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In examining the relationship between political reform and the redesign of Asia-Pacific electoral systems, this chapter argues that many of the political reforms undertaken across the region in recent years have, at their heart, the objective of promoting the development of more aggregative, centrist, and stable politics by encouraging cohesive political parties and limiting party fragmentation. It also highlights several distinctive patterns of electoral reform across the region, including the increasing prevalence of ‘mixed member’ systems in Asia; the spread of alternative vote systems in the Pacific Islands; the distinctively majoritarian nature of these reform trends; and the increasing willingness of many Asian and Pacific states to borrow from each other in the search for appropriate models of electoral system design.

Electoral reforms are surprisingly rare in established political systems. This chapter analyses the reasons why political actors might attempt to change an electoral system to one that more closely matches their own interests, and the reasons why they might decide not to attempt to do this. It discusses the limitations of the rational actor paradigm. It identifies the circumstances under which electoral reform becomes more likely. It discusses ‘fashions’ in electoral reform, particularly the adoption of mixed systems in a number of countries and moves to widen voters’ intraparty candidate choice, and emphasises the important role of democratic values.

The puzzle addressed by this chapter is why electoral reform for the Canadian House of Commons has so rarely made it to the agenda, let alone to adoption, despite the existence of widely recognized problems with the current electoral system, the experience of several rounds of constitutional reform in which the issue could have been raised, and relatively weak constitutional barriers to reform. The first section, ‘Electoral Rules and the Party System’, provides background on how the Canadian party system has evolved under the current set of single‐seat district (SSD) plurality electoral rules. The second section, ‘Explaining the Limited Electoral Reform Agenda in Canada’, examines why electoral reform for the Canadian House of Commons has so rarely been on the political agenda. The final section, ‘Prospects for Electoral Reform in the Future’,discusses conditions under which electoral reform might come onto the agenda in the near future, and whether it is likely to do so.

An analysis of the factors and the processes that led to the adoption of a mixed‐member electoral system in Israel. The first section analyzes the characteristics of the Israeli pre‐reform extreme electoral (hyper‐representative) system according to the two dimensions (intraparty and interparty) suggested by Shugart in Ch. 2; it also presents a brief discussion of reform initiatives, intended to provide solutions to some of the electoral system pathologies, and explains their failure. The second section discusses the developments in the intraparty dimension—the parties’ tendencies from the 1970s on to adopt more and more inclusive selectorates for candidate selection (this was reform outside the constitutional and legislative framework). The final section discusses the developments in the interparty dimension—patching a majoritarian feature onto a proportional system; this is an analysis of the politics of reform—the factors and the processes that led to the adoption of direct election of the prime minister, and includes five elements: long‐term developments that served as background factors; events that served as catalysts during the struggle for and against reform; a description of the political actors who took part in this struggle; the characteristics of the mixed system that make it more fit for promotion and its use by the reformers to overcome the primary advantage of the institutional status quo; and, lastly, the four stages of the reform process. An appendix lists major events and dates.

This chapter examines the political prospects of the Liberal Democrat Party. The big question is whether or not it can replace its rivals as the second, or even the first, party of British electoral politics. It begins with an analysis of the necessary conditions for the Liberal Democrats to replace one of the other parties as the second party of British politics. This leads into an examination of the likelihood that these conditions will be met in the foreseeable future. The evidence suggests that the party has a real opportunity to break the existing two-party hegemony at a general election in 2009 or 2010.

Reviews the experiences of several existing mixed‐member electoral systems in an effort to assess the likely prospects for the continued spread of this mode of electoral reform. There are three sections. The first, ‘Inherent and Contingent Factors in Electoral Reform’, looks at extreme electoral systems and systemic failure, act‐contingent explanations of pressures for reform, and outcome‐contingent explanations of political compromise leading to reform. The second section, ‘The Best of Both Worlds’, looks at the interparty and intraparty dimensions of mixed‐member electoral systems, and offers an assessment of these systems. The third section briefly assesses the prospects for continued spread of the mixed‐member idea.

In the field of electoral systems, Britain has long held out as a bastion of stability, as the country seen as least likely to undergo fundamental electoral reform, but this picture was rudely shattered in the late spring of 1997, with the election of a new Labour government. The central argument of this chapter is that the current debate over British electoral reform should be viewed as part of a wider process of the coming of age of British politics. A review of the historical debate reveals a series of failed initiatives to reform the electoral system, suggesting that the matter has never been entirely put to rest, and that there has always been the prospect of its re‐emergence. The current episode, dating from the election of the new government in 1997, provides reason to expect that electoral reform may really happen this time, and indeed already has happened in a number of British electoral arenas (European Parliament; London mayor; Northern Ireland, Scottish, Welsh and London Assemblies). The chapter is arranged as follows: the first section summarizes the historical record from 1860 to 1970, and provides evidence of a political elite willing at least to countenance the idea of experimenting with change, even if not yet prepared to embrace it; the second section explores possible explanations for why the issue re‐emerged in the 1990s and describes the reforms implemented in that period (up to 2000); this is followed by an outline of the deliberations and proposals of the Independent Commission on the Voting System for the British House of Commons (the Jenkins Commission), which was established by the new Labour prime minister, Tony Blair, in December 1997, whose report was published in October 1998 and suggested ‘alternative vote plus (AV+)’ as the new electoral system; the concluding section discusses the current prospects for electoral reform in the UK.

‘Times they are a-changing . . .’ is at the source of the Westminster model. Or are they? Electoral reformers are still trying to replace Britain’s single-member plurality electoral system with some form of PR, as they have been for 150 years. The system has maintained the parliamentary dominance of two parties, but elections have become increasingly multi-party and disproportional since 1974. However, at sub-state, local, and European elections, Britain has become a very active laboratory for electoral system design and implementation.

Explores several of the factors that significantly affected the transition of New Zealand's political system from a pluralitarian (extreme majoritarian) system famous for its tranquil efficacy to an MMP (mixed‐member proportional) system renowned for its vengeful reformism. These factors include: (1) dealignment; (2) minor party under‐representation; (3) the under‐representation of minority groups in an era of increasing multiculturalism; (4) radical, unpopular economic reform by successive Labour and National party governments; and (5) the parliamentary ‘other side’ of the calculus—the provision of both a Royal Commission, which highlighted representational failings of the Westminster system while legitimating MMP specifically as an alternative electoral system, and indicative and binding referendums, which gave New Zealand's voters the final say in determining the fate of the country's electoral system. The extent to which these issues were important in vote choices of electors in the 1993 referendum is also considered. A last section considers the overall explanations for New Zealand's turn to MMP, and the chapter includes a table that shows a timeline of electoral change in New Zealand since 1985 (the period immediately preceding the reform of 1993) and an appendix giving a sketch of the MMP system in New Zealand.

This chapter, on the causes of electoral reform in Japan, reviews the movement from an extreme electoral (hyper‐personalistic) system in which candidates of the same party competed against one another in three‐ to five‐seat districts (in a single non‐transferable vote system, SNTV) to a mixed‐member majoritarian (MMM) system that eliminated intraparty competition. It is argued that short‐term act‐contingent motivations played a necessary role in passing political reform, and that by January 1994, when the reform bills finally passed into law, no politician could publicly oppose political reform, even though some felt freer to grumble about it. The main sections of the chapter are: The Pathologies of SNTV: Who Hated What?; A Brief History of Failed Electoral Reform Efforts—1956 to 1991; The Fall and Rise of the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party): Electoral Reform in 1993–4; Analysis: The Causes of Electoral Reform.

Israel had a closed list PR system that was so proportional that it resulted in a large multi-party system with a very fragmented parliament. One result is that for decades, Israel experienced difficulties in building and maintaining large coalition governments, often containing several small and more extreme parties, which can and do yield blackmail powers. The failure to reform the actual electoral system led to misguided attempts at institutional engineering. Reformers attempted to alleviate some of the effects of the electoral system by adopting party primaries and directly electing the prime minister. However, the unintended consequences of these reforms were immediate. Primaries undermined party discipline, while the direct election of the Prime Minister made the problem of sustaining coalition governments worse than before the reform. Israel has since returned to a ‘single-ballot’ system.

Mexico has a long experience with highly majoritarian variants of mixed‐member systems, but has recently been made more proportional in a process of democratization. Electoral reform has developed along two major axes: the degree of proportionality, and the composition of the electoral authority, with the parties often trading openness on one axis for closure on the other. Sometimes trade‐offs in reform negotiations followed a third dimension—the registration requirements for new parties. This chapter first describes the evolution of the Mexican electoral formulae from 1963 to today, explaining the rationale of each phase of reform either as a majority party decision or as a trade‐off between government and opposition; the phases described are the plurality party deputy system (1963–1976), the mixed‐member majoritarian (MMM) minority representation system (1979–1985), the governability clause of the 1988 law, the governability clause with ‘moving escalator’ of the 1991 law, and the abandonment of the governability clause in the 1994 law. The last part of the chapter focuses on the last round of electoral reforms (the 1997 law), in which the mixed‐member majoritarian (MMM) system reintroduced in 1994 (after the earlier brief interludes of systems that combined MMM with mixed‐member proportional (MMP) arrangements under the 1988 and 1991 laws), was further reformed to result in a more proportional allocation of seats, with the dominant principle depending on the vote distribution.

The electoral system used in Britain for EP elections was changed radically in 1999, the SMP system being replaced by a PR, regional closed-list system. This change represented a very rare case of fundamental electoral reform in an established democratic political system, and by far the most substantial electoral reform ever introduced for EP elections. This chapter outlines the precise nature of the change instituted in 1999, elucidating the differences between the two electoral systems, outlining how key features of the new system can be expected to have an impact on the nature of the representative process, and tracing the immediate consequences of reform for the social and political representativeness of the British cohort of MEPs. The chapter then examines some survey evidence on the differences in attitudes to representation among MEPs that were produced by the new electoral system.

This analyzes the consequences of the Israeli version of a mixed electoral system, in which a majoritarian method of electing the head of the executive branch was grafted onto an extremely proportional system of electing the legislature. Focuses on the first two elections in which this mixed system was implemented, 1996 and 1999, and in doing so, concentrates on two aspects of the elections: the election results, i.e., the decimation of the two main parties and the rise of sectarian parties (fragmentation of the parliamentary system); and the electoral dynamics, i.e., the convergence toward the center in both the executive and the legislative elections. The most significant ramifications of the implementation of the direct popular election of the prime minister have been a significant shift in the electoral strength of the parties and a dramatic change in the competitive electoral orientation of the Israeli party system. Neither result was expected by those who initiated and propelled the electoral reform, while many of the actual expectations of the reform were not met. Arranged in the following sections: The Israeli Version of a Mixed Electoral System and Resulting Hybrid Political System; and The Consequences of the Mixed Electoral System for (1) Electoral Competition, (2) Political Representation, and (3) Electoral Efficiency.