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This analyzes the consequences of the Israeli version of a mixed electoral system, in which a majoritarian method of electing the head of the executive branch was grafted onto an extremely proportional system of electing the legislature. Focuses on the first two elections in which this mixed system was implemented, 1996 and 1999, and in doing so, concentrates on two aspects of the elections: the election results, i.e., the decimation of the two main parties and the rise of sectarian parties (fragmentation of the parliamentary system); and the electoral dynamics, i.e., the convergence toward the center in both the executive and the legislative elections. The most significant ramifications of the implementation of the direct popular election of the prime minister have been a significant shift in the electoral strength of the parties and a dramatic change in the competitive electoral orientation of the Israeli party system. Neither result was expected by those who initiated and propelled the electoral reform, while many of the actual expectations of the reform were not met. Arranged in the following sections: The Israeli Version of a Mixed Electoral System and Resulting Hybrid Political System; and The Consequences of the Mixed Electoral System for (1) Electoral Competition, (2) Political Representation, and (3) Electoral Efficiency.

This chapter examines the systematic factors behind local electoral results. Looking at data from over 7,000 different municipalities over a twenty-year time period, it appears that local elections are a curious mixture of the predictable and the idiosyncratic. They are predictable in that the majority of incumbents for local office either run unopposed or win reelection if they face challengers. This is consistent with the idea of managerial democracy: elections for local office should hinge on issues of custodial performance, and because incumbents get reelected at high rates, most are probably doing their jobs well enough to satisfy enough constituents or to dissuade any opponents. Identifying those instances when incumbents are likely to lose, however, turns out to be a very difficult task. Of the few identifiable trends, it appears that incumbent city council members are more likely to lose in places that are larger in size, greater in scope, and higher in bias. But the ability to predict the likelihood that any given incumbent is likely to lose, even when we know most political and social characteristics of a place, remains small.

This chapter addresses the questions of why the UK electoral system produces disproportional election results, and why that disproportionality increased between 1950 and 2005. Labour's landslide victories of 1997 and 2001 and its substantial majority in 2005 owe much to geography. This is not because the system is constructed to favour Labour: the system has not changed since 1950 and Labour has only benefited markedly since 1992. Instead, Labour has done much to create the geographical conditions that produced its landslide victories — whether through its influence on the Boundary Commissions, its carefully targeted and spatially focused campaigns, its willingness to accept low turnout in many constituencies, and its (implicit) preparedness to participate in tactical voting strategies.

How legitimate is the electoral process in post-Soviet Russia, and to what extent do reported electoral statistics reflect the actual will of the voters? It is not contended that we should regard all Russian election results with suspicion, nor that electoral malfeasance is unique to the country. Nonetheless, misgivings about the electoral process are voiced often enough that we cannot ignore them. The chapter provides an assessment of the legitimacy of the Russian electoral process through two perspectives. The first part examines the evidence of falsified results and major electoral rights violations in Russian elections, via observer reports, statistical analysis and analysis of official complaints. The second and third parts look at the question of external validity. Regardless of the actual evidence of electoral fraud, to what extent does the international community, and the Russian electorate, perceive the electoral process to be legitimate? Using survey and focus group materials, these questions – and the trends in public opinion over time – are examined.

This chapter discusses the selection process made by the National Candidate Commission in order to provide a final candidate list for the national elections of 2002–2003. This chapter focuses on the 2002–2003 elections which provide a great opportunity to examine closely the Cuban electoral process. Whereas previous studies on Cuban elections lacked gender perspective, this chapter focuses on the gender composition of the various assemblies involved in the Cuban national elections wherein female representation on the local and national level varies considerably due to positive discrimination. The chapter also examines the candidate nomination process and presents a detailed election results for the municipal and national level.

This chapter examines the role of the international community when using audits as a way of settling disputes about election results. Examples include Afghanistan in 2014, Haiti in 2010, and Kosovo in 2010. The aim of these audits is to resolve allegations of fraud, to mediate peacefully among disputing parties, and to establish credible evidence about the results. This process is thought to be particularly important for peace building in fragile states where governance structures and rule of law are weak and fraud allegations over election outcomes may easily trigger further conflict and violence. The chapter examines the standards that should be used in any audit process, including considering issues of ownership; clearly defined principles; rigorous, impartial, and consistent methods to establish the factual evidence; and the need for a timely evaluation of the outcome and resolve disputes.

This chapter discusses the 1950 election results, which did nothing to quell Republican factionalism as both Taft and Dewey saw the outcomes as further justification for their electoral strategies. As the GOP made preparations for the 1952 presidential campaign, the national political climate remained fairly static. The Korean conflict continued in stalemate, while McCarthy's crusade grew more aggressive and maintained high levels of public support. The economic picture looked to be one of ever-increasing prosperity with inflation weighing lightly on the minds of the voters. Inside the Republican organization, however, the mood transformed dramatically with rumors that General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the architect of D-Day, would seek the nomination. “Ike” regularly voted as a Republican, but since military code prevented him from making public political statements while on active duty, his party affiliation was largely unknown.

This chapter directly assesses the expectation that an increase in turnout from one election to the next produces a larger vote share for the Democratic candidate, while a decline in turnout reduces it. It offers straightforward data to analyze changes through time for presidential elections (overall and within states, from 1948 through 2016), Senate elections (overall, and for all one hundred seats from 1966 through 2016), gubernatorial elections (overall, and for all fifty states from 1966 through 2016), and congressional elections (overall, and for all 435 districts from 1972 through 2010). The focus is on aggregate patterns and relationships. The data indicate that partisan vote choice is not significantly correlated with turnout.

There are demographic and political factors beyond turnout that matter for elections. Congressional districts are sufficiently small and homogeneous to permit an examination of turnout in the context of relevant political and demographic variables. That controlled analysis is presented here. For the two most recent decades, this chapter uses data sets that include relevant demographic and political variables for each of the congressional districts, including the ethnicity of the electorate, its age profile, and district income to account for the effect of socioeconomic status on the Democratic vote share. This contextual information presses the analysis one level further. An estimation of the relationship between turnout and Democratic vote is strengthened when other factors that are known to influence support for the Democrats are considered and included in the models.

This chapter explores the link between turnout and the vote across an extended series of elections within states and electoral districts. The strength of this design is that it conforms exactly to the ordinary language that analysts and commentators use to assert a connection between turnout and vote outcome. The proponents of a turnout bias argue that increased turnout in a forthcoming election should increase the Democrat’s share of the vote compared to the previous election, while a turnout drop will erode that share. We use straightforward data for an analysis of changes through time for presidential elections from 1948 through 2016, for each Senate seat from 1966 through 2016, for each state’s gubernatorial contests from 1966 through 2016, and for all 435 congressional districts from 1972 through 2010. The analysis does not find support for the bias thesis but observes a virtually random relationship, with turnout in many states and districts helping the Republicans as often as it assists the Democrats.

This chapter seek to clarify the underlying concepts of electoral integrity and malpractice, and to consider what systematic, valid, and reliable evidence is available to allow scholars and practitioners to monitor the quality of elections. The chapter reviews the pros and cons of several methods and analytical techniques. Previous studies have usually relied upon one or several primary sources, including case studies, performance indices, and elite interviews, content analysis of observer mission reports, human rights reports, coding of news media coverage, forensic analysis of election results, randomized evaluations through natural or field experiments, and also public opinion surveys. It is argued that many of these approaches are useful, but they each suffer from important limitations, for example in terms of conceptual validity, cross-national coverage, and/or capacity to monitor all sequential stages throughout the electoral cycle. It is therefore useful to supplement this evidence through gathering evidence from a global survey of expert opinion. The new Perception of Electoral Integrity Index (PEI), it is suggested, offers a comprehensive, systematic, and robust measure that can usefully supplement many other sources of empirical evidence, playing a valuable role for both the academic and the policymaking communities.

This book concludes by describing how the final election results proved a devastating blow to the Progressive Party and all those associated with it. The presidential ticket finished an embarrassing fourth behind the Dixiecrats, polling only 1.1 million votes, 2.37 percent of those cast. The narrowness of Wallace's appeal was equally striking. Thirty-seven percent of his nationwide total came from New York City. In California, his second strongest state, 53 percent of the votes came from Los Angeles County. Few had anticipated such a poor showing. The last preelection Roper survey had put Wallace at 3.6 percent, a figure the Progressives fiercely disputed, charging that the pollster had “suppressed” the real numbers because he knew there was a huge “hidden vote” for the third party. The polls notwithstanding, on election eve, many Progressives remained convinced that Wallace would garner between 5 and 10 million votes.