Mark R. Leary
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195172423
- eISBN:
- 9780199786756
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195172423.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
Human beings are unique in their ability to think consciously about themselves. Because they have a capacity for self-awareness not shared by other animals, people can imagine themselves in the ...
More
Human beings are unique in their ability to think consciously about themselves. Because they have a capacity for self-awareness not shared by other animals, people can imagine themselves in the future, anticipate consequences, plan ahead, improve themselves, and perform many other behaviors that are uniquely characteristic of human beings. Yet, despite the obvious advantages of self-reflection, the capacity for self-thought comes at a high price as people's lives are adversely affected and their inner chatter interferes with their success, pollutes their relationships, and undermines their happiness. Indeed, self-relevant thought is responsible for most of the personal and social difficulties that human beings face as individuals and as a species. Among other things, the capacity for self-reflection distorts people's perceptions, leading them to make bad decisions based on faulty information. The self conjures up a great deal of personal suffering in the form of depression, anxiety, anger, envy, and other negative emotions by allowing people to ruminate about the past or imagine the future. Egocentrism and egotism blind people to their own shortcomings, promote self-serving biases, and undermine their relationships with others. The ability to self-reflect also underlies social conflict by leading people to separate themselves into ingroups and outgroups. Ironically, many sources of personal unhappiness — such as addictions, overeating, unsafe sex, infidelity, and domestic violence — are due to people's inability to exert self-control. For those inclined toward religion and spirituality, visionaries throughout history have proclaimed that the egoic self stymies the quest for spiritual fulfillment and leads to immoral behavior.Less
Human beings are unique in their ability to think consciously about themselves. Because they have a capacity for self-awareness not shared by other animals, people can imagine themselves in the future, anticipate consequences, plan ahead, improve themselves, and perform many other behaviors that are uniquely characteristic of human beings. Yet, despite the obvious advantages of self-reflection, the capacity for self-thought comes at a high price as people's lives are adversely affected and their inner chatter interferes with their success, pollutes their relationships, and undermines their happiness. Indeed, self-relevant thought is responsible for most of the personal and social difficulties that human beings face as individuals and as a species. Among other things, the capacity for self-reflection distorts people's perceptions, leading them to make bad decisions based on faulty information. The self conjures up a great deal of personal suffering in the form of depression, anxiety, anger, envy, and other negative emotions by allowing people to ruminate about the past or imagine the future. Egocentrism and egotism blind people to their own shortcomings, promote self-serving biases, and undermine their relationships with others. The ability to self-reflect also underlies social conflict by leading people to separate themselves into ingroups and outgroups. Ironically, many sources of personal unhappiness — such as addictions, overeating, unsafe sex, infidelity, and domestic violence — are due to people's inability to exert self-control. For those inclined toward religion and spirituality, visionaries throughout history have proclaimed that the egoic self stymies the quest for spiritual fulfillment and leads to immoral behavior.
Alison Hills
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199213306
- eISBN:
- 9780191594212
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213306.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The Beloved Self is about the ‘holy grail’ of moral philosophy: an argument against Egoism, that we all have reasons to be moral. The first part of the book introduces three versions of ...
More
The Beloved Self is about the ‘holy grail’ of moral philosophy: an argument against Egoism, that we all have reasons to be moral. The first part of the book introduces three versions of Egoism, each paralleling a different moral theory, and sheds new light on the concept of self-interest in virtue ethics and especially in Kant's moral theory. Part Two looks at attempts to prove that Egoism is false, and shows that even modest arguments against Egoist appear to fail. Part Three discusses the relationship between knowledge and action and defends a new conception of moral epistemology, centred on the importance of moral understanding, which has wide-ranging implications regarding not only moral testimony and moral disagreement but also the nature of virtue and morally worthy action. This final part of the book culminates in a vindication of morality, an argument that it is not epistemically rational to believe the most plausible versions of Egoism.Less
The Beloved Self is about the ‘holy grail’ of moral philosophy: an argument against Egoism, that we all have reasons to be moral. The first part of the book introduces three versions of Egoism, each paralleling a different moral theory, and sheds new light on the concept of self-interest in virtue ethics and especially in Kant's moral theory. Part Two looks at attempts to prove that Egoism is false, and shows that even modest arguments against Egoist appear to fail. Part Three discusses the relationship between knowledge and action and defends a new conception of moral epistemology, centred on the importance of moral understanding, which has wide-ranging implications regarding not only moral testimony and moral disagreement but also the nature of virtue and morally worthy action. This final part of the book culminates in a vindication of morality, an argument that it is not epistemically rational to believe the most plausible versions of Egoism.
Alison Hills
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199213306
- eISBN:
- 9780191594212
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213306.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Common sense morality is in a better epistemic position than Egoism, for those who accept common sense morality can modestly vindicate it – they can defend it to their own satisfaction – whereas most ...
More
Common sense morality is in a better epistemic position than Egoism, for those who accept common sense morality can modestly vindicate it – they can defend it to their own satisfaction – whereas most Egoists cannot defend Egoism, even modestly. The key to this defence of morality is the importance of moral understanding. What are the implications of recognizing that the focus of moral epistemology should be moral understanding rather than moral knowledge? Moral philosophers already act as if they are aiming for moral understanding, but there are many unanswered questions about moral understanding that need to be addressed in the future.Less
Common sense morality is in a better epistemic position than Egoism, for those who accept common sense morality can modestly vindicate it – they can defend it to their own satisfaction – whereas most Egoists cannot defend Egoism, even modestly. The key to this defence of morality is the importance of moral understanding. What are the implications of recognizing that the focus of moral epistemology should be moral understanding rather than moral knowledge? Moral philosophers already act as if they are aiming for moral understanding, but there are many unanswered questions about moral understanding that need to be addressed in the future.
David Phillips
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199778911
- eISBN:
- 9780199919093
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199778911.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics is one of the most important books in the history of moral philosophy. But it has not hitherto received the kind of sustained scholarly attention its stature ...
More
Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics is one of the most important books in the history of moral philosophy. But it has not hitherto received the kind of sustained scholarly attention its stature merits. In this book the author aims to do something that has (surprisingly) not been done before: to interpret and evaluate the central argument of the Methods, in a way that brings out the important conceptual and historical connections between Sidgwick’s views and contemporary moral philosophy.Sidgwick distinguished three basic methods: utilitarianism, egoism, and dogmatic intuitionism. And he focused on two conflicts: between utilitarianism and dogmatic intuitionism and between utilitarianism and egoism. Sidgwick believed he could largely resolve the conflict between utilitarianism and dogmatic intuitionism, but could not resolve the conflict between utilitarianism and egoism. Phillips suggests that the best way to approach Sidgwick’s ideas is to start with his views on these two conflicts, and with the metaethical and epistemological ideas on which they depend. Phillips interprets and largely defends Sidgwick’s non-naturalist metaethics and moderate intuitionist moral epistemology. But he argues for a verdict on the two conflicts different from Sidgwick’s own. Phillips claims that Sidgwick is less successful than he thinks in resolving the conflict between utilitarianism and dogmatic intuitionism, and that Sidgwick’s treatment of the conflict between utilitarianism and egoism is more successful than he thinks in that it provides the model for a plausible view of practical reason.Phillips’s book will be of interest to two different groups of readers: to students seeking a brief introduction to Sidgwick’s most important ideas and a guidebook to the Methods, and to scholars in ethics and the history of ideas concerned with Sidgwick’s seminal contribution to moral philosophy.Less
Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics is one of the most important books in the history of moral philosophy. But it has not hitherto received the kind of sustained scholarly attention its stature merits. In this book the author aims to do something that has (surprisingly) not been done before: to interpret and evaluate the central argument of the Methods, in a way that brings out the important conceptual and historical connections between Sidgwick’s views and contemporary moral philosophy.Sidgwick distinguished three basic methods: utilitarianism, egoism, and dogmatic intuitionism. And he focused on two conflicts: between utilitarianism and dogmatic intuitionism and between utilitarianism and egoism. Sidgwick believed he could largely resolve the conflict between utilitarianism and dogmatic intuitionism, but could not resolve the conflict between utilitarianism and egoism. Phillips suggests that the best way to approach Sidgwick’s ideas is to start with his views on these two conflicts, and with the metaethical and epistemological ideas on which they depend. Phillips interprets and largely defends Sidgwick’s non-naturalist metaethics and moderate intuitionist moral epistemology. But he argues for a verdict on the two conflicts different from Sidgwick’s own. Phillips claims that Sidgwick is less successful than he thinks in resolving the conflict between utilitarianism and dogmatic intuitionism, and that Sidgwick’s treatment of the conflict between utilitarianism and egoism is more successful than he thinks in that it provides the model for a plausible view of practical reason.Phillips’s book will be of interest to two different groups of readers: to students seeking a brief introduction to Sidgwick’s most important ideas and a guidebook to the Methods, and to scholars in ethics and the history of ideas concerned with Sidgwick’s seminal contribution to moral philosophy.
A. W. Price
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198248996
- eISBN:
- 9780191681172
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248996.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book fully explores for the first time an idea common to Plato and Aristotle, which unites their treatments—otherwise very different—of love and friendship. The idea is that although persons are ...
More
This book fully explores for the first time an idea common to Plato and Aristotle, which unites their treatments—otherwise very different—of love and friendship. The idea is that although persons are separate, their lives need not be. One person's life may overflow into another's, and as such, helping another person is a way of serving oneself. The book shows how their view of love and friendship, within not only personal relationships, but also the household and even the city-state, promises to resolve the old dichotomy between egoism and altruism.Less
This book fully explores for the first time an idea common to Plato and Aristotle, which unites their treatments—otherwise very different—of love and friendship. The idea is that although persons are separate, their lives need not be. One person's life may overflow into another's, and as such, helping another person is a way of serving oneself. The book shows how their view of love and friendship, within not only personal relationships, but also the household and even the city-state, promises to resolve the old dichotomy between egoism and altruism.
Simon Caney
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780198293507
- eISBN:
- 9780191602337
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019829350X.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Having argued, in Ch. 2, that there are universal moral values, the next logical step is to ask what these universal moral values are; this question is pursued in Chs 3 and 4, which consider ...
More
Having argued, in Ch. 2, that there are universal moral values, the next logical step is to ask what these universal moral values are; this question is pursued in Chs 3 and 4, which consider arguments for two different types of universal value and link together to provide an analysis of what universal principles of justice should apply at the global level. This chapter examines claims that there are universal principles of civil and political justice, that is, those principles that specify what rights people have to what freedoms, and argues for universal human rights to certain civil and political liberties. It is arranged in 13 sections: Section I presents an analysis of human rights, since this term plays a central and important role in a plausible account of civil and political justice; Section II puts forward a general thesis about justifications for civil and political human rights; this is followed, in Sections III–VII, by an analysis of four cosmopolitan arguments for human rights that criticizes three of them but defends the fourth; Section VIII considers an alternative non-cosmopolitan approach to defending civil and political human rights, presented by John Rawls in The Law of Peoples (1999b); the next three sections (IX–XI) of the chapter explore misgivings about civil and political human rights, including the objections that such human rights are a species of imperialism and do not accord sufficient respect to cultural practices (IX), produce homogeneity/uniformity (X), and generate egoism/individualism and destroy community (XI); Section XII considers a further objection—the realist charges that foreign policy to protect civil and political human rights is in practice selective and partial and a cloak for the pursuit of the national interest. Section XIII summarizes the overall case made for civil and political justice.Less
Having argued, in Ch. 2, that there are universal moral values, the next logical step is to ask what these universal moral values are; this question is pursued in Chs 3 and 4, which consider arguments for two different types of universal value and link together to provide an analysis of what universal principles of justice should apply at the global level. This chapter examines claims that there are universal principles of civil and political justice, that is, those principles that specify what rights people have to what freedoms, and argues for universal human rights to certain civil and political liberties. It is arranged in 13 sections: Section I presents an analysis of human rights, since this term plays a central and important role in a plausible account of civil and political justice; Section II puts forward a general thesis about justifications for civil and political human rights; this is followed, in Sections III–VII, by an analysis of four cosmopolitan arguments for human rights that criticizes three of them but defends the fourth; Section VIII considers an alternative non-cosmopolitan approach to defending civil and political human rights, presented by John Rawls in The Law of Peoples (1999b); the next three sections (IX–XI) of the chapter explore misgivings about civil and political human rights, including the objections that such human rights are a species of imperialism and do not accord sufficient respect to cultural practices (IX), produce homogeneity/uniformity (X), and generate egoism/individualism and destroy community (XI); Section XII considers a further objection—the realist charges that foreign policy to protect civil and political human rights is in practice selective and partial and a cloak for the pursuit of the national interest. Section XIII summarizes the overall case made for civil and political justice.
A. W. Price
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198248996
- eISBN:
- 9780191681172
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248996.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The character of life that has permitted people to unite egoism and altruism to a certain degree is that which is called moral fecundity. It is necessary that individual life should diffuse itself ...
More
The character of life that has permitted people to unite egoism and altruism to a certain degree is that which is called moral fecundity. It is necessary that individual life should diffuse itself for another, in another, and if need be, give itself. This diffusion is not contrary to nature, in fact, it is according to nature, and as such, it is the very condition of true life. This same concept is true of intelligence no less than of the body as it is impossible to confine intelligence within itself as it is like a flame that is made to radiate. There is the same diffusive force in people's sensibility, such as having to share joy and share grief. It is the whole nature that is sociable.Less
The character of life that has permitted people to unite egoism and altruism to a certain degree is that which is called moral fecundity. It is necessary that individual life should diffuse itself for another, in another, and if need be, give itself. This diffusion is not contrary to nature, in fact, it is according to nature, and as such, it is the very condition of true life. This same concept is true of intelligence no less than of the body as it is impossible to confine intelligence within itself as it is like a flame that is made to radiate. There is the same diffusive force in people's sensibility, such as having to share joy and share grief. It is the whole nature that is sociable.
James P. Sterba
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199580767
- eISBN:
- 9780191745836
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580767.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Most contemporary moral and political philosophers would like to have an argument showing that morality is rationally required. This book provides just such an argument and further show that ...
More
Most contemporary moral and political philosophers would like to have an argument showing that morality is rationally required. This book provides just such an argument and further show that morality, so justified, leads to substantial equality. The argument from rationality to morality is based on the principle of non-question-beggingness and it has two forms. The first assumes that the egoist is willing to argue for egoism non-question-beggingly, and the second only assumes that the egoist is willing to assent to premises she actually needs to achieve her egoistic goals. Either way, it is argued, morality is rationally (i.e., non-question-beggingly) preferable to egoism. The argument from morality to equality also non-question-beggingly starts with assumptions that are acceptable from a libertarian perspective, the view that appears to endorse the least enforcement of morality, and then shows that this perspective requires a right to welfare, and that further, when this right is extended to distant peoples and future generations, it leads to substantial equality. The strategy is to find conflicts of (negative) liberty within a libertarian perspective, and then argue that when these conflicts are appropriately resolved, they favor an allocation of liberty that supports a right to welfare that, in turn, when fully implemented, leads to substantial equality. The book also defends thus two-part argument against recent critics and further show how the argument is preferable to alternative attempts to justify morality as well as alternative attempts to show that morality leads to a right to welfare and/or to equality.Less
Most contemporary moral and political philosophers would like to have an argument showing that morality is rationally required. This book provides just such an argument and further show that morality, so justified, leads to substantial equality. The argument from rationality to morality is based on the principle of non-question-beggingness and it has two forms. The first assumes that the egoist is willing to argue for egoism non-question-beggingly, and the second only assumes that the egoist is willing to assent to premises she actually needs to achieve her egoistic goals. Either way, it is argued, morality is rationally (i.e., non-question-beggingly) preferable to egoism. The argument from morality to equality also non-question-beggingly starts with assumptions that are acceptable from a libertarian perspective, the view that appears to endorse the least enforcement of morality, and then shows that this perspective requires a right to welfare, and that further, when this right is extended to distant peoples and future generations, it leads to substantial equality. The strategy is to find conflicts of (negative) liberty within a libertarian perspective, and then argue that when these conflicts are appropriately resolved, they favor an allocation of liberty that supports a right to welfare that, in turn, when fully implemented, leads to substantial equality. The book also defends thus two-part argument against recent critics and further show how the argument is preferable to alternative attempts to justify morality as well as alternative attempts to show that morality leads to a right to welfare and/or to equality.
Robin West
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294962
- eISBN:
- 9780191598708
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294964.003.0021
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This argument for gay marriage based on its seamless sameness with straight marriage and the “equality” and equal treatment that sameness demands, deprives us of the opportunity to not only argue for ...
More
This argument for gay marriage based on its seamless sameness with straight marriage and the “equality” and equal treatment that sameness demands, deprives us of the opportunity to not only argue for gay marriage “on the moral merits,” so to speak, but to make such an argument which stresses, rather than pointedly denies, the morally salutary differences between what gay marriage might be and what straight marriage here and now is. We might want to consider the possibility that the nonreproductive sex act, tamed, disciplined, and sanctified by a legal, religious, and socially recognized same-sex marriage, between two individuals committed to the care of each other and no less committed than their heterosexual counterparts to the possibility of raising children, presents a physical model of caring for the other that, precisely because it does not embed the giving of physical care in genetic replication, is less constrained by egoism. Sandel is right that liberalism misses the moral point of family life, but Mary Shanley is right that Sandel should be faulted for not seeing that communitarianism (his proffered alternative) misses the profound damage that a particular community can wreak on the lives of its members. Will Kymlicka asks whether liberalism can be charged with any aspect of our apparent inability to transcend the paralyzing grip of the mythology of social Darwinism; it can: the logic of liberalism–even in its left wing variant–drives us away from a direct and meaningful attack on the moral merits, so to speak, of this myth as myth. To dislodge the myth of the “self-made man,” we have to not only expose it as myth, but we also have to challenge it in kind; we have to replace it with a better one.Less
This argument for gay marriage based on its seamless sameness with straight marriage and the “equality” and equal treatment that sameness demands, deprives us of the opportunity to not only argue for gay marriage “on the moral merits,” so to speak, but to make such an argument which stresses, rather than pointedly denies, the morally salutary differences between what gay marriage might be and what straight marriage here and now is. We might want to consider the possibility that the nonreproductive sex act, tamed, disciplined, and sanctified by a legal, religious, and socially recognized same-sex marriage, between two individuals committed to the care of each other and no less committed than their heterosexual counterparts to the possibility of raising children, presents a physical model of caring for the other that, precisely because it does not embed the giving of physical care in genetic replication, is less constrained by egoism. Sandel is right that liberalism misses the moral point of family life, but Mary Shanley is right that Sandel should be faulted for not seeing that communitarianism (his proffered alternative) misses the profound damage that a particular community can wreak on the lives of its members. Will Kymlicka asks whether liberalism can be charged with any aspect of our apparent inability to transcend the paralyzing grip of the mythology of social Darwinism; it can: the logic of liberalism–even in its left wing variant–drives us away from a direct and meaningful attack on the moral merits, so to speak, of this myth as myth. To dislodge the myth of the “self-made man,” we have to not only expose it as myth, but we also have to challenge it in kind; we have to replace it with a better one.
Julia Annas
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195096521
- eISBN:
- 9780199833061
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195096525.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Because of their eudaimonistic structure, ancient theories have been criticized as egoistic, but this is a mistake, overlooking the place in them of philia or ‘friendship’, covering particular ...
More
Because of their eudaimonistic structure, ancient theories have been criticized as egoistic, but this is a mistake, overlooking the place in them of philia or ‘friendship’, covering particular relationships, and of justice; both require other‐concern, the question for ancient ethics being how far this should extend.Less
Because of their eudaimonistic structure, ancient theories have been criticized as egoistic, but this is a mistake, overlooking the place in them of philia or ‘friendship’, covering particular relationships, and of justice; both require other‐concern, the question for ancient ethics being how far this should extend.
Henry Sidgwick
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250234
- eISBN:
- 9780191598432
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250231.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
In his reply to Barratt's criticisms of his Methods of Ethics, Sidgwick states that Barratt misapprehends his position by overlooking the fact that he reviews various methods of ethics from a neutral ...
More
In his reply to Barratt's criticisms of his Methods of Ethics, Sidgwick states that Barratt misapprehends his position by overlooking the fact that he reviews various methods of ethics from a neutral and impartial standpoint. Following Butler, Sidgwick holds that reasonable self‐love and conscience are the two primary principles in human life. He differs from Butler on which precepts of conscience are reasonable, and maintains that the central formula of conscience holds that one ought not to prefer one's own good to the greater good of another. To Barratt's challenge that this confutes the principle of Rational Egoism, Sidgwick replies that the principle is contradicted, not confuted.Less
In his reply to Barratt's criticisms of his Methods of Ethics, Sidgwick states that Barratt misapprehends his position by overlooking the fact that he reviews various methods of ethics from a neutral and impartial standpoint. Following Butler, Sidgwick holds that reasonable self‐love and conscience are the two primary principles in human life. He differs from Butler on which precepts of conscience are reasonable, and maintains that the central formula of conscience holds that one ought not to prefer one's own good to the greater good of another. To Barratt's challenge that this confutes the principle of Rational Egoism, Sidgwick replies that the principle is contradicted, not confuted.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195158427
- eISBN:
- 9780199871407
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195158427.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter considers whether practical reason is substantive or only instrumental. It examines egoism, in a normative form, as well as hedonism, for which pleasure and pain are the fundamental ...
More
This chapter considers whether practical reason is substantive or only instrumental. It examines egoism, in a normative form, as well as hedonism, for which pleasure and pain are the fundamental sources of practical reasons. The chapter also considers what metaphysical commitments a theory of practical rationality must make if it embraces some apparently irreducible normative notion, such as that of intrinsic value.Less
This chapter considers whether practical reason is substantive or only instrumental. It examines egoism, in a normative form, as well as hedonism, for which pleasure and pain are the fundamental sources of practical reasons. The chapter also considers what metaphysical commitments a theory of practical rationality must make if it embraces some apparently irreducible normative notion, such as that of intrinsic value.
Connie S. Rosati
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199269914
- eISBN:
- 9780191710032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter challenges one aspect of Moore's view. In his critical remarks about egoism as a theory of motivation, Moore argued that the notion of ‘good-for’, which figures in claims about this or ...
More
This chapter challenges one aspect of Moore's view. In his critical remarks about egoism as a theory of motivation, Moore argued that the notion of ‘good-for’, which figures in claims about this or that activity or pursuit being (non-morally, intrinsically) good for an individual, is incoherent. The chapter argues that Moore is mistaken and defends an account of the good-for relation modeled on the interpersonal relation of successful loving. Success in an interpersonal loving relationship is characterized by the same general sorts of features as the relation involved in something's being good for an individual; part of her personal good. The property good-for is a second-order relational property that is realized in a person's life when she stands in the right sort of relation to some pursuit or activity. The chapter defends this view in two ways. First, it appeals to certain dualities of human nature and experience. On the one hand, we are biological creatures who can discover what is good for us, as when one discovers that she has a natural talent for music and proceeds to develop her musical talent, so that playing music becomes part of her personal good. But on the other hand, we are autonomous agents for whom our personal good is partly a matter of our own making; something invented rather than simply discovered. In order for playing music to be part of her personal good, the would-be musician must cultivate her talent. In this way she makes playing music part of her personal good. The account of personal good nicely accommodates such dualities in that the various relations involved in something's being good for oneself depend partly on facts about oneself that are beyond one's control, but also partly on what one does. The second way the chapter defends its view is by responding to certain possible Moorean objections.Less
This chapter challenges one aspect of Moore's view. In his critical remarks about egoism as a theory of motivation, Moore argued that the notion of ‘good-for’, which figures in claims about this or that activity or pursuit being (non-morally, intrinsically) good for an individual, is incoherent. The chapter argues that Moore is mistaken and defends an account of the good-for relation modeled on the interpersonal relation of successful loving. Success in an interpersonal loving relationship is characterized by the same general sorts of features as the relation involved in something's being good for an individual; part of her personal good. The property good-for is a second-order relational property that is realized in a person's life when she stands in the right sort of relation to some pursuit or activity. The chapter defends this view in two ways. First, it appeals to certain dualities of human nature and experience. On the one hand, we are biological creatures who can discover what is good for us, as when one discovers that she has a natural talent for music and proceeds to develop her musical talent, so that playing music becomes part of her personal good. But on the other hand, we are autonomous agents for whom our personal good is partly a matter of our own making; something invented rather than simply discovered. In order for playing music to be part of her personal good, the would-be musician must cultivate her talent. In this way she makes playing music part of her personal good. The account of personal good nicely accommodates such dualities in that the various relations involved in something's being good for oneself depend partly on facts about oneself that are beyond one's control, but also partly on what one does. The second way the chapter defends its view is by responding to certain possible Moorean objections.
Peter Brooks
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691151588
- eISBN:
- 9781400839698
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691151588.003.0003
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
This chapter looks into instances of individual self-obsession and what these have to say not only about persons but also the society or culture in which they must survive. As representatives of the ...
More
This chapter looks into instances of individual self-obsession and what these have to say not only about persons but also the society or culture in which they must survive. As representatives of the need to write the story of the self in order to understand its identity, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Stendhal (Henri Beyle) both show to a high degree the work of the shaper on the shaped: the presence of the retrospective narrator and creator of the tale of the self. If the self would tell its story to and for itself, that story will end up being as much about the narrator as the narrated, as much about the creator as the created. This instance of egotism, this self-reflexiveness and self dramatization of the speaker, may have to do with the newness, the lack of precedent of their enterprise.Less
This chapter looks into instances of individual self-obsession and what these have to say not only about persons but also the society or culture in which they must survive. As representatives of the need to write the story of the self in order to understand its identity, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Stendhal (Henri Beyle) both show to a high degree the work of the shaper on the shaped: the presence of the retrospective narrator and creator of the tale of the self. If the self would tell its story to and for itself, that story will end up being as much about the narrator as the narrated, as much about the creator as the created. This instance of egotism, this self-reflexiveness and self dramatization of the speaker, may have to do with the newness, the lack of precedent of their enterprise.
Mark R. Leary
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195172423
- eISBN:
- 9780199786756
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195172423.003.0003
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
People process information about themselves, other people, and the world through the filter of their own self-images and egoistic desires. Their experience of the events that unfold around them is ...
More
People process information about themselves, other people, and the world through the filter of their own self-images and egoistic desires. Their experience of the events that unfold around them is accompanied by an ongoing internal commentary that modifies the nature of the experience itself. Furthermore, what they say to themselves is often biased as people engage in self-deluded wishful thinking and judge events through the narrow window of their own self-interest. The self appears to be inherently egocentric and egotistical, and these tendencies create a number of problems. This chapter deals with the ways in which self-reflection interferes with people's perceptions of reality, and with the personal and interpersonal costs of these egotistic distortions, including self-serving illusions, the better-than-average effect, self-serving attributions, the bias blind spot, and other consequences of self-enhancement. The chapter concludes with tactics for fostering the recognition that one's perceptions are likely to be distorted in self-serving ways.Less
People process information about themselves, other people, and the world through the filter of their own self-images and egoistic desires. Their experience of the events that unfold around them is accompanied by an ongoing internal commentary that modifies the nature of the experience itself. Furthermore, what they say to themselves is often biased as people engage in self-deluded wishful thinking and judge events through the narrow window of their own self-interest. The self appears to be inherently egocentric and egotistical, and these tendencies create a number of problems. This chapter deals with the ways in which self-reflection interferes with people's perceptions of reality, and with the personal and interpersonal costs of these egotistic distortions, including self-serving illusions, the better-than-average effect, self-serving attributions, the bias blind spot, and other consequences of self-enhancement. The chapter concludes with tactics for fostering the recognition that one's perceptions are likely to be distorted in self-serving ways.
Mark R. Leary
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195172423
- eISBN:
- 9780199786756
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195172423.003.0005
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
A great deal of unhappiness in friendships, romances, family relationships, and social life can be traced to how people construe themselves in their own minds. Once people form a social identity, ...
More
A great deal of unhappiness in friendships, romances, family relationships, and social life can be traced to how people construe themselves in their own minds. Once people form a social identity, they may relate to others in terms of that identity. After seeing themselves as members of a particular group, they automatically begin to perceive members of their own group differently than members of other groups, and these perceptions fuel hostility, prejudice, and aggression. Many social conflicts — whether among individuals, social groups, or nations — arise from the symbolic meaning of events for people's sense of self rather than from actual threats to people's well-being. In addition, people often fight with one another when others cast aspersions on their egos, never quite realizing that these interpersonal conflicts are about ego-threats rather than practical matters of any real significance. When people include others in their sense of self, they tend to be more accepting, trusting, and empathic.Less
A great deal of unhappiness in friendships, romances, family relationships, and social life can be traced to how people construe themselves in their own minds. Once people form a social identity, they may relate to others in terms of that identity. After seeing themselves as members of a particular group, they automatically begin to perceive members of their own group differently than members of other groups, and these perceptions fuel hostility, prejudice, and aggression. Many social conflicts — whether among individuals, social groups, or nations — arise from the symbolic meaning of events for people's sense of self rather than from actual threats to people's well-being. In addition, people often fight with one another when others cast aspersions on their egos, never quite realizing that these interpersonal conflicts are about ego-threats rather than practical matters of any real significance. When people include others in their sense of self, they tend to be more accepting, trusting, and empathic.
Mark R. Leary
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195172423
- eISBN:
- 9780199786756
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195172423.003.0009
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
Having examined the many ways in which the ability to self-reflect can work against people's happiness and best interests, the book concludes with a discussion of ways in which readers can protect ...
More
Having examined the many ways in which the ability to self-reflect can work against people's happiness and best interests, the book concludes with a discussion of ways in which readers can protect themselves against the curse of the self. Remembering the source of the problem — that we are living in the 21st century with a brain (and a capacity for self-awareness) designed for nomadic hunter-gatherers who lived 60,000 years ago — the chapter discusses ways of avoiding the dark side of the self. Because many of the problems discussed in the book arise from the self's incessant inner chatter, people can learn ways to quiet the self (through meditation, for example), and thus lower its intrusion in their lives. Furthermore, armed with the insights of the previous chapters, they can use the self's own ability to override its natural inclinations toward egocentrism, selfishness, egotism, and egodefensiveness. Perhaps most importantly, people can move beyond their narrow, egoistic views to a mode of self-operation that enhances rather than compromises their personal well-being as well as the well-being of other people and the world at large.Less
Having examined the many ways in which the ability to self-reflect can work against people's happiness and best interests, the book concludes with a discussion of ways in which readers can protect themselves against the curse of the self. Remembering the source of the problem — that we are living in the 21st century with a brain (and a capacity for self-awareness) designed for nomadic hunter-gatherers who lived 60,000 years ago — the chapter discusses ways of avoiding the dark side of the self. Because many of the problems discussed in the book arise from the self's incessant inner chatter, people can learn ways to quiet the self (through meditation, for example), and thus lower its intrusion in their lives. Furthermore, armed with the insights of the previous chapters, they can use the self's own ability to override its natural inclinations toward egocentrism, selfishness, egotism, and egodefensiveness. Perhaps most importantly, people can move beyond their narrow, egoistic views to a mode of self-operation that enhances rather than compromises their personal well-being as well as the well-being of other people and the world at large.
Max Saunders
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199579761
- eISBN:
- 9780191722882
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579761.003.0009
- Subject:
- Literature, 19th-century Literature and Romanticism, 20th-century Literature and Modernism
This chapter discusses the taxonomy of imaginary literary works (supplementing the taxonomy of fictionalized life‐writings proposed in Chapter 5), and their scarcity during the nineteenth century. It ...
More
This chapter discusses the taxonomy of imaginary literary works (supplementing the taxonomy of fictionalized life‐writings proposed in Chapter 5), and their scarcity during the nineteenth century. It concludes the discussion of Joyce, and ends with an account of Stein's Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas as an indisputable example of a fictionally authored auto/biography.Less
This chapter discusses the taxonomy of imaginary literary works (supplementing the taxonomy of fictionalized life‐writings proposed in Chapter 5), and their scarcity during the nineteenth century. It concludes the discussion of Joyce, and ends with an account of Stein's Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas as an indisputable example of a fictionally authored auto/biography.
Karen C. Lang
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195151138
- eISBN:
- 9780199870448
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195151135.003.0009
- Subject:
- Religion, Buddhism
Repudiates the mistaken apprehension of impermanent phenomena as being a permanent self and criticizes the selfish and egotistic behavior exemplified by a king and undermines the king's false pride ...
More
Repudiates the mistaken apprehension of impermanent phenomena as being a permanent self and criticizes the selfish and egotistic behavior exemplified by a king and undermines the king's false pride in royal role and his royal lineage. Candrakiriti, in a lengthy criticism of the artificially created distinctions of the caste system, quotes the Buddhist myth of the origins of the royalclass, which explains class distinctions as job descriptions. He urges the king to repudiate harsh punishments and the exercise of war and engage instead, in meritorious actions by sharing his wealth generously and by treating all people with compassion.Less
Repudiates the mistaken apprehension of impermanent phenomena as being a permanent self and criticizes the selfish and egotistic behavior exemplified by a king and undermines the king's false pride in royal role and his royal lineage. Candrakiriti, in a lengthy criticism of the artificially created distinctions of the caste system, quotes the Buddhist myth of the origins of the royalclass, which explains class distinctions as job descriptions. He urges the king to repudiate harsh punishments and the exercise of war and engage instead, in meritorious actions by sharing his wealth generously and by treating all people with compassion.
Christine M. Korsgaard
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199552733
- eISBN:
- 9780191720321
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552733.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Many philosophers believe there is a principle of practical reason directing the individual to maximize the satisfaction of his own interests. This belief is supposedly compatible with the views that ...
More
Many philosophers believe there is a principle of practical reason directing the individual to maximize the satisfaction of his own interests. This belief is supposedly compatible with the views that all practical reasons are instrumental and all motivation is grounded in desire. Against these claims, this chapter argues that the only possible normative foundation for the egoistic principle (or principle of prudence) would be a rational intuition that maximum satisfaction is the Good; that motivation to conform to the egoistic principle would have to rest in pure practical reason; and that the only coherent formulation of the egoistic principle depends on controversial psychological assumptions characteristic of 18th-century British empiricism.Less
Many philosophers believe there is a principle of practical reason directing the individual to maximize the satisfaction of his own interests. This belief is supposedly compatible with the views that all practical reasons are instrumental and all motivation is grounded in desire. Against these claims, this chapter argues that the only possible normative foundation for the egoistic principle (or principle of prudence) would be a rational intuition that maximum satisfaction is the Good; that motivation to conform to the egoistic principle would have to rest in pure practical reason; and that the only coherent formulation of the egoistic principle depends on controversial psychological assumptions characteristic of 18th-century British empiricism.
