C. Daniel Batson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195341065
- eISBN:
- 9780199894222
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341065.003.0009
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter considers the liabilities of empathy-induced altruism following roughly the same sequence as in Chapter 7—first, liabilities for individuals in need, then for groups in need, and ...
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This chapter considers the liabilities of empathy-induced altruism following roughly the same sequence as in Chapter 7—first, liabilities for individuals in need, then for groups in need, and finally, for the person experiencing altruistic motivation. The potential liabilities are: empathy-induced altruism can hurt those in need, especially when the helper needs a cool head; it may also produce maternalism and paternalism; empathy-induced altruism can be overridden by self-concern; it can produce empathy avoidance; empathy-induced altruism is less likely to be evoked by non-personal, abstract, and chronic needs; empathy-induced altruism can be a source of immoral action; it can also pose a threat to the common good in social dilemmas. Finally, empathy-induced altruism can pose a threat to the mental and physical health—and even to the life—of the altruistically motivated individual.Less
This chapter considers the liabilities of empathy-induced altruism following roughly the same sequence as in Chapter 7—first, liabilities for individuals in need, then for groups in need, and finally, for the person experiencing altruistic motivation. The potential liabilities are: empathy-induced altruism can hurt those in need, especially when the helper needs a cool head; it may also produce maternalism and paternalism; empathy-induced altruism can be overridden by self-concern; it can produce empathy avoidance; empathy-induced altruism is less likely to be evoked by non-personal, abstract, and chronic needs; empathy-induced altruism can be a source of immoral action; it can also pose a threat to the common good in social dilemmas. Finally, empathy-induced altruism can pose a threat to the mental and physical health—and even to the life—of the altruistically motivated individual.
C. Daniel Batson
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- October 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190651374
- eISBN:
- 9780190651404
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190651374.003.0012
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
To conclude—even tentatively—that empathy-induced altruism is within our motivational repertoire poses a puzzle: How is it possible? This question demands an answer at two levels. We need to know (a) ...
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To conclude—even tentatively—that empathy-induced altruism is within our motivational repertoire poses a puzzle: How is it possible? This question demands an answer at two levels. We need to know (a) the conditions necessary to produce empathic concern and altruistic motivation in our lives today and (b) how altruism could have become part of our nature. The direct antecedents of empathy-induced altruism seem to be perceiving another as in need and valuing the other’s welfare. The most plausible distal (evolutionary) antecedent is generalized parental care. This care is different from the evolutionary biologists’ idea of inclusive fitness (care proportional to degree of kinship). An experiment that tested for generalized parental care is described. Finally, three limits to empathy-induced altruism are considered: the scope of empathic concern, empathy avoidance, and the strength to competing concerns.Less
To conclude—even tentatively—that empathy-induced altruism is within our motivational repertoire poses a puzzle: How is it possible? This question demands an answer at two levels. We need to know (a) the conditions necessary to produce empathic concern and altruistic motivation in our lives today and (b) how altruism could have become part of our nature. The direct antecedents of empathy-induced altruism seem to be perceiving another as in need and valuing the other’s welfare. The most plausible distal (evolutionary) antecedent is generalized parental care. This care is different from the evolutionary biologists’ idea of inclusive fitness (care proportional to degree of kinship). An experiment that tested for generalized parental care is described. Finally, three limits to empathy-induced altruism are considered: the scope of empathic concern, empathy avoidance, and the strength to competing concerns.