Robert D. Rupert
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195379457
- eISBN:
- 9780199869114
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379457.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter summarizes the book's arguments against the extended view, as well as the primary conciliatory contentions advanced with regard to the embedded and embodied views. The chapter closes ...
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This chapter summarizes the book's arguments against the extended view, as well as the primary conciliatory contentions advanced with regard to the embedded and embodied views. The chapter closes with comments on the positive importance of the embodied and embedded programs, particularly in respect of such philosophical issues as reductionism and naturalized epistemology.Less
This chapter summarizes the book's arguments against the extended view, as well as the primary conciliatory contentions advanced with regard to the embedded and embodied views. The chapter closes with comments on the positive importance of the embodied and embedded programs, particularly in respect of such philosophical issues as reductionism and naturalized epistemology.
Robert D. Rupert
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195379457
- eISBN:
- 9780199869114
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379457.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The chapter argues that, contrary to the claims of the proponents of the embodied approach, embodied cognitive modeling does not underwrite a new view of the fundamental relation between mind and ...
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The chapter argues that, contrary to the claims of the proponents of the embodied approach, embodied cognitive modeling does not underwrite a new view of the fundamental relation between mind and body. The standard complaints lodged against computationalism are shown to follow largely from mistaken interpretations of functionalism, computationalism, and the associated accounts of realization. It is argued that although the embodied approach may rightly place special emphasis on imagistic representation, the empirical work on embodiment does not support very strongly a distinctively imagistic account of cognitive processing. The lessons of the chapter are briefly applied to Searle's Chinese Room argument and Harnad's concern about symbol grounding.Less
The chapter argues that, contrary to the claims of the proponents of the embodied approach, embodied cognitive modeling does not underwrite a new view of the fundamental relation between mind and body. The standard complaints lodged against computationalism are shown to follow largely from mistaken interpretations of functionalism, computationalism, and the associated accounts of realization. It is argued that although the embodied approach may rightly place special emphasis on imagistic representation, the empirical work on embodiment does not support very strongly a distinctively imagistic account of cognitive processing. The lessons of the chapter are briefly applied to Searle's Chinese Room argument and Harnad's concern about symbol grounding.
Jay Schulkin
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691157443
- eISBN:
- 9781400849031
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691157443.003.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience
This book traces the origins of music, from the appearance of the relevant anatomical features, to the development of diverse forms of biological systems that figure in musical expression. It ...
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This book traces the origins of music, from the appearance of the relevant anatomical features, to the development of diverse forms of biological systems that figure in musical expression. It considers how music reflects our social nature and is tied to other instrumental expression in the adaptation to changing circumstances. It shows that expectancy and violations of those musical expectations linked to memory and human development are critical features in the aesthetics of musical sensibility (like other avenues of human experience). The book also examines how music is connected to movement and dance. This introduction provides an overview of the “cognitive revolution” and the emergence of a discipline called “social neuroscience,” as well as Leonard Meyer's theory of music drawn from a pragmatism based in C. S. Peirce and John Dewey's notion of inquiry. It also explains how action and embodied cognition are related to music.Less
This book traces the origins of music, from the appearance of the relevant anatomical features, to the development of diverse forms of biological systems that figure in musical expression. It considers how music reflects our social nature and is tied to other instrumental expression in the adaptation to changing circumstances. It shows that expectancy and violations of those musical expectations linked to memory and human development are critical features in the aesthetics of musical sensibility (like other avenues of human experience). The book also examines how music is connected to movement and dance. This introduction provides an overview of the “cognitive revolution” and the emergence of a discipline called “social neuroscience,” as well as Leonard Meyer's theory of music drawn from a pragmatism based in C. S. Peirce and John Dewey's notion of inquiry. It also explains how action and embodied cognition are related to music.
Robert D. Rupert
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195379457
- eISBN:
- 9780199869114
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379457.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter briefly describes the history leading up to the situated revolution. It then introduces and motivates the three varieties of situated view to be discussed: (a) the extended view, which ...
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This chapter briefly describes the history leading up to the situated revolution. It then introduces and motivates the three varieties of situated view to be discussed: (a) the extended view, which holds that human cognitive processing literally extends into the environment beyond the boundary of the organism; (b) the embedded view, which asserts that the human cognitive system is bounded by the organism but relies in surprising and extensive ways on interaction with the environment; and (c) the embodied view, according to which the human's nonneural physical body deeply influences cognitive processing. The chapter also sets out the book's naturalistic methodology and explores the way in which this methodology might support conclusions about the human mind and self.Less
This chapter briefly describes the history leading up to the situated revolution. It then introduces and motivates the three varieties of situated view to be discussed: (a) the extended view, which holds that human cognitive processing literally extends into the environment beyond the boundary of the organism; (b) the embedded view, which asserts that the human cognitive system is bounded by the organism but relies in surprising and extensive ways on interaction with the environment; and (c) the embodied view, according to which the human's nonneural physical body deeply influences cognitive processing. The chapter also sets out the book's naturalistic methodology and explores the way in which this methodology might support conclusions about the human mind and self.
Lawrence Shapiro
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199217274
- eISBN:
- 9780191696060
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217274.003.0004
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter begins with a discussion of Searle's Chinese room, showing how it is supposed to render obvious the folly inherent in the symbolist's folly. It argues that the Chinese room does not show ...
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This chapter begins with a discussion of Searle's Chinese room, showing how it is supposed to render obvious the folly inherent in the symbolist's folly. It argues that the Chinese room does not show that symbolic approaches to cognition are deficient; that is the Chinese room contains nothing that need worry a good old-fashioned symbolist. It also argues that the same resources a symbolist can marshal in response to Searle work equally well to deflect the charge that one must turn to embodied cognition to avoid the symbolist's folly. It focuses on Barsalou's important work on perceptual symbol systems. It suggests a positive motivation for embodied cognition. Embodied cognition proposes new ways to conceive of the role of representation in cognition, new ways that promise to provide better and simpler accounts of cognition than those that insist on traditional conceptions of representation.Less
This chapter begins with a discussion of Searle's Chinese room, showing how it is supposed to render obvious the folly inherent in the symbolist's folly. It argues that the Chinese room does not show that symbolic approaches to cognition are deficient; that is the Chinese room contains nothing that need worry a good old-fashioned symbolist. It also argues that the same resources a symbolist can marshal in response to Searle work equally well to deflect the charge that one must turn to embodied cognition to avoid the symbolist's folly. It focuses on Barsalou's important work on perceptual symbol systems. It suggests a positive motivation for embodied cognition. Embodied cognition proposes new ways to conceive of the role of representation in cognition, new ways that promise to provide better and simpler accounts of cognition than those that insist on traditional conceptions of representation.
Miranda Anderson, Michael Wheeler, and Mark Sprevak
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781474442282
- eISBN:
- 9781474476904
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474442282.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
The general introduction, which is replicated across all four volumes, aims to orientate readers unfamiliar with this area of research. It provides an overview of the different approaches within the ...
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The general introduction, which is replicated across all four volumes, aims to orientate readers unfamiliar with this area of research. It provides an overview of the different approaches within the distributed cognition framework and discussion of the value of a distributed cognitive approach to the humanities. A distributed cognitive approach recognises that cognition is brain, body and world based. Distributed cognition is a methodological approach and a way of understanding the actual nature of cognition. The first section provides an overview of the various competing and sometimes conflicting theories that make up the distributed cognition framework and which are also collectively known as 4E cognition: embodied, embedded, extended and enactive cognition. The second section examines the ways in which humanities topics and methodologies are compatible with, placed in question or revitalised by new insights from philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences on the distributed nature of cognition, and considers what the arts and humanities, in turn, offer to philosophy and cognitive science.Less
The general introduction, which is replicated across all four volumes, aims to orientate readers unfamiliar with this area of research. It provides an overview of the different approaches within the distributed cognition framework and discussion of the value of a distributed cognitive approach to the humanities. A distributed cognitive approach recognises that cognition is brain, body and world based. Distributed cognition is a methodological approach and a way of understanding the actual nature of cognition. The first section provides an overview of the various competing and sometimes conflicting theories that make up the distributed cognition framework and which are also collectively known as 4E cognition: embodied, embedded, extended and enactive cognition. The second section examines the ways in which humanities topics and methodologies are compatible with, placed in question or revitalised by new insights from philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences on the distributed nature of cognition, and considers what the arts and humanities, in turn, offer to philosophy and cognitive science.
Miranda Anderson, George Rousseau, and Michael Wheeler (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781474442282
- eISBN:
- 9781474476904
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474442282.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a background to current research in Enlightenment and Romantic studies on topics related to distributed cognition. The first section of this introductory ...
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The purpose of this chapter is to provide a background to current research in Enlightenment and Romantic studies on topics related to distributed cognition. The first section of this introductory chapter by George Rousseau reflects on current research in Enlightenment and Romantic studies on topics related to distributed cognition, while the second section by Miranda Anderson considers how the various chapters in this volume advance work in this area. The thought-world of the long eighteenth century involves notions of flux between mind, body and world, mind-life and subject-object structural couplings, sympathetic circulations, mind metamorphoses and manacles, and texts, performances and artefacts as cognitive aids or modes of access to other minds and past phenomenologies.Less
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a background to current research in Enlightenment and Romantic studies on topics related to distributed cognition. The first section of this introductory chapter by George Rousseau reflects on current research in Enlightenment and Romantic studies on topics related to distributed cognition, while the second section by Miranda Anderson considers how the various chapters in this volume advance work in this area. The thought-world of the long eighteenth century involves notions of flux between mind, body and world, mind-life and subject-object structural couplings, sympathetic circulations, mind metamorphoses and manacles, and texts, performances and artefacts as cognitive aids or modes of access to other minds and past phenomenologies.
Michael Spivey
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195170788
- eISBN:
- 9780199786831
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195170788.003.0009
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience
This chapter emphasizes the importance of understanding the motor processes involved in any cognitive task. Findings in the field of embodied cognition show that constraints on motor movement ...
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This chapter emphasizes the importance of understanding the motor processes involved in any cognitive task. Findings in the field of embodied cognition show that constraints on motor movement strongly influence both language comprehension and visual perception. Moreover, action verbs and images of tools induce activation in the motor cortex. Rhythmic movement tasks and haptic exploration tasks show that elegant dynamical equations, using only biomechanical parameters, can account for behavioral data without postulating cognitive representational states. The chapter ends with an examination of continuous motor measures in cognitive tasks, and a discussion of the role of anticipated percepts in motor processing and learning.Less
This chapter emphasizes the importance of understanding the motor processes involved in any cognitive task. Findings in the field of embodied cognition show that constraints on motor movement strongly influence both language comprehension and visual perception. Moreover, action verbs and images of tools induce activation in the motor cortex. Rhythmic movement tasks and haptic exploration tasks show that elegant dynamical equations, using only biomechanical parameters, can account for behavioral data without postulating cognitive representational states. The chapter ends with an examination of continuous motor measures in cognitive tasks, and a discussion of the role of anticipated percepts in motor processing and learning.
Robert D. Rupert
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195379457
- eISBN:
- 9780199869114
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379457.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book surveys philosophical issues raised by the situated movement in cognitive science—the treatment of cognitive phenomena as the joint product of brain, body, and environment. The book focuses ...
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This book surveys philosophical issues raised by the situated movement in cognitive science—the treatment of cognitive phenomena as the joint product of brain, body, and environment. The book focuses specifically on the hypothesis of extended cognition, according to which human cognitive processes literally comprise elements beyond the boundary of the human organism. A systems-based approach is held to provide the only plausible criterion distinguishing what is cognitive from what is not. In most human cases, this system appears within the boundary of the human organism. It is argued that the systems-based view explains the existing successes of cognitive psychology and cognate fields in a way that extended conceptions of cognition do not and, furthermore, that once the systems-based view has been adopted, it is especially clear how extant arguments in support of the extended view go wrong. Additional aspects of the situated program, including the embedded and embodied views, are also examined. The book considers whether plausible incarnations of such views depart from orthodox, computational cognitive science, especially with regard to the role of representation and computation. It is argued that the embedded and embodied views do not constitute radical shifts in perspective. For instance, properly understood, the embodied view does not offer a new role for the nonneural body, different in principle from the one presupposed by orthodox cognitive science.Less
This book surveys philosophical issues raised by the situated movement in cognitive science—the treatment of cognitive phenomena as the joint product of brain, body, and environment. The book focuses specifically on the hypothesis of extended cognition, according to which human cognitive processes literally comprise elements beyond the boundary of the human organism. A systems-based approach is held to provide the only plausible criterion distinguishing what is cognitive from what is not. In most human cases, this system appears within the boundary of the human organism. It is argued that the systems-based view explains the existing successes of cognitive psychology and cognate fields in a way that extended conceptions of cognition do not and, furthermore, that once the systems-based view has been adopted, it is especially clear how extant arguments in support of the extended view go wrong. Additional aspects of the situated program, including the embedded and embodied views, are also examined. The book considers whether plausible incarnations of such views depart from orthodox, computational cognitive science, especially with regard to the role of representation and computation. It is argued that the embedded and embodied views do not constitute radical shifts in perspective. For instance, properly understood, the embodied view does not offer a new role for the nonneural body, different in principle from the one presupposed by orthodox cognitive science.
Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195374049
- eISBN:
- 9780199871889
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195374049.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The top‐down and bottom‐up approaches to artificial moral agents emphasize the importance in ethics of the ability to reason. However, much of the recent empirical literature on moral psychology ...
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The top‐down and bottom‐up approaches to artificial moral agents emphasize the importance in ethics of the ability to reason. However, much of the recent empirical literature on moral psychology emphasizes faculties besides rationality. Emotions, empathy, sociability, semantic understanding, and consciousness are all important to human moral decision making, but it remains an open question whether these will be essential to artificial moral agents and, if so, whether they can be implemented in machines. This chapter surveys the cutting‐edge scientific investigation in the areas of affective computing and embodied cognition that is aimed at providing computers and robots with the kinds of supra‐rational capacities underlying those social skills which may be essential for sophisticated human‐computer interaction.Less
The top‐down and bottom‐up approaches to artificial moral agents emphasize the importance in ethics of the ability to reason. However, much of the recent empirical literature on moral psychology emphasizes faculties besides rationality. Emotions, empathy, sociability, semantic understanding, and consciousness are all important to human moral decision making, but it remains an open question whether these will be essential to artificial moral agents and, if so, whether they can be implemented in machines. This chapter surveys the cutting‐edge scientific investigation in the areas of affective computing and embodied cognition that is aimed at providing computers and robots with the kinds of supra‐rational capacities underlying those social skills which may be essential for sophisticated human‐computer interaction.
Miranda Anderson, George Rousseau, and Michael Wheeler (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781474442282
- eISBN:
- 9781474476904
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474442282.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This collection brings together eleven essays by international specialists in Romantic and Enlightenment culture and provides a general and a period-specific introduction to distributed cognition and ...
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This collection brings together eleven essays by international specialists in Romantic and Enlightenment culture and provides a general and a period-specific introduction to distributed cognition and the cognitive humanities. The essays revitalise our reading of Romantic and Enlightenment works in the fields of archaeology, history, drama, literature, art, philosophy, science and medicine, by bringing to bear recent insights in cognitive science and philosophy of mind on the ways in which cognition is distributed across brain, body and world. The volume makes evident the ways in which the particular range of sociocultural and technological contexts that existed during the long eighteenth century periods fostered and reflected particular notions of distributed cognition.Less
This collection brings together eleven essays by international specialists in Romantic and Enlightenment culture and provides a general and a period-specific introduction to distributed cognition and the cognitive humanities. The essays revitalise our reading of Romantic and Enlightenment works in the fields of archaeology, history, drama, literature, art, philosophy, science and medicine, by bringing to bear recent insights in cognitive science and philosophy of mind on the ways in which cognition is distributed across brain, body and world. The volume makes evident the ways in which the particular range of sociocultural and technological contexts that existed during the long eighteenth century periods fostered and reflected particular notions of distributed cognition.
Chen Yu and Dana H. Ballard
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199553242
- eISBN:
- 9780191720444
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199553242.003.0010
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics
We show in a series of three related studies that intentional cues encoded in body movements can provide very specific gains to language learning. A computational model is developed on the basis of ...
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We show in a series of three related studies that intentional cues encoded in body movements can provide very specific gains to language learning. A computational model is developed on the basis of machine learning techniques which can identify sound patterns of individual words from continuous speech using non‐linguistic contextual information and employ body movements as deictic references to discover word‐meaning associations.Less
We show in a series of three related studies that intentional cues encoded in body movements can provide very specific gains to language learning. A computational model is developed on the basis of machine learning techniques which can identify sound patterns of individual words from continuous speech using non‐linguistic contextual information and employ body movements as deictic references to discover word‐meaning associations.
Mitchell J Nathan
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199217274
- eISBN:
- 9780191696060
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217274.003.0018
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter investigates how gestures enact symbols and thereby ground the meaning of abstract representations used in instructional settings. It explores two principles that follow from the theory ...
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This chapter investigates how gestures enact symbols and thereby ground the meaning of abstract representations used in instructional settings. It explores two principles that follow from the theory of embodied cognition — that cognition is situated and that cognitive work is off-loaded onto the environment. It also considers a third principle — that off-line cognition is body based — but includes the influences of social interactions, along with sensorimotor processes, as mediating cognitive behaviour even when others are not present.Less
This chapter investigates how gestures enact symbols and thereby ground the meaning of abstract representations used in instructional settings. It explores two principles that follow from the theory of embodied cognition — that cognition is situated and that cognitive work is off-loaded onto the environment. It also considers a third principle — that off-line cognition is body based — but includes the influences of social interactions, along with sensorimotor processes, as mediating cognitive behaviour even when others are not present.
Valerie Gray Hardcastle and Rosalyn W. Stewart
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199211531
- eISBN:
- 9780191705977
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211531.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
This chapter dissociates the working cognitive sciences from various reductive strategies. It advocates that cognitive science should be more inclusive in terms of what it accepts as data in ...
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This chapter dissociates the working cognitive sciences from various reductive strategies. It advocates that cognitive science should be more inclusive in terms of what it accepts as data in developing its theories, and that it should not be wedded only to reductive strategies. Appreciating how brains are embedded in complicated environments enlightens us about philosophical issues concerning the possibility of mind-brain reduction. Two fascinating case studies — depression and somatisation — support the claim that somatic states are part of our cognitive processes and, further, that as a result cognitive science cannot be reductive in the way it is normally taken to be.Less
This chapter dissociates the working cognitive sciences from various reductive strategies. It advocates that cognitive science should be more inclusive in terms of what it accepts as data in developing its theories, and that it should not be wedded only to reductive strategies. Appreciating how brains are embedded in complicated environments enlightens us about philosophical issues concerning the possibility of mind-brain reduction. Two fascinating case studies — depression and somatisation — support the claim that somatic states are part of our cognitive processes and, further, that as a result cognitive science cannot be reductive in the way it is normally taken to be.
Christian Coseru
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199843381
- eISBN:
- 9780199979851
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199843381.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Buddhism
Combining epistemological insights from Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla, but also drawing on the work of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty and on recent work in analytic philosophy and ...
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Combining epistemological insights from Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla, but also drawing on the work of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty and on recent work in analytic philosophy and phenomenology, this book defends the view that perception is intentionally constituted and, under certain circumstances, represents a type of implicit knowing that precludes (or at least minimizes) the possibility of error. The book also explores the classic debate between Buddhists philosophers and their opponents, principally the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāmsakas, on such issues as establishing reliable means of belief formation, the relation between language and conceptual thought, and the structure of awareness. It also provides new ways of conceptualizing the Buddhist epistemological defence of the reflexivity thesis of consciousness, namely that each cognitive event is to be understood as involving a pre-reflective implicit awareness of its own occurrence. From a methodological point of view, the book advances an innovative approach to Buddhist philosophy of mind under the guise of phenomenological naturalism—which allows for cognitive awareness to be understood in causal terms without reducing the contents of awareness to non-cognitive elements—and moves beyond comparative approaches to philosophy by emphasizing the continuity of concerns between the discourses of Buddhist and Western philosophers.Less
Combining epistemological insights from Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla, but also drawing on the work of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty and on recent work in analytic philosophy and phenomenology, this book defends the view that perception is intentionally constituted and, under certain circumstances, represents a type of implicit knowing that precludes (or at least minimizes) the possibility of error. The book also explores the classic debate between Buddhists philosophers and their opponents, principally the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāmsakas, on such issues as establishing reliable means of belief formation, the relation between language and conceptual thought, and the structure of awareness. It also provides new ways of conceptualizing the Buddhist epistemological defence of the reflexivity thesis of consciousness, namely that each cognitive event is to be understood as involving a pre-reflective implicit awareness of its own occurrence. From a methodological point of view, the book advances an innovative approach to Buddhist philosophy of mind under the guise of phenomenological naturalism—which allows for cognitive awareness to be understood in causal terms without reducing the contents of awareness to non-cognitive elements—and moves beyond comparative approaches to philosophy by emphasizing the continuity of concerns between the discourses of Buddhist and Western philosophers.
Martin Clayton and Laura Leante
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199811328
- eISBN:
- 9780199369539
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199811328.003.0009
- Subject:
- Music, Ethnomusicology, World Music, Performing Practice/Studies
This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first, current literature on embodied cognition is reviewed, and important themes drawn out. These themes—gesture, the embodied self, social interaction ...
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This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first, current literature on embodied cognition is reviewed, and important themes drawn out. These themes—gesture, the embodied self, social interaction and joint action—are discussed as they appear in the broader literature and as they might be applied to studies of music, and in this way a broad theoretical model of embodied cognition in music is built up. In the second part, specific ethnographic moments from the authors’ fieldwork in India are discussed with reference to this theoretical framework. In the first, the embodied nature of a raga’s meaning is discussed; in the second, the somewhat different ways in which Indian classical music can be embodied as ‘abstract’ design are addressed.Less
This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first, current literature on embodied cognition is reviewed, and important themes drawn out. These themes—gesture, the embodied self, social interaction and joint action—are discussed as they appear in the broader literature and as they might be applied to studies of music, and in this way a broad theoretical model of embodied cognition in music is built up. In the second part, specific ethnographic moments from the authors’ fieldwork in India are discussed with reference to this theoretical framework. In the first, the embodied nature of a raga’s meaning is discussed; in the second, the somewhat different ways in which Indian classical music can be embodied as ‘abstract’ design are addressed.
Lisa Ann Robertson
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781474442282
- eISBN:
- 9781474476904
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474442282.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter examines Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s ‘Theory of Life’ (1816/1848) and his theory of knowledge, discussed in Biographia Literaria (1817), through the lens of autopoietic enaction. It ...
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This chapter examines Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s ‘Theory of Life’ (1816/1848) and his theory of knowledge, discussed in Biographia Literaria (1817), through the lens of autopoietic enaction. It focuses on parallels between historical and contemporary theories, particularly their philosophical underpinnings, and argues that Coleridge’s theories are an important alternative to Cartesian accounts of the mind. Interrogating these theories in terms of enactive concepts, such as structural coupling, dynamic co-emergence, and mutual co-dependence, exposes the inherent embodied, embedded, and enacted premises on which Coleridge’s theory of cognition relies. The relationship between the subject and the object implicit in dualist and materialist theories reveals the effects assumptions about this relationship have on the way human beings understand themselves in relationship to nature and their own bodies – effects that are frequently inimical. The chapter concludes that Coleridge and the enactive approach offer valuable options for overcoming the schism between consciousness and nature, mind and world.Less
This chapter examines Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s ‘Theory of Life’ (1816/1848) and his theory of knowledge, discussed in Biographia Literaria (1817), through the lens of autopoietic enaction. It focuses on parallels between historical and contemporary theories, particularly their philosophical underpinnings, and argues that Coleridge’s theories are an important alternative to Cartesian accounts of the mind. Interrogating these theories in terms of enactive concepts, such as structural coupling, dynamic co-emergence, and mutual co-dependence, exposes the inherent embodied, embedded, and enacted premises on which Coleridge’s theory of cognition relies. The relationship between the subject and the object implicit in dualist and materialist theories reveals the effects assumptions about this relationship have on the way human beings understand themselves in relationship to nature and their own bodies – effects that are frequently inimical. The chapter concludes that Coleridge and the enactive approach offer valuable options for overcoming the schism between consciousness and nature, mind and world.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199874187
- eISBN:
- 9780190267674
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199874187.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter discusses a method for understanding embodied cognition which involves bodily representational codes and evidence regarding cognitive processes that the brain reuses. It offers a ...
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This chapter discusses a method for understanding embodied cognition which involves bodily representational codes and evidence regarding cognitive processes that the brain reuses. It offers a philosophical definition of the concept of embodied cognition, as well as empirical evidence of human cognition, not all but mostly, being embodied. It initially examines the relationship between embodiment and bodily representational codes, followed by an analysis of the Massive Redeployment Hypothesis or “neural reuse.” The chapter also explains the interrelationship between perception and embodied cognition through examining a research study conducted by Dennis Proffitt, a vision scientist who maintains that an individual's body is the measure of all things.Less
This chapter discusses a method for understanding embodied cognition which involves bodily representational codes and evidence regarding cognitive processes that the brain reuses. It offers a philosophical definition of the concept of embodied cognition, as well as empirical evidence of human cognition, not all but mostly, being embodied. It initially examines the relationship between embodiment and bodily representational codes, followed by an analysis of the Massive Redeployment Hypothesis or “neural reuse.” The chapter also explains the interrelationship between perception and embodied cognition through examining a research study conducted by Dennis Proffitt, a vision scientist who maintains that an individual's body is the measure of all things.
Manuel de Vega
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199217274
- eISBN:
- 9780191696060
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217274.003.0014
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter examines the nature of meaning (embodied versus symbolic) in the light of linguistic reference. It proposes three levels of reference differing in their computational demands, and ...
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This chapter examines the nature of meaning (embodied versus symbolic) in the light of linguistic reference. It proposes three levels of reference differing in their computational demands, and presumably in the quality or degree of embodied representations — on-line reference, displaced reference, and decoupled reference. It presents some evidence of embodied meaning in on-line and displaced reference. It explores the idea that the two kinds of reference may involve different degrees of embodied cognition.Less
This chapter examines the nature of meaning (embodied versus symbolic) in the light of linguistic reference. It proposes three levels of reference differing in their computational demands, and presumably in the quality or degree of embodied representations — on-line reference, displaced reference, and decoupled reference. It presents some evidence of embodied meaning in on-line and displaced reference. It explores the idea that the two kinds of reference may involve different degrees of embodied cognition.
Helen Slaney
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781474442282
- eISBN:
- 9781474476904
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474442282.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Sir William Hamilton’s Greek vase collection, assembled at Naples between the 1760s and 1790s, became a turning point in the reception of ancient material culture and hence in perceptions of ...
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Sir William Hamilton’s Greek vase collection, assembled at Naples between the 1760s and 1790s, became a turning point in the reception of ancient material culture and hence in perceptions of classical antiquity. This chapter compares three angles of approach to the collection, each corresponding to a strand of distributed cognition. Extended cognition is represented by the catalogue which made the collection available to the reading public; embodied cognition is represented by the dance performances of Emma Hamilton, Sir William’s wife, who based her tableaux vivants of ancient life around the images represented on the vases; and enactive cognition by the aesthetic theory of the ‘feeling imagination’ developed by philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder, who visited the Hamiltons at Naples and commented unfavourably on Emma’s performances. I argue that Herder’s rejection of Emma’s kinetic reception of ancient artwork was predicated in part on his reluctance to place physical limitations on simulated movement.Less
Sir William Hamilton’s Greek vase collection, assembled at Naples between the 1760s and 1790s, became a turning point in the reception of ancient material culture and hence in perceptions of classical antiquity. This chapter compares three angles of approach to the collection, each corresponding to a strand of distributed cognition. Extended cognition is represented by the catalogue which made the collection available to the reading public; embodied cognition is represented by the dance performances of Emma Hamilton, Sir William’s wife, who based her tableaux vivants of ancient life around the images represented on the vases; and enactive cognition by the aesthetic theory of the ‘feeling imagination’ developed by philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder, who visited the Hamiltons at Naples and commented unfavourably on Emma’s performances. I argue that Herder’s rejection of Emma’s kinetic reception of ancient artwork was predicated in part on his reluctance to place physical limitations on simulated movement.
