Richard Dean
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199285723
- eISBN:
- 9780191603938
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199285721.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The humanity formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative demands that we treat humanity as an end in itself. Because this principle resonates with currently influential ideals of human rights and ...
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The humanity formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative demands that we treat humanity as an end in itself. Because this principle resonates with currently influential ideals of human rights and dignity, contemporary readers often find it compelling, even if the rest of Kant’s moral philosophy leaves them cold. Moreover, some prominent specialists in Kant’s ethics recently have turned to the humanity formulation as the most theoretically central and promising principle of Kant’s ethics. Nevertheless, despite the intuitive appeal and the increasingly recognized philosophical importance of the humanity formulation, it has received less attention than many other, less central, aspects of Kant’s ethics. This book is the most sustained and systematic examination yet of the humanity formulation. It argues that the ‘rational nature’ that must be treated as an end in itself is not a minimally rational nature consisting of the power to set ends or the unrealized capacity to act morally, but instead is the more properly rational nature possessed by someone who gives priority to moral principles over any contrary impulses. In other words, good will is the end in itself. This non-standard reading of the humanity formulation provides a firm theoretical foundation for deriving plausible approaches to particular moral issues. Contrary to first impressions, it does not impose moralistic demands to pass judgment on others’ character. This reading of the humanity formulation also enables progress on problems of interest to Kant scholars such as reconstructing Kant’s argument for accepting the humanity formulation as a basic moral principle, and allows for increased understanding of the relationship between Kant’s ethics and supposedly Kantian ideas such as ‘respect for autonomy’.Less
The humanity formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative demands that we treat humanity as an end in itself. Because this principle resonates with currently influential ideals of human rights and dignity, contemporary readers often find it compelling, even if the rest of Kant’s moral philosophy leaves them cold. Moreover, some prominent specialists in Kant’s ethics recently have turned to the humanity formulation as the most theoretically central and promising principle of Kant’s ethics. Nevertheless, despite the intuitive appeal and the increasingly recognized philosophical importance of the humanity formulation, it has received less attention than many other, less central, aspects of Kant’s ethics. This book is the most sustained and systematic examination yet of the humanity formulation. It argues that the ‘rational nature’ that must be treated as an end in itself is not a minimally rational nature consisting of the power to set ends or the unrealized capacity to act morally, but instead is the more properly rational nature possessed by someone who gives priority to moral principles over any contrary impulses. In other words, good will is the end in itself. This non-standard reading of the humanity formulation provides a firm theoretical foundation for deriving plausible approaches to particular moral issues. Contrary to first impressions, it does not impose moralistic demands to pass judgment on others’ character. This reading of the humanity formulation also enables progress on problems of interest to Kant scholars such as reconstructing Kant’s argument for accepting the humanity formulation as a basic moral principle, and allows for increased understanding of the relationship between Kant’s ethics and supposedly Kantian ideas such as ‘respect for autonomy’.
Rein Taagepera
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199534661
- eISBN:
- 9780191715921
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534661.003.0018
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Economy
Society needs more from social sciences than they have delivered, and this book offers openings. To the society at large, quantitative social scientists presently seem no better at prediction than ...
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Society needs more from social sciences than they have delivered, and this book offers openings. To the society at large, quantitative social scientists presently seem no better at prediction than qualitative historians, philosophers, and journalists — they just look more boring. computers could be a boon to social sciences, but they have turned out a curse in disguise, by enabling people with insufficient understanding of scientific process to use canned computer programs and grind out reams of numbers parading as “results,” to be printed — and hardly ever used again. One may discard this book on the basis of errors of detail, but the problems it points out will still be there. Unless corrected, they will lead to a Ptolemaic dead end.Less
Society needs more from social sciences than they have delivered, and this book offers openings. To the society at large, quantitative social scientists presently seem no better at prediction than qualitative historians, philosophers, and journalists — they just look more boring. computers could be a boon to social sciences, but they have turned out a curse in disguise, by enabling people with insufficient understanding of scientific process to use canned computer programs and grind out reams of numbers parading as “results,” to be printed — and hardly ever used again. One may discard this book on the basis of errors of detail, but the problems it points out will still be there. Unless corrected, they will lead to a Ptolemaic dead end.
Joseph Pilsner
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286058
- eISBN:
- 9780191603808
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286051.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Thomas Aquinas believed that human actions have kinds or species. He divided human actions into good, evil, or indifferent, and subdivided them into more particular kinds such as almsgiving, murder, ...
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Thomas Aquinas believed that human actions have kinds or species. He divided human actions into good, evil, or indifferent, and subdivided them into more particular kinds such as almsgiving, murder, fraternal correction, or theft. From his earliest consideration of this topic in the Commentary on the Sentences to his latest in the Summa Theologiae, he used five different terms — end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive — to identify what gives species to human actions. Some difficulties have been noted with respect to his thinking on this subject. A first such difficulty is that his teaching on a few of these terms seems at times inconsistent. For example, although Aquinas maintains in some texts that circumstances can give species to human actions, he seems to deny that they can in other texts. Further, although on some occasions he holds that a remote end is irrelevant for the specification of human actions, on other occasions, he seems to assert that a remote end is the most important principle for such specification. It is not easy to see at first how these seemingly contradictory statements can be true at the same time. A second difficulty is that it is hard to grasp how end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive could all refer to what specifies human actions. Although certain similarities in meaning can be recognized among them, no term seems to be a strict synonym of any other, ruling out an easy reconciliation. This monograph examines Aquinas’s understanding of these five terms to resolve these difficulties and propose a coherent account of his teaching on the specification of human actions.Less
Thomas Aquinas believed that human actions have kinds or species. He divided human actions into good, evil, or indifferent, and subdivided them into more particular kinds such as almsgiving, murder, fraternal correction, or theft. From his earliest consideration of this topic in the Commentary on the Sentences to his latest in the Summa Theologiae, he used five different terms — end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive — to identify what gives species to human actions. Some difficulties have been noted with respect to his thinking on this subject. A first such difficulty is that his teaching on a few of these terms seems at times inconsistent. For example, although Aquinas maintains in some texts that circumstances can give species to human actions, he seems to deny that they can in other texts. Further, although on some occasions he holds that a remote end is irrelevant for the specification of human actions, on other occasions, he seems to assert that a remote end is the most important principle for such specification. It is not easy to see at first how these seemingly contradictory statements can be true at the same time. A second difficulty is that it is hard to grasp how end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive could all refer to what specifies human actions. Although certain similarities in meaning can be recognized among them, no term seems to be a strict synonym of any other, ruling out an easy reconciliation. This monograph examines Aquinas’s understanding of these five terms to resolve these difficulties and propose a coherent account of his teaching on the specification of human actions.
Lane Kenworthy
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199591527
- eISBN:
- 9780191731389
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591527.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Economy
One of the principal goals of antipoverty efforts should be to improve the absolute living standards of the least well-off. This book aims to enhance our understanding of how to do that.
One of the principal goals of antipoverty efforts should be to improve the absolute living standards of the least well-off. This book aims to enhance our understanding of how to do that.
Joseph Pilsner
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286058
- eISBN:
- 9780191603808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286051.003.0010
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter shows that end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive can all be understood to contribute to the specification of human actions for Aquinas in a fundamentally consistent way. Although ...
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This chapter shows that end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive can all be understood to contribute to the specification of human actions for Aquinas in a fundamentally consistent way. Although specification by end and by object have characteristic differences, they are at base compatible because both end and object can refer to precisely the same reality in human action. The same goal can be both a human action’s final cause (end), and that good to which the will is directed (object). Specification by matter can be integrated with the first two: Aquinas asserts that matter specifies human action either because it has been willed as an end or possesses a distinctive formal aspect (like an object’s). Specification by circumstance can be fit into the picture through object: Aquinas believes that a ‘circumstance’ essential with respect to right reason takes on a new name, ‘condition’ or ‘difference’, and constitutes in whole or in part something essential to an object’s formal aspect. Although motives may seem more difficult to integrate since they are sometimes presented as causes for appetite, Aquinas says that motives are ‘proper objects of the will’ and asserts that they specify as ‘ends’ of human action.Less
This chapter shows that end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive can all be understood to contribute to the specification of human actions for Aquinas in a fundamentally consistent way. Although specification by end and by object have characteristic differences, they are at base compatible because both end and object can refer to precisely the same reality in human action. The same goal can be both a human action’s final cause (end), and that good to which the will is directed (object). Specification by matter can be integrated with the first two: Aquinas asserts that matter specifies human action either because it has been willed as an end or possesses a distinctive formal aspect (like an object’s). Specification by circumstance can be fit into the picture through object: Aquinas believes that a ‘circumstance’ essential with respect to right reason takes on a new name, ‘condition’ or ‘difference’, and constitutes in whole or in part something essential to an object’s formal aspect. Although motives may seem more difficult to integrate since they are sometimes presented as causes for appetite, Aquinas says that motives are ‘proper objects of the will’ and asserts that they specify as ‘ends’ of human action.
Joseph Pilsner
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286058
- eISBN:
- 9780191603808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286051.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
A crucial task for any moral theory is to determine what makes a human action to be of a certain kind. For instance, what makes almsgiving to be in its own species rather than in the species of theft ...
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A crucial task for any moral theory is to determine what makes a human action to be of a certain kind. For instance, what makes almsgiving to be in its own species rather than in the species of theft or selling? Aquinas addresses this issue in a few of his works, most notably Commentary on the Sentences, De Malo, and the Summa Theologiae. However, a puzzle arises when his writings are examined carefully. Aquinas uses five different terms — end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive — to signify what gives species to human actions. Although similarities in meaning can be discerned among certain of these terms, it is difficult to grasp how all five could refer to what specifies human actions. In this monograph, the five terms used by Aquinas are examined and compared to propose a more comprehensive account of his teaching on specification of human action.Less
A crucial task for any moral theory is to determine what makes a human action to be of a certain kind. For instance, what makes almsgiving to be in its own species rather than in the species of theft or selling? Aquinas addresses this issue in a few of his works, most notably Commentary on the Sentences, De Malo, and the Summa Theologiae. However, a puzzle arises when his writings are examined carefully. Aquinas uses five different terms — end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive — to signify what gives species to human actions. Although similarities in meaning can be discerned among certain of these terms, it is difficult to grasp how all five could refer to what specifies human actions. In this monograph, the five terms used by Aquinas are examined and compared to propose a more comprehensive account of his teaching on specification of human action.
Paul Guyer
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199273461
- eISBN:
- 9780191706196
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273461.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, General
The chapters in the first part of this book explore Kant's conception of the systematicity of concepts and laws as the ultimate goals of natural science, explore the implications of Kant's account of ...
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The chapters in the first part of this book explore Kant's conception of the systematicity of concepts and laws as the ultimate goals of natural science, explore the implications of Kant's account of our experience of organisms for the goal of a unified science, and examine Kant's attempt to prove the existence of an ether as the condition of the possibility of experience of the physical world. The second group of chapters explore Kant's conception of a systematic union of persons as ends in themselves and of their particular ends as the object of morality, and examine his conception of the systems of political and ethical duties necessary to achieve such an end. The third group of chapters examine Kant's attempt to unify the systems of nature and freedom through a radical transformation of traditional teleology.Less
The chapters in the first part of this book explore Kant's conception of the systematicity of concepts and laws as the ultimate goals of natural science, explore the implications of Kant's account of our experience of organisms for the goal of a unified science, and examine Kant's attempt to prove the existence of an ether as the condition of the possibility of experience of the physical world. The second group of chapters explore Kant's conception of a systematic union of persons as ends in themselves and of their particular ends as the object of morality, and examine his conception of the systems of political and ethical duties necessary to achieve such an end. The third group of chapters examine Kant's attempt to unify the systems of nature and freedom through a radical transformation of traditional teleology.
Joseph Pilsner
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286058
- eISBN:
- 9780191603808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286051.003.0009
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
There is an apparent paradox with respect to Aquinas’s teaching on proximate and remote ends. On some occasions, he seems to assert that a proximate end specifies a human action, while the remote end ...
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There is an apparent paradox with respect to Aquinas’s teaching on proximate and remote ends. On some occasions, he seems to assert that a proximate end specifies a human action, while the remote end is inconsequential. On other occasions, he appears to hold not only that a remote end gives a species to a human action, but also that this species has greater formal influence than the species from a proximate end. The way to resolve this paradox is to realize that Aquinas addresses two different questions with respect to the specification of human action. Sometimes, he is exploring what is required to determine a particular species of human action. In this case, he thinks that willing a proximate end (such as ‘having intercourse with another’s spouse’) is sufficient to determine this action’s species (adultery), and that no further end would add something critical for making this determination. On other occasions, he is wondering what the species of an action would be in a case where a particular proximate end (such as theft) is already being willed by an agent for a particular remote end (such as murder or almsgiving). In this case, he believes that the human action in question has two moral species, one from each end; the species from the remote end has a kind of formal primacy, since the proximate end is being willed for the remote end’s sake.Less
There is an apparent paradox with respect to Aquinas’s teaching on proximate and remote ends. On some occasions, he seems to assert that a proximate end specifies a human action, while the remote end is inconsequential. On other occasions, he appears to hold not only that a remote end gives a species to a human action, but also that this species has greater formal influence than the species from a proximate end. The way to resolve this paradox is to realize that Aquinas addresses two different questions with respect to the specification of human action. Sometimes, he is exploring what is required to determine a particular species of human action. In this case, he thinks that willing a proximate end (such as ‘having intercourse with another’s spouse’) is sufficient to determine this action’s species (adultery), and that no further end would add something critical for making this determination. On other occasions, he is wondering what the species of an action would be in a case where a particular proximate end (such as theft) is already being willed by an agent for a particular remote end (such as murder or almsgiving). In this case, he believes that the human action in question has two moral species, one from each end; the species from the remote end has a kind of formal primacy, since the proximate end is being willed for the remote end’s sake.
Richard Dean
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199285723
- eISBN:
- 9780191603938
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199285721.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter argues that reading ‘humanity’ in the humanity formulation as good will provides the best fit between the humanity formulation and other major themes of Kant’s ethics. An analysis of ...
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This chapter argues that reading ‘humanity’ in the humanity formulation as good will provides the best fit between the humanity formulation and other major themes of Kant’s ethics. An analysis of Kant’s most significant claims about value in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals shows that good will and humanity are equivalent. Since all of Kant’s claims about value must be read in light of his position that value is just a way to describe the choices that rational beings would make, it is especially significant to note that he often describes humanity as a moral ideal that must be pursued at all costs. Taking the end in itself to be good will also explains why the duty to aid others in pursuing their ends does not include their immoral ends, and allows for stronger connections between the different formulations of the Categorical Imperative.Less
This chapter argues that reading ‘humanity’ in the humanity formulation as good will provides the best fit between the humanity formulation and other major themes of Kant’s ethics. An analysis of Kant’s most significant claims about value in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals shows that good will and humanity are equivalent. Since all of Kant’s claims about value must be read in light of his position that value is just a way to describe the choices that rational beings would make, it is especially significant to note that he often describes humanity as a moral ideal that must be pursued at all costs. Taking the end in itself to be good will also explains why the duty to aid others in pursuing their ends does not include their immoral ends, and allows for stronger connections between the different formulations of the Categorical Imperative.
Arie Morgenstern
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195305784
- eISBN:
- 9780199784820
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195305787.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Judaism
Profound changes in late 18th- and early 19th-century European and Jewish history persuaded many traditional Jews around the world that the redemption was at hand and that they were living in the ...
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Profound changes in late 18th- and early 19th-century European and Jewish history persuaded many traditional Jews around the world that the redemption was at hand and that they were living in the times of the “Footsteps of the Messiah”. Among the changes in response to that sense was a growth in messianic activism, especially on the part of the Perushim; the activism was grounded in the belief that it was proper for Jews to take steps, both spiritual and practical, to hasten the End-time. Those steps included an effort to locate the lost Ten Tribes of Israel, whose discovery would be seen as a further harbinger of the Messiah’s imminent appearance.Less
Profound changes in late 18th- and early 19th-century European and Jewish history persuaded many traditional Jews around the world that the redemption was at hand and that they were living in the times of the “Footsteps of the Messiah”. Among the changes in response to that sense was a growth in messianic activism, especially on the part of the Perushim; the activism was grounded in the belief that it was proper for Jews to take steps, both spiritual and practical, to hasten the End-time. Those steps included an effort to locate the lost Ten Tribes of Israel, whose discovery would be seen as a further harbinger of the Messiah’s imminent appearance.
Arie Morgenstern
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195305784
- eISBN:
- 9780199784820
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195305787.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Judaism
Various End-reckonings, based on both the Talmud and the Zohar, led to the conclusion that the Messiah would appear in 5600 A.M. (the six-hundredth year of the sixth millennium), corresponding to ...
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Various End-reckonings, based on both the Talmud and the Zohar, led to the conclusion that the Messiah would appear in 5600 A.M. (the six-hundredth year of the sixth millennium), corresponding to 1840 C.E. The firmly entrenched belief appears in documents from throughout the Jewish world: Persia and Kurdistan, Morocco, the Land of Israel, Eastern Europe (Hasidic and non-Hasidic alike), and Western Europe. The documents are relatively few, given the Jews’ reluctance to discuss such matters in writing, but it appears as well in accounts by Christian missionaries of their conversations with Jews in most of those areas.Less
Various End-reckonings, based on both the Talmud and the Zohar, led to the conclusion that the Messiah would appear in 5600 A.M. (the six-hundredth year of the sixth millennium), corresponding to 1840 C.E. The firmly entrenched belief appears in documents from throughout the Jewish world: Persia and Kurdistan, Morocco, the Land of Israel, Eastern Europe (Hasidic and non-Hasidic alike), and Western Europe. The documents are relatively few, given the Jews’ reluctance to discuss such matters in writing, but it appears as well in accounts by Christian missionaries of their conversations with Jews in most of those areas.
Mary Briody Mahowald
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195176179
- eISBN:
- 9780199786558
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195176170.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
Cases illustrating variables that arise in the health care of elderly women and their caregivers, and care of the dying are presented. These include questions about ageism, competence to perform ...
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Cases illustrating variables that arise in the health care of elderly women and their caregivers, and care of the dying are presented. These include questions about ageism, competence to perform ordinary functions such as driving, possible loss of capacity for moral agency, advance directives, and decisions about forgoing or terminating life-support. For each topic, empirical and theoretical factors are discussed from an “egalitarian perspective” that imputes privileged status to the standpoint of women.Less
Cases illustrating variables that arise in the health care of elderly women and their caregivers, and care of the dying are presented. These include questions about ageism, competence to perform ordinary functions such as driving, possible loss of capacity for moral agency, advance directives, and decisions about forgoing or terminating life-support. For each topic, empirical and theoretical factors are discussed from an “egalitarian perspective” that imputes privileged status to the standpoint of women.
Joseph Pilsner
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286058
- eISBN:
- 9780191603808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286051.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Aquinas asserts that ends specify human actions, and explains this point by comparing human actions with other realities. For example, he maintains that an end is comparable to a form in a natural ...
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Aquinas asserts that ends specify human actions, and explains this point by comparing human actions with other realities. For example, he maintains that an end is comparable to a form in a natural corporeal being (such as a plant or animal), for just as no material creature exists or has a species without a form, no human action can come to be or be of a particular kind unless a human agent wills some definite end. Even more important for Aquinas is a comparison with natural motions (such as changes in place, colour, or size). He thinks that as a subsensory motion is specified by its active principle (the nature from which the motion arises) and its ‘terminus to which’ (the motion’s final resting point), so a human action is specified by its active principle (the rational good or end which attracts the agent) and its ‘terminus to which’ (the action’s arrival at the agent’s intended goal).Less
Aquinas asserts that ends specify human actions, and explains this point by comparing human actions with other realities. For example, he maintains that an end is comparable to a form in a natural corporeal being (such as a plant or animal), for just as no material creature exists or has a species without a form, no human action can come to be or be of a particular kind unless a human agent wills some definite end. Even more important for Aquinas is a comparison with natural motions (such as changes in place, colour, or size). He thinks that as a subsensory motion is specified by its active principle (the nature from which the motion arises) and its ‘terminus to which’ (the motion’s final resting point), so a human action is specified by its active principle (the rational good or end which attracts the agent) and its ‘terminus to which’ (the action’s arrival at the agent’s intended goal).
Joseph Pilsner
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286058
- eISBN:
- 9780191603808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286051.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Aquinas asserts on many occasions that human actions are specified by their objects. Two meanings he gives to the term ‘object’ are particularly significant. On some occasions, he uses ‘object’ to ...
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Aquinas asserts on many occasions that human actions are specified by their objects. Two meanings he gives to the term ‘object’ are particularly significant. On some occasions, he uses ‘object’ to mean a thing in so far as it possesses a formal quality by which it defines a related action, habit, or power. To illustrate, as the colour of something (not its smell or taste) defines sight, so distinctive differences in what is willed determines whether human actions are morally good, evil, or indifferent, and whether they belong to more particular moral species such as almsgiving or adultery. On other occasions, Aquinas has a second meaning for ‘object’, namely, a proximate end. In this case, when he says an object specifies, he means that a proximate end (such as ‘taking an innocent life’) determines a moral species (such as ‘murder’), and that no further end an agent may pursue (such as wealth) is necessary to make this determination.Less
Aquinas asserts on many occasions that human actions are specified by their objects. Two meanings he gives to the term ‘object’ are particularly significant. On some occasions, he uses ‘object’ to mean a thing in so far as it possesses a formal quality by which it defines a related action, habit, or power. To illustrate, as the colour of something (not its smell or taste) defines sight, so distinctive differences in what is willed determines whether human actions are morally good, evil, or indifferent, and whether they belong to more particular moral species such as almsgiving or adultery. On other occasions, Aquinas has a second meaning for ‘object’, namely, a proximate end. In this case, when he says an object specifies, he means that a proximate end (such as ‘taking an innocent life’) determines a moral species (such as ‘murder’), and that no further end an agent may pursue (such as wealth) is necessary to make this determination.
Joseph Pilsner
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286058
- eISBN:
- 9780191603808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286051.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Aquinas sometimes says that matter specifies a human action, and frequently uses ‘matter’ as an alternative term for ‘object’. He does not hold that all matter can determine a human action’s species, ...
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Aquinas sometimes says that matter specifies a human action, and frequently uses ‘matter’ as an alternative term for ‘object’. He does not hold that all matter can determine a human action’s species, but only that matter to which an action is specially related, called the ‘matter about which’ an action takes place or its ‘due’/‘undue’ matter. Aquinas has two different ways of explaining how matter can specify. On occasion, he argues that just as particular kinds of matter predispose for certain substantial forms (for instance, only flesh and bones can accommodate the human soul), so the distinctive characters of things willed predispose for certain kinds of human actions and habits (for example, pleasures of touch predispose for temperance, not courage). In other contexts, Aquinas uses explanations more familiar in his moral teaching: he says that matter specifies because a human agent wills some matter as an end, or because matter possesses a distinctive formal aspect (like an object’s).Less
Aquinas sometimes says that matter specifies a human action, and frequently uses ‘matter’ as an alternative term for ‘object’. He does not hold that all matter can determine a human action’s species, but only that matter to which an action is specially related, called the ‘matter about which’ an action takes place or its ‘due’/‘undue’ matter. Aquinas has two different ways of explaining how matter can specify. On occasion, he argues that just as particular kinds of matter predispose for certain substantial forms (for instance, only flesh and bones can accommodate the human soul), so the distinctive characters of things willed predispose for certain kinds of human actions and habits (for example, pleasures of touch predispose for temperance, not courage). In other contexts, Aquinas uses explanations more familiar in his moral teaching: he says that matter specifies because a human agent wills some matter as an end, or because matter possesses a distinctive formal aspect (like an object’s).
Joseph Pilsner
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286058
- eISBN:
- 9780191603808
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286051.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Aquinas says that motives are responsible for the specification of human action. ‘Motive’ can generally refer to any principle of movement, but two meanings are especially significant in the context ...
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Aquinas says that motives are responsible for the specification of human action. ‘Motive’ can generally refer to any principle of movement, but two meanings are especially significant in the context of the voluntary. First, one sees ‘motive’ referring to what attracts a person to action. In this context, Aquinas calls motives ‘proper objects of the will’ and insists that they specify as ‘ends’ of human action. Second, one sees motives referring to causes related to appetite. For example, Aquinas differentiates gluttony into five species (named by circumstances) because each species is associated with a distinctive motive, as when rapid digestion (motive) incites concupiscence and defines the species of gluttony called ‘too soon’. Since Aquinas holds that a passion is morally relevant only to the extent that it is voluntary, motives regarding appetite must be willed somehow for them to determine a species of sin.Less
Aquinas says that motives are responsible for the specification of human action. ‘Motive’ can generally refer to any principle of movement, but two meanings are especially significant in the context of the voluntary. First, one sees ‘motive’ referring to what attracts a person to action. In this context, Aquinas calls motives ‘proper objects of the will’ and insists that they specify as ‘ends’ of human action. Second, one sees motives referring to causes related to appetite. For example, Aquinas differentiates gluttony into five species (named by circumstances) because each species is associated with a distinctive motive, as when rapid digestion (motive) incites concupiscence and defines the species of gluttony called ‘too soon’. Since Aquinas holds that a passion is morally relevant only to the extent that it is voluntary, motives regarding appetite must be willed somehow for them to determine a species of sin.
Paul Grice
Richard Warner (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198242529
- eISBN:
- 9780191597534
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198242522.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book, based on Grice's 1979 Locke Lectures at Oxford and published posthumously, elaborates the notions of reasons, reasoning, and rationality, with particular emphasis on the unity of practical ...
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This book, based on Grice's 1979 Locke Lectures at Oxford and published posthumously, elaborates the notions of reasons, reasoning, and rationality, with particular emphasis on the unity of practical and non‐practical (‘alethic’) reasoning. It begins with a look at the nature of ordinary reasoning and distinguishes between ‘flat rationality’, the formal capacity to apply inferential rules, and ‘variable rationality’, the excellence or competence of good reasoning (Ch. 1). Grice then proposes an ‘Equivocality Thesis’, arguing that a structural representation can be given for justificatory (normative) reasons that allows for modals (ought, must, etc.) to be used univocally across the alethic/practical divide in terms of general acceptability statements (Chs. 2–3). In addition, he shows that valid inferences can be drawn from alethic to practical acceptability statements (Ch. 4). Finally, Grice provides a characterization of happiness as it features in practical thinking, and suggests it to be an ‘inclusive end’, consisting of the realization of other ends that are desirable for their own sake as well as for the sake of happiness (Ch. 5). An extensive introduction by Richard Warner provides a helpful summary and explanation of key aspects of the book.Less
This book, based on Grice's 1979 Locke Lectures at Oxford and published posthumously, elaborates the notions of reasons, reasoning, and rationality, with particular emphasis on the unity of practical and non‐practical (‘alethic’) reasoning. It begins with a look at the nature of ordinary reasoning and distinguishes between ‘flat rationality’, the formal capacity to apply inferential rules, and ‘variable rationality’, the excellence or competence of good reasoning (Ch. 1). Grice then proposes an ‘Equivocality Thesis’, arguing that a structural representation can be given for justificatory (normative) reasons that allows for modals (ought, must, etc.) to be used univocally across the alethic/practical divide in terms of general acceptability statements (Chs. 2–3). In addition, he shows that valid inferences can be drawn from alethic to practical acceptability statements (Ch. 4). Finally, Grice provides a characterization of happiness as it features in practical thinking, and suggests it to be an ‘inclusive end’, consisting of the realization of other ends that are desirable for their own sake as well as for the sake of happiness (Ch. 5). An extensive introduction by Richard Warner provides a helpful summary and explanation of key aspects of the book.
Damian Thompson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195178562
- eISBN:
- 9780199785070
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195178564.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of existing academic theories of millenarianism, some of which reflect, and may even help shape, popular misconceptions of apocalyptic believers. It ...
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This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of existing academic theories of millenarianism, some of which reflect, and may even help shape, popular misconceptions of apocalyptic believers. It is argued that the most important factor distinguishing extreme from moderate millenarianism is the imminence of the End, not its violent character. An overview of the chapters included in this volume is presented.Less
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of existing academic theories of millenarianism, some of which reflect, and may even help shape, popular misconceptions of apocalyptic believers. It is argued that the most important factor distinguishing extreme from moderate millenarianism is the imminence of the End, not its violent character. An overview of the chapters included in this volume is presented.
Damian Thompson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195178562
- eISBN:
- 9780199785070
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195178564.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This chapter examines how Pentecostal churches are pulled toward and away from accommodation with society as they seek to exercise ministries of miraculous healing and non-eschatological prophecy. It ...
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This chapter examines how Pentecostal churches are pulled toward and away from accommodation with society as they seek to exercise ministries of miraculous healing and non-eschatological prophecy. It describes the millenarian traditions that Pentecostalism inherited from fundamentalism. Pentecostal attitudes to the End Times, which range from enthusiastic participation in the prophecy subculture to a complete lack of interest in it are discussed, including a more recent, optimistic belief in the coming restoration of God’s kingdom.Less
This chapter examines how Pentecostal churches are pulled toward and away from accommodation with society as they seek to exercise ministries of miraculous healing and non-eschatological prophecy. It describes the millenarian traditions that Pentecostalism inherited from fundamentalism. Pentecostal attitudes to the End Times, which range from enthusiastic participation in the prophecy subculture to a complete lack of interest in it are discussed, including a more recent, optimistic belief in the coming restoration of God’s kingdom.
Damian Thompson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195178562
- eISBN:
- 9780199785070
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195178564.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This chapter explores the different strategies used by leaders and members of Kensington Temple with regard to the subject of the End Times. It examines the “official” treatment of apocalyptic ...
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This chapter explores the different strategies used by leaders and members of Kensington Temple with regard to the subject of the End Times. It examines the “official” treatment of apocalyptic doctrines in sermons and Bible classes, and the “unofficial” material sold in the church bookshop. At both levels, there is evidence that the transmission of millenarian ideas is affected by the personal dispositions of pastors and church employees, many of whom find this a difficult area to manage. Drawing on interviews with ordinary church members and survey data, the different strategies employed by worshippers in dealing with potentially troublesome apocalyptic ideas are examined. These include a policy of ignoring them, a focus on explanatory rather than predictive motifs, and the use of language that reduces millenarianism to the unthreatening proportions of a professional discourse.Less
This chapter explores the different strategies used by leaders and members of Kensington Temple with regard to the subject of the End Times. It examines the “official” treatment of apocalyptic doctrines in sermons and Bible classes, and the “unofficial” material sold in the church bookshop. At both levels, there is evidence that the transmission of millenarian ideas is affected by the personal dispositions of pastors and church employees, many of whom find this a difficult area to manage. Drawing on interviews with ordinary church members and survey data, the different strategies employed by worshippers in dealing with potentially troublesome apocalyptic ideas are examined. These include a policy of ignoring them, a focus on explanatory rather than predictive motifs, and the use of language that reduces millenarianism to the unthreatening proportions of a professional discourse.
