. They can include impossibilities. There is no realm of propositions. The important Entailment Principle says that if a proposition entails some further proposition, then a truthmaker for the premise is also truthmaker for the conclusion. This casts significant light on the nature of valid argument.
David M. Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199590612
- eISBN:
- 9780191723391
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Logical and mathematical truths differ from the empirical sciences in being necessary; they can be discovered a priori and in general can be proved (contra Quine). How is this possible? This problem ...
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Logical and mathematical truths differ from the empirical sciences in being necessary; they can be discovered a priori and in general can be proved (contra Quine). How is this possible? This problem is partly met by recognizing that the rational sciences are sciences of the possible. Only the mathematical structures that are instantiated in space‐time are existents. Furthermore, using the Entailment Principle, it is seen that only the logico‐mathematical axioms require truthmakers. We should recognize laws in these sciences, but laws that are necessary. Such laws will be truthmakers for truths about uninstantiated structures, for instance large infinite numbers. What is the source of these necessary laws? Perhaps it is a necessity in the nature of things.Less
Logical and mathematical truths differ from the empirical sciences in being necessary; they can be discovered a priori and in general can be proved (contra Quine). How is this possible? This problem is partly met by recognizing that the rational sciences are sciences of the possible. Only the mathematical structures that are instantiated in space‐time are existents. Furthermore, using the Entailment Principle, it is seen that only the logico‐mathematical axioms require truthmakers. We should recognize laws in these sciences, but laws that are necessary. Such laws will be truthmakers for truths about uninstantiated structures, for instance large infinite numbers. What is the source of these necessary laws? Perhaps it is a necessity in the nature of things.
Daniel Stoljar
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195306583
- eISBN:
- 9780199786619
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195306589.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The problem to be discussed is the logical problem of experience, which focuses on three inconsistent theses: there are experiential truths; if there are experiential truths, every truth is entailed ...
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The problem to be discussed is the logical problem of experience, which focuses on three inconsistent theses: there are experiential truths; if there are experiential truths, every truth is entailed by, or supervenes on, some non-experiential truth; and if there are experiential truths, not every truth is entailed by, or supervenes on, some non-experiential truth. This problem is distinguished from two others: the empirical problem and the traditional mind-body problem.Less
The problem to be discussed is the logical problem of experience, which focuses on three inconsistent theses: there are experiential truths; if there are experiential truths, every truth is entailed by, or supervenes on, some non-experiential truth; and if there are experiential truths, not every truth is entailed by, or supervenes on, some non-experiential truth. This problem is distinguished from two others: the empirical problem and the traditional mind-body problem.
Mark Schroeder
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199534654
- eISBN:
- 9780191715938
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534654.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter shows that once we have accepted the solution to the negation problem from Chapter 4, this leads immediately to solutions to analogous problems about conjunction and disjunction, and in ...
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This chapter shows that once we have accepted the solution to the negation problem from Chapter 4, this leads immediately to solutions to analogous problems about conjunction and disjunction, and in fact to a constructive semantics for a very simple normative language with the expressive power of propositional logic. The semantics for this simple language is outlined, and inconsistency, entailment, and validity are defined. It is proven, given very simple assumptions, that the semantics yields the correct results about which sentences are inconsistent with which. Logical inconsistency is distinguished from ordinary inconsistency and given a precise definition, and it is shown why Geach's original moral modus ponens argument is logically valid. Finally, a loose end about the inconsistency of ‘murdering is wrong’ and ‘not murdering is wrong’ is set aside.Less
This chapter shows that once we have accepted the solution to the negation problem from Chapter 4, this leads immediately to solutions to analogous problems about conjunction and disjunction, and in fact to a constructive semantics for a very simple normative language with the expressive power of propositional logic. The semantics for this simple language is outlined, and inconsistency, entailment, and validity are defined. It is proven, given very simple assumptions, that the semantics yields the correct results about which sentences are inconsistent with which. Logical inconsistency is distinguished from ordinary inconsistency and given a precise definition, and it is shown why Geach's original moral modus ponens argument is logically valid. Finally, a loose end about the inconsistency of ‘murdering is wrong’ and ‘not murdering is wrong’ is set aside.
Patricia A. Blanchette
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199891610
- eISBN:
- 9780199933211
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199891610.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter discusses the question of how modern model-theoretic methods should be assessed from a Fregean point of view. It is argued that while the central features of mathematical theories, from ...
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This chapter discusses the question of how modern model-theoretic methods should be assessed from a Fregean point of view. It is argued that while the central features of mathematical theories, from a post-Fregean point of view, have essentially to do with features of those theories’ classes of models, this is not the case from Frege’s point of view. Given a Fregean starting-point, from which logical relations are borne not by sentences but by thoughts, and from which conceptual analysis is relevant to the discovery of logical relations, classes of models are not sensitive to the crucial logically-significant features of theories. Hence the important logical properties of theories as Frege understands them cannot be cashed out in standard modern terms. For similar reasons, model-theoretic entailment in a sufficiently rich language will diverge from logical entailment as understood by FregeLess
This chapter discusses the question of how modern model-theoretic methods should be assessed from a Fregean point of view. It is argued that while the central features of mathematical theories, from a post-Fregean point of view, have essentially to do with features of those theories’ classes of models, this is not the case from Frege’s point of view. Given a Fregean starting-point, from which logical relations are borne not by sentences but by thoughts, and from which conceptual analysis is relevant to the discovery of logical relations, classes of models are not sensitive to the crucial logically-significant features of theories. Hence the important logical properties of theories as Frege understands them cannot be cashed out in standard modern terms. For similar reasons, model-theoretic entailment in a sufficiently rich language will diverge from logical entailment as understood by Frege
Amie L. Thomasson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195319910
- eISBN:
- 9780199869602
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195319910.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Causal redundancy arguments allege that all the causal work attributed to ordinary macroscopic objects is really performed (jointly) by their microscopic parts, making ordinary objects epiphenomenal. ...
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Causal redundancy arguments allege that all the causal work attributed to ordinary macroscopic objects is really performed (jointly) by their microscopic parts, making ordinary objects epiphenomenal. Trenton Merricks holds that this shows there are no such things, since, if there were ordinary objects such as baseballs, they would be causally efficacious. It is argued, however, that Merricks' argument is either invalid or unsound, depending on how one understands “overdetermination”. This chapter makes the case that standard prohibitions against overdetermination do not apply where there are analytic entailments between the causal claims, so we can accept the causal claims of, for example, a baseball and of simples arranged baseballwise, without them being rivals in claims to causal efficacy or yielding redundant “double causation”.Less
Causal redundancy arguments allege that all the causal work attributed to ordinary macroscopic objects is really performed (jointly) by their microscopic parts, making ordinary objects epiphenomenal. Trenton Merricks holds that this shows there are no such things, since, if there were ordinary objects such as baseballs, they would be causally efficacious. It is argued, however, that Merricks' argument is either invalid or unsound, depending on how one understands “overdetermination”. This chapter makes the case that standard prohibitions against overdetermination do not apply where there are analytic entailments between the causal claims, so we can accept the causal claims of, for example, a baseball and of simples arranged baseballwise, without them being rivals in claims to causal efficacy or yielding redundant “double causation”.
Peter M. Arkadiev
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199238385
- eISBN:
- 9780191716768
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199238385.003.0004
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
This chapter surveys the semantic motivations of ‘split’ case marking of intransitive subjects in several genetically unrelated languages in terms of Dowty's proto-role entailments. It is argued that ...
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This chapter surveys the semantic motivations of ‘split’ case marking of intransitive subjects in several genetically unrelated languages in terms of Dowty's proto-role entailments. It is argued that it is not the overall balance of entailments but a single entailment grammaticalized in a given language which determines case marking.Less
This chapter surveys the semantic motivations of ‘split’ case marking of intransitive subjects in several genetically unrelated languages in terms of Dowty's proto-role entailments. It is argued that it is not the overall balance of entailments but a single entailment grammaticalized in a given language which determines case marking.
Christopher Potts
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199273829
- eISBN:
- 9780191706653
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273829.003.0002
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
This chapter begins with a brief history of the idea of conventional implicatures (CIs) and a close look at Grice’s original definition. It compares and contrasts CIs with conversational ...
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This chapter begins with a brief history of the idea of conventional implicatures (CIs) and a close look at Grice’s original definition. It compares and contrasts CIs with conversational implicatures, at-issue entailments, presuppositions, and intonational meanings, concluding that CIs, as Grice defined them, are distinct from all of them. The chapter then considers the linguistic consequences of Grice’s specifications. CIs should be scopeless, they should determine their own dimension of meaning, they should introduce new (but backgrounded) information, and they should serve as a kind of commentary on the main content of the sentence that contains them.Less
This chapter begins with a brief history of the idea of conventional implicatures (CIs) and a close look at Grice’s original definition. It compares and contrasts CIs with conversational implicatures, at-issue entailments, presuppositions, and intonational meanings, concluding that CIs, as Grice defined them, are distinct from all of them. The chapter then considers the linguistic consequences of Grice’s specifications. CIs should be scopeless, they should determine their own dimension of meaning, they should introduce new (but backgrounded) information, and they should serve as a kind of commentary on the main content of the sentence that contains them.
Sven Bernecker
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199577569
- eISBN:
- 9780191722820
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577569.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book presents an analysis of the concept of propositional (or factual) memory, defends a version of the causal theory of memory, and examines a number of metaphysical and epistemological issues ...
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This book presents an analysis of the concept of propositional (or factual) memory, defends a version of the causal theory of memory, and examines a number of metaphysical and epistemological issues crucial for memory. The book argues that memory, unlike knowledge, implies neither belief nor justification. There are instances where memory, though hitting the mark of truth, succeeds in an epistemically defective way. This book shows that, contrary to received wisdom in epistemology, memory not only preserves epistemic features generated by other epistemic sources but also functions as a source of justification and knowledge. According to the causal theory of memory argued for in this book, the dependence of memory states on past representations supports counterfactuals of the form: if the subject hadn't represented a given proposition in the past he wouldn't represent it in the present. The book argues for a version of content externalism whereupon the individuation of memory contents depends on relations the subject bears to his past physical or social environment. Moreover, it shows that memory doesn't require identity, but only similarity, of past and present attitudes and contents. The notion of content similarity is explicated in terms of the entailment relation.Less
This book presents an analysis of the concept of propositional (or factual) memory, defends a version of the causal theory of memory, and examines a number of metaphysical and epistemological issues crucial for memory. The book argues that memory, unlike knowledge, implies neither belief nor justification. There are instances where memory, though hitting the mark of truth, succeeds in an epistemically defective way. This book shows that, contrary to received wisdom in epistemology, memory not only preserves epistemic features generated by other epistemic sources but also functions as a source of justification and knowledge. According to the causal theory of memory argued for in this book, the dependence of memory states on past representations supports counterfactuals of the form: if the subject hadn't represented a given proposition in the past he wouldn't represent it in the present. The book argues for a version of content externalism whereupon the individuation of memory contents depends on relations the subject bears to his past physical or social environment. Moreover, it shows that memory doesn't require identity, but only similarity, of past and present attitudes and contents. The notion of content similarity is explicated in terms of the entailment relation.
Paul Horwich
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199268900
- eISBN:
- 9780191708459
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199268900.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
This chapter offers a critique of mainstream formal semantics. It begins with a statement of widely assumed adequacy conditions: namely, that a good semantic theory must (i) explain relations of ...
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This chapter offers a critique of mainstream formal semantics. It begins with a statement of widely assumed adequacy conditions: namely, that a good semantic theory must (i) explain relations of entailment; (ii) show how the meanings of complex expressions are ‘composed’ from the meanings of their parts; and (iii) characterize facts of meaning in truth-theoretic terms (it may be supposed, for example, that the meaning of a sentence, s, is the set of possible worlds in which s is true). The chapter then proceeds to criticize the orthodox conception of semantics that is articulated in these three desiderata. This critique is followed by a sketch of an alternative conception — involving desiderata that are more in tune with the empirical objectives of linguistics. Finally, the chapter proposes and defends a specific theoretical approach — use based rather than truth based — that is suggested by that alternative conception.Less
This chapter offers a critique of mainstream formal semantics. It begins with a statement of widely assumed adequacy conditions: namely, that a good semantic theory must (i) explain relations of entailment; (ii) show how the meanings of complex expressions are ‘composed’ from the meanings of their parts; and (iii) characterize facts of meaning in truth-theoretic terms (it may be supposed, for example, that the meaning of a sentence, s, is the set of possible worlds in which s is true). The chapter then proceeds to criticize the orthodox conception of semantics that is articulated in these three desiderata. This critique is followed by a sketch of an alternative conception — involving desiderata that are more in tune with the empirical objectives of linguistics. Finally, the chapter proposes and defends a specific theoretical approach — use based rather than truth based — that is suggested by that alternative conception.
Sven Bernecker
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199577569
- eISBN:
- 9780191722820
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577569.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
For a present propositional attitude token to stand in a memory‐relation to a past propositional attitude token, the contents of both tokens need not be type‐identical but only sufficiently similar. ...
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For a present propositional attitude token to stand in a memory‐relation to a past propositional attitude token, the contents of both tokens need not be type‐identical but only sufficiently similar. This view flies in the face of the widespread identity theory of memory which demands type‐identity of diachronic content tokens and attitude tokens. This chapter determines to what extent two diachronic propositional attitude tokens may differ from one another and one of them still count as sufficiently similar to the other so as to be memory‐related to it. The chapter starts out by distinguishing two aspects of the veridicality constraint on memory: authenticity and truth. The truth of a memory report has to do with the memory content correctly representing objective reality. Authenticity, on the other hand, is an internal criterion concerning the accuracy of the reproduction of a past propositional attitude (true or false). The mark of authentic content representation is entailment: a present propositional attitude token is memory‐related to a past propositional attitude token only if the content of the present token is entailed by the content of the past token. One of the consequences of the entailment thesis is that it is possible that the content of a memory state is entertained for the first time at the time of recollection. This view is compared and contrasted with Plato's theory of recollection whereby all learning is nothing but remembering. Finally, the chapter addresses the question of when two diachronic attitude tokens are of the same kind and proposes a functionalist answer. The notion of attitude‐similarity is spelled out in terms of sameness of direction of fit and polarity.Less
For a present propositional attitude token to stand in a memory‐relation to a past propositional attitude token, the contents of both tokens need not be type‐identical but only sufficiently similar. This view flies in the face of the widespread identity theory of memory which demands type‐identity of diachronic content tokens and attitude tokens. This chapter determines to what extent two diachronic propositional attitude tokens may differ from one another and one of them still count as sufficiently similar to the other so as to be memory‐related to it. The chapter starts out by distinguishing two aspects of the veridicality constraint on memory: authenticity and truth. The truth of a memory report has to do with the memory content correctly representing objective reality. Authenticity, on the other hand, is an internal criterion concerning the accuracy of the reproduction of a past propositional attitude (true or false). The mark of authentic content representation is entailment: a present propositional attitude token is memory‐related to a past propositional attitude token only if the content of the present token is entailed by the content of the past token. One of the consequences of the entailment thesis is that it is possible that the content of a memory state is entertained for the first time at the time of recollection. This view is compared and contrasted with Plato's theory of recollection whereby all learning is nothing but remembering. Finally, the chapter addresses the question of when two diachronic attitude tokens are of the same kind and proposes a functionalist answer. The notion of attitude‐similarity is spelled out in terms of sameness of direction of fit and polarity.
John Heil
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199596201
- eISBN:
- 9780191741876
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596201.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
The significance and utility of the concept of truthmaking are discussed. The suggestion that truthmaking is entailment (truths entail truthmakers) is found wanting, as is the apparently innocent ...
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The significance and utility of the concept of truthmaking are discussed. The suggestion that truthmaking is entailment (truths entail truthmakers) is found wanting, as is the apparently innocent slogan that ‘truth supervenes on being’. Truthmaking is said to be an internal relation holding between a truth bearer — a representation that the world is some way — and the world’s being that way. Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment and its implications for the determination of what exists are discussed and found to be ontologically unilluminating. The question whether every truth has a truthmaker is addressed, and the suggestion that truths of logic and mathematics ‘require nothing of the world’, hence need no truthmakers (‘trivialism’), is regarded with favor. The possibility that reality, being itself, has a definite nature, is defended.Less
The significance and utility of the concept of truthmaking are discussed. The suggestion that truthmaking is entailment (truths entail truthmakers) is found wanting, as is the apparently innocent slogan that ‘truth supervenes on being’. Truthmaking is said to be an internal relation holding between a truth bearer — a representation that the world is some way — and the world’s being that way. Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment and its implications for the determination of what exists are discussed and found to be ontologically unilluminating. The question whether every truth has a truthmaker is addressed, and the suggestion that truths of logic and mathematics ‘require nothing of the world’, hence need no truthmakers (‘trivialism’), is regarded with favor. The possibility that reality, being itself, has a definite nature, is defended.
Alan Weir
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199541492
- eISBN:
- 9780191594915
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199541492.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Gappy semantics is used to model indeterminacy with ‘upwards falsity-preservation’ emphasized as much as downwards truth-preservation. This two-way idea is generalized to multiple premiss/multiple ...
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Gappy semantics is used to model indeterminacy with ‘upwards falsity-preservation’ emphasized as much as downwards truth-preservation. This two-way idea is generalized to multiple premiss/multiple conclusion rules in a ‘neo-classical’ characterization of entailment; it is shown that this notion is non-transitive, though simple transitivity of entailment holds. A sound proof theory is set out, and it is shown how excluded middle fails. Quantifiers are interpreted as infinitary conjunctions and disjunctions and ‘classical recapture’ demonstrated for a negation-complete Peano-Arithmetic in the infinitary logic. This negation-completeness is extended to the simple theory of types, and to a set theory based on a schema whose instances are infinitary generalizations of the pair set axiom. It is acknowledged this is highly artificial, and not a modeling of real mathematics. The chapter concludes with a comparison of these formal theories and ‘really existing’ set theory and with a discussion of the legitimacy of classical reasoning in the latter.Less
Gappy semantics is used to model indeterminacy with ‘upwards falsity-preservation’ emphasized as much as downwards truth-preservation. This two-way idea is generalized to multiple premiss/multiple conclusion rules in a ‘neo-classical’ characterization of entailment; it is shown that this notion is non-transitive, though simple transitivity of entailment holds. A sound proof theory is set out, and it is shown how excluded middle fails. Quantifiers are interpreted as infinitary conjunctions and disjunctions and ‘classical recapture’ demonstrated for a negation-complete Peano-Arithmetic in the infinitary logic. This negation-completeness is extended to the simple theory of types, and to a set theory based on a schema whose instances are infinitary generalizations of the pair set axiom. It is acknowledged this is highly artificial, and not a modeling of real mathematics. The chapter concludes with a comparison of these formal theories and ‘really existing’ set theory and with a discussion of the legitimacy of classical reasoning in the latter.
Stephen J Barker
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199263660
- eISBN:
- 9780191601354
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199263663.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
I deal with the cognitive states expressed by de dicto logically complex sentences–those that are expressives, such as negations, disjunctions, universal noun phrase sentences, and adverbs of ...
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I deal with the cognitive states expressed by de dicto logically complex sentences–those that are expressives, such as negations, disjunctions, universal noun phrase sentences, and adverbs of generality. I also articulate more clearly STA’s expressivism about semantic norms and its psychologism: the account of how sentences express cognitive states is integral to the semantics that STA gives of them.Less
I deal with the cognitive states expressed by de dicto logically complex sentences–those that are expressives, such as negations, disjunctions, universal noun phrase sentences, and adverbs of generality. I also articulate more clearly STA’s expressivism about semantic norms and its psychologism: the account of how sentences express cognitive states is integral to the semantics that STA gives of them.
JAY DAVID ATLAS
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195133004
- eISBN:
- 9780199850181
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195133004.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
While this chapter attempts to explain the construction of one kind of post-Gricean presupposition pragmatic theory, it also looks into the possible substantive problems that may be encountered ...
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While this chapter attempts to explain the construction of one kind of post-Gricean presupposition pragmatic theory, it also looks into the possible substantive problems that may be encountered regarding issues on presupposition. In doing so, the author focuses on one type of post-Gricean theory of pragmatism and extracts the aspects of entailment and generalized conversational inferenda from the notion of presupposition. Also, the author attempts to explore Grice's endeavor to come up with the same reduction through making use not of the notion of semantical nonspecificity but of the notion of ambiguity. Lastly, the author discusses his belief that Stalnaker and Grice altered the use of the concept of common ground, and that “accommodation” may pave the way for the reconstruction of theories that concern presupposition.Less
While this chapter attempts to explain the construction of one kind of post-Gricean presupposition pragmatic theory, it also looks into the possible substantive problems that may be encountered regarding issues on presupposition. In doing so, the author focuses on one type of post-Gricean theory of pragmatism and extracts the aspects of entailment and generalized conversational inferenda from the notion of presupposition. Also, the author attempts to explore Grice's endeavor to come up with the same reduction through making use not of the notion of semantical nonspecificity but of the notion of ambiguity. Lastly, the author discusses his belief that Stalnaker and Grice altered the use of the concept of common ground, and that “accommodation” may pave the way for the reconstruction of theories that concern presupposition.
Pieter A. M. Seuren
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199559480
- eISBN:
- 9780191721144
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559480.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics
The Logic of Language opens a new perspective on logic. Seuren first argues that the logic of language derives from the lexical meanings of the logical operators. These meanings, ...
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The Logic of Language opens a new perspective on logic. Seuren first argues that the logic of language derives from the lexical meanings of the logical operators. These meanings, however, prove not to be consistent. To solve this problem, the author distinguishes between a default ‘basic‐natural’ and two nondefault ‘strict‐natural’ versions of natural predicate logic, all different from standard modern logic. Basic‐natural logic is shown to derive from an ontology of entities and properties, combined with a basic‐natural set theory, reflecting the way humans deal cognitively with plural sets. A new measure for ‘logical power’ shows the extreme weakness of standard predicate logic as against the maximal power of one version of strict‐natural logic, traditional, post‐Aristotelian predicate logic, or the ‘Square of Opposition’. It is shown that Aristotle's original logic as reconstructed by Abelard is logically faultless (unlike the Square, which suffers from ‘undue existential import’) and also more powerful than standard logic, though less so than the Square or basic‐natural logic. The latter two are shown to be maximally functional for natural linguistic interaction. In the last five chapters, a general theory of discourse‐bound interpretation is developed, covering discourse incrementation, anaphora, presupposition (with its logic) and topic—comment structure. The ‘donkey‐anaphora’ problem is solved by an appeal to discourse structures. The great defect of the Square, its ‘undue existential import’, is remedied by means of a protecting presuppositional ‘mantle’ creating a third truth value of radical falsity, assigned to propositions suffering from presupposition failure and causing inconsistency with preceding true discourse. Finally, topic—comment structure is shown to correspond to a question—answer game directing the building up of discourse domains and to be not of a pragmatic but of a truth‐conditional, hence semantic, nature. Anaphora, presupposition, and topic—comment structure are thus seen to form the ‘cement’ of discourse structure.Less
The Logic of Language opens a new perspective on logic. Seuren first argues that the logic of language derives from the lexical meanings of the logical operators. These meanings, however, prove not to be consistent. To solve this problem, the author distinguishes between a default ‘basic‐natural’ and two nondefault ‘strict‐natural’ versions of natural predicate logic, all different from standard modern logic. Basic‐natural logic is shown to derive from an ontology of entities and properties, combined with a basic‐natural set theory, reflecting the way humans deal cognitively with plural sets. A new measure for ‘logical power’ shows the extreme weakness of standard predicate logic as against the maximal power of one version of strict‐natural logic, traditional, post‐Aristotelian predicate logic, or the ‘Square of Opposition’. It is shown that Aristotle's original logic as reconstructed by Abelard is logically faultless (unlike the Square, which suffers from ‘undue existential import’) and also more powerful than standard logic, though less so than the Square or basic‐natural logic. The latter two are shown to be maximally functional for natural linguistic interaction. In the last five chapters, a general theory of discourse‐bound interpretation is developed, covering discourse incrementation, anaphora, presupposition (with its logic) and topic—comment structure. The ‘donkey‐anaphora’ problem is solved by an appeal to discourse structures. The great defect of the Square, its ‘undue existential import’, is remedied by means of a protecting presuppositional ‘mantle’ creating a third truth value of radical falsity, assigned to propositions suffering from presupposition failure and causing inconsistency with preceding true discourse. Finally, topic—comment structure is shown to correspond to a question—answer game directing the building up of discourse domains and to be not of a pragmatic but of a truth‐conditional, hence semantic, nature. Anaphora, presupposition, and topic—comment structure are thus seen to form the ‘cement’ of discourse structure.
J. L. Austin
- Published in print:
- 1975
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198245537
- eISBN:
- 9780191680861
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245537.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter considers another case of infelicity: insincerities and infractions or breaches. Here, the performance is not void, although it is still unhappy. The chapter considers one's feelings, ...
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This chapter considers another case of infelicity: insincerities and infractions or breaches. Here, the performance is not void, although it is still unhappy. The chapter considers one's feelings, thoughts, and intentions. An example of not having the requisite feeling is: ‘I congratulate you’, said when one did not feel at all pleased, or perhaps was even annoyed. An example of not having the requisite thought is: ‘I advise you to’, said when one did not think it would be the most expedient course. An example of not having the requisite intention is: ‘I promise’, said when one did not intend to keep the promise. The discussion also considers three of the many ways in which a statement implies the truth of certain other statements: entailment, implication, and presupposition.Less
This chapter considers another case of infelicity: insincerities and infractions or breaches. Here, the performance is not void, although it is still unhappy. The chapter considers one's feelings, thoughts, and intentions. An example of not having the requisite feeling is: ‘I congratulate you’, said when one did not feel at all pleased, or perhaps was even annoyed. An example of not having the requisite thought is: ‘I advise you to’, said when one did not think it would be the most expedient course. An example of not having the requisite intention is: ‘I promise’, said when one did not intend to keep the promise. The discussion also considers three of the many ways in which a statement implies the truth of certain other statements: entailment, implication, and presupposition.
Christian List and Clemens Puppe
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199290420
- eISBN:
- 9780191710506
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290420.003.0020
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
The chapter surveys the recent and fast‐growing literature on the aggregation of logically interrelated propositions, following List and Pettit's formalization of the “doctrinal paradox”. The ...
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The chapter surveys the recent and fast‐growing literature on the aggregation of logically interrelated propositions, following List and Pettit's formalization of the “doctrinal paradox”. The classical preference aggregation problem is a special case in which propositions take the form of binary preference judgments (“alternative x is better than alternative y”). The first part of the chapter focuses on aggregation methods that satisfy an Arrowian independence condition (“propositionwise aggregation”). In the independent case, the literature has produced a number of general characterization results that precisely demarcate the circumstances in which satisfactory aggregation is possible from those in which it is not Arrow's impossibility theorem and Gibbards oligarchy theorem are special cases of these results. The independence condition is, however, not uncontroversial and the second part of the chapter considers various relaxations of it. Judgment aggregation is still a very active field and the chapter concludes with an outlook on what we believe are important topics for future research.Less
The chapter surveys the recent and fast‐growing literature on the aggregation of logically interrelated propositions, following List and Pettit's formalization of the “doctrinal paradox”. The classical preference aggregation problem is a special case in which propositions take the form of binary preference judgments (“alternative x is better than alternative y”). The first part of the chapter focuses on aggregation methods that satisfy an Arrowian independence condition (“propositionwise aggregation”). In the independent case, the literature has produced a number of general characterization results that precisely demarcate the circumstances in which satisfactory aggregation is possible from those in which it is not Arrow's impossibility theorem and Gibbards oligarchy theorem are special cases of these results. The independence condition is, however, not uncontroversial and the second part of the chapter considers various relaxations of it. Judgment aggregation is still a very active field and the chapter concludes with an outlook on what we believe are important topics for future research.
Robert Kirk
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199669417
- eISBN:
- 9780191748769
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669417.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Physicalism entails that truths expressed in non-physical terms are redescriptions of a world specifiable in narrowly physical terms. This book argues that physicalists must therefore hold that the ...
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Physicalism entails that truths expressed in non-physical terms are redescriptions of a world specifiable in narrowly physical terms. This book argues that physicalists must therefore hold that the physical truth about the world ‘logico-conceptually’ entails the mental truth, in the sense that it is impossible for broadly logical and conceptual reasons that the former should have been true if the latter had been false. The ‘redescriptive physicalism’ based on these ideas is a fresh approach to the nature of the mental-physical connection, and the book explains why physicalists should endorse it. It must be distinguished from ‘a priori physicalism’, which Jackson and Chalmers say physicalism requires. Although physicalism does need phenomenal truths to be logico-conceptually entailed by the narrowly physical truth, the idea that they are also inferrable a priori is mistaken. On the other hand ‘a posteriori physicalism’ is too weak, and the psycho-physical identity thesis is not even sufficient for physicalism. Yet the physical-to-mental connection does not depend on analytic truths: there are holistic but non-analytic conceptual links from physical to mental descriptions, explicable by means of functionalism – which, it is argued, physicalism entails. Redescriptive physicalism is also an excellent basis for dealing with questions of mental causation. Some regard the ‘Cartesian intuitions’ as objections to these views; it is argued that they are false. As to the ‘explanatory gap’, there is an epistemic gap, but it has a physicalistically acceptable explanation.Less
Physicalism entails that truths expressed in non-physical terms are redescriptions of a world specifiable in narrowly physical terms. This book argues that physicalists must therefore hold that the physical truth about the world ‘logico-conceptually’ entails the mental truth, in the sense that it is impossible for broadly logical and conceptual reasons that the former should have been true if the latter had been false. The ‘redescriptive physicalism’ based on these ideas is a fresh approach to the nature of the mental-physical connection, and the book explains why physicalists should endorse it. It must be distinguished from ‘a priori physicalism’, which Jackson and Chalmers say physicalism requires. Although physicalism does need phenomenal truths to be logico-conceptually entailed by the narrowly physical truth, the idea that they are also inferrable a priori is mistaken. On the other hand ‘a posteriori physicalism’ is too weak, and the psycho-physical identity thesis is not even sufficient for physicalism. Yet the physical-to-mental connection does not depend on analytic truths: there are holistic but non-analytic conceptual links from physical to mental descriptions, explicable by means of functionalism – which, it is argued, physicalism entails. Redescriptive physicalism is also an excellent basis for dealing with questions of mental causation. Some regard the ‘Cartesian intuitions’ as objections to these views; it is argued that they are false. As to the ‘explanatory gap’, there is an epistemic gap, but it has a physicalistically acceptable explanation.
Stephen Mumford
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199259823
- eISBN:
- 9780191698637
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199259823.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter considers the contrasts that are drawn between dispositions and occurrences, structures and categorical properties. The second section presents the first objection to the orthodox view ...
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This chapter considers the contrasts that are drawn between dispositions and occurrences, structures and categorical properties. The second section presents the first objection to the orthodox view of ascriptions of dispositions. It holds that disposition ascriptions do not uniquely entail conditionals. The third section discusses Elizabeth Prior's unsuccessful reply against Mellor's triangularity. The fourth section considers the problem in Mellor's position. The sixth section presents a functionalist response to the first objection. The seventh section presents the second attack on distinction. It holds that not even disposition ascriptions entail conditionals. The eighth section proposes another reply supporting the account of dispositions using a functionalist account which ultimately fails. The ninth section describes the context of ideal conditions. The last section presents a defence of realism.Less
This chapter considers the contrasts that are drawn between dispositions and occurrences, structures and categorical properties. The second section presents the first objection to the orthodox view of ascriptions of dispositions. It holds that disposition ascriptions do not uniquely entail conditionals. The third section discusses Elizabeth Prior's unsuccessful reply against Mellor's triangularity. The fourth section considers the problem in Mellor's position. The sixth section presents a functionalist response to the first objection. The seventh section presents the second attack on distinction. It holds that not even disposition ascriptions entail conditionals. The eighth section proposes another reply supporting the account of dispositions using a functionalist account which ultimately fails. The ninth section describes the context of ideal conditions. The last section presents a defence of realism.
