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This chapter explores President Abraham Lincoln's policies for their impact on Southern civilians, with Lincoln's evolving policies on enemy private property, including the practice of “devastating” enemy territory. One of Lincoln's earliest acts as commander in chief was to promise respect for the property of enemy civilians. Legitimate operations necessarily impinged on civilian property. Lincoln proposed to deal with the broader issue of enemy civilian property. He had drafted three military orders for the cabinet to consider, and remained reluctant to issue general instructions on the treatment of enemy private property, even when suggested by the commanding general he had personally selected.

This chapter elaborates Abraham Lincoln's policy toward bombardment of cities. It is noted that, at the time of the Civil War, army commanders had no recognized obligation to ensure that enemy civilians did not starve. It is also stated that a Confederate government which could not protect its citizens' property would lose legitimacy. Union lack of discipline had become a way to make a political point about the powerlessness of the Confederate government. The Confederate destruction of forage at Sandersville was not the act of local civilians, guerrillas, or bushwhackers. In the case of President Lincoln and General Sherman in Georgia, based on the general's very limited sharing of plans with Washington, Lincoln had no reason to expect more damage to civilian property than would be normal whenever a Civil War army moved through a populated countryside.

President Abraham Lincoln signed an order to General Winfield Scott. If the Maryland legislature voted “to arm their people against the United States,” Scott was “to adopt the most prompt, and efficient means to counteract, even, if necessary, to the bombardment of their cities.” A serious effort to analyze Lincoln's treatment of Southern civilians must start by determining what measures he authorized, or at least which ones he knew about and did not oppose. Where treatment of enemy civilians is concerned, it is easy to make emotionally charged accusations against Lincoln and his officers. This study seeks an answer to the question: Did President Lincoln authorize or condone violations of the laws of war, as they were understood in his time? The focus is on the words and actions of Lincoln in relation to enemy civilians. An overview of the chapters included in the book is provided. President Lincoln probably authorized the bombardment of Baltimore at the urging of the army's general in chief, Winfield Scott.

This chapter explores the general policies Abraham Lincoln adopted toward enemy civilians. It also analyzes the possible reasons for his reluctance to widely disseminate these policies, and suggests some insights these explorations may give into Lincoln's character. Under the standards of his time, President Lincoln did not authorize or condone any violations of the laws of war against enemy civilians. Beyond this generalization, the record suggests additional conclusions that may be drawn on Lincoln's policies toward Southern civilians and how those policies reflect his leadership style and personality. Instead of issuing general guidance, President Lincoln tended to wait until specific abuses were brought to his attention by individual petitioners. He may have been reluctant to issue general guidelines for the treatment of Southern civilians for the same reason he was reluctant to join the abolitionists. To restore the Union, Lincoln would tolerate strong measures that brought injustice to some white civilians because he was convinced that these measures placed the rebellion on the course of ultimate defeat.

This chapter addresses force protection and the degree to which necessity permits attacking forces to prioritize the lives of their own soldiers over the lives of enemy civilians. This is a difficult problem of application; although everyone agrees that the lives of enemy civilians must be safeguarded, the question is how much must be risked in order to safeguard them. The chapter discusses the case of the Israeli Defense Forces, in which great emphasis is placed on preventing the abduction of Israeli troops and on facilitating their rescue, even at the cost of other lives. This chapter concludes by articulating a standard of reasonable force protection that is neither too restrictive nor too permissive.

This chapter considers selected literary works on the American wars in Vietnam and Iraq that throw light on an array of people living in war and navigating its aftermaths. Novels and memoirs curate through stories that miniaturize and narrow war to a few featured characters and experiential moments of larger conflicts. Importantly, literary sites of war knowledge bring to the fore dark essentials of war, including torture, rape and the abject corpses that war museum exhibitions and official memorials to war veterans avoid showing. The novels and memoirs featured here are classics by Americans, Iraqis and Vietnamese, soldiers and civilians, among them works by Bao Ninh, Sinan Antoon, Kevin Powers, Helen Benedict, and Riverbend.