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Jimmy Carter’s faith played a major role in both the 1976 and 1980 presidential campaigns and his presidency. This is evident in his speeches, relationship with religious constituencies, approach to politics, and many of his domestic and foreign policies. Three major factors shaped Carter’s ideology: Southern evangelicalism, Baptists’ views of the separation of church and state, and the Christian realism of Reinhold Niebuhr. In most ways, Carter’s personal faith was typical of Southern Baptists and most other evangelicals. He believed in the need to be born again, the importance of evangelism, the sinfulness of human beings, and the authority of the Bible. Carter insisted that his faith should play an important role in his political decisions. He strongly stressed morality, virtue, justice, forgiveness, humility, peace, human rights, concern for the poor, and stewardship. Carter’s faith also helped to inspire his efforts to promote peace throughout the world. Motivated by Christ’s example, Carter strove as president to adopt the attitude and approach of a servant. His positions on several issues, most notably abortion, school prayer, and tuition tax credits, were at odds with those of many evangelicals and Catholics. Carter’s Christian commitment is especially evident in his efforts to strengthen families, reduce poverty, reform welfare, combat the nation’s energy crisis, and slow world population growth.

Sometimes the inclusion of the environmental movement in the state that has occurred has been genuine, and sometimes it has involved co‐option, i.e. access without real influence. We argue that inclusion can be genuine when the movement's defining interest can be attached to one of the core state imperatives; this explains why the US alone could prove such an environmental success story around 1970. Later in the 1970s, energy crisis meant that environmentalism was kept away from the state's core in all four countries, though there was substantial variation in how this was played out. More recent history reveals environmentalism generally kept away from the core, though there are exceptions (especially in Norway and, later, Germany).

This chapter argues that the relationship between energy insecurity and state weakness is real but complicated, and the link should not be exaggerated. Weak states are more vulnerable to disruptions in energy production and transit. Furthermore, high oil and gas prices tend to fuel corruption and conflict in relatively poor producers, while volatility in energy markets may further destabilize weak-state suppliers—reinforcing a vicious cycle of instability and energy insecurity. In general, however, weak states do not pose the greatest threat to US and global energy security; relatively stronger developing countries do. The chapter begins by analyzing of the growing prominence of energy issues in the US national security debate. It then explores the role of fragile states in world energy markets, and evaluates arguments about the dangers posed by these states to energy security. Next, it focuses on how the recent energy crisis—and US reliance on supplies from developing countries—may actually exacerbate state weakness and undermine US foreign policy goals. Finally, it underlines the importance of energy-rich “states to watch” for US energy security.

This chapter investigates the current energy law and policy in Colombia and Venezuela, two of the richest but also most unstable countries in the area. It traces the efforts of the two countries as they struggle to avert a looming energy crisis of both domestic and international significance. It discusses that few other regions and countries face such a challenging and mixed array of energy security issues, ranging from physical security of personnel and infrastructure, to ensuring that the lights come on and stay on in every household, while meeting revenue-generating export goals. It notes that much like their neighbours in the rest of the Andean region, whether or not these countries succeed in their efforts or whether they go from exporters to importers of energy products, may shape the very notion of energy security on a regional and international scale. It discusses the uncertainties that cloud energy development.

This chapter examines the energy crisis in the U.S. during the 1970s. It explains that contrary to popular belief, the energy problem manifested itself months, even years, before the Arab oil embargo. According to experts, it was caused by several factors including the price control system implemented by the administration of former President Richard Nixon which played hob with the normal equilibrium of supply and demand. This problem presented another huge challenge for Gerald Ford.

This chapter describes how, for four decades, California has been at the forefront of national efforts to improve energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. These initiatives began with policies to reduce energy use in order to avoid the construction of additional power plants and went on to include progressively more stringent energy efficiency standards and renewable energy mandates, additional curbs on automotive emissions, and a cap-and-trade program designed to reduce statewide greenhouse gas emissions. The emergence and expansion of these efforts demonstrates the importance of the factors that have shaped environmental policy innovations in other areas. At the same time, these policies are also distinct from those described in the previous chapters. First, they developed more incrementally, with some backsliding, much conflict, and frequent compromises. Second, some of their policy triggers—most notably, the 1973 energy crisis and California's 2000–2001 energy deregulation fiasco—were unrelated to environmental risks or threats. Third, their scope, diversity, and economic impact have been more substantial than those of the state's regulations protecting land use, coastal areas, and automotive emissions. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in marked contrast to the state's other environmental policy threats, California cannot protect itself from the risks of global climate change. This means that the state has a critical stake in promoting a “California effect” that will encourage other political jurisdictions both in and outside the United States to also restrict their greenhouse gas emissions.

Chapter 1 begins by stressing the severity of climate change (CC) and showing how, contrary to popular belief, atomic energy is not a viable solution to CC. Many scientists and most market proponents agree that renewable energy and energy efficiencies are better options. The chapter also shows that government subsidies for oil and nuclear power are the result of flawed science, poor ethics, short-term thinking, and special-interest influence. The chapter has 7 sections, the first of which surveys four major components of the energy crisis. These are oil addiction, non-CC-related deaths from fossil-fuel pollution, nuclear-weapons proliferation, and catastrophic CC. The second section summarizes some of the powerful evidence for global CC. The third section uses historical, ahistorical, Rawlsian, and utilitarian ethical principles to show how developed nations, especially the US, are most responsible for human-caused CC. The fourth section shows why climate-change skeptics, such as “deniers” who doubt CC is real, and “delayers” who say that it should not yet be addressed, have no valid objections. Instead, they all err scientifically and ethically. The fifth section illustrates that all modern scientific methods—and scientific consensus since at least 1995—confirm the reality of global CC. Essentially all expert-scientific analyses published in refereed, scientific-professional journals confirm the reality of global CC. The sixth section of the chapter shows how fossil-fuel special interests have contributed to the continued CC debate largely by paying non-experts to deny or challenge CC. The seventh section of the chapter provides an outline of each chapter in the book, noting that this book makes use of both scientific and ethical analyses to show why nuclear proponents’ arguments err, why CC deniers are wrong, and how scientific-methodological understanding can advance sound energy policy—including conservation, renewable energy, and energy efficiencies.

This chapter examines former U.S. President Gerald Ford's program to address the energy crisis. It discusses Ford's appointment of Frank Zarb as the first administrator of the newly created Federal Energy Agency (FEA) and explains the formidable obstacles that were blocking Ford's efforts to develop an energy program. Ford's major proposal was new energy taxes which meant that consumers would pay higher prices for petroleum-based energy of all forms, not just gasoline. He believed that dealing with the energy problems would restore business and consumer confidence and help to end the recession.

This chapter examines the lack of action to address the energy crisis in the U.S. in 1975. The response to former President Gerald Ford's energy proposals was generally negative. Business leaders voiced objections, while utility and petrochemical executives complained that the imposition of an import fee on petroleum products would hurt their industries. In addition, there was also no congressional action on the issue, which led some experts to believe that energy became a victim of the visceral desire of the members of the Ninety-fourth Congress to stay in office.

US economic and geopolitical interests were entwined in the Middle East in the early 1970s. Prioritizing geopolitical objectives, the Nixon administration bolstered Iran and Saudi Arabia as regional clients and cultivated Israel as a Cold War ally. Meanwhile, the declining U.S. share of global oil production made the United States-and the larger Western world-ever-more dependent upon the oil exports of the Middle East. In the context of the Middle East crisis of late 1973, which included an Arab-Israeli war and a major oil crisis, US decision-makers struggled to comprehend and manage the consequences of energy interdependence. Recognizing the damage that surging oil prices were doing to the Western Alliance, Henry Kissinger belatedly set out to manage-and mitigate-the vulnerabilities that economic interdependence created for the West and to stabilize the Middle East through the achievement of a bilateral peace between Egypt and Israel.

This chapter examines the U.S. Congress' drafting of as energy legislation in June 1975. The bill was developed after former President Gerald Ford's angry television performances and actions concerning the Congress' lack of action on the energy crisis. The provisions of the proposed bill included measures to enforce gasoline conservation, a reduction of dependence on foreign oil, and the right turn on red policy.

This chapter begins by looking at pictures of gas lines that emerged during the OPEC oil embargo in 1973-74. These images presented the energy crisis as a short-term problem of supply rather than a long-term question of escalating demand. In a period marked by severe economic decline and increasing public cynicism, gas lines also contributed to the decade’s broader emotional politics that emphasized anger and alienation over a collective sense of hope and possibility. While the Advertising Council once again produced public service announcements that emphasized individual responsibility for energy conservation, environmentalists sought to broaden the concept of energy crisis by warning of the dangers of nuclear power and by promoting alternative energy sources. Ultimately, the emotional politics of the 1970s intersected, in shifting and surprising ways, with popular environmentalism. During this crucial environmental moment, the visual media conveyed the dangers of radiation to a mass public, but reaffirmed popular conceptions of environmentalism as a cause that focused on individual moral choices rather than on broader structural solutions.

This chapter discusses how public awareness of the 1970s “energy crisis” influenced the shift towards neoliberalism. Surveys revealed that the majority of Americans believed the energy crisis was manipulated by various forces including the oil companies, oil sheiks, and the government itself through oil price controls. The 1970s energy crisis thus represented not a crisis of scarcity but a crisis for the whole free market system; it focused upon a whole set of actors and institutions that were defined as the antithesis of the fair competition of the market. The rise of neoliberalism at the time prompted the establishment of an apolitical economy, wherein any visible form of power over the market was considered as an unfair “political” attempt to seize wealth through connections with special interests, instead of individual hard work.

This chapter examines the material basis for life in terms of energy conversion. The exploitation of cheap energy reserves in terms of fossil fuels created industrial civilization, but we are running out of cheap oil and entering into an energy crisis, as well as heating the planet due to global warming. Alternatives cannot simply replace oil; we need new forms of energy conversion and transformation. The chapter suggests a way to think about nuclear energy in non-thermal terms. Furthermore, using Gilles Deleuze's thought, it offers some reflections for a theological materialism based on energy transformation.

This introductory chapter explains the coverage of this book, which is about former U.S. President Gerald Ford and the challenges faced by his presidency during the 1970s. This book examines the three major issues affecting Ford's presidency and the nation as a whole. These include the high cost of living and concerns related to the Watergate scandal such as lack of trust in government, corruption in government, and the energy crisis. This book also analyses how Ford dealt with these problems and discusses the highlights of his career.

Chapter 4 describes the rapid shift from a “consumer” to a “producer” market at the end of the 1960s. This shift was characterized by the radicalization of the political and social climate in most petrostates, by the emergence “peak” oil production in two crucial producers such as the US and Venezuela, and generally by the passage from the era of “cheap oil” to that of “expensive oil.” The chapter will also explain the cultural context of this passage with the rise of environmentalist movements and criticism towards overconsumption that had characterized the societies in industrialized countries. All of these factors led to the first two major victories of OPEC during the Tehran and Tripoli negotiation with the international oil companies in 1971.

In the previous chapter, the malleability of Danish energy policy was highlighted as a key factor behind the successful diffusion of wind power in Denmark. This chapter examines wind power diffusion in Germany, and in the process highlights a different, though equally successful policy ideology. Compared to policy of its Nordic neighbor, wind power development policy in Germany has been far more structured and invariable. In fact, the success of Germany’s wind power development strategy often serves as an exemplar for proponents of consistent feed-in tariff regimes, which is considered by some to be the most effective strategy for driving wind power development. As this chapter will demonstrate, fostering wind power development in Germany is, like in other nations, a complex challenge involving dynamic interactions between government and nongovernment actors. As German wind power capacity expanded, there has been social dissent and utility opposition. Nevertheless, the German government has remained committed to aggressive wind power diffusion policies and has responded to emergent challenges in a remarkably unified manner wherein state, regional, and local government actors have formed integrated problem-solving networks. This chapter also highlights the seamless web of nation-specific STEP factors influencing wind power development that is apparent in Germany. As one pair of researchers observed, wind power development in Germany has been marked by “close interplay between the actors within the political system, technical and economic development, as well as social factors.” As has been the case in most industrialized nations, forces in support of wind power development began to amass during the two energy crises of the 1970s. As the government began to evaluate its alternative energy technology options, nuclear power and wind power emerged as the two most viable utility-scale options. In the 1970s, nuclear power in Germany enjoyed a modicum of developmental success. The nation’s first commercial nuclear power plant commenced operation in 1969. By 2010, nuclear power contributed approximately 22% to Germany’s electricity supply. However, nuclear power development has been contentious. Although there has been industrial support, there has also been strident public opposition, especially since Chernobyl.

Chapter 3 introduced a three-step framework that could be applied to case study analysis in order to extract insights for refining wind power development policy. The first step of the framework entailed the analysis of a sufficient number of national case studies to identify prominent commonalities that influence wind power development. In this book Germany, Denmark, China, the United States, Japan, and Canada were chosen as nations for analysis. Germany and Denmark—two nations that have laudable and sustained successes in wind power development—were selected in order to provide insight into successful wind power development policies. China and the United States, which have both experienced boom and bust periods of wind power development, were picked to provide insight into factors that cause such oscillations in development. Japan and Canada, which are two nations that have underperformed in regard to wind power development, were selected to provide insight into barriers to wind power diffusion. Although only six nations were included in this study, additional wind power policy analysis undertaken by the author in Australia and Taiwan provide general confirmation of the external validity of the findings that will be summarized in this chapter. In this chapter the social, technological, economic, and political (STEP) factors that emerged as influential for either supporting or impeding wind power development in the six case study nations will be summarized. The intention of this compendium is to provide policymakers and interested stakeholders with greater clarity regarding the factors that must be strategically managed in order to enhance the scale scope and pace of wind power diffusion. The factors introduced in this chapter should not be misconstrued as constituting a best practice list for optimizing wind power policy success. As was pointed out in the introductory chapter, energy policy is designed and implemented within a contextually unique environment that involves a seamless web of dynamically evolving forces. Consequently, the notion that it might be feasible to construct a universally applicable manual of best policy practice is a fool’s errand.