John Campbell
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199248964
- eISBN:
- 9780191719387
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199248964.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
This chapter addresses some of the central issues raised by Evans's paper ‘Molyneux's question’, exploring how Evans's approach to Molyneux's question is informed by his account of the content of ...
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This chapter addresses some of the central issues raised by Evans's paper ‘Molyneux's question’, exploring how Evans's approach to Molyneux's question is informed by his account of the content of conscious perceptual experience, as developed in The Varieties of Reference. It takes issue with Evans's account of the content of perceptual experience, and in particular with what he sees as its conflation of subpersonal information processing content and personal-level experiential content.Less
This chapter addresses some of the central issues raised by Evans's paper ‘Molyneux's question’, exploring how Evans's approach to Molyneux's question is informed by his account of the content of conscious perceptual experience, as developed in The Varieties of Reference. It takes issue with Evans's account of the content of perceptual experience, and in particular with what he sees as its conflation of subpersonal information processing content and personal-level experiential content.
Adrian Alsmith
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- May 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198851738
- eISBN:
- 9780191886461
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198851738.003.0013
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter offers an indirect defence of the Evansian conception of egocentric space by showing how it resolves a puzzle concerning the unity of egocentric spatial perception. The chapter outlines ...
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This chapter offers an indirect defence of the Evansian conception of egocentric space by showing how it resolves a puzzle concerning the unity of egocentric spatial perception. The chapter outlines several common assumptions about egocentric perspectival structure and argues that a subject’s experience, both within and across her sensory modalities, may involve multiple structures of this kind. This raises the question of how perspectival unity is achieved, such that these perspectival structures form a complex whole, rather than merely a disunified set of individually, distinctively structured experiences. The shortcomings of a variety of accounts are considered: switch accounts; sensory accounts; transformation accounts; and ultimate accounts. These shortcomings are addressed by a further kind of account provided by the Evansian conception—an agentive account—according to which egocentrically structured experiences present the world in relation to parts of a single thing, the body as a dynamic unity.Less
This chapter offers an indirect defence of the Evansian conception of egocentric space by showing how it resolves a puzzle concerning the unity of egocentric spatial perception. The chapter outlines several common assumptions about egocentric perspectival structure and argues that a subject’s experience, both within and across her sensory modalities, may involve multiple structures of this kind. This raises the question of how perspectival unity is achieved, such that these perspectival structures form a complex whole, rather than merely a disunified set of individually, distinctively structured experiences. The shortcomings of a variety of accounts are considered: switch accounts; sensory accounts; transformation accounts; and ultimate accounts. These shortcomings are addressed by a further kind of account provided by the Evansian conception—an agentive account—according to which egocentrically structured experiences present the world in relation to parts of a single thing, the body as a dynamic unity.
Tim Bayne
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199215386
- eISBN:
- 9780191594786
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215386.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General
This chapter examines whether the unity of consciousness is grounded in bodily self‐consciousness. The focal point of discussion is the embodiment constraint, which claims that the unity of ...
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This chapter examines whether the unity of consciousness is grounded in bodily self‐consciousness. The focal point of discussion is the embodiment constraint, which claims that the unity of consciousness cannot co‐exist with a break down in the unity of bodily self‐consciousness. Three challenges to the embodiment constraint are examined. The first challenge turns on the question of whether bodily sensations and perceptual experiences can be located within a single frame of reference. The second challenge focuses on a pair of pathologies of bodily experience—depersonalization and Cotard's delusion—in which patients appear to lose the normal integrity of bodily self-consciousness but retain a unified consciousness. A third challenge to the embodiment constraint derives from the possibility of multiple embodiment. It is argued that although the embodiment constraint can meet the first two challenges it succumbs to the third.Less
This chapter examines whether the unity of consciousness is grounded in bodily self‐consciousness. The focal point of discussion is the embodiment constraint, which claims that the unity of consciousness cannot co‐exist with a break down in the unity of bodily self‐consciousness. Three challenges to the embodiment constraint are examined. The first challenge turns on the question of whether bodily sensations and perceptual experiences can be located within a single frame of reference. The second challenge focuses on a pair of pathologies of bodily experience—depersonalization and Cotard's delusion—in which patients appear to lose the normal integrity of bodily self-consciousness but retain a unified consciousness. A third challenge to the embodiment constraint derives from the possibility of multiple embodiment. It is argued that although the embodiment constraint can meet the first two challenges it succumbs to the third.
Monika Harvey
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198524113
- eISBN:
- 9780191689116
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524113.003.0012
- Subject:
- Psychology, Neuropsychology
Among the behavioural disorders found in patients with hemispheric dysfunction, unilateral visual neglect is one of the most striking. The symptoms, although many and various, always include a ...
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Among the behavioural disorders found in patients with hemispheric dysfunction, unilateral visual neglect is one of the most striking. The symptoms, although many and various, always include a tendency to ignore objects and parts of objects on the left (i.e. contralesional) side of the patient's egocentric space. In its most extreme forms, a patient may deny that the involved limbs are his own and object to their presence in his hospital bed. Other patients may fail to shave or dress the neglected side.Less
Among the behavioural disorders found in patients with hemispheric dysfunction, unilateral visual neglect is one of the most striking. The symptoms, although many and various, always include a tendency to ignore objects and parts of objects on the left (i.e. contralesional) side of the patient's egocentric space. In its most extreme forms, a patient may deny that the involved limbs are his own and object to their presence in his hospital bed. Other patients may fail to shave or dress the neglected side.
