Edouard Machery
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195306880
- eISBN:
- 9780199867950
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306880.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the ...
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Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the inputs of the budding neuropsychology of concepts. But our empirical knowledge about concepts has yet to be organized in a coherent framework. This book argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required to make sense of the research on concepts in psychology and neuropsychology. The book shows that the class of concepts divides into several distinct kinds that have little in common with one another and that for this very reason, it is a mistake to attempt to encompass all known phenomena within a single theory of concepts. In brief, concepts are not a natural kind. The book concludes that the theoretical notion of concept should be eliminated from the theoretical apparatus of contemporary psychology and should be replaced with theoretical notions that are more appropriate for fulfilling psychologists' goals. The notion of concept has encouraged psychologists to believe that a single theory of concepts could be developed, leading to useless theoretical controversies between the dominant paradigms of concepts. Keeping this notion would slow down, and maybe prevent, the development of a more adequate classification and would overshadow the theoretical and empirical issues that are raised by this more adequate classification.Less
Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the inputs of the budding neuropsychology of concepts. But our empirical knowledge about concepts has yet to be organized in a coherent framework. This book argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required to make sense of the research on concepts in psychology and neuropsychology. The book shows that the class of concepts divides into several distinct kinds that have little in common with one another and that for this very reason, it is a mistake to attempt to encompass all known phenomena within a single theory of concepts. In brief, concepts are not a natural kind. The book concludes that the theoretical notion of concept should be eliminated from the theoretical apparatus of contemporary psychology and should be replaced with theoretical notions that are more appropriate for fulfilling psychologists' goals. The notion of concept has encouraged psychologists to believe that a single theory of concepts could be developed, leading to useless theoretical controversies between the dominant paradigms of concepts. Keeping this notion would slow down, and maybe prevent, the development of a more adequate classification and would overshadow the theoretical and empirical issues that are raised by this more adequate classification.
Bryan Frances
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199282135
- eISBN:
- 9780191602917
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199282137.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The nagging voice of the sceptic has always been present in epistemology. Over the last thirty years or so, philosophers have thought of several promising ways to counter the radical sceptic. For ...
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The nagging voice of the sceptic has always been present in epistemology. Over the last thirty years or so, philosophers have thought of several promising ways to counter the radical sceptic. For instance, facts about the reliability of cognitive processes, principles determining which possibilities must be ruled out in order to have knowledge, and principles regarding the context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions. In this research monograph, Bryan Frances presents a new argument template for generating new kinds of radical scepticism, ones that hold even if all the clever anti-sceptical fixes such as contextualism, relevant alternatives theory, and reliabilism defeat the traditional sceptic. However, the new sceptical conclusions are quite different from traditional scepticism. Although the new sceptic concludes that people don’t know that fire engines are red, that people sometimes have pains in their knees, or even that people believe that fire engines are red or that knees sometimes throb, people admit that they know millions of exotic truths, such as the fact that black holes exist. One can know about the existence of black holes, but not about the colour of one’s shirt or even about what one believes regarding the colour of one’s shirt. The new sceptical arguments proceed in the usual way (here’s a sceptical hypothesis; one can’t neutralize it, one has to be able to neutralize it to know P; so one doesn’t know P), but the sceptical hypotheses plugged into it are “real, live” scientific-philosophical hypotheses often thought to be actually true, such as error theories about belief, colour, pain location, and character traits. Frances investigates the questions, ‘Under what conditions do we need to rule out these error theories in order to know things inconsistent with them?’ and ‘Can we rule them out?’Less
The nagging voice of the sceptic has always been present in epistemology. Over the last thirty years or so, philosophers have thought of several promising ways to counter the radical sceptic. For instance, facts about the reliability of cognitive processes, principles determining which possibilities must be ruled out in order to have knowledge, and principles regarding the context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions. In this research monograph, Bryan Frances presents a new argument template for generating new kinds of radical scepticism, ones that hold even if all the clever anti-sceptical fixes such as contextualism, relevant alternatives theory, and reliabilism defeat the traditional sceptic. However, the new sceptical conclusions are quite different from traditional scepticism. Although the new sceptic concludes that people don’t know that fire engines are red, that people sometimes have pains in their knees, or even that people believe that fire engines are red or that knees sometimes throb, people admit that they know millions of exotic truths, such as the fact that black holes exist. One can know about the existence of black holes, but not about the colour of one’s shirt or even about what one believes regarding the colour of one’s shirt. The new sceptical arguments proceed in the usual way (here’s a sceptical hypothesis; one can’t neutralize it, one has to be able to neutralize it to know P; so one doesn’t know P), but the sceptical hypotheses plugged into it are “real, live” scientific-philosophical hypotheses often thought to be actually true, such as error theories about belief, colour, pain location, and character traits. Frances investigates the questions, ‘Under what conditions do we need to rule out these error theories in order to know things inconsistent with them?’ and ‘Can we rule them out?’
Joseph Levine
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195132359
- eISBN:
- 9780199833375
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195132351.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Consciousness presents a problem. There are excellent reasons for believing that materialism, or physicalism, is the correct metaphysical view of our world, yet it is extremely difficult to see how ...
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Consciousness presents a problem. There are excellent reasons for believing that materialism, or physicalism, is the correct metaphysical view of our world, yet it is extremely difficult to see how conscious experiences, or qualia, can be incorporated into the materialist framework. Both aspects of the problem are defended. First, a positive argument for materialism is given, with responses to dualist objections. Second, objections are presented to most materialist attempts to explain consciousness – in particular, higher‐order theories, representationalism, and eliminativism. Finally, it is argued that to make genuine progress on this problem we need to delve deeper into the question of our cognitive access to our own experience. Thus the problems of intentionality and consciousness are not as separable as has often been thought.Less
Consciousness presents a problem. There are excellent reasons for believing that materialism, or physicalism, is the correct metaphysical view of our world, yet it is extremely difficult to see how conscious experiences, or qualia, can be incorporated into the materialist framework. Both aspects of the problem are defended. First, a positive argument for materialism is given, with responses to dualist objections. Second, objections are presented to most materialist attempts to explain consciousness – in particular, higher‐order theories, representationalism, and eliminativism. Finally, it is argued that to make genuine progress on this problem we need to delve deeper into the question of our cognitive access to our own experience. Thus the problems of intentionality and consciousness are not as separable as has often been thought.
Stephen P. Stich
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195126662
- eISBN:
- 9780199868322
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195126661.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Eliminativism (or eliminative materialism) has been an important and provocative view in the philosophy of mind since the 1970s. Eliminativism claims that the mental states alluded to in our ordinary ...
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Eliminativism (or eliminative materialism) has been an important and provocative view in the philosophy of mind since the 1970s. Eliminativism claims that the mental states alluded to in our ordinary talk about the mind – particularly intentional states like beliefs, desires, and thoughts – are the posits of a badly mistaken “folk” theory, and thus, like phlogiston, witches and other posits of badly mistaken theories, they do not exist. This volume is a collection of essays that systematically examine the arguments for eliminativism. Ch. 2 illustrates the way in which connectionist models of belief and memory might be used to support the claim that folk psychology is a radically mistaken theory. Ch. 4 argues against the claim that simulation theory undermines the debate between eliminativists and their opponents. Chs. 3 and 5 argue that the case for the premises of the eliminativist argument is problematic in ways that have not been noted in previous discussions. The long title essay (Ch. 1) argues that, even if the premises are true, they do not support the eliminativist conclusion without the addition of some additional premise, and none of the additional premises that might fill the gap, are defensible. Though many writers rely on the theory of reference to fill the gap between premises and conclusion, it is argued that appeals to the theory of reference cannot do the ontological work required by the eliminativist argument.Less
Eliminativism (or eliminative materialism) has been an important and provocative view in the philosophy of mind since the 1970s. Eliminativism claims that the mental states alluded to in our ordinary talk about the mind – particularly intentional states like beliefs, desires, and thoughts – are the posits of a badly mistaken “folk” theory, and thus, like phlogiston, witches and other posits of badly mistaken theories, they do not exist. This volume is a collection of essays that systematically examine the arguments for eliminativism. Ch. 2 illustrates the way in which connectionist models of belief and memory might be used to support the claim that folk psychology is a radically mistaken theory. Ch. 4 argues against the claim that simulation theory undermines the debate between eliminativists and their opponents. Chs. 3 and 5 argue that the case for the premises of the eliminativist argument is problematic in ways that have not been noted in previous discussions. The long title essay (Ch. 1) argues that, even if the premises are true, they do not support the eliminativist conclusion without the addition of some additional premise, and none of the additional premises that might fill the gap, are defensible. Though many writers rely on the theory of reference to fill the gap between premises and conclusion, it is argued that appeals to the theory of reference cannot do the ontological work required by the eliminativist argument.
Daniel Stoljar
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195306583
- eISBN:
- 9780199786619
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195306589.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter concludes the book by doing three things: reviewing the reasons for rejecting eliminativism and primitivism; criticizing an independent argument for these views that would, if ...
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This chapter concludes the book by doing three things: reviewing the reasons for rejecting eliminativism and primitivism; criticizing an independent argument for these views that would, if successful, also undermine our own position — this is an argument founded on the idea, known as “revelation”, that understanding experience means knowing its essence; and finally, summarizing and making explicit some general morals.Less
This chapter concludes the book by doing three things: reviewing the reasons for rejecting eliminativism and primitivism; criticizing an independent argument for these views that would, if successful, also undermine our own position — this is an argument founded on the idea, known as “revelation”, that understanding experience means knowing its essence; and finally, summarizing and making explicit some general morals.
Shaun Nichols and Stephen P. Stich
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198236108
- eISBN:
- 9780191600920
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198236107.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This volume defends an integrated account of the psychological mechanisms underlying “mindreading,” the commonplace capacity to understand the mind. The authors maintain that it is, as commonsense ...
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This volume defends an integrated account of the psychological mechanisms underlying “mindreading,” the commonplace capacity to understand the mind. The authors maintain that it is, as commonsense would suggest, vital to distinguish between reading others’ minds and reading one’s own. In reading other minds, the imagination plays a central role. As a result, the authors begin with an explicit and systematic account of pretense and imagination which proposes that pretense representations are contained in a separate mental workspace, the “Possible World Box,” which is part of the basic architecture of the human mind. The mechanisms subserving pretense get recruited in reading other minds, a capacity that implicates multifarious kinds of processes, including those favored by simulation approaches to mindreading, those favored by information-based approaches, and processes that don’t fit into either category. None of these mechanisms or processes, though, explains how we read our own minds, which, according to the authors, requires invoking an entirely independent set of mechanisms.Less
This volume defends an integrated account of the psychological mechanisms underlying “mindreading,” the commonplace capacity to understand the mind. The authors maintain that it is, as commonsense would suggest, vital to distinguish between reading others’ minds and reading one’s own. In reading other minds, the imagination plays a central role. As a result, the authors begin with an explicit and systematic account of pretense and imagination which proposes that pretense representations are contained in a separate mental workspace, the “Possible World Box,” which is part of the basic architecture of the human mind. The mechanisms subserving pretense get recruited in reading other minds, a capacity that implicates multifarious kinds of processes, including those favored by simulation approaches to mindreading, those favored by information-based approaches, and processes that don’t fit into either category. None of these mechanisms or processes, though, explains how we read our own minds, which, according to the authors, requires invoking an entirely independent set of mechanisms.
James Ladyman, Don Ross, and and David Spurrett with John Collier
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199276196
- eISBN:
- 9780191706127
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276196.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This book argues that the only kind of metaphysics that can contribute to objective knowledge is one based specifically on contemporary science as it really is, and not on philosophers' a priori ...
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This book argues that the only kind of metaphysics that can contribute to objective knowledge is one based specifically on contemporary science as it really is, and not on philosophers' a priori intuitions, common sense, or simplifications of science. In addition to showing how recent metaphysics has drifted away from connection with all other serious scholarly inquiry as a result of not heeding this restriction, this book demonstrates how to build a metaphysics compatible with current fundamental physics (“ontic structural realism”), which, when combined with metaphysics of the special sciences (“rainforest realism”), can be used to unify physics with the other sciences without reducing these sciences to physics itself. Taking science metaphysically seriously, this book argues, means that metaphysicians must abandon the picture of the world as composed of self-subsistent individual objects, and the paradigm of causation as the collision of such objects. The text assesses the role of information theory and complex systems theory in attempts to explain the relationship between the special sciences and physics, treading a middle road between the grand synthesis of thermodynamics and information, and eliminativism about information. The consequences of the books' metaphysical theory for central issues in the philosophy of science are explored, including the implications for the realism versus empiricism debate, the role of causation in scientific explanations, the nature of causation and laws, the status of abstract and virtual objects, and the objective reality of natural kinds.Less
This book argues that the only kind of metaphysics that can contribute to objective knowledge is one based specifically on contemporary science as it really is, and not on philosophers' a priori intuitions, common sense, or simplifications of science. In addition to showing how recent metaphysics has drifted away from connection with all other serious scholarly inquiry as a result of not heeding this restriction, this book demonstrates how to build a metaphysics compatible with current fundamental physics (“ontic structural realism”), which, when combined with metaphysics of the special sciences (“rainforest realism”), can be used to unify physics with the other sciences without reducing these sciences to physics itself. Taking science metaphysically seriously, this book argues, means that metaphysicians must abandon the picture of the world as composed of self-subsistent individual objects, and the paradigm of causation as the collision of such objects. The text assesses the role of information theory and complex systems theory in attempts to explain the relationship between the special sciences and physics, treading a middle road between the grand synthesis of thermodynamics and information, and eliminativism about information. The consequences of the books' metaphysical theory for central issues in the philosophy of science are explored, including the implications for the realism versus empiricism debate, the role of causation in scientific explanations, the nature of causation and laws, the status of abstract and virtual objects, and the objective reality of natural kinds.
Steven Horst
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195317114
- eISBN:
- 9780199871520
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195317114.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter outlines the contemporary conversation in philosophy of mind. Reductionists claim the mind can or must be reducible to natural phenomena. Eliminativists claim the mind cannot be so ...
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This chapter outlines the contemporary conversation in philosophy of mind. Reductionists claim the mind can or must be reducible to natural phenomena. Eliminativists claim the mind cannot be so reduced and that this implies that our mentalistic categories should be eliminated in favor of a more naturalistic vocabulary. Dualists point to an explanatory gap between mind and nature and argue that this implies the mind is not reducible to something else, and that this entails either substance or property dualism. Mysterians agree that the mind is irreducible but trace this to a limitation of our ability to understand mind‐body relations. Nonreductive materialists also reject reduction but hold that the mind is nothing over and above a set of natural phenomena. All of these views share the assumption that intertheoretic reduction is the norm in the natural sciences, and this assumption motivates both reductionism and the idea that the explanatory gap poses a unique and disturbing problem.Less
This chapter outlines the contemporary conversation in philosophy of mind. Reductionists claim the mind can or must be reducible to natural phenomena. Eliminativists claim the mind cannot be so reduced and that this implies that our mentalistic categories should be eliminated in favor of a more naturalistic vocabulary. Dualists point to an explanatory gap between mind and nature and argue that this implies the mind is not reducible to something else, and that this entails either substance or property dualism. Mysterians agree that the mind is irreducible but trace this to a limitation of our ability to understand mind‐body relations. Nonreductive materialists also reject reduction but hold that the mind is nothing over and above a set of natural phenomena. All of these views share the assumption that intertheoretic reduction is the norm in the natural sciences, and this assumption motivates both reductionism and the idea that the explanatory gap poses a unique and disturbing problem.
James Ladyman, Don Ross, David Spurrett, and John Collier
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199276196
- eISBN:
- 9780191706127
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276196.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter argues that the idea of causation has similar status to ideas of cohesion, forces, and things. Appreciating the role of causation in a notional world is crucial to understanding the ...
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This chapter argues that the idea of causation has similar status to ideas of cohesion, forces, and things. Appreciating the role of causation in a notional world is crucial to understanding the nature of the special sciences, and the general ways in which they differ from fundamental physics. Causation, unlike cohesion, is both a notional-world concept and a folk concept. Moreover, causation, unlike cohesion, is a basic category of traditional metaphysics, including metaphysics that purports to be naturalistic but falls short of this ambition. This chapter also argues that causation, just like cohesion, is a representational real pattern that is necessary for an adequately comprehensive science. It begins with an account that eliminates causation altogether on naturalistic grounds, and then shows, using principle of naturalistic closure (PNC)-mandated motivations, why this outright eliminativism is too strong. The eliminativist argument to be discussed is due to Bertrand Russell, whose view has some important contemporary adherents among philosophers of physics.Less
This chapter argues that the idea of causation has similar status to ideas of cohesion, forces, and things. Appreciating the role of causation in a notional world is crucial to understanding the nature of the special sciences, and the general ways in which they differ from fundamental physics. Causation, unlike cohesion, is both a notional-world concept and a folk concept. Moreover, causation, unlike cohesion, is a basic category of traditional metaphysics, including metaphysics that purports to be naturalistic but falls short of this ambition. This chapter also argues that causation, just like cohesion, is a representational real pattern that is necessary for an adequately comprehensive science. It begins with an account that eliminates causation altogether on naturalistic grounds, and then shows, using principle of naturalistic closure (PNC)-mandated motivations, why this outright eliminativism is too strong. The eliminativist argument to be discussed is due to Bertrand Russell, whose view has some important contemporary adherents among philosophers of physics.
Amie L. Thomasson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195319910
- eISBN:
- 9780199869602
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195319910.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
If we don't need ordinary objects in our causal explanations, it is often held, Occam's razor enjoins us to eliminate them. This chapter examines these arguments from parsimony, suggesting first that ...
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If we don't need ordinary objects in our causal explanations, it is often held, Occam's razor enjoins us to eliminate them. This chapter examines these arguments from parsimony, suggesting first that Occam's razor does not generalize to cases in which there are analytic entailments between existence claims. Moreover, it is argued that eliminativists, such as van Inwagen and Merricks who seek to paraphrase claims, for example, about baseballs in terms of claims about atoms arranged baseballwise, don't really offer a more parsimonious theory, since their paraphrased claims may be pleonastically transformed into claims that are explicitly committed to ordinary objects. This provides the basis for an argument for the existence of ordinary objects, and against Quine's criterion of ontological commitment. In closing, this chapter considers whether this also entails commitment to extraordinary objects, and whether more severe forms of eliminativism can do better.Less
If we don't need ordinary objects in our causal explanations, it is often held, Occam's razor enjoins us to eliminate them. This chapter examines these arguments from parsimony, suggesting first that Occam's razor does not generalize to cases in which there are analytic entailments between existence claims. Moreover, it is argued that eliminativists, such as van Inwagen and Merricks who seek to paraphrase claims, for example, about baseballs in terms of claims about atoms arranged baseballwise, don't really offer a more parsimonious theory, since their paraphrased claims may be pleonastically transformed into claims that are explicitly committed to ordinary objects. This provides the basis for an argument for the existence of ordinary objects, and against Quine's criterion of ontological commitment. In closing, this chapter considers whether this also entails commitment to extraordinary objects, and whether more severe forms of eliminativism can do better.
Amie L. Thomasson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195319910
- eISBN:
- 9780199869602
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195319910.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The introductory chapter lays out the motivations for defending a common sense ontology and provides an overview of the various eliminativist arguments against ordinary objects that will be discussed ...
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The introductory chapter lays out the motivations for defending a common sense ontology and provides an overview of the various eliminativist arguments against ordinary objects that will be discussed in the book. It also describes the argument strategy of the book: the early chapters (2 and 3) argue for central views about reference and modality — namely, a hybrid approach to reference, and a conceptualist understanding of modality. But the later chapters provide the most important evidence for these views by demonstrating their ability to defuse all of the arguments against ordinary objects, and to make sense of our common sense world view nonproblematically. The book closes by sketching important metaontological results of the above work regarding which metaphysical questions are and are not answerable, and what methods should be employed in pursuing them.Less
The introductory chapter lays out the motivations for defending a common sense ontology and provides an overview of the various eliminativist arguments against ordinary objects that will be discussed in the book. It also describes the argument strategy of the book: the early chapters (2 and 3) argue for central views about reference and modality — namely, a hybrid approach to reference, and a conceptualist understanding of modality. But the later chapters provide the most important evidence for these views by demonstrating their ability to defuse all of the arguments against ordinary objects, and to make sense of our common sense world view nonproblematically. The book closes by sketching important metaontological results of the above work regarding which metaphysical questions are and are not answerable, and what methods should be employed in pursuing them.
Bryan Frances
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199282135
- eISBN:
- 9780191602917
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199282137.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
It is argued that most of the counterintuitive elements of traditional sceptical theories do not apply to the live sceptical theories, and that the live sceptic’s argument is identical in form to ...
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It is argued that most of the counterintuitive elements of traditional sceptical theories do not apply to the live sceptical theories, and that the live sceptic’s argument is identical in form to arguments we rely on without hesitation. The live sceptic is not denying anyone of the warrant they think they have; neither are they denying its quality. The knowledge denied by the live sceptic (knowledge of our own beliefs, the locations of our own pains, and the colours of objects in perfect view) is frequently ruled out in uncontroversial circumstances. This is important to the live sceptic’s case because it might be objected that it’s nearly impossible not to know one’s own beliefs, pain locations, or sock colours when the beliefs are formed in maximally veridical ways.Less
It is argued that most of the counterintuitive elements of traditional sceptical theories do not apply to the live sceptical theories, and that the live sceptic’s argument is identical in form to arguments we rely on without hesitation. The live sceptic is not denying anyone of the warrant they think they have; neither are they denying its quality. The knowledge denied by the live sceptic (knowledge of our own beliefs, the locations of our own pains, and the colours of objects in perfect view) is frequently ruled out in uncontroversial circumstances. This is important to the live sceptic’s case because it might be objected that it’s nearly impossible not to know one’s own beliefs, pain locations, or sock colours when the beliefs are formed in maximally veridical ways.
Stephen Mumford
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199259823
- eISBN:
- 9780191698637
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199259823.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter considers the different positions and proposes a new form of monism. It explores the different claims of the eliminativist and reductionist responses and provides some assessment to ...
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This chapter considers the different positions and proposes a new form of monism. It explores the different claims of the eliminativist and reductionist responses and provides some assessment to their relative merits. The second section of this chapter presents the varieties of property monism: categorical reductionism, dispositional reductionism, categorical reductionism, categorical eliminativism, and dispositional eliminativism. The third and fourth sections consider the case for and against eliminativism. What essentially distinguishes an eliminativist position from a reductionist one is a denial of identities between dispositional and categorical properties. The fifth section assesses the arguments for reductionism. The sixth section suggests a monism without reductionism.Less
This chapter considers the different positions and proposes a new form of monism. It explores the different claims of the eliminativist and reductionist responses and provides some assessment to their relative merits. The second section of this chapter presents the varieties of property monism: categorical reductionism, dispositional reductionism, categorical reductionism, categorical eliminativism, and dispositional eliminativism. The third and fourth sections consider the case for and against eliminativism. What essentially distinguishes an eliminativist position from a reductionist one is a denial of identities between dispositional and categorical properties. The fifth section assesses the arguments for reductionism. The sixth section suggests a monism without reductionism.
Bryan Frances
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199282135
- eISBN:
- 9780191602917
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199282137.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The argument template of chapter 3 is taken together with other live hypotheses to generate other kinds of live scepticism. For instance, one can focus on error theories with regard to colour, or ...
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The argument template of chapter 3 is taken together with other live hypotheses to generate other kinds of live scepticism. For instance, one can focus on error theories with regard to colour, or pain location, or character traits. Or, oddly enough, we can plug in, as a live hypothesis, the hypothesis that no one knows any external world proposition. The upshot is that in intellectual communities, in which error theories about belief, pain locations, character traits, and colour are live, mere mortals don’t know that fire engines are red, don’t know that they sometimes have pains in their lower backs, don’t know that John Rawls was kind, and don’t even know that they believe any of those truths.Less
The argument template of chapter 3 is taken together with other live hypotheses to generate other kinds of live scepticism. For instance, one can focus on error theories with regard to colour, or pain location, or character traits. Or, oddly enough, we can plug in, as a live hypothesis, the hypothesis that no one knows any external world proposition. The upshot is that in intellectual communities, in which error theories about belief, pain locations, character traits, and colour are live, mere mortals don’t know that fire engines are red, don’t know that they sometimes have pains in their lower backs, don’t know that John Rawls was kind, and don’t even know that they believe any of those truths.
Allan Gotthelf
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199287956
- eISBN:
- 9780191738296
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287956.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter identifies three categories of questions answers to which are required if one is to have a full understanding of Aristotle's teleology: Analysis, Basis, Extent. It then focuses on the ...
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This chapter identifies three categories of questions answers to which are required if one is to have a full understanding of Aristotle's teleology: Analysis, Basis, Extent. It then focuses on the ‘Basis’ questions and presents a typology of recent interpretations of the ontological basis of Aristotelian natural teleology, which it labels (i) Strong irreducibility (e.g., Gotthelf); (ii) Regulative/pragmatic (e.g., Nussbaum and Sorabji); (iii) limited irreducibility (e.g., Charles); (iv) weak irreduciblilty (e.g., M. Bradie and F.D. Miller, Jr.); (v) intrinsic cause/eliminativism (e.g., S. S. Meyer). Views (iv) and (v) are assessed at some length. Meyer, it is argued, confuses Aristotle's grounds for rejecting his opponents’ view (eliminativism) with what he takes to be the basis of his own view (anti‐reductionism). In addressing view (v) it is it is proposed that, in the face of contemporary science, Aristotle would have retreated to something like the contemporary etiological view of biological teleology.Less
This chapter identifies three categories of questions answers to which are required if one is to have a full understanding of Aristotle's teleology: Analysis, Basis, Extent. It then focuses on the ‘Basis’ questions and presents a typology of recent interpretations of the ontological basis of Aristotelian natural teleology, which it labels (i) Strong irreducibility (e.g., Gotthelf); (ii) Regulative/pragmatic (e.g., Nussbaum and Sorabji); (iii) limited irreducibility (e.g., Charles); (iv) weak irreduciblilty (e.g., M. Bradie and F.D. Miller, Jr.); (v) intrinsic cause/eliminativism (e.g., S. S. Meyer). Views (iv) and (v) are assessed at some length. Meyer, it is argued, confuses Aristotle's grounds for rejecting his opponents’ view (eliminativism) with what he takes to be the basis of his own view (anti‐reductionism). In addressing view (v) it is it is proposed that, in the face of contemporary science, Aristotle would have retreated to something like the contemporary etiological view of biological teleology.
Taylor Carman
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199272457
- eISBN:
- 9780191709951
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272457.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Dennett's intellectualist theory of consciousness trades on an equivocation between weaker and stronger claims that might be leveled against traditional psychology and epistemology. Only the weaker ...
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Dennett's intellectualist theory of consciousness trades on an equivocation between weaker and stronger claims that might be leveled against traditional psychology and epistemology. Only the weaker claims find support in the empirical evidence to which he appeals. Merleau–Ponty, by contrast, while also dismissive of pure qualia, argues that intellectualism takes for granted the constancy hypothesis by making sensory qualities dependent in principle on sensory stimuli. O'Regan and Noë advance an alternative ‘sensorimotor’ approach to perception that remains behavioristic, like Dennett's theory, by describing perceptual experience as constituted by a knowledge of causal contingencies between sensory inputs and behavioral outputs. But perception is not just what we do, it's what we are. Phenomenology is inescapable, since it is what allows us to specify at the outset what any theory of perception or consciousness must be a theory of.Less
Dennett's intellectualist theory of consciousness trades on an equivocation between weaker and stronger claims that might be leveled against traditional psychology and epistemology. Only the weaker claims find support in the empirical evidence to which he appeals. Merleau–Ponty, by contrast, while also dismissive of pure qualia, argues that intellectualism takes for granted the constancy hypothesis by making sensory qualities dependent in principle on sensory stimuli. O'Regan and Noë advance an alternative ‘sensorimotor’ approach to perception that remains behavioristic, like Dennett's theory, by describing perceptual experience as constituted by a knowledge of causal contingencies between sensory inputs and behavioral outputs. But perception is not just what we do, it's what we are. Phenomenology is inescapable, since it is what allows us to specify at the outset what any theory of perception or consciousness must be a theory of.
Barry Maund
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199556151
- eISBN:
- 9780191725548
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556151.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that, with certain qualifications, the right theory of colour is a form of eliminativism. The first qualification is that the subject of colour is complex, and an adequate theory ...
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This chapter argues that, with certain qualifications, the right theory of colour is a form of eliminativism. The first qualification is that the subject of colour is complex, and an adequate theory of the subject, likewise, will be complex, containing both metaphysical and semantic theses. Eliminativism, rightly understood, comprises only a part of the story, but an indispensable part. The second qualification is that it has to be the right kind of eliminativism, for there are several varieties. This chapter argues that we can be ontological eliminativists, holding that there are no colours, as ordinarily understood, without being conceptual eliminativists. There are important reasons for retaining the concept, even if it is not instantiated—as well as for accepting a place for other concepts of colour.Less
This chapter argues that, with certain qualifications, the right theory of colour is a form of eliminativism. The first qualification is that the subject of colour is complex, and an adequate theory of the subject, likewise, will be complex, containing both metaphysical and semantic theses. Eliminativism, rightly understood, comprises only a part of the story, but an indispensable part. The second qualification is that it has to be the right kind of eliminativism, for there are several varieties. This chapter argues that we can be ontological eliminativists, holding that there are no colours, as ordinarily understood, without being conceptual eliminativists. There are important reasons for retaining the concept, even if it is not instantiated—as well as for accepting a place for other concepts of colour.
Daniel Kelly, Edouard Machery, and Ron Mallon
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199582143
- eISBN:
- 9780191594496
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter argues that current work on racial cognition is relevant to many of philosophers' concerns about race. It first examines several positions within the philosophy of race, pointing out ...
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This chapter argues that current work on racial cognition is relevant to many of philosophers' concerns about race. It first examines several positions within the philosophy of race, pointing out where facts about the psychology of race could have an impact upon the feasibility of reform proposals offered by philosophers. It then reviews two relatively separate sets of psychological literature. The first shows that the content of racial thought is not a simple product of one's social environment, but is also shaped by the operation of certain evolved psychological mechanisms. After drawing out implications of this work for several types of proposals made by philosophers, it turns to the question of racial evaluation. Recent studies suggest that implicit racist biases can exist and influence behavior even in persons sincerely professing tolerant or even anti-racist views, and that implicit racial evaluations can be insulated in important ways from more explicitly held beliefs. The chapter then argues that these findings bear on the feasibility of proposals made in the philosophical literature on race, and may be useful in shaping novel proposals.Less
This chapter argues that current work on racial cognition is relevant to many of philosophers' concerns about race. It first examines several positions within the philosophy of race, pointing out where facts about the psychology of race could have an impact upon the feasibility of reform proposals offered by philosophers. It then reviews two relatively separate sets of psychological literature. The first shows that the content of racial thought is not a simple product of one's social environment, but is also shaped by the operation of certain evolved psychological mechanisms. After drawing out implications of this work for several types of proposals made by philosophers, it turns to the question of racial evaluation. Recent studies suggest that implicit racist biases can exist and influence behavior even in persons sincerely professing tolerant or even anti-racist views, and that implicit racial evaluations can be insulated in important ways from more explicitly held beliefs. The chapter then argues that these findings bear on the feasibility of proposals made in the philosophical literature on race, and may be useful in shaping novel proposals.
Stephen L. White
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199556182
- eISBN:
- 9780191721014
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Contemporary physicalists, materialists, and naturalists generally hold two theses: that mental states such as pains are identical to physical states of the brain, and that these identities are a ...
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Contemporary physicalists, materialists, and naturalists generally hold two theses: that mental states such as pains are identical to physical states of the brain, and that these identities are a posteriori. The property dualism argument raises a problem for such mental-physical identities. Suppose that pains are identical with c-fiber firings. That the identity is a posteriori means that a subject could be perfectly rational in believing what would be naturally expressed by saying ‘I am in pain’ and what would be naturally expressed by saying ‘My c-fibers are not firing’. There is, however, a pervasive ambiguity in the literature as to what is meant by ‘mode of presentation’ — whether it is representational, something on the side of our language, beliefs, or conceptual scheme, or something on the side of the world, something represented. This chapter argues that the assumption that we have a meaningful vocabulary of mentalistic terms such as ‘pain’ entails that there are modes of presentation of both kinds — concepts and the properties that give those concepts their content. And the properties that give such concepts content are thin. Thus, they confer no empirically discoverable nature on the objects that instantiate them. It concludes that there must be some irreducibly mentalistic properties — properties not identical to any physical properties — and that this is a consequence of the assumptions made by the proponents of a posteriori mental-physical identities themselves.The alternative is ‘local eliminativism’. This view is unstable — it collapses into straightforward eliminativism regarding the mental, which is incompatible with the qualia realism of the proponents of a posteriori mental-physical identities.Less
Contemporary physicalists, materialists, and naturalists generally hold two theses: that mental states such as pains are identical to physical states of the brain, and that these identities are a posteriori. The property dualism argument raises a problem for such mental-physical identities. Suppose that pains are identical with c-fiber firings. That the identity is a posteriori means that a subject could be perfectly rational in believing what would be naturally expressed by saying ‘I am in pain’ and what would be naturally expressed by saying ‘My c-fibers are not firing’. There is, however, a pervasive ambiguity in the literature as to what is meant by ‘mode of presentation’ — whether it is representational, something on the side of our language, beliefs, or conceptual scheme, or something on the side of the world, something represented. This chapter argues that the assumption that we have a meaningful vocabulary of mentalistic terms such as ‘pain’ entails that there are modes of presentation of both kinds — concepts and the properties that give those concepts their content. And the properties that give such concepts content are thin. Thus, they confer no empirically discoverable nature on the objects that instantiate them. It concludes that there must be some irreducibly mentalistic properties — properties not identical to any physical properties — and that this is a consequence of the assumptions made by the proponents of a posteriori mental-physical identities themselves.The alternative is ‘local eliminativism’. This view is unstable — it collapses into straightforward eliminativism regarding the mental, which is incompatible with the qualia realism of the proponents of a posteriori mental-physical identities.
Robert D. Rupert
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195379457
- eISBN:
- 9780199869114
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379457.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter briefly describes the history leading up to the situated revolution. It then introduces and motivates the three varieties of situated view to be discussed: (a) the extended view, which ...
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This chapter briefly describes the history leading up to the situated revolution. It then introduces and motivates the three varieties of situated view to be discussed: (a) the extended view, which holds that human cognitive processing literally extends into the environment beyond the boundary of the organism; (b) the embedded view, which asserts that the human cognitive system is bounded by the organism but relies in surprising and extensive ways on interaction with the environment; and (c) the embodied view, according to which the human's nonneural physical body deeply influences cognitive processing. The chapter also sets out the book's naturalistic methodology and explores the way in which this methodology might support conclusions about the human mind and self.Less
This chapter briefly describes the history leading up to the situated revolution. It then introduces and motivates the three varieties of situated view to be discussed: (a) the extended view, which holds that human cognitive processing literally extends into the environment beyond the boundary of the organism; (b) the embedded view, which asserts that the human cognitive system is bounded by the organism but relies in surprising and extensive ways on interaction with the environment; and (c) the embodied view, according to which the human's nonneural physical body deeply influences cognitive processing. The chapter also sets out the book's naturalistic methodology and explores the way in which this methodology might support conclusions about the human mind and self.